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At least 307 records · Page 17

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NASA NTRS2015

Intelligent Design and Intelligent Failure

Good Evening, my name is Greg Jerman and for nearly a quarter century I have been performing failure analysis on NASA's aerospace hardware. During that time I had the distinct privilege of keeping the Space Shuttle flying for two thirds of its history. I have analyzed a wide variety of failed hardware from simple electrical cables to cryogenic fuel tanks to high temperature turbine blades. During this time I have found that for all the time we spend intelligently designing things, we need to be equally intelligent about understanding why things fail. The NASA Flight Director for Apollo 13, Gene Kranz, is best known for the expression "Failure is not an option." However, NASA history is filled with failures both large and small, so it might be more accurate to say failure is inevitable. It is how we react and learn from our failures that makes the difference.

Jerman, Gregory↗

NASA NTRS2015

Predicting Time Series Outputs and Time-to-Failure for an Aircraft Controller Using Bayesian Modeling

Safety of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) is paramount, but the large number of dynamically changing controller parameters makes it hard to determine if the system is currently stable, and the time before loss of control if not. We propose a hierarchical statistical model using Treed Gaussian Processes to predict (i) whether a flight will be stable (success) or become unstable (failure), (ii) the time-to-failure if unstable, and (iii) time series outputs for flight variables. We first classify the current flight input into success or failure types, and then use separate models for each class to predict the time-to-failure and time series outputs. As different inputs may cause failures at different times, we have to model variable length output curves. We use a basis representation for curves and learn the mappings from input to basis coefficients. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our prediction methods on a NASA neuro-adaptive flight control system.

Statistics↗

NASA NTRS2016

Orion Burn Management, Nominal and Response to Failures

An approach for managing Orion on-orbit burn execution is described for nominal and failure response scenarios. The burn management strategy for Orion takes into account per-burn variations in targeting, timing, and execution; crew and ground operator intervention and overrides; defined burn failure triggers and responses; and corresponding on-board software sequencing functionality. Burn-to- burn variations are managed through the identification of specific parameters that may be updated for each progressive burn. Failure triggers and automatic responses during the burn timeframe are defined to provide safety for the crew in the case of vehicle failures, along with override capabilities to ensure operational control of the vehicle. On-board sequencing software provides the timeline coordination for performing the required activities related to targeting, burn execution, and responding to burn failures.

Odegard, Ryan↗

NASA NTRS2016

Analysis and Characterization of Damage and Failure Utilizing a Generalized Composite Material Model Suitable for Use in Impact Problems

A material model which incorporates several key capabilities which have been identified by the aerospace community as lacking in state-of-the art composite impact models is under development. In particular, a next generation composite impact material model, jointly developed by the FAA and NASA, is being implemented into the commercial transient dynamic finite element code LS-DYNA. The material model, which incorporates plasticity, damage, and failure, utilizes experimentally based tabulated input to define the evolution of plasticity and damage and the initiation of failure as opposed to specifying discrete input parameters (such as modulus and strength). The plasticity portion of the orthotropic, three-dimensional, macroscopic composite constitutive model is based on an extension of the Tsai-Wu composite failure model into a generalized yield function with a non-associative flow rule. For the damage model, a strain equivalent formulation is utilized to allow for the uncoupling of the deformation and damage analyses. In the damage model, a semi-coupled approach is employed where the overall damage in a particular coordinate direction is assumed to be a multiplicative combination of the damage in that direction resulting from the applied loads in the various coordinate directions. Due to the fact that the plasticity and damage models are uncoupled, test procedures and methods to both characterize the damage model and to covert the material stress-strain curves from the true (damaged) stress space to the effective (undamaged) stress space have been developed. A methodology has been developed to input the experimentally determined composite failure surface in a tabulated manner. An analytical approach is then utilized to track how close the current stress state is to the failure surface.

Finite Element Method↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The System Complexity Metric (SCM) Predicts System Costs and Failure Rates

A complex system has many parts and interactions and so is difficult to understand. Systems with higher complexity generally have higher costs and failure rates. A System Complexity Metric (SCM) is defined to be the sum of the number of nodes, N, in the system block diagram plus the number of one-way interactions, I, between the nodes. SCM = N + I. SCMs are easily determined by direct inspection of high level block diagrams of life support systems. System cost was found to be directly proportional to SCM. The system MTBF (Mean Time Before Failure) is the inverse of the system failure rate. MTBF = 1/f. The system MTBF was found to be proportional to SCM^(-2.2) for estimated preflight MTBFs. As is typical for systems that are not extensively tested and redesigned to eliminate unexpected failure modes, the life support flight failure rates were about ten times higher than the preflight estimates and the MTBFs one-tenth the preflight estimates. The system MTBF was found to be proportional to SCM^(-2.6) for observed flight MTBFs.

