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At least 307 records · Page 17

Simulation Center for Runaway Electron Avoidance and Mitigation. Final report

We stand in preparation for ITER with the revelation of a critical need for predictive modeling of runaway electron avoidance and mitigation. It is now widely accepted that a disruption during high current operation could generate multi-MeV runaway electrons which damage the device severely, and threaten the viability of experimental operations. The risk to the mission of ITER is so great, that this predictive capability must be developed via theory and simulation in advance of experimental operations with a thorough validation against present day experiments. The United States is responsible for the design and implementation of the disruption mitigation system on ITER, and in July 2016 the Simulation Center for Runaway Electron Avoidance and Mitigation (SCREAM) was launched by the Department of Energy (DOE), in a joint Fusion Energy Sciences (FES) and Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR) collaboration, to address this need. It is now critical for the U.S. fusion program to continue support for this dedicated center that is establishing the qualitative and quantitative bases for safe operational scenarios and viable mitigation techniques.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

In-Situ Applied Coatings for Mitigating Gas Hydrate Deposition in Deepwater Operations (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

The Project objectives of this work were focused on the need to develop, investigate, and validate for field and commercial deployment robust pipeline surface treatments to prevent / minimize hydrate and other flow assurance solids deposition in subsea oil flowlines. A robust pipeline treatment that can prevent hydrate and wax/asphaltene adhesion/deposition will be a major fundamental breakthrough in hydrate and flow assurance science and engineering, and to critical Deepwater field operations. The project addressed the current major outstanding issue of mitigating gas hydrate and other solids deposition in different pipeline conditions, a major outstanding issue that has not been solved to-date, despite previous attempts/studies. The major goal of this project was to develop and investigate for deployment robust pipeline coatings to mitigate gas hydrate deposition in Deepwater oil flowlines, which will be critical in offshore leak and spill prevention. As oil and gas production wells mature, the water content and oil composition can change and increase the risk of gas hydrate, wax, and asphaltene deposition and blockages in flowlines, with the cost of complete inhibition becoming prohibitive. The ability to mitigate flow assurance risks in maturing flowlines can extend the life of the field, significantly reduce operational costs from inhibitor injection and prevent potential safety hazards to personnel and equipment and can prevent potential environmental hazards leading to catastrophic hydrocarbon emissions. This research allows for a novel, cost-effective method of mitigating gas hydrate and other pipeline solids deposition/blockages in flowlines, extending the life of the field while being minimally disruptive to normal flowline operation. The omniphobic surface treatment developed in this work can significantly improve the economics of energy transport by providing flow assurance and limiting catastrophic blowouts.

02 PETROLEUM↗

Capability Building Progression of an Insider Threat Mitigation Program at International Nuclear Power Plant

With threats to nuclear facilities continuously evolving, the development and implementation of insider threat mitigation programs is increasingly important. The Office of International Nuclear Security within the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA’s) developed the “Insider Threat Mitigation Program: Facility Implementation Handbook” to assist organizations to be better positioned to minimize the risks posed by malicious insiders. The handbook identified eight elements that contribute to the development and implementation of insider threat mitigation programs. This report outlines the development of a capability building progression of an insider threat mitigation program at international nuclear power plants. This information can be stand-alone or be accompanied by a technical exchange with subject matter experts to support development and implementation of programs with interested international partners.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Mitigation for the demolition of the foundation of building 25-3113/3113a, area 25, Nevada national security site, NYE county, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking that would demolish the foundation of Building 25-3113/3113A and the adjoining test pad at Test Cell A in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in compliance with the terms of the 2024 Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (NNSS PA). The foundation of Building 25-3113/3113A (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource # B2443) is a contributing element to the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District (SHPO Resource # D424), which has been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A, B, C, and D (Reno et al. 2023). The proposed demolition constitutes an adverse effect. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) consulted with the SHPO on an adverse effect finding for the undertaking and notified the SHPO of its intent to use the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA on December 11, 2024 (Julian to Reed). The SHPO concurred on December 30, 2024 (Reed to Julian). Therefore, NNSA/NFO has prepared mitigation pursuant to the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA Appendix D.I.A for contributing elements to recorded, NRHP-eligible districts.

#B2443↗

Mitigation for the demolition of building 25-3124,equipment testing laboratory, area 25, Nevada national security site, NYE county, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking that would demolish Building 25-3124 in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in compliance with the terms of the 2024 Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (NNSS PA). Building 25-3124 (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource # B19009) is a contributing element to the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District (SHPO Resource # D424), which has been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A, B, C, and D (Reno et al. 2023). The proposed demolition constitutes an adverse effect. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) consulted with the SHPO on an adverse effect finding for the undertaking and notified the SHPO of its intent to use the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA on December 11, 2024 (Julian to Reed). The SHPO concurred on December 30, 2024 (Reed to Julian). Therefore, NNSA/NFO has prepared mitigation pursuant to the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA Appendix D.I.A for contributing elements to recorded, NRHP-eligible districts.

