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At least 307 records · Page 17

Post-Closure Inspection and Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 417: Central Nevada Test Area Surface, Hot Creek Valley, Nevada

This report presents data collected during the annual post-closure site inspection conducted at the Central Nevada Test Area Surface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 417 in May of 2008. The annual post-closure site inspection included inspections of the UC-1, UC-3, and UC-4 sites in accordance with the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan provided in the CAU 417 Closure Report (NNSA/NV 2001). The annual inspection conducted at the UC-1 Central Mud Pit (CMP) indicated that the site and soil cover were in good condition. Three new cracks or fractures were observed in the soil cover during the annual inspection and were immediately filled with bentonite chips. The vegetation on the soil cover was adequate, but showed signs of the area's ongoing drought. No issues were identified with the CMP fence, gate, or subsidence monuments. No issues were identified with the warning signs and monuments at the other two UC-1 locations. The annual subsidence survey was conducted at UC-1 CMP and UC-4 Mud Pit C in August 2008. The results of the subsidence surveys indicate that the covers are performing as expected, and no unusual subsidence was observed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Closure Inspection Letter Report for Corrective Action Units on the Nevada National Security Site: Calendar Year 2013

This letter serves as the post-closure inspection letter report for Corrective Action Units (CAUs) on the Nevada National Security Site for calendar year 2013. The inspections identified maintenance and repair is required at the following sites: sign and/or fence repair is necessary at CAUs 113, 137, 139, 140, 143, 262, 370, 371, 372, 374, 476, 478, 529, 542, and 560; animal burrows were identified at CAU 547; and erosion was identified at CAUs 366, 367, 383, 551, and 574. In addition, the following use restrictions were removed during 2013 and will no longer be inspected in 2014: 165, 357, and 528.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, for Fiscal Year 2014

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for several Corrective Action Units (CAUs). The locations of the sites are shown in Figure 1. This report covers fiscal year 2014 (October 2013–September 2014). The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 and summarized in each CAU-specific section in Section 1.0 of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted semiannually at CAUs 90 and 91 and quarterly at CAUs 92, 110, 111, and 112. Additional inspections are conducted at CAU 92 if precipitation occurs in excess of 0.50 inches (in.) in a 24-hour period and at CAU 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 in. in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. In addition to visual inspections, soil moisture monitoring, vegetation evaluations, and subsidence surveys are conducted at CAU 110. At CAU 111, soil moisture monitoring, vegetation evaluations, subsidence surveys, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are conducted. The results of the vegetation surveys and an analysis of the soil moisture monitoring data at CAU 110 are presented in this report. Results of additional monitoring at CAU 111 are documented annually in the Nevada National Security Site Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites and in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, which will be prepared in approximately June 2015. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. It is recommended to continue inspections and monitoring as scheduled.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

2015 DOE Final UF Report. Effects of Warming the Deep Soil and Permafrost on Ecosystem Carbon Balance in Alaskan Tundra. A Coupled Measurement and Modeling Approach

The major research goal of this project was to understand and quantify the fate of carbon stored in permafrost ecosystems using a combination of field and laboratory experiments to measure isotope ratios and C fluxes in a tundra ecosystem exposed to experimental warming. Field measurements centered on the establishment of a two-factor experimental warming using a snow fence and open top chambers to increase winter and summer temperatures alone, and in combination, at a tundra field site at the Eight Mile Lake watershed near Healy, Alaska. The objective of this experimental warming was to significantly raise air and deep soil temperatures and increase the depth of thaw beyond that of previous warming experiments. Detecting the loss and fate of the old permafrost C pool remains a major challenge. Because soil C has been accumulating in these ecosystems over the past 10,000 years, there is a strong difference between the radiocarbon isotopic composition of C deep in the soil profile and permafrost compared to that near the soil surface. This large range of isotopic variability is unique to radiocarbon and provides a valuable and sensitive fingerprint for detecting the loss of old soil C as permafrost thaws.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Carbon Absorber Retrofit Equipment (CARE)

