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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 307 records · Page 17
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Evaluating software defined networking solutions to reduce the digital attack surface of nuclear security systems

Most nuclear security systems used today were not designed for today’s threat environment. Systems that were intended to be stand alone are now interconnected. Devices that have a single purpose are built on multi-purpose platforms and communication protocols that, while effective, have no ability to authenticate authorized versus unauthorized commands. These attributes provide an attacker significant ability to affect the system, pivot throughout the interconnected networks, and remain undetected if he/she is able to compromise a single node. Software defined networking (SDN) has been used for years by information technology (IT) cloud service providers to quickly provision or remove servers or other systems to meet changing demand. The same concept has recently been applied to operational technology (OT) systems to enable very fast failover on critical systems that have stringent and deterministic (<5ms) transmit/receive times. By carefully engineering the communication flows through a network using preplanned routes and specific pathways it is possible to achieve deterministic and extremely reliable message delivery even when components fail. This engineering approach to network design has added security benefits including securing the networking control plane, eliminating network scanning and mapping, inhibiting ARP spoofing and host masquerading, eliminating unauthorized network pivoting and enabling greater situational awareness on the network. SDN in OT environments is new but early testing in electrical power and other critical infrastructure has shown it to be a very powerful tool for building reliable networks and reducing the digital attack surface of the network. The authors tested a software defined network switch on a simple physical protection system with components commonly found in nuclear security systems and found improved mitigations to denial of service attacks, lateral movement and network reconnaissance. The paper details the tests and their results.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, software defined↗
DOE OSTI2025

Internship Presentation: Reactor System Facility Modification to Detect Compromised Human Machine Interfaces

This study presents a multi-layered Industrial Control System (ICS)/Operational Technology (OT) security architecture aimed at detecting and mitigating compromised Human Machine Interface (HMI) and Instrumentation & Control (I&C) systems within the Flowing Autoclave System (FAS) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The approach combines network security solutions, hash-based algorithms, and blockchain technologies to verify system integrity and provide an immutable record of network activity. This integrated three-pronged strategy enhances the detection of system compromises, enabling preemptive action before significant damage occurs.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗
DOE OSTI2024

Independent Review of the Proof-of-Concept Cyber100 Compass Cybersecurity Risk Tool

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), and Office of Electricity (OE) commissioned the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) to develop a method and tool to enable electric utilities to understand and manage the risk of cybersecurity events that can lead to physical effects like blackouts. This tool, called Cyber100 Compass, uses cybersecurity data elicited from cybersecurity experts, then incorporates that data into a tool designed to be usable by cybersecurity non-experts who understand the system itself. The tool estimates dollar-valued risks for a current or postulated future electric power digital control configuration, in order to enable utility risk planners to prioritize among proposed cybersecurity risk mitigation options. With the development of the Cyber100 Compass tool for quantification of future cyber-physical security risks, NREL has taken an initial bold step in the direction of enabling and indeed encouraging electric utilities to address the potential for cybersecurity incidents to produce detrimental physical effects related to electric power delivery. As part of the Cyber100 Compass development process, DOE funded NREL to seek out an independent technical review of the risk methodology embodied in the tool. NREL requested this review from Sandia National Laboratories, and made available to Sandia a very late version of the project report, as well as NREL personnel to provide clarification and to respond to questions. This paper provides the result of the independent review activity.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity Considerations for Grid-Connected Batteries with Hardware Demonstrations

The share of renewable and distributed energy resources (DERs), like wind turbines, solar photovoltaics and grid-connected batteries, interconnected to the electric grid is rapidly increasing due to reduced costs, rising efficiency, and regulatory requirements aimed at incentivizing a lower-carbon electricity system. These distributed energy resources differ from traditional generation in many ways including the use of many smaller devices connected primarily (but not exclusively) to the distribution network, rather than few larger devices connected to the transmission network. DERs being installed today often include modern communication hardware like cellular modems and WiFi connectivity and, in addition, the inverters used to connect these resources to the grid are gaining increasingly complex capabilities, like providing voltage and frequency support or supporting microgrids. To perform these new functions safely, communications to the device and more complex controls are required. The distributed nature of DER devices combined with their network connectivity and complex controls interfaces present a larger potential attack surface for adversaries looking to create instability in power systems. To address this area of concern, the steps of a cyberattack on DERs have been studied, including the security of industrial protocols, the misuse of the DER interface, and the physical impacts. These different steps have not previously been tied together in practice and not specifically studied for grid-connected storage devices. In this work, we focus on grid-connected batteries. We explore the potential impacts of a cyberattack on a battery to power system stability, to the battery hardware, and on economics for various stakeholders. We then use real hardware to demonstrate end-to-end attack paths exist when security features are disabled or misconfigured. Our experimental focus is on control interface security and protocol security, with the initial assumption that an adversary has gained access to the network to which the device is connected. We provide real examples of the effectiveness of certain defenses. This work can be used to help utilities and other grid-connected battery owners and operators evaluate the severity of different threats and the effectiveness of defense strategies so they can effectively deploy and protect grid-connected storage devices.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2023

