Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Control Systems Cyber Security”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 307 records · Page 17

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) – Engineered Controls Database and Use

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber-attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This database is meant to establish clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design. The goal is to ensure that resilience is engineered into systems from the outset. Unlike cybersecurity protections that defend the digital layer, engineered controls act directly at the physical and algorithmic levels to guarantee that unacceptable consequences are prevented or limited. CIE keeps the consequences of a cyber attack from impacting the safety, reliability, and performance of engineered systems.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

Project Boeing SGS (Final Report)

Boeing and its partner, PJM Interconnection, teamed to bring advanced “defense-grade” technologies for cyber security to the US regional power grid through demonstration in PJM’s energy management environment. Under this cooperative project with the Department of Energy, Boeing and PJM have developed and demonstrated a host of technologies specifically tailored to the needs of PJM and the electric sector as a whole. The team has demonstrated to the energy industry a combination of processes, techniques and technologies that have been successfully implemented in the commercial, defense, and intelligence communities to identify, mitigate and continuously monitor the cyber security of critical systems. Guided by the results of a Cyber Security Risk-Based Assessment completed in Phase I, the Boeing-PJM team has completed multiple iterations through the Phase II Development and Phase III Deployment phases. Multiple cyber security solutions have been completed across a variety of controls including: Application Security, Enhanced Malware Detection, Security Incident and Event Management (SIEM) Optimization, Continuous Vulnerability Monitoring, SCADA Monitoring/Intrusion Detection, Operational Resiliency, Cyber Range simulations and hands on cyber security personnel training. All of the developed and demonstrated solutions are suitable for replication across the electric sector and/or the energy sector as a whole. Benefits identified include; Improved malware and intrusion detection capability on critical SCADA networks including behavioral-based alerts resulting in improved zero-day threat protection; Improved Security Incident and Event Management system resulting in better threat visibility, thus increasing the likelihood of detecting a serious event; Improved malware detection and zero-day threat response capability; Improved ability to systematically evaluate and secure in house and vendor sourced software applications; Improved ability to continuously monitor and maintain secure configuration of network devices resulting in reduced vulnerabilities for potential exploitation; Improved overall cyber security situational awareness through the integration of multiple discrete security technologies into a single cyber security reporting console; Improved ability to maintain the resiliency of critical systems in the face of a targeted cyber attack of other significant event; Improved ability to model complex networks for penetration testing and advanced training of cyber security personnel

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

VAC: A Software Approach to Resilient SCADA Automation

To better secure critical infrastructure, especially power systems, this paper introduces a virtual SCADA automation controller. The automation controller is a gateway into a power subsystem, making it a valuable target for cyber-attacks that could cut it off from the control center and cause a loss of view and control. To prevent this, the Virtual Automation Controller (VAC) is a backup device that mirrors the capabilities of the physical controller. It can communicate via Modbus and DNP3 and is containerized so it can be deployed on a variety of platforms. Furthermore, it utilizes software-defined networking to quickly disconnect a failed automation controller and preserve its state for forensics. The VAC gives system operators time to replace the failed controller and prevents dangerous and costly damage to power systems. The VAC is compared against the SEL 3505-3 RTAC and shown to have the necessary features to act as a failover controller.

Johnson, Jordan↗

K-anonymity applied to the energy grid of things distributed energy resource management system

Smart grid infrastructure relies on information exchange between multiple actors in order to ensure system reliability. These actors include but are not limited to smart loads, grid control, and energy management technologies. As information exchange between these actors is susceptible to cyber-attacks, security and privacy issues are indispensable to ensure a reliable and stable grid. This position paper proposes a privacypreserving, trust-augmented secure scheme for a smart grid implementation.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Industrial Control System Risk

Risk is integrated into all business processes, and leaders work to limit risk to as low as reasonable within their systems. Within Industrial Control System networks, risk is especially challenging due to the second- and third-order effects that an attack can incur. We present a new equation for risk and analyze its appropriateness in determining risk through Monte Carlo methods. We believe that this new equation has merit in allowing leadership to more quickly access and mitigate risk based off factors within the decision maker’s control, understanding how capable an attacker may be, how much impact an attack would have on the system, and how intensely an attacker may want to cause damage to the system. These variables will allow a leader to provide strategic vision to the business that he/she leads.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Blockchain: Next Generation Supply Chain Security for Energy Infrastructure and NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Compliance