During Project DE-FE0007528, CARE (Carbon Absorber Retrofit Equipment), Neumann Systems Group (NSG) designed, installed and tested a 0.5MW NeuStream® carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) capture system using the patented NeuStream® absorber equipment and concentrated (6 molal) piperazine (PZ) as the solvent at Colorado Springs Utilities’ (CSU’s) Martin Drake pulverized coal (PC) power plant. The 36 month project included design, build and test phases. The 0.5MW NeuStream® CO 2 capture system was successfully tested on flue gas from both coal and natural gas combustion sources and was shown to meet project objectives. Ninety percent CO 2 removal was achieved with greater than 95% CO 2 product purity. The absorbers tested support a 90% reduction in absorber volume compared to packed towers and with an absorber parasitic power of less than 1% when configured for operation with a 550MW coal plant. The preliminary techno-economic analysis (TEA) performed by the Energy and Environmental Research Center (EERC) predicted an over-the-fence cost of $25.73/tonne of CO 2 captured from a sub-critical PC plant.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Analysis of Debris Trajectories at the Scaled Wind Farm Technology (SWiFT) Facility

Sandia National Laboratories operates the Scaled Wind Farm Technology Facility (SWiFT) on behalf of the Department of Energy Wind and Water Power Technologies Office. An analysis was performed to evaluate the hazards associated with debris thrown from one of SWiFT’s operating wind turbines, assuming a catastrophic failure. A Monte Carlo analysis was conducted to assess the complex variable space associated with debris throw hazards that included wind speed, wind direction, azimuth and pitch angles of the blade, and percentage of the blade that was separated. In addition, a set of high fidelity explicit dynamic finite element simulations were performed to determine the threshold impact energy envelope for the turbine control building located on-site. Assuming that all of the layered, independent, passive and active engineered safety systems and administrative procedures failed (a 100% failure rate of the safety systems), the likelihood of the control building being struck was calculated to be less than 5/10,000 and ballistic simulations showed that the control building would not provide passive protection for the majority of impact scenarios. Although options exist to improve the ballistic resistance of the control building, the recommendation is not to pursue them because there is a low probability of strike and there is an equal likelihood personnel could be located at similar distances in other areas of the SWiFT facility which are not passively protected, while the turbines are operating. A fenced exclusion area has been created around the turbines which restricts access to the boundary of the 1/100 strike probability. The overall recommendation is to neither relocate nor improve passive protection of the control building as the turbine safety systems have been improved to have no less than two independent, redundant, high quality engineered safety systems. Considering this, in combination with a control building strike probability of less than 5/10,000, the overall probability of turbine debris striking the control building is less than 1/1,000,000.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Data Validation Package June 2016 Groundwater and Surface Water Sampling at the Old and New Rifle, Colorado, Processing Sites September 2016

Sampling Period: June 14–17 and July 7, 2016. Water samples were collected from 36 locations at New Rifle and Old Rifle, Colorado, Disposal/Processing Sites. Planned monitoring locations are shown in Attachment 1, Sampling and Analysis Work Order. Duplicate samples were collected from New Rifle locations 0216 and 0855, and Old Rifle location 0655. One equipment blank was collected after decontamination of non-dedicated equipment used to collect one surface water sample. See Attachment 2, Trip Report for additional details. Sampling and analyses were conducted as specified in the Sampling and Analysis Plan for U.S. Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management Sites (LMS/PRO/S04351, continually updated, http://energy.gov/lm/downloads/sampling-and- analysis-plan-us-department-energy-office-legacy-management-sites). New Rifle Site Samples were collected at the New Rifle site from 16 monitoring wells and 7 surface locations in compliance with the December 2008 Groundwater Compliance Action Plan [GCAP] for the New Rifle, Colorado, Processing Site (LMS/RFN/S01920). Monitoring well 0216 could not be sampled in June because it was surrounded by standing water due to the high river stage from spring runoff, it was later sampled in July. Monitoring well 0635 and surface location 0322 could not be sampled because access through the elk fence along Interstate 70 has not been completed at this time. Old Rifle Site Samples were collected at the Old Rifle site from eight monitoring wells and five surface locations in compliance with the December 2001 Ground Water Compliance Action Plan for the Old Rifle, Colorado, UMTRA Project Site (GJ0-2000-177-TAR).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC 1

