Results for “Engineering Risk Assessment” — Page 17

NASA NTRS1978

Study of hypersonic propulsion/airframe integration technology

An assessment is done of current and potential ground facilities, and analysis and flight test techniques for establishing a hypersonic propulsion/airframe integration technology base. A mach 6 cruise prototype aircraft incorporating integrated Scramjet engines was considered the baseline configuration, and the assessment focused on the aerodynamic and configuration aspects of the integration technology. The study describes the key technology milestones that must be met to permit a decision on development of a prototype vehicle, and defines risk levels for these milestones. Capabilities and limitations of analysis techniques, current and potential ground test facilities, and flight test techniques are described in terms of the milestones and risk levels.

Hartill, W. R.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Quality Interaction Between Mission Assurance and Project Team Members

Mission Assurance independent assessments started during the development cycle and continued through post launch operations. In operations, Health and Safety of the Observatory is of utmost importance. Therefore, Mission Assurance must ensure requirements compliance and focus on process improvements required across the operational systems including new/modified products, tools, and procedures. The deployment of the interactive model involves three objectives: Team member Interaction, Good Root Cause Analysis Practices, and Risk Assessment to avoid reoccurrences. In applying this model, we use a metric based measurement process and was found to have the most significant effect, which points to the importance of focuses on a combination of root cause analysis and risk approaches allowing the engineers the ability to prioritize and quantify their corrective actions based on a well-defined set of root cause definitions (i.e. closure criteria for problem reports), success criteria and risk rating definitions.

quality↗

NASA NTRS2014

GPM Timeline Inhibits For IT Processing

The Safety Inhibit Timeline Tool was created as one approach to capturing and understanding inhibits and controls from IT through launch. Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Mission, which launched from Japan in March 2014, was a joint mission under a partnership between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). GPM was one of the first NASA Goddard in-house programs that extensively used software controls. Using this tool during the GPM buildup allowed a thorough review of inhibit and safety critical software design for hazardous subsystems such as the high gain antenna boom, solar array, and instrument deployments, transmitter turn-on, propulsion system release, and instrument radar turn-on. The GPM safety team developed a methodology to document software safety as part of the standard hazard report. As a result of this process, a new tool safety inhibit timeline was created for management of inhibits and their controls during spacecraft buildup and testing during IT at GSFC and at the launch range in Japan. The Safety Inhibit Timeline Tool was a pathfinder approach for reviewing software that controls the electrical inhibits. The Safety Inhibit Timeline Tool strengthens the Safety Analysts understanding of the removal of inhibits during the IT process with safety critical software. With this tool, the Safety Analyst can confirm proper safe configuration of a spacecraft during each IT test, track inhibit and software configuration changes, and assess software criticality. In addition to understanding inhibits and controls during IT, the tool allows the Safety Analyst to better communicate to engineers and management the changes in inhibit states with each phase of hardware and software testing and the impact of safety risks. Lessons learned from participating in the GPM campaign at NASA and JAXA will be discussed during this session.

Inhibits↗

NASA NTRS2022

A Systems Model for System-Wide Safety Safety Demonstrator (SD-1): Wildfire Response Operations

The aim of this internship-based project was to contribute to the ongoing development of a systems model for System-Wide Safety’s first Technical Challenge 5 (TC5) series Safety Demonstrator (SD-1), which will be a demonstration of an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) in emerging wildfire response operations. Using Models-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) principles to develop the model, I organized and traced previously collected stakeholder needs from the Spring 2022 NASA System-Wide Safety Wildland Firefighting Operations Virtual Workshop (https://nari.arc.nasa.gov/sws-wildfire) to system elements, creating connections which can be used in the future by the project engineers to identify and address requirements gaps throughout the system design process. I also identified and modeled preliminary use case scenarios for aerial assets in the demonstrator and, building on previously produced preliminary high-level models of the 8 SD-1 Services, Functions, and Capabilities (SFCs) and their IASMS data flows, worked to model the Real-Time Risk Assessment (RTRA) tool as an implementation of Risk Assessment and Management that can take in multiple sets of data monitored by SFCs. Project deliverables include stakeholder requirements tables and matrices and systems model diagrams produced with MagicDraw software in the SysML Systems Modeling Language, with eventual plans to connect model diagrams to a Department of Defense Operational Viewpoint (OV-1) graphic, a high-level operational concept graphic that will be used to visualize the SD-1 scenarioin a future phase. The system model serves to provide a common understanding of the scope of and activities necessary for the completion of SD-1,and traces how stakeholder needs are to be addressed.