Implementation of an ICS Ransomware Testbed: Scenarios, Variants, and Evaluation Methods

Ransomware attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have emerged as a formidable threat to the United States’ critical infrastructure, eliciting grave concerns regarding national security. In March 2023, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) unveiled its 2022 Internet Crime Report, highlighting a concerning 870 complaints related to ransomware impacting U.S. critical infrastructure. Of the country's 16 critical infrastructure sectors, 14 encountered at least one ransomware attack. Notably, while the Healthcare and Public Health sector suffered the most, reporting 210 attacks, sectors pivotal to ICS networks and governmental organizations were also targeted: the Defense Industrial Base reported 1 attack, Water and Wastewater Systems 3, Chemical 19, Energy 15, Government Facilities 115, and Critical Manufacturing 157. For instance, a ransomware attack on a major chemical company could jeopardize not only its production but also pose environmental risks should systems controlling hazardous materials be compromised. In 2022, three ransomware variants predominantly targeted U.S. critical infrastructure: HIVE, with 87 attacks; ALPHV/BlackCat, with 114; and LOCKBIT, with 149. Several cyber-attacks, such as the MOVEit data breach in May 2023 and the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack in May 2021, have been so impactful that they commanded national attention. The DarkSide hacking group's assault on the Colonial Pipeline, initiated on May 6th, 2021, stands as one of the most substantial and publicly acknowledged cyber-attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. The group exploited an exposed Virtual Private Network (VPN) password, paving the way for initial intrusion and subsequent data theft. A mere day later, DarkSide unleashed a ransomware attack that compromised vital accounting and billing systems, prompting an immediate shutdown of the pipeline to mitigate further ransomware proliferation across its network. This crisis spurred a robust response from the U.S. president and regulators, culminating in a national emergency declaration related to the pipeline shutdown on May 9th, 2021. This incident mirrors the 2017 NotPetya ransomware attack that significantly impacted the shipping giant Maersk, highlighting an urgent need for fortified cybersecurity across various industries. Future incidents, akin to the Colonial Pipeline attack, could potentially be mitigated—or entirely averted—should government agencies and private entities scrutinize system vulnerabilities, exploring various ransomware types and entry points. Proactive measures, such as conducting experiments on VPN accounts or auditing passwords to pinpoint duplicate usage across diverse systems and software, might illuminate feasible entry points and vulnerability zones within an organization's systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

APPLICATION OF MATURITY MODELS FOR EVALUATING CYBERSECURITY PROGRAMS AT NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL FACILITIES

Maturity models can be used to provide government agencies, industry associations, and organizations operating nuclear facilities with the ability to quickly evaluate the maturity of their cybersecurity programs and identify areas to prioritize for improvement. The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) was developed by the U.S. Department of Energy to allow organizations in the energy sector to evaluate the programmatic capabilities of their cybersecurity programs in a consistent manner, communicate programmatic maturity information, prioritize cybersecurity investments in targeted areas of concern, and track how the maturity of their cybersecurity program evolves over time. The C2M2 is designed for use by any critical infrastructure organization regardless of ownership, structure, or size. The C2M2 can be easily fine-tuned to access the maturity of nuclear cybersecurity programs and their application at individual facilities. Built on a foundation of existing cybersecurity standards, frameworks, programs, and initiatives, the model features 10 security domains. Performance in each security domain is characterized using a structured set of cybersecurity practices that represent activities an organization can perform to improve cybersecurity in their domain. Each practice can be quickly evaluated as being either fully, largely, partially, or not implemented. Once practices are evaluated for each security domain, the model defines four maturity indicator levels that apply independently to each domain in the model. To earn a maturity level in a given domain, an organization must adequately perform all the practices for that maturity level and its predecessor level(s). A small assessment team can conduct a C2M2 assessment in a single day. A screening version of the C2M2 allows an initial look at the maturity of nuclear cybersecurity programs that could be completed in under an hour.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, maturity model↗
DOE OSTI2022

Draft Methodology for Cybersecurity Analysis for Adoption of Wireless Technology in Nuclear Power Plants