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. CAU 573 comprises the two corrective action sites (CASs): 05-23-02-GMX Alpha Contaminated Are-Closure in Place and 05-45-01-Atmospheric Test Site - Hamilton- Clean Closure. The purpose of this CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 573 based on the implementation of the corrective actions. Corrective action activities were performed at Hamilton from May 25 through June 30, 2016; and at GMX from May 25 to October 27, 2016, as set forth in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Corrective Action Plan (CAP) for Corrective Action Unit 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices. Verification sample results were evaluated against data quality objective criteria developed by stakeholders that included representatives from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) during the corrective action alternative (CAA) meeting held on November 24, 2015. Radiological doses exceeding the final action level were assumed to be present within the high contamination areas associated with CAS 05-23-02, thus requiring corrective action. It was also assumed that radionuclides were present at levels that require corrective action within the soil/debris pile associated with CAS 05-45-01. During the CAU 573 CAA meeting, the CAA of closure in place with a use restriction (UR) was selected by the stakeholders as the preferred corrective action of the high contamination areas at CAS 05-23-02 (GMX), which contain high levels of removable contamination; and the CAA of clean closure was selected by the stakeholders as preferred corrective action for the debris pile at CAS 05-45-01 (Hamilton). The closure in place was accomplished by posting signs containing a warning label on the existing contamination area fence line; and recording the FFACO UR and administrative UR in the FFACO database, the NNSA/NFO CAU/CAS files, and the management and operating contractor Geographic Information Systems. The clean closure was accomplished by excavating the soil/debris pile, disposing of the contents at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex, and collecting verification samples. The corrective actions were implemented as stipulated in the CADD/CAP, and verification sample results confirm that the criteria for the completion of corrective actions have been met. Based on the implementation of these corrective actions, NNSA/NFO provides the following recommendations: No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 573; The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection should issue a Notice of Completion to NNSA/NFO for closure of CAU 573; CAU 573 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Data Validation Package November 2015 Groundwater and Surface Water Sampling at the Old and New Rifle, Colorado, Processing Sites February 2016