The U.S. power grid is a complex system of systems that requires a secure, reliable and trustworthy global supply chain. This is especially true for the grid’s increasing number of networked energy delivery system (EDS) and industrial control systems (ICS) and associated vendors, distributers, integrators and end users. Grid modernization has increased the use of “smart” energy devices that network, digitize, automate and increasingly converge the cyber-physical energy supply chain. In this Energy Internet of Things (EIoT) environment there is an increasing number of both critical cyber assets as well as data speed and size requirements, creating new cyber supply chain security and North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) CIP compliance challenges for utilities, regulators and vendors. In realization of these goals, improvements are needed in the process and technology to better monitor, audit and realize cyber security and compliance goals in complex EIoT environments. This paper explores how blockchain technology may present a disruptive solution to facilitate NERC CIP compliance and increase the security of the electricity infrastructure supply chain through a cryptographically signed distributed ledger that provides increased data provenance, attribution and auditability.

Blockchain, Cyber security, grid cyber, NERC CIP, ↗

Gateway Implementation of Cybersecurity Requirements

Cybersecurity threats are a constant present-day reality for any type of business -- Space exploration is not excluded from these threats either. The Gateway Program is one of NASA’s latest initiatives that extend space exploration beyond low earth orbit. Gateway allows for NASA to prove technologies and mature systems necessary to live and work on another celestial body before embarking on multi-year missions to Mars. The Gateway is a small, human-tended space station in orbit around the Moon. With the increased autonomy, distance and criticality of systems, cybersecurity is a critical discipline that touches and integrates with most if not all subsystems of the Gateway. Building a gateway to the lunar orbit is no simple task. In this presentation, we outline an approach that the Gateway team adopted in creating a cyber safe and robust vehicle to support operations and assure protection of the critical functions. Gateway Program is required to implement National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines to adhere to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA). NIST provides a framework for managing and controlling cybersecurity risks by defining cybersecurity controls and methodologies for implementation. The NIST framework is based upon the system, data within the system, integrations with external systems, and risk assessments to determine impacts for each of those systems. The goals and objectives are to identify appropriate security controls that fulfil and map to the NIST 800-53 framework. The implementation process involves developing an organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, people, assets, data, and capabilities. NIST Security controls are interpreted and defined within the Gateway vehicle requirements subsystems specifications. This paper details the approach, implementation, and challenges faced during the development and design phases to address cyber threats during the Gateway vehicle operations.

Cybersecurity↗

Gateway Implementation of Cybersecurity Requirements

Cyber threats are a constant present-day reality for any type of business -- Space exploration is not excluded from these threats either. The Gateway Program is one of NASA’s latest initiatives that extend space exploration beyond low earth orbit. Gateway allows for NASA to prove technologies and mature systems necessary to live and work on another celestial body before embarking on multi-year missions to Mars. The Gateway is a small, human-tended space station in orbit around the Moon. With the increased autonomy, distance and criticality of systems, cybersecurity is one of the critical subsystems that touches and integrates with most if not all subsystems of the Gateway. Building a gateway to the lunar orbit is no simple task. In this presentation, we outline an approach that the Gateway team adopted in creating a cyber safe and robust vehicle to support operations and assure protection of the critical functions. Gateway Program is required to implement National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines to adhere to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA). NIST provides a framework for managing and controlling cybersecurity risks by defining cybersecurity controls and methodologies for implementation. The NIST framework is based upon the system, data within the system, integrations with external systems, and risk assessments to determine impacts for each of those systems. The goals and objectives are to identify appropriate security controls that fulfill and map to the NIST 800-53 framework. The implementation process involves developing an organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, people, assets, data, and capabilities. NIST Security controls are interpreted and defined within the Gateway vehicle requirements subsystems specifications. This paper details the approach, implementation, and challenges faced during the development and design phases to address cyber threats during the Gateway vehicle operations.