System compleity↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Investigation of Rectifier Diode Failures in the NEXT-C Power Processing Unit

NASA's Evolutionary Xenon Thruster-Commercial (NEXT-C) project is tasked with developing flight electric propulsion systems, including both thrusters and power processing units (PPUs). In 2018, the beam supply in a NEXT-C engineering prototype PPU experienced an output rectifier diode failure during development thermal-vacuum testing. A failure investigation led by NASA GRC identified the root cause of the failure as a thermal runaway caused by increased reverse recovery losses in the diodes when the PPU was run at its maximum operating temperature. Significant reverse recovery performance variations were identified in diodes with the same part number but manufactured by different vendors. The failure investigation was able to collect evidence of the increased reverse recovery and replicate the diode failures in a controlled laboratory environment.

George L Thomas↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Investigation of Rectifier Diode Failures in the NEXT-C Power Processing Unit

George L. Thomas↗

NASA NTRS2022

A Discussion of the Failure of a Quad Diode Module and Efforts to Assure the Flight Spares

In 2019 the International Space Station (ISS) experienced an on on-orbit failure that affected 1 of 28 Battery Charge Discharge Units (BCDUs). Telemetry pointed to a short circuit failure of a Power Rectifier Quad Diode Module. Astronauts removed the failed unit from service which was then returned to Earth for failure analysis. The failure analysis confirmed that the quad diode module had failed short circuit. The investigation identified silver dendrites had grown on the insulated, sloped edge of the mesa semiconductor die of the failed diode and also a 2nd diode in the same quad diode module. Voids between the diode’s protective encapsulating ring and the die provided space within which dendrites were able to form and cause catastrophic failure. The NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) convened a EEE Parts Sub-Team to investigate root cause and to assist with risk assessment for all of the flight diode modules (4 distinct production lots) and the flight spares (from a 5th lot). Analysis of the original diode manufacturer’s read and record screening test data identified some lots which contained diodes with parametric instabilities that could signal conditions suited for silver dendrite formation. Computed Tomography (CT) X-ray screening inspection was performed on flight spare modules to identify diodes that do not exhibit voids between the edge of die and encapsulating ring as a mitigation against dendrite formation.

Jay Brusse↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Successes and Failures of Metal Additive Manufacturing for Rocket Engines

NASA has been developing additive manufacturing (AM) for various technical and programmatic advantages for complex rocket engine and aerospace components. This maturation has focused on various AM processes, new alloys, characterizing material properties, developing standards, producing demonstrator parts, and integrating AM hardware in liquid rocket engines through test-fail-fix cycles, as well as application and dissemination of lessons learned of the AM lifecycle. The importance of proper AM processing was made evident in the failure of a Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) copper-alloy combustion chamber during a hot-fire test due to a degraded material quality. The hot-fire test aimed to demonstrate high duty cycle under a risk-tolerant development project, where consequences of component failure would be minimal. However, the unintentional component failure emphasized the necessity of robust material characterization and rigorous process control procedures for the safe use of AM components in critical applications. This presentation provides an overview of the development failure, a discussion on the evaluation of the failed chamber and supplemental chambers produced at the same time, a representative material samples that included intentional build witness lines, and a summary of the key results and recommendations from the evaluations. NASA continues to approach AM processes and designs with a level of risk and acceptance of failures that is appropriate for the project objectives, with the overall goal of safe implementation of AM technology and transferring AM technology into commercial space applications. This presentation with provide critical awareness to the community lessons learned on proper implementation of AM.

Additive Manufacturing↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Spaceflight Over the Last Ten Years: Failures and Fix-ups 2013 - 2022 RAMS XV Conference

This project is an overview and analysis of the past ten years (2013 – present) in global spaceflight, highlighting the orbital launches of countries, particularly the failures that occurred, the reasons they occurred, and a breakdown of the related statistics and background information. The analysis is conducted from a perspective of reliability and maintainability engineering and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to formulate a quantifiable understanding of the data and how it is pertinent to Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) in spaceflight. There is a breakdown by country or group, timelines, and number of launches. The failures over the years are categorized, all given a broad analysis of subsystem failures and details of events. A few failures are given a more in-depth analysis of root causes and failure modes determined by their unique or common nature. The data is retrieved from online, publicly available sources.