Water samples were collected from 36 locations at New Rifle and Old Rifle, Colorado, Processing Sites. Duplicate samples were collected from New Rifle locations 0659 and 0855, and Old Rifle location 0304. One equipment blank was collected after decontamination of non-dedicated equipment used to collect one surface water sample. Sampling and analyses were conducted as specified in the Sampling and Analysis Plan for U.S. Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management Sites (LMS/PRO/S04351, continually updated). New Rifle Site Samples were collected at the New Rifle site from 16 monitoring wells and 7 surface locations in compliance with the December 2008 Groundwater Compliance Action Plan [GCAP] for the New Rifle, Colorado, Processing Site (LMS/RFN/S01920), with one exception: New Rifle location 0635 could not be sampled because it was inaccessible; a fence installed by the Colorado Department of Transportation prevents access to this location. DOE is currently negotiating access with the Colorado Department of Transportation. Analytes measured at the New Rifle site included contaminants of concern (COCs) (arsenic, molybdenum, nitrate + nitrite as nitrogen, selenium, uranium, and vanadium) ammonia as nitrogen, major cations, and major anions. Field measurements of total alkalinity, oxidation- reduction potential, pH, specific conductance, turbidity, and temperature were made at each location, and the water level was measured at each sampled well. A proposed alternate concentration limit (ACL) for vanadium of 50 milligrams per liter (mg/L), specific to the compliance (POC) wells (RFN-0217, -0659, -0664, and -0669) is included in the New Rifle GCAP. Vanadium concentrations in the POC wells were below the proposed ACL as shown in the time-concentration graphs in the Data Presentation section (Attachment 2). Time-concentration graphs from all other locations sampled are also included in Attachment 2. Sampling location RFN-0195 was misidentified for the June/August 2014 and November 2014 sampling events. (Well RFN-0609 was inadvertently sampled instead of RFN-0195 in 2014.) The results for RFN-0195 have been corrected, and are included in associated time-concentration graphs for this location. Recent results for RFN-0195 are consistent with established trends with the possible exception of vanadium. The most recent result for vanadium showed an increase over recent values. Vanadium concentrations at RFN-0195 and other locations will continue to be evaluated in the future to determine the potential for deviations from established trends. The surface water locations were sampled to monitor the impact of groundwater discharge. COC concentrations at Colorado River surface water locations RFN-0324 and RFN-0326, downgradient of the site, remained low and were consistent with historical results, as shown in the time-concentration graphs. COC concentrations did not indicate there are any impacts related to groundwater discharge to the river. In many cases, elevated COC concentrations at the New Rifle site pond locations were observed, as shown in the time-versus concentration graphs. As noted in the GCAP, this indicates impacts from groundwater discharge to the ponds. Old Rifle Site Samples were collected at the Old Rifle site from eight monitoring wells and five surface locations in compliance with the December 2001 Groundwater Compliance Action Plan for the Old Rifle, Colorado, UMTRA Project Site (GJ0-2000-177-TAR). Analytes measured at the Old Rifle site included COCs (selenium, uranium, and vanadium), major cations, and major anions. Field measurements of total alkalinity, oxidation-reduction potential, pH, specific conductance, turbidity, temperature, were made at each location, and the water level was measured at each sampled well. The monitoring strategy described in the GCAP is designed to determine progress of the natural flushing process in meeting compliance standards for site COCs. Standards for selenium and vanadium are the proposed ACLs of0.05 mg/L and 1.0 mg/L, respectively. For uranium the cleanup goal is the UMTRA standard of 0.044 mg/L or background, whichever is higher. As shown in the time concentration graphs, the uranium concentration exceeds the cleanup goal at groundwater monitoring locations RF0-0304, -0305, -0310, -0655, and -0656. The surface water locations were sampled to monitor the impact of groundwater discharge at Colorado River surface water locations adjacent to (RF0-0396) and downgradient of the site (RF0-0741). COC concentrations remain low and consistent with historical concentrations as shown in the time-concentration graphs (Attachment 2), which indicate no impacts from groundwater discharge to the river.

2015 Old and New Rifle↗

Permafrost Thawing and Vegetation Change Effects on Cryoturbation Rates and C and CH4 Dynamics. Final Report

Permafrost Thawing and Vegetation Change Effects on Cryoturbation Rates and C and CH4 Dynamics Permafrost soils cover 8.6% of the Earth land area but contain 50% of the global soil organic carbon (SOC) pool, 20-25% of which may be stored in the upper 30 cm, making it highly vulnerable to changes in climate. Predicted warming in northern latitudes may lead to strong forcing feedbacks on the climate system. It has been shown that the C content in the active layer of cryoturbated soils can be roughly 60% higher than in non-cryoturbated ones. However other cryogenic processes can affect the Arctic soil C pool at shorter time scales. For instance, warming may lead to increases winter precipitation resulting in a deeper snow cover with consequent thermal insulation of Arctic soils. Warmer soils may elicit summer and winter decomposition rates decreasing the SOC pool. We developed multi isotope methods to measure the soil carbon effects of snow pack accumulation on Arctic SOC dynamics in a moist acidic tundra by exposing soils to experimental accumulated snow pack (using fence experiments, Toolik Lake) in order to increase soil thermal insulation. We found that carbon dynamics were not linear and transient. At the beginning of the experiment C was lost in great quantities but they were partly recovered after about two decades. Snow cover also slows the C lost from permafrost thaw but increases CH4 emissions and heterotrophic respiration. Carbon was redistributed along the soil profile and moisture rather than temperature appeared to be the factor controlling decomposability.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nevada National Security Site 2015 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These data include direct radiation exposure, as well as radiation from the air, groundwater, meteorology, and vadose zone. This report summarizes the 2015 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports developed by National Security Technologies, LLC. Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data show that tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS were all below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection system at the mixed low-level waste cell were below established contaminant regulatory limits. During 2015, precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS was 0.9% above average, and precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS was 25% above average. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation as measured from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. The 1.8 inches of precipitation in September reached the lowest sensors at 180 cm on the Cell 5S and 5N covers, however the sensors on the floor do not indicate any signs of the precipitation percolating thru the waste to the floor. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 150 centimeters (cm) (5 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS. A second remedial revegetation trial was done on the southern portion of the North Cover. In March 2015 it was determined that germination occurred on both the mulched and non-mulched treatments that were irrigated, but that no germination occurred on the non-irrigated treatments. By June the seedlings observed in March were gone, possibly grazed by rabbits which were observed inside the rabbit-proof fence. In August the entire area was sprayed with the herbicide glyphosate in an attempt to minimize weed seed production. During 2015, there was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil as indicated from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. Thirty-one percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter, which received 3 times the natural precipitation. All 2015 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facilities’ PAs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Alternative Crucibles for U-Mo Microwave Melting

