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303 records · Page 17

Decommissioning and Demolition of a Redundant UK Research Facility at AWE Aldermaston - 12453

The redundant two-storey brick built research facility on the AWE Site at Aldermaston, UK is in the closing stages of decommissioning and demolition. The facility was used for a variety of purposes up to 1995 predominately involving the use of alpha-emitting isotopes. The two main areas of alpha-based contamination have been decommissioned with the removal of hot -boxes and fume cupboards on the ground floor and HEPA filter units and ventilation equipment on the first floor. Many of these activities were undertaken using both airline fed suits, (supplied via a free standing mobile unit), and full face respirators. Asbestos materials were located and cleared from the first floor by specialist contractor. All sections of active drain running from the building to the site active effluent disposal system were removed early in the program using established techniques with specialist monitoring equipment used to provide confidence in the data required for disposal of the decommissioning debris. In particular a dedicated High Resolution Gamma Spectrometer (radioactive materials scanning unit) was utilized to categorise waste drums and wrapped packages. The building has been decommissioned and the monitoring and sampling of the structure was completed in November 2011 - the results demonstrating that the building was clear of contamination in accordance with UK clearance and exemption requirements. The demolition plan was developed and implemented in December with site excavation of foundations and site clearance currently ongoing in preparation for final site backfill activities and project close. A number of useful lessons have been learnt during the operations and are set out at the rear of the main text. (authors)

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Update on Demolition Strategy and Progress at Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant - 17161

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M) is currently demolishing the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The facility is located on the Hanford Site and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1988, the facility was formally shut-down in 1996 and material processing completed in 2004. In November 2016, the project team, partnering with DOE-Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) began demolition of the building. CH2M and DOE-RL will demolish PFP as a Hazardous Category II nuclear facility (HazCat II). The PFP is considered one of the most hazardous buildings on the Hanford site; employees have performed some of the most hazardous work anywhere across the DOE Environmental Management complex. Since 2008, employees have removed much of the plutonium-processing infrastructure. Four main buildings make up the majority of the PFP complex. As of November 2016, one building is undergoing demolition, another is ready for demolition and, concurrently, demolition preparations continue in the remaining two buildings. That hazard mitigation work includes removing contaminated ventilation duct work, process lines and performing asbestos abatement. To ensure safe and compliant demolition, CH2M employees researched, trained and deployed personal protective equipment never before used on the Hanford Site to complete some of the most hazardous demolition preparations. Project management commissioned the development of an air dispersion model that dictated ready-for-demolition criteria and established conservative demolition parameters. Management also sequenced project work to allow demolition to occur while demolition preparations continue a safe distance away in adjacent buildings. This paper will allow CH2M and DOE-RL to share lessons learned and progress to date with other complex and hazardous projects across the DOE complex. (authors)

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Preliminary Study on Recycling and Reuse of Metals from Decommissioning in Construction of Disposal Vaults in Slovakia - 17217

The decommissioning of nuclear installations represents a complex process resulting in the generation of large amounts of various waste materials. Majority of them are non-contaminated, however some of them may be hazardous as well (e.g. chemicals, asbestos, oil products, etc.). During decommissioning of NPP, significant quantities of materials with various levels of radionuclides concentration arise as well. All of these materials should be managed appropriately keeping in mind safety principles, legislative requirements, lessons learned and other relevant factors. Therefore, selection of an appropriate strategy for management of the materials arising from decommissioning is crucial and strongly influences the overall effectiveness of decommissioning process. In line with international incentives for optimization of radioactive material management, concepts of recycling and reuse of slightly radioactive materials are widely discussed and applications of these concepts are analyzed. Therefore, the paper is devoted to the preliminary study of potential for recycling of re-melted metals from decommissioning in form of reinforcement bars or mesh used in the construction of ferro-concrete disposal vaults within the near surface repository. The paper presents the preliminary results and discusses the technical and non-technical aspects related to the recycling scenario. Moreover, comparison of various scenarios related to the scrap metal clearance and recycling within nuclear industry is included. Key findings and lessons learned from study may be useful for the international community dealing with waste management optimization and in particular with recycling of materials within nuclear industry. (authors)

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Uranium and Beryllium Decontamination and Decommissioning in a Developed Neighborhood - 17494

In September 2008, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Region 1, issued an Administrative Order by Consent (AOC) that required the completion of a Non-Time-Critical Removal Action for the Nuclear Metals, Inc. Site (Site), which is located in Concord, Massachusetts. The AOC required decontamination and demolition of the site buildings and structures. The Site was originally used for radiological research and production, and included foundry equipment for melting metals, extrusion presses and metal working equipment, pickling and etching tanks, and electroplating equipment. In the 1970's, Nuclear Metals, Inc. developed a large scale depleted uranium manufacturing, operation, which included the manufacturing of penetrators, or bullets, from depleted uranium (DU) as a defense contractor for the U.S. Army. Later operations included production of beryllium alloy materials. The Site included a two-story, five-section interconnected building, a tank house, a hydrogen peroxide tank house, two gas cylinder storage huts, and four 'Butler' metal storage buildings, which had a combined footprint of approximately 17,000 square meters (185,000 square feet). The buildings were principally contaminated with DU and beryllium dust, along with asbestos, PCBs, lead and other constituents. The required removal action at the Site consisted of building stabilization activities to remove flammable materials, install temporary utilities and control dust to create a safe work environment within the buildings for site workers; removal of hazardous materials; demolition of all structures and equipment; and off-site disposal of waste materials. The Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D) activities and highlights of some of the public involvement work required to complete building D and D work in a residential community are discussed. (authors)