#B19009↗

Mitigation for the demolition of building 25-3153, fire station, area 25, Nevada national security site, NYE county, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking that would demolish Building 25-3153 in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in compliance with the terms of the 2024 Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (NNSS PA). Building 25-3153 (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource # B19004) is a contributing element to the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District (SHPO Resource # D424), which has been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A, B, C, and D (Reno et al. 2023). The proposed demolition constitutes an adverse effect. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) consulted with the SHPO on an adverse effect finding for the undertaking and notified the SHPO of its intent to use the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA on December 11, 2024 (Julian to Reed). The SHPO concurred on December 30, 2024 (Reed to Julian). Therefore, NNSA/NFO has prepared mitigation pursuant to the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA Appendix D.I.A for contributing elements to recorded, NRHP-eligible districts.

#B19004↗

Mitigation for the demolition of building 25-4314, radiation services, area 25, Nevada national security site, NYE county, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking that would demolish Building 25-4314 in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in compliance with the terms of the 2024 Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (NNSS PA). Building 25-4314 (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource # B19016) is a contributing element to the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District (SHPO Resource # D424), which has been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A, B, C, and D (Reno et al. 2023). The proposed demolition constitutes an adverse effect. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) consulted with the SHPO on an adverse effect finding for the undertaking and notified the SHPO of its intent to use the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA on December 11, 2024 (Julian to Reed). The SHPO concurred on December 30, 2024 (Reed to Julian). Therefore, NNSA/NFO has prepared mitigation pursuant to the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA Appendix D.I.A for contributing elements to recorded, NRHP-eligible districts.

#B19016↗

Mitigation for the demolition of building 25-4838, vehicle maintenance shop, area 25, Nevada national security site, NYE county, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking that would demolish Building 25-4838 in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in compliance with the terms of the 2024 Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (NNSS PA). Building 25-4838 (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource # B19019) is a contributing element to the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District (SHPO Resource # D424), which has been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A, B, C, and D (Reno et al. 2023). The proposed demolition constitutes an adverse effect. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) consulted with the SHPO on an adverse effect finding for the undertaking and notified the SHPO of its intent to use the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA on December 11, 2024 (Julian to Reed). The SHPO concurred on December 30, 2024 (Reed to Julian). Therefore, NNSA/NFO has prepared mitigation pursuant to the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA Appendix D.I.A for contributing elements to recorded, NRHP-eligible districts.

#B19019↗

Improving the efficiency of learning-based error mitigation

Error mitigation will play an important role in practical applications of near-term noisy quantum computers. Current error mitigation methods typically concentrate on correction quality at the expense of frugality (as measured by the number of additional calls to quantum hardware). To fill the need for highly accurate, yet inexpensive techniques, we introduce an error mitigation scheme that builds on Clifford data regression (CDR). The scheme improves the frugality by carefully choosing the training data and exploiting the symmetries of the problem. We test our approach by correcting long range correlators of the ground state of XY Hamiltonian on IBM Toronto quantum computer. We find that our method is an order of magnitude cheaper while maintaining the same accuracy as the original CDR approach. The efficiency gain enables us to obtain a factor of 10 improvement on the unmitigated results with the total budget as small as 2 ⋅ 10 5 shots. Furthermore, we demonstrate orders of magnitude improvements in frugality for mitigation of energy of the LiH ground state simulated with IBM's Ourense-derived noise model.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Peening Techniques for Mitigating Chlorine-Induced Stress Corrosion Cracking of Dry Storage Canisters for Nuclear Applications

Fusion-welded austenitic stainless steel (ASS) was predominantly employed to manufacture dry storage canisters (DSCs) for the storage applications of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). However, the ASS weld joints are prone to chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC), a critical safety issue in the nuclear industry. DSCs were exposed to a chloride-rich environment during storage, creating CISCC precursors. The CISCC failure leads to nuclear radiation leakage. Therefore, there is a critical need to enhance the CISCC resistance of DSC weld joints using promising repair techniques. This review article encapsulates the current state-of-the-art of peening techniques for mitigating the CISCC in DSCs. More specifically, conventional shot peening (CSP), ultrasonic impact peening (UIP), and laser shock peening (LSP) were elucidated with a focus on CISCC mitigation. The underlying mechanism of CISCC mitigation in each process was summarized. Finally, this review provides recent advances in surface modification techniques, repair techniques, and developments in welding techniques for CISCC mitigation in DSCs.