The crucibles used currently for microwave melting of U-Mo alloy at the Y-12 Complex contain silicon carbide (SiC) in a mullite (3Al 2 O 3 -2SiO 2 ) matrix with an erbia coating in contact with the melt. Due to observed silicon contamination, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has investigated alternative crucible materials that are susceptible to microwave radiation and are chemically compatible with molten U-Mo at 1400 1500C. Recommended crucibles for further testing are: 1) high-purity alumina (Al 2 O 3 ); 2) yttria-stabilized zirconia (ZrO 2 ); 3) a composite of alumina and yttria-stabilized zirconia; 4) aluminum nitride (AlN). Only AlN does not require an erbia coating. The recommended secondary susceptor, for heating at low temperature, is SiC in a “picket fence” arrangement.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Smart Barrier Design and Evaluation (ReKonTM: An Integrated Detection and Assessment Perimeter System)

Many government and military sites continue to demand high performance security technologies such as those afforded by a traditional perimeter intrusion detection and assessment system (PIDAS), but require additional standoff beyond the existing perimeter. To meet such varied needs, a perimeter security system needs to be configurable to meet the demands unique to each site, adaptable to the latest sensor technology and security requirements, and scalable to provide for installation at short temporary perimeters just as well as large multi-mile perimeters. ReKonTM is an integrated perimeter security system solution, one that couples access delay with detection and assessment. A prototype system was designed and built that integrated fiber optic break sensors, active infrared sensors, fence disturbance sensors, video motion detection, ground sensors, and vehicle/human delay barriers. ReKonTM uses a machine learning fusion technique to determine whether an alarm event has occurred as opposed to the conventional system which simply triggers an alarm event when any one sensor is activated. This novel perimeter solution was designed to be configurable for use at facilities ranging from high-security military sites to commercial power plants, to petro/chemical facilities of various kinds. ReKonTM was evaluated against a conventional system and logical inference fusion system with a fixed dataset that was collected over five months from the perimeter. ReKon outperformed both systems with respect to nuisance alarm rate and had only one less alarm detection than the conventional system out of a total of 133 total true alarm events. The sensors on the ReKonTM perimeter generated approximately 8.86 nuisance alarms per day using the conventional system. Using the machine learning fusion these were greatly reduced to approximately 0.02 alarms per day. ReKonTM may enable the use of high performance perimeter security for reduced cost in environments previously incapable of achieving such performance due to budget or installation constraints.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

A Complex Systems Approach to More Resilient Multi-Layered Security Systems

In July 2012, protestors cut through security fences and gained access to the Y-12 National Security Complex. This was believed to be a highly reliable, multi-layered security system. This report documents the results of a Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project that created a consistent, robust mathematical framework using complex systems analysis algorithms and techniques to better understand the emergent behavior, vulnerabilities and resiliency of multi-layered security systems subject to budget constraints and competing security priorities. Because there are several dimensions to security system performance and a range of attacks that might occur, the framework is multi-objective for a performance frontier to be estimated. This research explicitly uses probability of intruder interruption given detection (P I ) as the primary resilience metric. We demonstrate the utility of this framework with both notional as well as real-world examples of Physical Protection Systems (PPSs) and validate using a well-established force-on-force simulation tool, Umbra.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Calendar Year 2017, Revision 0