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Remote Dismantling and Packaging of the RPV and Thermal Shield at the Obrigheim NPP - 16073

The Obrigheim Nuclear Power Plant (KWO) is located in the Federal State of Baden- Wuerttemberg in Germany and was operated by the EnKK-KWO. The Nuclear Power Plant - a light water pressurized water reactor with 357 MW of electrical power - was operated from 1968 to 2005. In June 2009 the Energiewerke Nord GmbH (EWN) was charged with the dismantling planning and dismantling of the reactor. According to the German nuclear and radiation protection law, several licenses will be required for the realisation of this task. This also applies to the disposal of the waste produced by dismantling, which must finally be stored in the German final repository for low and medium-radioactive waste (underground repository 'Konrad'). In spring 2010 EWN completed all application documents for the dismantling of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the RPV internals and EnKK-KWO delivered them to the responsible Environmental Ministry of Baden-Wuerttemberg. Since then it has been worked intensively on the design, construction and manufacturing of the facilities for dismantling. With a separate notification of amendment, it was applied for the license to install and commission the facilities for the dismantling of the RPV and the RPV internals at the Environmental Ministry of Baden-Wuerttemberg in October 2010. This notification of amendment was confirmed in summer 2012. In September 2011 the work process and test plan and the technical information about the campaign for the removal of the radioactive waste resulting from the RPV with internals, peripheral components and secondary waste with the aim of final disposal in the Federal Repository 'Konrad' was submitted to the Federal Office for Radiation Protection. The evaluation and assessment of the work process and test plan was concluded in August 2013, when it was audited by TUV Nord EnSys without any further measures and indications. On September 10 the work process and test plan was released by the Federal Office for radiation protection. The dismantling of the RPV internals upper core and lower core structure started in September 2013 in the wet cutting area in room 01.106/306 and were finished in October 2014. In the presentation 'Dismantling of the Obrigheim NPP Reactor and Waste Management' held on the WM Symposia in Phoenix, 2014, an overview about the remote cutting and packaging of the upper and lower core structure was given. In today's presentation the subsequent dismantling activities will be outlined and evaluated. The presentation will start with the short description of the basic frame conditions for the nuclear licensing procedure, important procedural principles, and necessary plant-specific conditions. After the remote cutting and packing of the reactor internals of the upper and lower core structure was completed, the wet cutting area 'reactor room 01.106/306' was cleaned and the reactor room rebuilt into a cutting area for peripheral components. After the peripheral components were dismantled, all preconditions were set to lift the RPV from its mounting position and to arrange it in the upper reactor room 01.306. After these activities were completed, the lifting of the RPV was prepared and the cutting area 'Dismantling of the RPV insulation in the reactor room 01.106/306' was set up. To carry out this task, a strand jack unit with connection block was installed on the bridge of the reactor building crane. The opening created by the dismantling of the pool plate was closed with a flap door. The manipulators used for the wet cutting of the RPV internals were also used for the remote dismantling of the RPV insulation and mounted in the cutting area. The remote facilities were handled from a control centre and/or control stand. The air-technical housing which has already been used for the remote dismantling of the RPV internals was designed for the dismantling of the RPV insulation and was extended for this dismantling scope with appropriate ventilation systems. A special feature is the fixation of the RPV insulation at the RPV corpus. The RPV insulation consists of insulation wool, wire mesh and metal-sheet insulation. This 'Sandwich Construction' is detached with a steel corset at the RPV corpus and partly tightened. The insulation of the RPV bottom dome is tightened at the supporting frame. Due to the activation of the material in the core area and the resulting high ambient dose rate the RPV insulation can only be dismantled remotely. Additionally, as asbestos fibers are expected to be found in the insulation the dismantling has to be performed according to the Technical Rules for hazardous substances. The demolition, restoration or maintenance works have to be performed remotely according to the Technical Rules for hazardous substances when the RPV is located in the cutting area. But in case of dismantling of a power reactor no such experience can be found. Beginning with the explanation of the technical, radiological and substantial boundary conditions this presentation will not only impart knowledge about the dismantling of the RPV insulation but also about the remote controlled packaging of the metal sheet insulation and the manual conditioning of the RPV insulation. Subsequently, reports on the remotely controlled cutting and packaging of the RDB are given. Here is particularly interesting that cutting methods have been used and how the activity determination of the segments was carried out. On the basis of the evaluation of the realisation the subsequent dismantling activities will be lined out. In parallel to the dismantling tasks, the waste package documentation for the final repository was issued, checked and confirmed for the containers loaded with parts of the RDB internals. The most important stages are exemplified in this presentation. (authors)