model-based systems engineering↗

NASA NTRS2011

Integration of Evidence Base into a Probabilistic Risk Assessment

INTRODUCTION: A probabilistic decision support model such as the Integrated Medical Model (IMM) utilizes an immense amount of input data that necessitates a systematic, integrated approach for data collection, and management. As a result of this approach, IMM is able to forecasts medical events, resource utilization and crew health during space flight. METHODS: Inflight data is the most desirable input for the Integrated Medical Model. Non-attributable inflight data is collected from the Lifetime Surveillance for Astronaut Health study as well as the engineers, flight surgeons, and astronauts themselves. When inflight data is unavailable cohort studies, other models and Bayesian analyses are used, in addition to subject matters experts input on occasion. To determine the quality of evidence of a medical condition, the data source is categorized and assigned a level of evidence from 1-5; the highest level is one. The collected data reside and are managed in a relational SQL database with a web-based interface for data entry and review. The database is also capable of interfacing with outside applications which expands capabilities within the database itself. Via the public interface, customers can access a formatted Clinical Findings Form (CLiFF) that outlines the model input and evidence base for each medical condition. Changes to the database are tracked using a documented Configuration Management process. DISSCUSSION: This strategic approach provides a comprehensive data management plan for IMM. The IMM Database s structure and architecture has proven to support additional usages. As seen by the resources utilization across medical conditions analysis. In addition, the IMM Database s web-based interface provides a user-friendly format for customers to browse and download the clinical information for medical conditions. It is this type of functionality that will provide Exploratory Medicine Capabilities the evidence base for their medical condition list. CONCLUSION: The IMM Database in junction with the IMM is helping NASA aerospace program improve the health care and reduce risk for the astronauts crew. Both the database and model will continue to expand to meet customer needs through its multi-disciplinary evidence based approach to managing data. Future expansion could serve as a platform for a Space Medicine Wiki of medical conditions.

Saile, Lyn↗

NASA NTRS1990

A methodology for probabilistic prediction of structural failures of launch vehicle propulsion systems

A quantitative methodology for estimating the probability of occurrence of critical structural failure modes of launch vehicle propulsion systems during mission operation is presented. In this approach, engineering analysis models that characterize specific failure modes based on the physics and mechanics of the failure phenomenon are used in a prescribed probabalistic structure in which quantified uncertainty in the information used in the analysis and quantified uncertainty of the engineering analysis models themselves are both considered in estimating failure risk. The methodology is applicable to high cycle fatigue, low cycle fatigue, flaw propagation stress rupture, and other failure modes of launch vehicle propulsion systems and other space-flight systems. The probabalistic failure assessment presented provides the capability of performing quantitative analyses to rank options to improve reliability, thereby enabling limited financial resources of development and improvement programs to be more effectively allocated.

Moore, N.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Planetary Protection Technologies for Planetary Science Instruments, Spacecraft, and Missions: Report of the NASA Planetary Protection Technology Definition Team (PPTDT)

Planetary bodies like Mars, Europa, and Enceladus pose the question, "How to study them without contaminating them and destroying future prospects to detect life, if it is there?" The natural trade-off, of course, is that the cleaner your spacecraft, the more you can explore such a body without risk of contaminating it. As chartered by NASA Headquarters, the Planetary Protection Technology Definition Team (PPTDT) was asked to provide a report covering six different areas related to the engineering and technology challenges of implementing planetary protection requirements on solar system exploration missions, including: Assessment of technical and engineering challenges to applying available microbial-reduction methods, including recontamination prevention, to spacecraft hardware and instruments, to meet current NASA requirements on preventing the forward contamination of potentially habitable worlds by future spacecraft missions (orbiters, atmospheric missions, landers, penetrators, and drills); Identification of spacecraft and instrument materials known to be compatible with existing planetary protection protocols; Planetary protection protocols/processes available or which appear promising, and areas ripe for technological development; The technical and engineering challenges in ensuring that spacecraft hardware and instruments can meet organic cleanliness requirements needed to ensure high confidence in differentiating Earth contamination from extraterrestrial signals to avoid false negative as well as false positive results; Approaches for mitigating the identified challenges that would allow instruments to be flown successfully at the required levels of cleanliness and microbial reduction, beginning with identification of commonly used materials and spacecraft hardware that are compatible (or particularly vulnerable) to planetary protection protocols; Engineering, technology, and scientific research and development that could be funded by NASA to provide future capabilities to field scientific instruments and spacecraft on missions that require either subsystem or system-level microbial reduction and recontamination prevention.