The report is delivered as DOE-NE Cybersecurity Program Milestone M2CT-22IN1104014-Industry cybersecurity guidance adoption status. The milestone is specifically to document the process and the status of the efforts towards developing guidance in support of industry’s adoption of wireless communication technologies. To transform the operation of nuclear power plants, including domestic light-water reactors, advanced reactors, microreactors, and fission battery, for grid and non-grid applications, secure and resilient wireless capabilities are required. In addition, to realize new operational concepts such as autonomous operation and remote monitoring, advanced sensor, and instrumentation, wireless technology is essential. However, industry implementation is low, and there is no technical basis for how to understand and address potential risks for wireless communications for critical plant functions. A methodology with a technical basis for implementing secure wireless communication is crucial. This wireless adoption methodology is intended to assist a licensee in identifying an appropriate technological approach for securing wireless communications in nuclear power plant. However, this methodology does not provide guidance for addressing wireless design criteria or for addressing all the cybersecurity commitments in licensees’ cybersecurity plans (CSPs) including addressing security impact analysis that a licensee must perform before an update to a Critical Digital Asset (CDA). This methodology guides a licensee through a process of evaluating a proposed wireless implementation and drafting a plant change notification for an example use case. The example is a generic/nonproprietary version of the first test case of the methodology, which, if successfully implemented, is part of the consideration for protecting other functions’ use of wireless in a cybersecure manner.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Reactor System Facility Modification to Detect Compromised Human Machine Interfaces

This study focuses on a multi-layered Industrial Control System (ICS)/Operational Technology (OT) security architecture to aid in the discovery and mitigation of compromised Human Machine Interface (HMI)/Instrumentation & Control (I&C) based systems for modifying a prototypical reactor condition test facility called the Flowing Autoclave System (FAS) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). This is achieved through a three-layered combination of network security solutions, hash-based algorithms, and blockchain technologies. Hash algorithms are mathematical functions used to generate a predetermined set of fixed-length values. They are widely used in computer security to verify the integrity of system information and data, both on a local network and the wider internet. Even small amounts of unauthorized system modification will cause the hash algorithm to output a set of characters that deviate significantly from its original value. Assisting secure hash functions, blockchain technology is a secure and distributed technology used to provide an immutable set of records replicated on all devices within a decentralized network. Blockchain offers a cost-effective solution to detect system compromise by providing a traceable breadcrumb trail of all network activity and data modification happening on a system. If both are used in conjunction with network monitoring tools, the integration of this three-pronged approach can become an asset in detecting suspected system compromises before any real damage can occur.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

CyTRICS: Vulnerability Analysis Tailored for Critical Infrastructure

Society and modern life are dependent on critical infrastructure that is composed of expensive, special purpose devices that have long life cycles and may be in use for decades before being replaced. There are an abundance of organizations and individuals doing vulnerability analysis on a variety of systems, but what makes the Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems (CyTRICS) program unique and valuable is its strategic focus on high-priority critical infrastructure, close partnership with vendors, and ability to leverage bills of materials (BOMs) to identify and relate vulnerabilities to affected systems. Creating a bill of materials is a formal way of understanding and documenting the components of a system, including everything from integrated circuits to operating systems to third-party libraries. This is beneficial for connecting known vulnerabilities to affected devices, since vulnerabilities in a specific component are often not mapped to all systems that use that vulnerable component. Additionally, CyTRICS finds novel vulnerabilities through its vulnerability testing process and works closely with vendor partners to provide vulnerability reports so that affected systems can be patched in a timely manner. This presentation will describe the interrelated technical processes CyTRICS uses to create bills of materials and conduct vulnerability analysis.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

An integrated data management and informatics framework for continuous drug product manufacturing processes: A case study on two pilot plants

The pharmaceutical industry continuously looks for ways to improve its development and manufacturing efficiency. In recent years, such efforts have been driven by the transition from batch to continuous manufacturing and digitalization in process development. To facilitate this transition, integrated data management and informatics tools need to be developed and implemented within the framework of Industry 4.0 technology. Here, in this regard, the work aims to guide the data integration development of continuous pharmaceutical manufacturing processes under the Industry 4.0 framework, improving digital maturity and enabling the development of digital twins. This paper demonstrates two instances where a data integration framework has been successfully employed in academic continuous pharmaceutical manufacturing pilot plants. Details of the integration structure and information flows are comprehensively showcased. Approaches to mitigate concerns in incorporating complex data streams, including integrating multiple process analytical technology tools and legacy equipment, connecting cloud data and simulation models, and safeguarding cyber-physical security, are discussed. Critical challenges and opportunities for practical considerations are highlighted.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Sequential Perturbation-based FDIA Detection using DERs for Unbalanced Distribution System