Svetlana Hanson↗

Designing and Operating Through Compromise: Architectural Analysis of CKMS for the Advanced Metering Infrastructure

Compromises attributable to the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) highlight the necessity for constant vigilance. The APT provides a new perspective on security metrics (e.g., statistics based cyber security) and quantitative risk assessments. We consider design principals and models/tools that provide high assurance for energy delivery systems (EDS) operations regardless of the state of compromise. Cryptographic keys must be securely exchanged, then held and protected on either end of a communications link. This is challenging for a utility with numerous substations that must secure the intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) that may comprise complex control system of systems. For example, distribution and management of keys among the millions of intelligent meters within the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is being implemented as part of the National Smart Grid initiative. Without a means for a secure cryptographic key management system (CKMS) no cryptographic solution can be widely deployed to protect the EDS infrastructure from cyber-attack. We consider 1) how security modeling is applied to key management and cyber security concerns on a continuous basis from design through operation, 2) how trusted models and key management architectures greatly impact failure scenarios, and 3) how hardware-enabled trust is a critical element to detecting, surviving, and recovering from attack.

Cryptographic Key Management System (CKMS)↗

Real-Time SCADA Cyber Protection Using Compression Techniques

The Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE-OE) has a critical mission to secure the energy infrastructure from cyber attack. Through DOE-OE’s Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) program, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has developed a method to detect malicious traffic on Supervisory, Control, and Data Acquisition (SCADA) network using a data compression technique. SCADA network traffic is often repetitive with only minor differences between packets. Research performed at the INL showed that SCADA network traffic has traits desirable for using compression analysis to identify abnormal network traffic. An open source implementation of a Lempel-Ziv-Welch (LZW) lossless data compression algorithm was used to compress and analyze surrogate SCADA traffic. Infected SCADA traffic was found to have statistically significant differences in compression when compared against normal SCADA traffic at the packet level. The initial analyses and results are clearly able to identify malicious network traffic from normal traffic at the packet level with a very high confidence level across multiple ports and traffic streams. Statistical differentiation between infected and normal traffic level was possible using a modified data compression technique at the 99% probability level for all data analyzed. However, the conditions tested were rather limited in scope and need to be expanded into more realistic simulations of hacking events using techniques and approaches that are better representative of a real-world attack on a SCADA system. Nonetheless, the use of compression techniques to identify malicious traffic on SCADA networks in real time appears to have significant merit for infrastructure protection.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Restricted Authentication and Encryption for Cyber-physical Systems

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are characterized by the close linkage of computational resources and physical devices. These systems can be deployed in a number of critical infrastructure settings. As a result, the security requirements of CPS are different than traditional computing architectures. For example, critical functions must be identified and isolated from interference by other functions. Similarly, lightweight schemes may be required, as CPS can include devices with limited computing power. One approach that offers promise for CPS security is the use of lightweight, hardware-based authentication. Specifically, we consider the use of Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to bind an access request to specific hardware with device-specific keys. PUFs are implemented in hardware, such as SRAM, and can be used to uniquely identify the device. This technology could be used in CPS to ensure location-based access control and encryption, both of which would be desirable for CPS implementations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Addressing the Challenges of Anomaly Detection for Cyber Physical Energy Grid Systems

The consolidation of cyber communications networks and physical control systems within the energy smart grid introduces a number of new risks. Unfortunately, these risks are largely unknown and poorly understood, yet include very high impact losses from attack and component failures. One important aspect of risk management is the detection of anomalies and changes. However, anomaly detection within cyber security remains a difficult, open problem, with special challenges in dealing with false alert rates and heterogeneous data. Furthermore, the integration of cyber and physical dynamics is often intractable. And, because of their broad scope, energy grid cyber-physical systems must be analyzed at multiple scales, from individual components, up to network level dynamics. We describe an improved approach to anomaly detection that combines three important aspects. First, system dynamics are modeled using a reduced order model for greater computational tractability. Second, a probabilistic and principled approach to anomaly detection is adopted that allows for regulation of false alerts and comparison of anomalies across heterogeneous data sources. Third, a hierarchy of aggregations are constructed to support interactive and automated analyses of anomalies at multiple scales.

