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NASA NTRS1999

The Faster, Better, Cheaper Approach to Space Missions: An Engineering Management Assessment

NASA was chartered as an independent civilian space agency in 1958 following the Soviet Union's dramatic launch of the Sputnik 1 (1957). In his state of the union address in May of 1961, President Kennedy issued to the fledging organization his famous challenge for a manned lunar mission by the end of the decade. The Mercury, Gemini and Apollo programs that followed put the utmost value on high quality, low risk (as low as possible within the context of space flight), quick results, all with little regard for cost. These circumstances essentially melded NASAs culture as an organization capable of great technological achievement but at extremely high cost. The Space Shuttle project, the next major agency endeavor, was put under severe annual budget constraints in the 1970's. NASAs response was to hold to the high quality standards, low risk and annual cost and let schedule suffer. The result was a significant delay in the introduction of the Shuttle as well as overall total cost growth. By the early 1990's, because NASA's budget was declining, the number of projects was also declining. Holding the same cost and schedule productivity levels as before was essentially causing NASA to price itself out of business. In 1992, the helm of NASA was turned over to a new Administrator. Dan Goldin's mantra was "faster, better, cheaper" and his enthusiasm and determination to change the NASA culture was not to be ignored. This research paper documents the various implementations of "faster, better, cheaper" that have been attempted, analyzes their impact and compares the cost performance of these new projects to previous NASA benchmarks. Fundamentally, many elements of "faster, better, cheaper" are found to be working well, especially on smaller projects. Some of the initiatives are found to apply only to smaller or experimental projects however, so that extrapolation to "flagship" projects may be problematic.

Hamaker, Joseph W.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Electrical Characterizations of Lightning Strike Protection Techniques for Composite Materials

The growing application of composite materials in commercial aircraft manufacturing has significantly increased the risk of aircraft damage from lightning strikes. Composite aircraft designs require new mitigation strategies and engineering practices to maintain the same level of safety and protection as achieved by conductive aluminum skinned aircraft. Researchers working under the NASA Aviation Safety Program s Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) Project are investigating lightning damage on composite materials to support the development of new mitigation, diagnosis & prognosis techniques to overcome the increased challenges associated with lightning protection on composite aircraft. This paper provides an overview of the electrical characterizations being performed to support IVHM lightning damage diagnosis research on composite materials at the NASA Langley Research Center.

Szatkowski, George N.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Simulation of Mission Phases

This position with the Simulation and Graphics Branch (ER7) at Johnson Space Center (JSC) provided an introduction to vehicle hardware, mission planning, and simulation design. ER7 supports engineering analysis and flight crew training by providing high-fidelity, real-time graphical simulations in the Systems Engineering Simulator (SES) lab. The primary project assigned by NASA mentor and SES lab manager, Meghan Daley, was to develop a graphical simulation of the rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking (RPOD) phases of flight. The simulation is to include a generic crew/cargo transportation vehicle and a target object in low-Earth orbit (LEO). Various capsule, winged, and lifting body vehicles as well as historical RPOD methods were evaluated during the project analysis phase. JSC core mission to support the International Space Station (ISS), Commercial Crew Program (CCP), and Human Space Flight (HSF) influenced the project specifications. The simulation is characterized as a 30 meter +V Bar and/or -R Bar approach to the target object's docking station. The ISS was selected as the target object and the international Low Impact Docking System (iLIDS) was selected as the docking mechanism. The location of the target object's docking station corresponds with the RPOD methods identified. The simulation design focuses on Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) system architecture models with station keeping and telemetry data processing capabilities. The optical and inertial sensors, reaction control system thrusters, and the docking mechanism selected were based on CCP vehicle manufacturer's current and proposed technologies. A significant amount of independent study and tutorial completion was required for this project. Multiple primary source materials were accessed using the NASA Technical Report Server (NTRS) and reference textbooks were borrowed from the JSC Main Library and International Space Station Library. The Trick Simulation Environment and User Training Materials version 2013.0 release was used to complete the Trick tutorial. Multiple network privilege and repository permission requests were required in order to access previous simulation models. The project was also an introduction to computer programming and the Linux operating system. Basic C++ and Python syntax was used during the completion of the Trick tutorial. Trick's engineering analysis and Monte Carlo simulation capabilities were observed and basic space mission planning procedures were applied in the conceptual design phase. Multiple professional development opportunities were completed in addition to project duties during this internship through the System for Administration, Training, and Education Resources for NASA (SATERN). Topics include: JSC Risk Management Workshop, CCP Risk Management, Basic Radiation Safety Training, X-Ray Radiation Safety, Basic Laser Safety, JSC Export Control, ISS RISE Ambassador, Basic SharePoint 2013, Space Nutrition and Biochemistry, and JSC Personal Protective Equipment. Additionally, this internship afforded the opportunity for formal project presentation and public speaking practice. This was my first experience at a NASA center. After completing this internship I have a much clearer understanding of certain aspects of the agency's processes and procedures, as well as a deeper appreciation from spaceflight simulation design and testing. I will continue to improve my technical skills so that I may have another opportunity to return to NASA and Johnson Space Center.