Quinn Slaugenhoupt↗

NASA NTRS2025

Localization of Ad-Hoc Lunar Constellations in Communication Failure Modes for Distributed Spacecraft Autonomy

As Lunar missions increase in complexity, inspired by NASA’s Artemis Program, they will require reliable and sufficient Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) capability to support the upcoming Lunar users. The navigation service should also be compatible with the smaller platforms, like CubeSats, being sent by the public and private sectors. A non-dedicated, ad-hoc Lunar navigation constellation can provide PNT services on-demand using the non-dedicated swarm assets. Swarm members cooperatively and autonomously localize themselves with minimal interaction from Earth, freeing up valuable bandwidth and ground segment resources. The autonomous localization of Lunar constellations utilizes neighbor two-way intersatellite link (ISL) measurements in a distributed extended Kalman filter (DEKF) system to minimize operating costs. Because the decentralized Lunar PNT system relies on relay communication amongst the agents, network failures or loss of assets among ad-hoc Lunar constellations may impact localization performance. This study presents an evaluation of localization performance under increasing levels of network degradation. A simulation of an ad-hoc Lunar PNT swarm is augmented to include system faults and the impacts of intermittent and permanent failures on localization performance are evaluated. We investigate three potential causes of network degradation: single spacecraft loss, multiple spacecraft loss, and antenna failure. The numerical assessments from the simulation show that the LPNT system under study, based on an autonomous decentralized concept of operation, is highly robust and resilient to communication failures. Minor faults, such as single spacecraft loss, solar interference, technical malfunctions, message delays, and antenna outages, have minimal impact on state estimation, with only a 4.47% and 3.75% degradation in median position error for assets and a representative ground user, respectively, compared to an ideal communication scenario. However, major faults, such as hardware failures or meteor strikes leading to the loss of multiple spacecrafts, are more concerning. The permanent loss of three spacecraft results in a more severe performance degradation, with median position error increasing by 23.3% for assets and 11.7% for a representative ground user, despite the Lunar PNT system remaining functional.

Yeji Kim↗

NASA NTRS2005

On Automating Failure Mode Analysis and Enforcing its Integrity

This paper reports our experience on the development of a design-for-safety (DFS) workbench called Risk Assessment and Management Environment (RAME) for microelectronic avionics systems. Our objective is to transform DFS practice from an ad-hoc, inefficient, error-prone approach to a stringent engineering process such that DFS can keep up with the rapidly growing complexity of avionics systems. In particular, RAME is built upon an information infrastructure that comprises a fault model, a knowledge base, and a failure reporting/tracking system. This infrastructure permits systematic learning from prior projects and enables the automation of failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA). Among other unique features, the most important advantage of RAME is its capability of directly accepting design source code in hardware description languages (HDLs) for automated failure mode analysis, which enables RAME to be compatible and to evolve with most electronic-computer-aided-design systems. Through an initial experimental evaluation of the RAME prototype, we show that our approach to FMECA automation improves failure mode analysis turn-around-time, completeness, and accuracy.

design for safety↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Automated Addressing Failure Detection for Multiplexer Systems

Multiplexers are electronic devices which select between several input signals and deliver an output signal. Also known as data selectors or mux, multiplexers are commonly used in circuit design to provide signal switching, simplify hardware and manufacturing, and decrease cost. Systems which use a digital mux as a switch or selector are vulnerable to events called addressing failures, arising in hardware or software. An addressing failure results in the system requesting, or the mux delivering, a data signal other than the one intended. The unintended use of this erroneous signal may lead to system-level failures. This paper discusses a novel method of automatic detection for addressing failures, utilizing multiplexer channelization and a monitoring algorithm.

multiplexer↗

NASA NTRS1994

Ampoule failure sensor development for semiconductor crystal growth experiments

Currently there are no devices to detect an ampoule failure in semiconductor crystal growth experiments. If an ampoule fails, it will go undetected until the containing cartridge is breached due to chemical degradation. The experiment will then be terminated resulting in a failed experiment and a loss of data. The objective of this research was to develop a reliable failure sensor that would detect a specific liquid or vapor material before the metallic cartridge is degraded and the processing furnace contaminated. The sensor is a chemical fuse made from a metal with which the semiconductor material reacts more rapidly than it does with the containing cartridge. Upon ampoule failure, the sensor is exposed to the vapor or liquid semiconductor and the chemical reaction causes a resistance change in the sensor material. The sensor shows a step change in resistance on the order of megohms when exposed to mercury zinc telluride (HgZnTe), mercury cadmium telluride (HgCdTe), or gallium arsenide (GaAs). This ampoule failure sensor is being tested for possible use on the second United States Microgravity Mission (USML-2) and is the subject of a NASA patent application.