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Status Update - Installation and Operation of GeoMelt{sup R} ICV{sup TM} Process in the NNL's Central Laboratory on the Sellafield Site - 16410

Thermal treatment of nuclear waste in the UK has seen much renewed interest recently, owing to the advantages that can be gained in terms of reduced waste volumes, compatibility with reactive metals and organics and its ability to treat mixed generic wastes. Vitrification is a treatment option which destroys organics and some hazardous inorganics such as asbestos, reduces wasteform volume, and produces a robust leach resistant wasteform. Kurion's GeoMelt{sup R} In-Container Vitrification (ICV){sup TM} is a vitrification process where the treatment vessel can serve as an interim-storage, transport, and final long-term storage vessel - thus negating the need to pour glass into a separate container, effectively leading to a much simpler system than traditional waste melters. The UK's National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) and Kurion have entered into a joint project to deploy an active waste ICV{sup TM} plant based on Kurion's GeoMelt{sup R} technology, at NNL's flagship Central Laboratory on the Sellafield site. NNL is the UK's national laboratory for civil nuclear science and technology, providing advice to government, protecting key skills, supporting industry and delivering national nuclear programs. NNL is bringing the Kurion GeoMelt{sup R} process alongside its existing capabilities in thermal waste treatment. Kurion provides technology solutions to minimize and stabilize nuclear and hazardous waste through its families of technologies: access, separation and stabilization processes. The GeoMelt{sup R} plant being installed at the NNL's Central Laboratory creates a platform to evaluate the vitrification technology for the variety of wastes from the NDA estate and creates a treatment path for problematic waste streams that currently have no disposition pathway. With the diverse facilities under NNL management coupled with the NNL's ability to import wastes from within the UK and Europe, this arrangement with Kurion provides waste owners with treatment disposition pathways for problematic wastes. The Kurion / NNL team completed non-radioactive commissioning of a GeoMelt{sup R} ICV{sup TM} treatment system in 2015. Commissioning consisted of performing two tests at NNL's Workington Laboratory. Commissioning Test 1 involved vitrification of 367 kg of glass frit over the course of approximately 18 hours. Commissioning Test 2 consisted of processing 470 kg of soil and additives in approximately 27 hours. The soil processed in the second test was non-radioactive soil from Sellafield and was used as an analog for radioactive soil to be processed during radioactive commissioning at the Central Laboratory at Sellafield. All commissioning test goals were easily achieved and all subsystems operated as designed. Radioactive commissioning will be carried out in early 2016. (authors)

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Development and Delivery of National Strategic Approaches to Radioactive Waste Management in the UK - 16595

The UK has limited capacity for the management of radioactive wastes. Such capacity is needed to enable nuclear and non-nuclear sectors to continue to make responsible use of radioactive substances (e.g. for health care provision) as well as to deliver key objectives such as the decommissioning and clean-up of the civil nuclear legacy. A revision in UK LLW policy in 2007 led to the development of a range of national LLW strategies, each focusing on a particular radioactive waste sector. For various reasons each of the strategies was developed in a different way. The success of these strategies to-date includes the development of a range of new routes for LLW management, greater transparency and understanding of the challenges facing LLW management across the UK, and recognition of priorities for national work, e.g., to address issues such as the management of radioactive asbestos waste and the treatment of metallic radioactive wastes. The work also revealed common issues across each of the waste producing sectors, and the opportunity to improve future waste management through further integration. (authors)

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Information needs, approaches, and case studies in human health risk communication

This article uses ten case studies to illustrate the information needs, various communication approaches, and the communicator's role in explaining environmental health risks from a variety of hazards, to a variety of audiences, over time frames from days to years, using in person consultation, lectures, zooms, and email formats. Events often had a long history before the communication began and may have had a long tail afterward. Audiences may be public officials, companies, workers, communities, or individuals. Each individual may have their own understanding or mental model regarding the hazard, exposure, and risk. The communicator's role or intention may be to reassure an audience that has unrealistic exaggerated concerns or fears or to protect a client if the fears are realistic. Or it may be altruistic to inform a complacent audience to take the risks it faces more seriously. Although risk assessment research has advanced the techniques for communicating abstruse probabilities to audiences with low numeracy, in my experience, audiences are unimpressed by precise–sounding probability numbers, and are more interested in whether exposure is occurring or may occur and how to stop it. Often audiences have reason to be outraged and may be more concerned about punishing wrong doers than about the hazard itself, particularly when the exposure is past and cannot be undone. Thus, there is a difference between discussing the riskiness of a situation (risk communication) and what you are going to do about the situation (risk management). Risk communication is successful when the audience responds as intended, calming down or taking action. These case studies are drawn from a large number of risk communication experiences that I and my Rutgers colleagues have engaged in over the past four decades. Through the 20th century, New Jersey was the most densely industrialized State in United States. New Jersey experienced growth of the chemical and petrochemical industries and the unfortunately profligate disposal of toxic wastes. Having the most Superfund sites of any state is a dubious distinction, but New Jersey also has the most experience in evaluating and responding to these hazards.

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