Carlstrom, Nicholas Mercury↗

NASA NTRS1992

STGT program: Ada coding and architecture lessons learned

STGT (Second TDRSS Ground Terminal) is currently halfway through the System Integration Test phase (Level 4 Testing). To date, many software architecture and Ada language issues have been encountered and solved. This paper, which is the transcript of a presentation at the 3 Dec. meeting, attempts to define these lessons plus others learned regarding software project management and risk management issues, training, performance, reuse, and reliability. Observations are included regarding the use of particular Ada coding constructs, software architecture trade-offs during the prototyping, development and testing stages of the project, and dangers inherent in parallel or concurrent systems, software, hardware, and operations engineering.

Usavage, Paul↗

NASA NTRS2013

NASA's Commercial Crew Program, The Next Step in U.S. Space Transportation

The Commercial Crew Program (CCP) is leading NASA's efforts to develop the next U.S. capability for crew transportation and rescue services to and from the International Space Station (ISS) by the mid-decade timeframe. The outcome of this capability is expected to stimulate and expand the U.S. space transportation industry. NASA is relying on its decades of human space flight experience to certify U.S. crewed vehicles to the ISS and is doing so in a two phase certification approach. NASA Certification will cover all aspects of a crew transportation system, including development, test, evaluation, and verification; program management and control; flight readiness certification; launch, landing, recovery, and mission operations; sustaining engineering and maintenance/upgrades. To ensure NASA crew safety, NASA Certification will validate technical and performance requirements, verify compliance with NASA requirements, validate the crew transportation system operates in appropriate environments, and quantify residual risks.

Mango, Edward J.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Planetary Protection Program to Assure Mission Safety and Success

NASA’s planetary protection program seeks to understand and control harmful contamination of solar systems targets of exploration by terrestrial contamination and prevent harmful biological contamination of the Earth-Moon system by extraterrestrial life, should it exist. To accomplish these objective’s NASA has developed a balanced safety and mission assurance strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guidelines, workshops, scientiﬁc consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. Upcoming crewed missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as robotic missions to small solar system bodies, Europa, Titan and Mars are some of the driving activities of astrobiological interest that continue to emphasize the importance of planetary protection throughout the project life cycle. Development of a responsive and updated agency planetary protection policy has been a focus area in supporting upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include Mars sample return and crewed mission concepts. An extensive update of this policy is underway which encompasses crewed and robotic procedural polices, a general technical requirements standard, and an implementation handbook. During this timeframe NASA has been working with the international community to develop scientiﬁc consensus, and to identify and ﬁll in knowledge gaps for developing balanced policy guidelines, incorporation of risk informed decision making and quantitative technical standards. NASA has developed a planetary protection roadmap as a technology management strategy to track and monitor the development of each knowledge gaps. The Committee of Space Research (COSPAR) Policy on Planetary Protection and the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine’s Committee of Planetary Protection are used to inform updates to the planetary protection polices and guidelines. This integrated strategy for planetary protection seeks to provide a transparent, structured approach for enabling missions, providing guidance for NASA and NASA partnered missions, and being responsive to the increased interest and activities in space exploration whilst maintaining an understanding and control of harmful contamination.