CHEMICAL FUSE↗

NASA NTRS1992

Alterations in left ventricular diastolic function in conscious dogs with pacing-induced heart failure

We investigated in conscious dogs (a) the effects of heart failure induced by chronic rapid ventricular pacing on the sequence of development of left ventricular (LV) diastolic versus systolic dysfunction and (b) whether the changes were load dependent or secondary to alterations in structure. LV systolic and diastolic dysfunction were evident within 24 h after initiation of pacing and occurred in parallel over 3 wk. LV systolic function was reduced at 3 wk, i.e., peak LV dP/dt fell by -1,327 +/- 105 mmHg/s and ejection fraction by -22 +/- 2%. LV diastolic dysfunction also progressed over 3 wk of pacing, i.e., tau increased by +14.0 +/- 2.8 ms and the myocardial stiffness constant by +6.5 +/- 1.4, whereas LV chamber stiffness did not change. These alterations were associated with increases in LV end-systolic (+28.6 +/- 5.7 g/cm2) and LV end-diastolic stresses (+40.4 +/- 5.3 g/cm2). When stresses and heart rate were matched at the same levels in the control and failure states, the increases in tau and myocardial stiffness were no longer observed, whereas LV systolic function remained depressed. There were no increases in connective tissue content in heart failure. Thus, pacing-induced heart failure in conscious dogs is characterized by major alterations in diastolic function which are reversible with normalization of increased loading condition.

NASA Discipline Cardiopulmonary↗

NASA NTRS1993

Test-to-Failure of a Two-Grid, 30-cm-dia. Ion Accelerator System

To determine the failure mechanism and erosion characteristics of an ion accelerator system due to erosion by charge-exchange ions a test was performed in which a 30-cm-diameter, 2-grid ion accelerator system was tested to failure. The erosion charcteristics observed in this test, however, imply significantly shorter accelerator grid life times than typically stated in the literature. Finally, the test suggests that structural failure is probably not the most likely first failure mechanism for the accelerator grid.

distortion↗

NASA NTRS2013

The Effect of Fiber Strength Stochastics and Local Fiber Volume Fraction on Multiscale Progressive Failure of Composites

Continuous fiber unidirectional polymer matrix composites (PMCs) can exhibit significant local variations in fiber volume fraction as a result of processing conditions that can lead to further local differences in material properties and failure behavior. In this work, the coupled effects of both local variations in fiber volume fraction and the empirically-based statistical distribution of fiber strengths on the predicted longitudinal modulus and local tensile strength of a unidirectional AS4 carbon fiber/ Hercules 3502 epoxy composite were investigated using the special purpose NASA Micromechanics Analysis Code with Generalized Method of Cells (MAC/GMC); local effective composite properties were obtained by homogenizing the material behavior over repeating units cells (RUCs). The predicted effective longitudinal modulus was relatively insensitive to small (~8%) variations in local fiber volume fraction. The composite tensile strength, however, was highly dependent on the local distribution in fiber strengths. The RUC-averaged constitutive response can be used to characterize lower length scale material behavior within a multiscale analysis framework that couples the NASA code FEAMAC and the ABAQUS finite element solver. Such an approach can be effectively used to analyze the progressive failure of PMC structures whose failure initiates at the RUC level. Consideration of the effect of local variations in constituent properties and morphologies on progressive failure of PMCs is a central aspect of the application of Integrated Computational Materials Engineering (ICME) principles for composite materials.

multiscale analysis↗

NASA NTRS2015

Reliability and Failure in NASA Missions: Blunders, Normal Accidents, High Reliability, Bad Luck

NASA emphasizes crew safety and system reliability but several unfortunate failures have occurred. The Apollo 1 fire was mistakenly unanticipated. After that tragedy, the Apollo program gave much more attention to safety. The Challenger accident revealed that NASA had neglected safety and that management underestimated the high risk of shuttle. Probabilistic Risk Assessment was adopted to provide more accurate failure probabilities for shuttle and other missions. NASA's "faster, better, cheaper" initiative and government procurement reform led to deliberately dismantling traditional reliability engineering. The Columbia tragedy and Mars mission failures followed. Failures can be attributed to blunders, normal accidents, or bad luck. Achieving high reliability is difficult but possible.

accidents↗