John D. Rummel↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Precision Landing Performance of a Human-Scale Lunar Lander Using a Generalized Simulation Framework

NASA has established goals of returning humans to Moon with an initial landing by 2024 and a subsequent sustained presence by 2028, which will require technological advances in spacecraft navigation to enable precision landing. The ability to assess the navigation performance of these new and existing technologies is critical to identifying areas of risk reduction and investment. To that end, the Safe and Precise Landing Integrated Capabilities Evolution (SPLICE) project has demonstrated that a detailed six degree-of-freedom integrated performance simulation framework can provide information on and assessment of expected navigation performance. This framework incorporates engineering models of the on-board spacecraft guidance, navigation, and control systems at varying levels of fidelity. Recent advances in the development of this integrated performance simulation permit running these systems “in-the-loop,” rather than assuming perfect knowledge of the spacecraft states. This development, coupled with fast simulation time and modularization of the various system models, enables a wide variety of system trades to be assessed at once. This paper presents a summary of the advances in the SPLICE simulation framework, updates to the spacecraft navigation models, and an application of the framework to characterize the precision landing performance of a human-scale lunar lander. A series of trade studies examining effects of ground state update qualities shows that given all other assumptions, sufficiently accurate Deep Space Network (DSN) measurements can enable safe and precise human-scale Lunar landings.

Spacecraft navigation↗

NASA NTRS2022

Precision Landing Performance and Technology Assessments of a Human-Scale Lunar Lander Using a Generalized Simulation Framework

NASA has established goals of returning humans to Moon with an initial landing by 2024 and a subsequent sustained presence by 2028, which will require technological advances in spacecraft navigation to enable precision landing. The ability to assess the navigation performance of these new and existing technologies is critical to identifying areas of risk reduction and investment. To that end, the Safe and Precise Landing Integrated Capabilities Evolution (SPLICE) project has demonstrated that a detailed six degree-of-freedom integrated performance simulation framework can provide information on and assessment of expected navigation performance. This framework incorporates engineering models of the on-board spacecraft guidance, navigation, and control systems at varying levels of fidelity. Recent advances in the development of this integrated performance simulation permit running these systems “in-the-loop,” rather than assuming perfect knowledge of the spacecraft states. This development, coupled with fast simulation time and modularization of the various system models, enables a wide variety of system trades to be assessed at once. This paper presents a summary of the advances in the SPLICE simulation framework, updates to the spacecraft navigation models, and an application of the framework to characterize the precision landing performance of a human-scale lunar lander. A series of trade studies examining effects of ground state update qualities shows that given all other assumptions, sufficiently accurate Deep Space Network (DSN) measurements can enable safe and precise human-scale Lunar landings.

"D'Souza, Sarah", 'Pensado, Alegandro R.↗

NASA NTRS1999

The Faster, Better, Cheaper Approach to Space Missions: An Engineering Management Assessment