James Benardini↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Planetary Protection Program to Assure Mission Safety and Success

NASA's planetary protection program seeks to understand and control harmful contamination of solar systems targets of exploration by terrestrial contamination and prevent harmful biological contamination of the Earth-Moon system by extraterrestrial life, should it exist. To accomplish these objective's NASA has developed a balanced safety and mission assurance strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guidelines, workshops, scientific consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. Upcoming crewed missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as robotic missions to small solar system bodies, Europa, Titan and Mars are some of the driving activities of astrobiological interest that continue to emphasize the importance of planetary protection throughout the project life cycle.Development of a responsive and updated agency planetary protection policy has been a focus area in supporting upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include Mars sample return and crewed mission concepts. An extensive update of this policy is underway which encompasses crewed and robotic procedural polices, a general technical requirements standard, and an implementation handbook. During this timeframe NASA has been working with the international community to develop scientific consensus, and to identify and fill in knowledge gaps for developing balanced policy guidelines, incorporation of risk informed decision making and quantitative technical standards. NASA has developed a planetary protection roadmap as a technology management strategy to track and monitor the development of each knowledge gaps. The Committee of Space Research (COSPAR) Policy on Planetary Protection and the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine's Committee of Planetary Protection are used to inform updates to the planetary protection polices and guidelines. This integrated strategy for planetary protection seeks to provide a transparent, structured approach for enabling missions, providing guidance for NASA and NASA partnered missions, and being responsive to the increased interest and activities in space exploration whilst maintaining an understanding and control of harmful contamination.

Planetary Protection↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Ensuring Safety of Government Personnel During Suborbital Spaceflight

The NASA Suborbital Crew (SubC) office is focused on enabling flights by NASA civil servants, such as scientists and engineers conducting research, on suborbital vehicles. A broader goal is ensuring that commercial human spaceflight is both viable and safe. Within the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), the SubC office is exploring game-changing methods to perform safety assessments to enable NASA personnel to fly on suborbital missions. Commercial suborbital space flight capabilities are anticipated to be more accessible, affordable, and available than missions to the International Space Station and could provide additional opportunities for testing and qualification of space flight hardware, human-tended microgravity research, and further cutting-edge research enabled by the space environment. Although NASA currently supports human tended suborbital payloads for non-civil servants under auspices of NASA’s Flight Opportunities Program, the SubC effort will enable civil servant scientists, researchers, and engineers to accompany their experiments and tests into the space microgravity environment.

Risk Management↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗

NASA NTRS2014

iPAS: AES Flight System Technology Maturation for Human Spaceflight

In order to realize the vision of expanding human presence in space, NASA will develop new technologies that can enable future crewed spacecraft to go far beyond Earth orbit. These technologies must be matured to the point that future project managers can accept the risk of incorporating them safely and effectively within integrated spacecraft systems, to satisfy very challenging mission requirements. The technologies must also be applied and managed within an operational context that includes both on-board crew and mission support on Earth. The Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Program is one part of the NASA strategy to identify and develop key capabilities for human spaceflight, and mature them for future use. To support this initiative, the Integrated Power Avionics and Software (iPAS) environment has been developed that allows engineers, crew, and flight operators to mature promising technologies into applicable capabilities, and to assess the value of these capabilities within a space mission context. This paper describes the development of the integration environment to support technology maturation and risk reduction, and offers examples of technology and mission demonstrations executed to date.

Othon, William L.↗

DOE OSTI2025

Failure Analysis–Informed Risk Assessment Framework for Geological Carbon Storage Using Numerical Simulation and Machine Learning

Geological carbon storage (GCS) is recognized as a critical technology for achieving large-scale reductions in anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions. Ensuring long-term containment and safety requires robust risk assessment frameworks that account for geological uncertainty and identify potential failure scenarios. Among various indicators, the area of review (AoR) serves as a key metric for evaluating storage performance, regulatory compliance, and monitoring design, as it delineates the spatial extent impacted by pressure buildup and plume migration. However, conventional AoR-based risk assessments typically perturb parameters within narrow uncertainty bounds, potentially overlooking rare but high-impact events arising from extreme geological conditions. In this study, we present a failure analysis–informed risk assessment framework for large-scale GCS projects to improve site prescreening and monitoring design. A suite of 300 numerical simulations was generated using stochastic geological models that vary five key parameters: net-to-gross ratio, anisotropy azimuth, porosity multiplier, permeability multiplier, and vertical-to-horizontal permeability ratio. Among these, 200 realizations represent normal geological uncertainty, while 100 additional cases explore extreme yet plausible conditions for failure-case analysis. The AoR was simulated and computed from pressure and CO 2 saturation fields, where the baseline AoR boundary, representing the extent predicted under typical geological uncertainty, was defined as the union of 200 normal-range simulations, and failure was identified when extreme-range cases exceeded this baseline. Results show that incorporating broader parameter uncertainty produces significantly larger AoR extents, underscoring the potential underestimation of risk under conventional uncertainty ranges. Furthermore, spatial probability maps derived from failure-induced AoR exceedance identify regions requiring enhanced monitoring attention. Various machine learning (ML)–based classifiers were developed to predict failure occurrence from geological parameters, with the random forest model achieving the highest performance (F1-score of 0.986). Consistent findings from correlation coefficient, feature importance, and Sobol sensitivity analyses reveal that low net-to-gross ratios and permeability multipliers are the dominant risk drivers, reflecting reduced reservoir connectivity and limited pressure dissipation. Altogether, these results provide a novel framework for risk-informed site prescreening and monitoring design that explicitly considers rare but high-impact geological scenarios in GCS projects.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