Chemistry↗

Evaluating Short-warning Mitigation via Intentional Robust Disruption of a Hypothetical Impact of Asteroid 2023 NT1

We investigate various short-warning mitigation scenarios via fragmentation for a hypothetical impact of asteroid 2023 NT1, a near-Earth object (NEO) that was discovered on 2023 July 15, two days after its closest approach to Earth on July 13. The asteroid passed by Earth within ∼0.25 lunar distances, with a closest approach of ∼1 × 10 5 km and a velocity of 11.27 km s −1 . Its size remains largely uncertain, with an estimated diameter range of 26–58 m and a most probable estimate of 34 m (JPL Sentry, 2023 September 15; weighted by the NEO size frequency distribution). If 2023 NT1 had collided with Earth, it could have caused significant local damage. Assuming a spherical asteroid with a diameter of 34 m, uniform density of 2.6 g cm −3 , and impact velocity of 15.59 km s −1 , a collision would have yielded an estimated impact energy of ∼1.5 Mt, approximately 3 times the energy of the Chelyabinsk airburst in 2013. We analyze the effectiveness of mitigation via intentional robust disruption for objects similar to 2023 NT1. We utilize Pulverize It (PI), a NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts study of planetary defense via fragmentation, to model potential mitigation scenarios through simulations of hypervelocity asteroid disruption and atmospheric ground effects in the case of a terminal defense mode. Simulations suggest that PI is an effective multimodal approach for planetary defense that can operate in extremely short interdiction modes, in addition to long interdiction timescales with extended warning. Our simulations support the proposition that threats like 2023 NT1 can be effectively mitigated with intercepts of 1 day (or less) prior to impact, yielding minimal to no ground damage.

Asteroids↗

Identifying, Assessing, and Mitigating Risk of Single-Point Inspections on the Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor

In the production of each Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), over 100,000 inspections are performed. ATK Thiokol Inc. reviewed these inspections to ensure a robust inspection system is maintained. The principal effort within this endeavor was the systematic identification and evaluation of inspections considered to be single-point. Single-point inspections are those accomplished on components, materials, and tooling by only one person, involving no other check. The purpose was to more accurately characterize risk and ultimately address and/or mitigate risk associated with single-point inspections. After the initial review of all inspections and identification/assessment of single-point inspections, review teams applied risk prioritization methodology similar to that used in a Process Failure Modes Effects Analysis to derive a Risk Prioritization Number for each single-point inspection. After the prioritization of risk, all single-point inspection points determined to have significant risk were provided either with risk-mitigating actions or rationale for acceptance. This effort gave confidence to the RSRM program that the correct inspections are being accomplished, that there is appropriate justification for those that remain as single-point inspections, and that risk mitigation was applied to further reduce risk of higher risk single-point inspections. This paper examines the process, results, and lessons learned in identifying, assessing, and mitigating risk associated with single-point inspections accomplished in the production of the Space Shuttle RSRM.

Greenhalgh, Phillip O.↗

Near Earth Object (NEO) Mitigation Options Using Exploration Technologies

This work documents the advancements in MSFC threat modeling and mitigation technology research completed since our last major publication in this field. Most of the work enclosed here are refinements of our work documented in NASA TP-2004-213089. Very long development times from start of funding (10-20 years) can be expected for any mitigation system which suggests that delaying consideration of mitigation technologies could leave the Earth in an unprotected state for a significant period of time. Fortunately there is the potential for strong synergy between architecture requirements for some threat mitigators and crewed deep space exploration. Thus planetary defense has the potential to be integrated into the current U.S. space exploration effort. The number of possible options available for protection against the NEO threat was too numerous for them to all be addressed within the study; instead, a representative selection were modeled and evaluated. A summary of the major lessons learned during this study is presented, as are recommendations for future work.

Arnold William↗

Pilot Navigation Errors on the Airport Surface: Identifying Contributing Factors and Mitigating Solutions

A taxonomy of navigation errors (pilot deviations) during taxi operations was developed that defines 3 classes of errors: planning, decision, and execution errors. This taxonomy was applied to error data from 2 full-mission simulation studies that included trials that replicated current-day operations and trials with advanced cockpit technologies including datalink, electronic moving maps (EMM), and head-up displays (HUDs). Pilots committed navigation errors on 17% of current-day operations trials (in low-visibility and night), distributed roughly equally across the 3 error classes. Each error class was associated with a unique set of contributing factor s and mitigating solutions. Planning errors were mitigated by technologies that provided an unambiguous record of the clearance (datalink and the EMM, which possessed a text-based clearance). Decision errors were mitigated by technologies that provided both local and global awareness including information about the distance to and direction of the next turn, current township location, and a graphical depiction of the route (as provided by the EMM and HUD together). Execution errors were best mitigated by the HUD, which disambiguated the environment and depicted the clear ed taxi route. Implications for technology design and integration are provided.