NASA was chartered as an independent civilian space agency in 1958 following the Soviet Union's dramatic launch of the Sputnik 1 (1957). In his state of the union address in May of 1961, President Kennedy issued to the fledging organization his famous challenge for a manned lunar mission by the end of the decade. The Mercury, Gemini and Apollo programs that followed put the utmost value on high quality, low risk (as low as possible within the context of space flight), quick results, all with little regard for cost. These circumstances essentially melded NASAs culture as an organization capable of great technological achievement but at extremely high cost. The Space Shuttle project, the next major agency endeavor, was put under severe annual budget constraints in the 1970's. NASAs response was to hold to the high quality standards, low risk and annual cost and let schedule suffer. The result was a significant delay in the introduction of the Shuttle as well as overall total cost growth. By the early 1990's, because NASA's budget was declining, the number of projects was also declining. Holding the same cost and schedule productivity levels as before was essentially causing NASA to price itself out of business. In 1992, the helm of NASA was turned over to a new Administrator. Dan Goldin's mantra was "faster, better, cheaper" and his enthusiasm and determination to change the NASA culture was not to be ignored. This research paper documents the various implementations of "faster, better, cheaper" that have been attempted, analyzes their impact and compares the cost performance of these new projects to previous NASA benchmarks. Fundamentally, many elements of "faster, better, cheaper" are found to be working well, especially on smaller projects. Some of the initiatives are found to apply only to smaller or experimental projects however, so that extrapolation to "flagship" projects may be problematic.

Hamaker, Joseph W.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Accident Precursor Analysis and Management: Reducing Technological Risk Through Diligence

Almost every year there is at least one technological disaster that highlights the challenge of managing technological risk. On February 1, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia and her crew were lost during reentry into the atmosphere. In the summer of 2003, there was a blackout that left millions of people in the northeast United States without electricity. Forensic analyses, congressional hearings, investigations by scientific boards and panels, and journalistic and academic research have yielded a wealth of information about the events that led up to each disaster, and questions have arisen. Why were the events that led to the accident not recognized as harbingers? Why were risk-reducing steps not taken? This line of questioning is based on the assumption that signals before an accident can and should be recognized. To examine the validity of this assumption, the National Academy of Engineering (NAE) undertook the Accident Precursors Project in February 2003. The project was overseen by a committee of experts from the safety and risk-sciences communities. Rather than examining a single accident or incident, the committee decided to investigate how different organizations anticipate and assess the likelihood of accidents from accident precursors. The project culminated in a workshop held in Washington, D.C., in July 2003. This report includes the papers presented at the workshop, as well as findings and recommendations based on the workshop results and committee discussions. The papers describe precursor strategies in aviation, the chemical industry, health care, nuclear power and security operations. In addition to current practices, they also address some areas for future research.

Phimister, James R.↗

NASA NTRS2024

Measurements of Silicosis Factors in Lunar and Martian Simulants

Simulants are geologically complex materials that are developed to represent the physical and/or compositional characteristics of a planetary surface (e.g., a naturally occurring soil or regolith). There are dozens of commercially available simulants that have been developed over the years; each simulant exhibits unique physical, chemical, and mineralogical characteristics. Simulants are derived from either natural or synthetic sources (i.e., “feedstocks”) of glass, minerals, and rocks. These feedstock components are processed by crushing, pulverizing, melting, etc., and then combined in the appropriate proportions to represent a particular site, surface, or region (e.g., Lunar Highlands Regolith). The process of creating simulants therefore requires the mechanical breakdown and reincorporation of feedstock components which may contain crystalline silica minerals such as quartz, cristobalite, and tridymite. Certain crystalline silica particles of the respirable fraction (<10 μm in diameter) are of great concern; chronic and acute exposure to these respirable crystalline silica (RCS) can lead to permanent damage and scarring of lung tissue, incurable lung diseases (i.e., silicosis), lung cancer, COPD (chronic obstructive pulmonary disease), and kidney disease. Planetary simulants are used extensively as test materials in the in scientific and engineering communities (e.g., testing of dust mitigation technologies, in-situ resource utilization, rover mobility, hardware, soft goods etc.). As such, this assessment was developed to serve as a guide for simulant users, local Safety and Occupational Health professionals, and Industrial Hygienists to evaluate the risk of silicosis across a wide variety of Lunar and Martian simulants. The goal of these works is to ensure that those working with simulant can do so safely and with an informed understanding of potential health risks.