NASA NTRS1978

Engineering in the 21st century

Reasonable evolutionary trends in federal outlays for aerospace research and development predict a continuing decline in real resources (1970 dollars) until the mid eighties, and a growth thereafter to the 1970 level by 2000, still well below the 1966 peak. Employment levels will parallel this trend with no shortage of available personnel foreseen. These trends characterize a maturing industry. Shifts in outlook toward the economic use of resources, rather than minimum risk at any cost, and toward missions aligned with societal needs and broad national goals will accompany these trends. These shifts in outlook will arise in part in academia, and will, in turn, influence engineering education. By 2000, space technology will have achieved major advances in the management of information, in space transportation, in space structures, and in energy. The economics of space systems must be the primary consideration if the space program foreseen for the 21st century is to become an actuality.

Mccarthy, J. F., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS1993

A plume spectroscopy system for flight applications

An operational plume spectroscopy system will be an important element of any rocket engine health management system (HMS). The flight capable FPI spectrometer will enable prognosis and response to incipient rocket engine failures as well as diagnosis of wear and degradation for on-condition maintenance. Spectrometer application to development programs, such as the Space Lifter, NASP, and SSTO, will reduce program risks, allow better adherence to schedules and save money by reducing or eliminating redesign and test costs. The diagnostic capability of a proven, calibrated spectrometer will enhance post-burn certification of high value, reusable engines, such as the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), where life and reliability are key cost drivers. This paper describes a prototype FPI spectrometer for demonstration and validation testing on NASA's Technology Test Bed Engine (TTBE) at Marshall Space Flight Center. The TTBE test unit is designed with flight prototype optics and a commercial off-the-shelf data processing system.

Makel, D. B.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Enhancing Interdisciplinary Human System Risk Research Through Modeling and Network Approaches

NASA's Human Research Program (HRP) supports research to reduce human health and performance risks inherent in future human space exploration missions. Understanding risk outcomes and contributing factors in an integrated manner allows HRP research to support development of efficient and effective mitigations from cross‐disciplinary perspectives, and to enable resilient human and engineered systems for spaceflight. The purpose of this work is to support scientific collaborations and research portfolio management by utilizing modeling for analysis and visualization of current and potential future interdisciplinary efforts.

Mindock, Jennifer↗

NASA NTRS2019

Radiation Hardness Assurance: Evolving for NewSpace

During the past decade, government agencies, private companies and academic institutions, have launched hundreds of small satellites into space, with dramatically expanded dependence on advanced commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies and systems required for mission success. While the radiation effects vulnerabilities of components within small satellites are the same as those of their larger, traditional relatives, revised approaches are needed for risk management because of differences in technical requirements and programmatic resources. While moving to COTS components and systems may reduce direct costs and procurement lead times, it undermines many cost-reduction strategies used for conventional radiation hardness assurance (RHA). Limited resources are accompanied by a lack of radiation testing and analysis, which can pose significant risks. Small satellites have benefited from short mission durations in low Earth orbits with respect to their radiation response, but as mission objectives grow and become reliant on advanced technologies operating for longer and in harsher environments, requirements need to reflect the changing scope without hindering developers that provide new capabilities. In this course we suggest RHA strategies that engineers and scientists can apply to a wide range of aerospace systems, including constellations, with a focus on how to manage aggressive system scaling for smaller platforms.