Anomaly Detection↗

Detection of DoS Attacks Using ARFIMA Modeling of GOOSE Communication in IEC 61850 Substations

Integration of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in modern smart grids (SGs) offers many advantages including the use of renewables and an effective way to protect, control and monitor the energy transmission and distribution. To reach an optimal operation of future energy systems, availability, integrity and confidentiality of data should be guaranteed. Research on the cyber-physical security of electrical substations based on IEC 61850 is still at an early stage. In the present work, we first model the network traffic data in electrical substations, then, we present a statistical Anomaly Detection (AD) method to detect Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against the Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) network communication. According to interpretations on the self-similarity and the Long-Range Dependency (LRD) of the data, an Auto-Regressive Fractionally Integrated Moving Average (ARFIMA) model was shown to describe well the GOOSE communication in the substation process network. Based on this ARFIMA-model and in view of cyber-physical security, an effective model-based AD method is developed and analyzed. Two variants of the statistical AD considering statistical hypothesis testing based on the Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) and the cumulative sum (CUSUM) are presented to detect flooding attacks that might affect the availability of the data. Our work presents a novel AD method, with two different variants, tailored to the specific features of the GOOSE traffic in IEC 61850 substations. The statistical AD is capable of detecting anomalies at unknown change times under the realistic assumption of unknown model parameters. The performance of both variants of the AD method is validated and assessed using data collected from a simulation case study. We perform several Monte-Carlo simulations under different noise variances. The detection delay is provided for each detector and it represents the number of discrete time samples after which an anomaly is detected. In fact, our statistical AD method with both variants (CUSUM and GLRT) has around half the false positive rate and a smaller detection delay when compared with two of the closest works found in the literature. Our AD approach based on the GLRT detector has the smallest false positive rate among all considered approaches. Whereas, our AD approach based on the CUSUM test has the lowest false negative rate thus the best detection rate. Depending on the requirements as well as the costs of false alarms or missed anomalies, both variants of our statistical detection method can be used and are further analyzed using composite detection metrics.

IEC 61850 electrical substations↗

Enhancing power plant safety through simulated cyber events - 341

There are gaps in understanding how a cyber-attack would manifest itself within power plants and what these events would look like within the control room from an operator's perspective. This is especially true for nuclear power plants where safety has much broader consequences than nonnuclear plants. The operating and emergency procedures that operators currently use are likely inadequate for targeted cyber-attacks. This research focuses on understanding how a cyber event would affect the operation of the plant, how an operator would perceive the event, and if the operator's actions would keep the plant in a safe condition. This research is part of Sandia's Laboratory Directed Research and Development program where a nuclear power plant cyber model of the control system digital architecture is coupled with a generic pressurized water reactor plant training simulator. Cyber event scenarios will be performed on the coupled system with plant operators. The scenarios simulate plant conditions that may exist during a cyber-attack, component failure, or insider sabotage, and provide an understanding of the displayed information and the actual plant conditions. These scenarios will determine if plant operators can 1) recognize that they are under cyber-attack and 2) take appropriate actions to keep the plant safe. This will also provide the opportunity to assess the operator cognitive workload during such events and identify where improvements might be made. Experiments with nuclear power plant operators will be carried out over FY 2018 and results of the research are expected by the end of FY 2018. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

BioSecure Digital Twin: Manufacturing Innovation and Cybersecurity Resilience

U.S. national security, prosperity, economy, and well-being require secure, flexible, and resilient Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing. The COVID-19 pandemic reaffirmed that the biomedical production value-chain is vulnerable to disruption and has been under attack from sophisticated nation-state adversaries. Current cyber defenses are inadequate, and the integrity of critical production systems and processes are inherently vulnerable to cyber-attacks, human error, and supply chain disruptions. The following chapter explores how a BioSecure Digital Twin will improve U.S. manufacturing resilience and preparedness to respond to these hazards by significantly improving monitoring, integrity, security, and agility of our manufacturing infrastructure and systems. The BioSecure Digital Twin combines a scalable manufacturing framework with a robust platform for monitoring and control to increase U.S. biopharma manufacturing resilience. Then, the chapter discusses some of the inherent vulnerabilities and challenges at the nexus of health and advanced manufacturing. Next, the chapter highlights that as the Pandemic evolves, we need agility and resilience to overcome significant obstacles. This section highlights an innovative application of Cyber Informed Engineering to developing and deploying a BioSecure Digital Twin to improve the resilience and security of the biopharma industrial supply chain and production processes. Finally, the chapter concludes with a process framework to complement the Digital Twin platform, called the Biopharma (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) OODA Loop Framework (BOLF), a four-step approach to decision-making outputs from the Digital Twin. The BOLF will help end users leverage twin technology by distilling the available information, focusing the data on context, and rapidly making the best decision while remaining cognizant of changes that can be made as more data becomes available.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Real-World Cyber Security Demonstration for Networked Electric Drives