Hooey, Becky L.↗

Lunar Dust: Characterization and Mitigation

Lunar dust is a ubiquitous phenomenon which must be explicitly addressed during upcoming human lunar exploration missions. Near term plans to revisit the moon as a stepping stone for further exploration of Mars, and beyond, places a primary emphasis on characterization and mitigation of lunar dust. Comprised of regolith particles ranging in size from tens of nanometers to microns, lunar dust is a manifestation of the complex interaction of the lunar soil with multiple mechanical, electrical, and gravitational effects. The environmental and anthropogenic factors effecting the perturbation, transport, and deposition of lunar dust must be studied in order to mitigate it's potentially harmful effects on exploration systems. The same hold true for assessing the risk it may pose for toxicological health problems if inhaled. This paper presents the current perspective and implementation of dust knowledge management and integration, and mitigation technology development activities within NASA's Exploration Technology Development Program. This work is presented within the context of the Constellation Program's Integrated Lunar Dust Management Strategy. This work further outlines the scientific basis for lunar dust behavior, it's characteristics and potential effects, and surveys several potential strategies for its control and mitigation both for lunar surface operations and within the working volumes of a lunar outpost. The paper also presents a perspective on lessons learned from Apollo and forensics engineering studies of Apollo hardware.

Hyatt. Mark J.↗

Defending Planet Earth: Near-Earth Object Surveys and Hazard Mitigation Strategies

The United States spends approximately four million dollars each year searching for near-Earth objects (NEOs). The objective is to detect those that may collide with Earth. The majority of this funding supports the operation of several observatories that scan the sky searching for NEOs. This, however, is insufficient in detecting the majority of NEOs that may present a tangible threat to humanity. A significantly smaller amount of funding supports ways to protect the Earth from such a potential collision or "mitigation." In 2005, a Congressional mandate called for NASA to detect 90 percent of NEOs with diameters of 140 meters of greater by 2020. Defending Planet Earth: Near-Earth Object Surveys and Hazard Mitigation Strategies identifies the need for detection of objects as small as 30 to 50 meters as these can be highly destructive. The book explores four main types of mitigation including civil defense, "slow push" or "pull" methods, kinetic impactors and nuclear explosions. It also asserts that responding effectively to hazards posed by NEOs requires national and international cooperation. Defending Planet Earth: Near-Earth Object Surveys and Hazard Mitigation Strategies is a useful guide for scientists, astronomers, policy makers and engineers.

Source record↗

Copolyimide Surface Modifying Agents for Particle Adhesion Mitigation

Marine biofouling, insect adhesion on aircraft surfaces, microbial contamination of sterile environments, and particle contamination all present unique challenges for which researchers have adopted an array of mitigation strategies. Particulate contamination is of interest to NASA regarding exploration of the Moon, Mars, asteroids, etc.1 Lunar dust compromised seals, clogged filters, abraded visors and space suit surfaces, and was a significant health concern during the Apollo missions.2 Consequently, NASA has instituted a multi-faceted approach to address dust including use of sacrificial surfaces, active mitigation requiring the use of an external energy source, and passive mitigation utilizing materials with an intrinsic resistance to surface contamination. One passive mitigation strategy is modification of a material s surface energy either chemically or topographically. The focus of this paper is the synthesis and evaluation of novel copolyimide materials with surface modifying agents (SMA, oxetanes) enabling controlled variation of surface chemical composition.

Wohl, Christopher J.↗

Tests of Multibeam Scintillation Mitigation on Laser Uplinks

A report presents additional details about parts of the program of research and development that is the topic of the immediately preceding article. The report emphasizes those aspects of the program that pertain to the use of multiple uplink laser beams in a ground-to-spacecraft optical communication system to reduce (relative to the case of a single uplink laser beam) the depth and frequency of occurrence of fades in the uplink signal received at the spacecraft. The underlying multibeam scintillation-mitigation concept was described in "Multiple-Beam Transmission for Optical Communication" (NPO-20384), NASA Tech Briefs, Vol. 22, No. 11 (November 1998), page 56. The report discusses the need for mitigating uplink scintillation; briefly describes the Optical Communications Telescope Laboratory and its role as the ground station in the research; summarizes prior experiments in uplink scintillation and multibeam mitigation of scintillation in ground-to-spacecraft laser communications; and describes key experiments planned to be performed in the next five years. The report then elaborates somewhat on the initial experiments, which are to be dedicated to understanding and perfecting the multibeam scintillation-mitigation strategy.

Wilson, Keith↗