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA)↗

NASA NTRS2014

Imagery Integration Team

The Human Exploration Science Office (KX) provides leadership for NASA's Imagery Integration (Integration 2) Team, an affiliation of experts in the use of engineering-class imagery intended to monitor the performance of launch vehicles and crewed spacecraft in flight. Typical engineering imagery assessments include studying and characterizing the liftoff and ascent debris environments; launch vehicle and propulsion element performance; in-flight activities; and entry, landing, and recovery operations. Integration 2 support has been provided not only for U.S. Government spaceflight (e.g., Space Shuttle, Ares I-X) but also for commercial launch providers, such as Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) and Orbital Sciences Corporation, servicing the International Space Station. The NASA Integration 2 Team is composed of imagery integration specialists from JSC, the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), who have access to a vast pool of experience and capabilities related to program integration, deployment and management of imagery assets, imagery data management, and photogrammetric analysis. The Integration 2 team is currently providing integration services to commercial demonstration flights, Exploration Flight Test-1 (EFT-1), and the Space Launch System (SLS)-based Exploration Missions (EM)-1 and EM-2. EM-2 will be the first attempt to fly a piloted mission with the Orion spacecraft. The Integration 2 Team provides the customer (both commercial and Government) with access to a wide array of imagery options - ground-based, airborne, seaborne, or vehicle-based - that are available through the Government and commercial vendors. The team guides the customer in assembling the appropriate complement of imagery acquisition assets at the customer's facilities, minimizing costs associated with market research and the risk of purchasing inadequate assets. The NASA Integration 2 capability simplifies the process of securing one-of-a-kind imagery assets and skill sets, such as ground-based fixed and tracking cameras, crew-in the-loop imaging applications, and the integration of custom or commercial-off-the-shelf sensors onboard spacecraft. For spaceflight applications, the Integration 2 Team leverages modeling, analytical, and scientific resources along with decades of experience and lessons learned to assist the customer in optimizing engineering imagery acquisition and management schemes for any phase of flight - launch, ascent, on-orbit, descent, and landing. The Integration 2 Team guides the customer in using NASA's world-class imagery analysis teams, which specialize in overcoming inherent challenges associated with spaceflight imagery sets. Precision motion tracking, two-dimensional (2D) and three-dimensional (3D) photogrammetry, image stabilization, 3D modeling of imagery data, lighting assessment, and vehicle fiducial marking assessments are available. During a mission or test, the Integration 2 Team provides oversight of imagery operations to verify fulfillment of imagery requirements. The team oversees the collection, screening, and analysis of imagery to build a set of imagery findings. It integrates and corroborates the imagery findings with other mission data sets, generating executive summaries to support time-critical mission decisions.

Calhoun, Tracy↗

DOE OSTI2025

Progress on the MARVEL Cybersecurity by Design Model-Based Systems Engineering Project

Formal model-based systems engineering (MBSE) combines a model, systems thinking, and systems engineering to visually depict the boundaries, context, and behavior of interconnected systems, facilitating effective design, development, and utilization of engineered systems throughout the systems engineering lifecycle. Although nuclear reactor vendors employ these tools to integrate functionality, performance, and safety, they are not yet addressing digital risk concerns introduced by use of operational technology, such as digital instrumentation and control systems. To accomplish this objective, the Microreactor Applications Research Validation and EvaLuation (MARVEL) microreactor was used as an MBSE case study. This real-world application provides a first-of-a-kind opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of integrating digital risk and cybersecurity into the MBSE design process of a nuclear reactor. This paper provides an update of the ongoing MARVEL Cyber MBSE project as it specifically relates to the integration of digital risk management and cybersecurity by design.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NASA NTRS2013

Probing Aircraft Flight Test Hazard Mitigation for the Alternative Fuel Effects on Contrails & Cruise Emissions (ACCESS) Research Team

The Alternative Fuel Effects on Contrails & Cruise Emissions (ACCESS) Project Integration Manager requested in July 2012 that the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) form a team to independently assess aircraft structural failure hazards associated with the ACCESS experiment and to identify potential flight test hazard mitigations to ensure flight safety. The ACCESS Project Integration Manager subsequently requested that the assessment scope be focused predominantly on structural failure risks to the aircraft empennage raft empennage.

Kelly, Michael J.↗