In this article, we present the design and implementation of a cyber-physical security testbed for networked electric drive systems, aimed at conducting real-world security demonstrations. To our knowledge, this is one of the first security testbeds for networked electric drives, seamlessly integrating the domains of power electronics and computer science, and cybersecurity. By doing so, the testbed offers a comprehensive platform to explore and understand the intricate and often complex interactions between cyber and physical systems. The core of our testbed consists of four electric machine drives, meticulously configured to emulate small-scale but realistic information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) networks. This setup both provides a controlled environment for simulating a wide array of cyber-attacks, and mirrors potential real-world attack scenarios with a high degree of fidelity. The testbed serves as an invaluable resource for the study of cyber-physical security, offering a practical and dynamic platform for testing and validating cybersecurity measures in the context of networked electric drive systems. As a concrete example of the testbed's capabilities, we have developed and implemented a Python-based script designed to execute step-stone attacks over a wireless local area network (WLAN). This script leverages a sequence of target IP addresses, simulating a real-world attack vector that could be exploited by adversaries. To counteract such threats, we demonstrate the efficacy of our developed cyber-attack detection algorithms, which are integral to our testbed's security framework. Furthermore, the testbed incorporates a real-time visualization system using InfluxDB and Grafana, providing a dynamic and interactive representation of networked electric drives and their associated security monitoring mechanisms. This visualization component not only enhances the testbed's usability but also offers insightful, real-time data for researchers and practitioners, thereby facilitating a deeper understanding of cyber-physical security dynamics in networked electric drive systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

TAS::89 0927::TAS RECOVERY - The Lean Green Energy Controller Machine

Achieving efficiency improvements and providing demand-response programs have been identified as key elements of our national energy initiative. The residential market is the largest, yet most difficult, segment to engage in efforts to meet these objectives. This project developed Energy Management System that engages the consumer and enables Smart Grid services, applications, and business processes to address this need. Our innovative solution provides smart controller providing dynamic optimization of energy consumption for the residential energy consumer. Our solution extends the technical platform to include a cloud based Internet of Things (IoT) aggregation of data sensors and actuators the go beyond energy management and extend to life style services provided through compelling mobile and console based user experiences.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Advanced Transmission Technologies –GETs and HPCs Session 3: HPCs and Building Actions Plans to Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) program, held on November 11, 2025, centered on High Performance Conductors (HPCs) and the formulation of action plans to address digital assurance risks associated with Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs). This session convened experts from utilities, vendors, and government agencies to examine the technical, operational, and cybersecurity aspects of HPC deployment. Discussions highlighted the benefits of HPCs, such as their ability to rapidly increase transmission capacity using existing corridors, improve grid resilience, reduce system losses, and align with FERC Orders 2023 and 1920. Participants evaluated supply chain and digital assurance risks, including reliance on imported materials, limited domestic manufacturing capacity, workforce shortages, and traceability issues. The session also emphasized the importance of digital trust, integration-layer cybersecurity, and unified risk frameworks, introducing tools like intrusion detection systems, encryption, zero trust networking, and firmware integrity. Recaps of earlier workshops on Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs), Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC), and Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO) underscored institutional barriers and integration challenges. Action plans were proposed to mitigate issues such as inconsistent cybersecurity practices, SBOM usage, supply chain visibility, operator trust, and misaligned incentives. Additionally, INL presented its supply chain risk management tools and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to support secure procurement and system design. The session concluded with a commitment to share key takeaways, incorporate cohort feedback into future policy development, and continue collaborative engagement through upcoming pilot activities. Session 3 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