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; and, CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted annually at CAUs 90, 91, and 112; semiannually at CAUs 92 and 110; and quarterly at CAU 111. Additional inspections are conducted at CAU 92 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inches in a 24-hour period and at CAU 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inch in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. At CAU 110, soil moisture monitoring, vegetation evaluations, and subsidence surveys are conducted in addition to the visual inspections. At CAU 111, soil moisture monitoring, vegetation evaluations, subsidence surveys, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are conducted. This report will address all monitoring items notes above except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. Revision 4 of Permit NEV HW0101 was issued effective December 10, 2015, and remains in effect until December 10, 2020.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

E Tunnel Wastewater Disposal System Quarterly Monitoring Report Nevada National Security Site, Nevada Water Pollution Control Permit NEV 96021, Third Quarter 2018

This report includes the results of the E Tunnel Wastewater Disposal System (ETDS) inspections and monitoring for July, August, and September 2018. Monitoring and sampling activities were performed in accordance with the requirements of Water Pollution Control Permit NEV 96021, Revision 1, effective October 1, 2013. Monthly monitoring was conducted on July 16, August 13, and September 13, 2018. Operating personnel measured the instantaneous flow rate (see Table 1), log hydrogen ion activity (pH), temperature, and specific conductance of the discharge water (see Table 2). Monthly inspections also included an assessment of the general condition of the berms, including ponding (the water levels relative to the overflow pipes); any tunneling or burrowing into the berms; soil conditions on and around the berms, including erosion or sloughing of the interior or exterior slopes of the berms; seeps at the toe of the berms; the presence of any deep-rooting botanicals on the berms; and the physical condition of fencing (see Tables 3 through 7). Monthly rainfall quantities are presented in Table 8.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Chemical Waste Landfill Annual Post-Closure Care Report Calendar Year 2016

The purpose of this CWL Annual Post-Closure Care Report is to document monitoring, inspection, maintenance, and repair activities conducted during CY 2016 in accordance with PCCP Attachment 1. This annual report documents post-closure care activities conducted from January through December 2016 and fulfills the PCCP requirement for annual reporting to the NMED. The PCCP requires monitoring, inspection, and maintenance/repair activities that must be documented and reported for each CY. Monitoring activities include semi-annual groundwater monitoring for specific volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and metals, and annual vadose zone soil-gas monitoring for specific VOCs. Inspection, maintenance, and repair activities are required for the following components: final cover (vegetation and surface); storm-water diversion structures; monitoring networks and sampling equipment (groundwater and soil-gas); and security fence, locks, gates, signage, and survey monuments. The CWL final cover is a vegetative at-grade soil cover, or ET Cover.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Mixed Waste Landfill Annual Long-Term Monitoring & Maintenance Report April 2016-March 2017

Sampling activities for this reporting period included two semiannual monitoring events each for groundwater, soil-vapor, and radon. Annual soil-moisture monitoring was conducted in April 2016, annual tritium surface soil sampling was conducted in August 2016, and annual biota sampling (metals and radionuclides) was conducted in September 2016. All monitoring activities were conducted in accordance with LTMMP requirements and no monitoring results exceeded LTMMP trigger levels. All monitoring results were consistent with historic MWL monitoring data. Inspections of the MWL final cover system, storm-water diversion structures, compliance monitoring systems, and security fence were performed in accordance with LTMMP requirements. Required maintenance and repairs were minor and were generally performed during the inspections. The Evapotranspirative (ET) Cover continues to meet successful revegetation criteria and is in excellent condition with even coverage of mature, native perennial grasses. Maintenance was performed during the reporting period as a best management practice for ET Cover vegetation, and included a lower level of effort relative to previous years. The purpose of ongoing ET Cover maintenance efforts is to promote the growth and health of the desired native grass species by reducing competition with weedy species for limited moisture and nutrients. Based on previous inspections, additional best management practice activities were conducted during this reporting period to improve the site and reduce long-term ET Cover and site maintenance. These activities included improvements to site access and drainage (i.e., improvements to the access and perimeter road) and the installation of erosion and burrow control measures at the ten perimeter monitoring well locations.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