The power distribution system with its reliance on automated monitoring and control infrastructure makes it a complicated cyber-physical system and vulnerable to various cyber-attacks. This paper proposes a moving target defense inspired false data injection attack (FDIA) detection mechanism for an unbalanced distribution system. In the proposed grid diagnosis service framework, the distribution system operator judiciously manipulates power outputs of a subset of inverter-based distribution energy resources (DERs) to create secret low magnitude voltage perturbations which are inconsequential to the normal operation of the grid. A mixed-integer-linear-programming algorithm is developed to select the optimal set of DERs that can create a voltage perturbation signal of the required magnitude at each sensor location at a minimum cost. Then, a sequential detector is applied that detects for the FDIA as measurements are received from individual sensors. The performance of the proposed perturbation-based FDIA detection framework is demonstrated via simulation of the IEEE 123 bus test system.

Attack Detection↗
DOE OSTI2023

Towards Smart Grids Enhanced Situation Awareness: A Bi-Level Quasi-Static State Estimation Model

Smart Grid situational awareness is provided by Energy Management Systems. A core process of these systems is State Estimation. The great majority of state estimators model the Smart Grid through a set of nonlinear algebraic equations, named the measurement model. Problem formulation considers the Gauss solution. Several model improvements have been presented regarding the Gauss solution, aiming between others to provide measurement noise robustness to the state estimation process. While considerable effort has been focused on such developments, state estimation is still constrained by the implicit modelling error, and thus inevitably vulnerable to cyber-threats. In this work, a state estimation bi-level formal model is presented towards Smart Grids enhanced situational awareness considering the concepts of synthetic measurements and innovation. Comparative test results with the state-of-the-art on the IEEE 14-bus system are presented highlighting improved situational awareness to bad data. Easy-to-implement model, without hard-to-derive parameters, built-on the classic weighted least squares solution, highlight potential aspects for real-life implementation.

cyber security↗
DOE OSTI2022

User-Focused Tools to Enhance IT/OT Cyber Resilience within the Power Grid

The power grid is undergoing several changes that are increasing its complexity as nexuses between electric-gas, transmission-distribution, and energy-communications continue to become increasingly critical. This system is heavily dependent on communication infrastructure and controls, and it relies on humans in operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT) roles to manage the increasing breadth, depth, and speed of data. Many technical challenges have presented themselves and will need to be addressed to provide reliable grid operations. With increased reliance on distributed controls and communication infrastructure, cybersecurity becomes an inherent requirement. When considering current cyber-physical security solutions for the power grid, one can notice a clear divide between information technology and operation technology networks. However, in real-life applications, these networks are interdependent. This work presents results of interviews with key utility cybersecurity personnel, analyzes the results, and makes recommendations towards solution of existing technical and operational challenges realized. Existing workflows are presented, wireframe interviews are discussed, and tool requirements are described. The existence of easy-to-implement solutions, based on existing energy management systems, highlight the potential for real-life applications.

cybersecurity, resilience, user-centered design, p↗
DOE OSTI2020

PMU and Communication Infrastructure Restoration for Post-Attack Observability Recovery of Power Grids

This paper is concerned about recovering the observability of cyber-physical power grids after massive cyber attacks, which helps to achieve the cyber-physical resilience of the grids. For recovering the observability of the grid, the measurability of the Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) and the connectivity of the communication network are needed to be restored. The PMU and communication infrastructure restoration problem is jointly formulated as a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) problem to minimize the observability loss of the grid over time after a cyber attack while considering the constraint of limited resources. The efficacy of the proposed optimal restoration strategy is verified by comparing with heuristic methods on the IEEE 57-bus system.

cyber security↗
DOE OSTI2023

Adaptive Control of Distributed Energy Resources for Distribution Grid Voltage Stability

Volt-VAR and Volt-Watt functionality in photovoltaic (PV) smart inverters provide mechanisms to ensure system voltage magnitudes and power factors remain within acceptable limits. However, these control functions can become unstable, introducing oscillations in system voltages when not appropriately configured or maliciously altered during a cyberattack. In the event that Volt-VAR and Volt-Watt control functions in a portion of PV smart inverters in a distribution grid are unstable, the proposed adaptation scheme utilizes the remaining and stably-behaving PV smart inverters and other Distributed Energy Resources to mitigate the effect of the instability. The adaptation mechanism is entirely decentralized, model-free, communication-free, and requires virtually no external configuration. Here we provide a derivation of the adaptive control approach and validate the algorithm in experiments on the IEEE 37 and 8500 node test feeders.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