Lunar↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Measurements of Silicosis Factors in Lunar and Martian Simulants

Simulants are geologically complex materials that are developed to represent the physical and/or compositional characteristics of a planetary surface (e.g., a naturally occurring soil or regolith). There are dozens of commercially available simulants that have been developed over the years; each simulant exhibits unique physical, chemical, and mineralogical characteristics. Simulants are derived from either natural or synthetic sources (i.e., “feedstocks”) of glass, minerals, and rocks. These feedstock components are processed by crushing, pulverizing, melting, etc., and then combined in the appropriate proportions to represent a particular site, surface, or region (e.g., Lunar Highlands Regolith). The process of creating simulants therefore requires the mechanical breakdown and reincorporation of feedstock components which may contain crystalline silica minerals such as quartz, cristobalite, and tridymite. Certain crystalline silica particles of the respirable fraction (<10 μm in diameter) are of great concern; chronic and acute exposure to these respirable crystalline silica (RCS) can lead to permanent damage and scarring of lung tissue, incurable lung diseases (i.e., silicosis), lung cancer, COPD (chronic obstructive pulmonary disease), and kidney disease. Planetary simulants are used extensively as test materials in the in scientific and engineering communities (e.g., testing of dust mitigation technologies, in-situ resource utilization, rover mobility, hardware, soft goods etc.). As such, this assessment was developed to serve as a guide for simulant users, local Safety and Occupational Health professionals, and Industrial Hygienists to evaluate the risk of silicosis across a wide variety of Lunar and Martian simulants. The goal of these works is to ensure that those working with simulant can do so safely and with an informed understanding of potential health risks.

Lunar↗

NASA NTRS2024

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

NASA NTRS2014

Physics-based Entry, Descent and Landing Risk Model

A physics-based risk model was developed to assess the risk associated with thermal protection system failures during the entry, descent and landing phase of a manned spacecraft mission. In the model, entry trajectories were computed using a three-degree-of-freedom trajectory tool, the aerothermodynamic heating environment was computed using an engineering-level computational tool and the thermal response of the TPS material was modeled using a one-dimensional thermal response tool. The model was capable of modeling the effect of micrometeoroid and orbital debris impact damage on the TPS thermal response. A Monte Carlo analysis was used to determine the effects of uncertainties in the vehicle state at Entry Interface, aerothermodynamic heating and material properties on the performance of the TPS design. The failure criterion was set as a temperature limit at the bondline between the TPS and the underlying structure. Both direct computation and response surface approaches were used to compute the risk. The model was applied to a generic manned space capsule design. The effect of material property uncertainty and MMOD damage on risk of failure were analyzed. A comparison of the direct computation and response surface approach was undertaken.

descent and landing↗

NASA NTRS2017

Designing to Sample the Unknown: Lessons from OSIRIS-REx Project Systems Engineering

On September 8, 2016, the third NASA New Frontiers mission launched on an Atlas V 411. The Origins, Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification, Security-Regolith Explorer (OSIRIS-REx) will rendezvous with asteroid Bennu in 2018, collect a sample in 2020, and return that sample to Earth in September 2023. The development team has overcome a number of challenges in order to design and build a system that will make contact with an unexplored, airless, low-gravity body. This paper will provide an overview of the mission, then focus in on the system-level challenges and some of the key system-level processes. Some of the lessons here are unique to the type of mission, like discussion of operating at a largely-unknown, low-gravity object. Other lessons, particularly from the build phase, have broad implications. The OSIRIS-REx risk management process was particularly effective in achieving an on-time and under-budget development effort. The systematic requirements management and verification and the system validation also helped identify numerous potential problems. The final assessment of the OSIRIS-REx performance will need to wait until the sample is returned in 2023, but this post-launch assessment will capture some of the key systems-engineering lessons from the development team.

Asteroid↗

NASA NTRS2015

Hyperbolic Rendezvous at Mars: Risk Assessments and Mitigation Strategies

Given the current interest in the use of flyby trajectories for human Mars exploration, a key requirement is the capability to execute hyperbolic rendezvous. Hyperbolic rendezvous is used to transport crew from a Mars centered orbit, to a transiting Earth bound habitat that does a flyby. Representative cases are taken from future potential missions of this type, and a thorough sensitivity analysis of the hyperbolic rendezvous phase is performed. This includes early engine cutoff, missed burn times, and burn misalignment. A finite burn engine model is applied that assumes the hyperbolic rendezvous phase is done with at least two burns.

Jedrey, Ricky↗