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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2013

Assess/Mitigate Risk through the Use of Computer-Aided Software Engineering (CASE) Tools

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was requested to perform an independent assessment of the mitigation of the Constellation Program (CxP) Risk 4421 through the use of computer-aided software engineering (CASE) tools. With the cancellation of the CxP, the assessment goals were modified to capture lessons learned and best practices in the use of CASE tools. The assessment goal was to prepare the next program for the use of these CASE tools. The outcome of the assessment is contained in this document.

Aguilar, Michael L.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Development of Autonomous Aerobraking - Phase 2

Phase 1 of the Development of Autonomous Aerobraking (AA) Assessment investigated the technical capability of transferring the processes of aerobraking maneuver (ABM) decision-making (currently performed on the ground by an extensive workforce and communicated to the spacecraft via the deep space network) to an efficient flight software algorithm onboard the spacecraft. This document describes Phase 2 of this study, which was a 12-month effort to improve and rigorously test the AA Development Software developed in Phase 1. Aerobraking maneuver; Autonomous Aerobraking; Autonomous Aerobraking Development Software; Deep Space Network; NASA Engineering and Safety Center

Murri, Daniel G.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Autonomous Aerobraking Development Software: Phase 2 Summary

NASA has used aerobraking at Mars and Venus to reduce the fuel required to deliver a spacecraft into a desired orbit compared to an all-propulsive solution. Although aerobraking reduces the propellant, it does so at the expense of mission duration, large staff, and DSN coverage. These factors make aerobraking a significant cost element in the mission design. By moving on-board the current ground-based tasks of ephemeris determination, atmospheric density estimation, and maneuver sizing and execution, a flight project would realize significant cost savings. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) sponsored Phase 1 and 2 of the Autonomous Aerobraking Development Software (AADS) study, which demonstrated the initial feasibility of moving these current ground-based functions to the spacecraft. This paper highlights key state-of-the-art advancements made in the Phase 2 effort to verify that the AADS algorithms are accurate, robust and ready to be considered for application on future missions that utilize aerobraking. The advancements discussed herein include both model updates and simulation and benchmark testing. Rigorous testing using observed flight atmospheres, operational environments and statistical analysis characterized the AADS operability in a perturbed environment.

Cianciolo, Alicia D.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Flight Performance Feasibility Studies for the Max Launch Abort System

In 2007, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) initiated the Max Launch Abort System Project to explore crew escape system concepts designed to be fully encapsulated within an aerodynamic fairing and smoothly integrated onto a launch vehicle. One objective of this design was to develop a more compact launch escape vehicle that eliminated the need for an escape tower, as was used in the Mercury and Apollo escape systems and what is planned for the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV). The benefits for the launch vehicle of eliminating a tower from the escape vehicle design include lower structural weights, reduced bending moments during atmospheric flight, and a decrease in induced aero-acoustic loads. This paper discusses the development of encapsulated, towerless launch escape vehicle concepts, especially as it pertains to the flight performance and systems analysis trade studies conducted to establish mission feasibility and assess system-level performance. Two different towerless escape vehicle designs are discussed in depth: one with allpropulsive control using liquid attitude control thrusters, and a second employing deployable aft swept grid fins to provide passive stability during coast. Simulation results are presented for a range of nominal and off-nominal escape conditions.

Tarabini, Paul V.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Capsule Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) Wake Deficit Wind Tunnel Testing

During descent after re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere, the Orion CM deploys its drogue parachutes at approximately Mach 0.7. Accurately predicting the dynamic pressure experienced by the drogue parachutes at deployment is critical to properly designing the parachutes. This NASA Engineering and Safety Center assessment was designed to provide a complete set of flowfield measurements on and around an idealized Orion Crew Module shape with the most appropriate wind tunnel simulation of the Orion flight conditions prior to parachute deployment. This document contains the details of testing and the outcome of the assessment.

Ross, James C.↗
NASA NTRS2014

International Space Station (ISS) Orbital Replaceable Unit (ORU) Wet Storage Risk Assessment

The International Space Station (ISS) Program requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) to evaluate the risks posed by the practice of long-term wet storage of ISS Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) regeneration system orbital replacement units (ORUs). The ISS ECLS regeneration system removes water from urine and humidity condensate and converts it into potable water and oxygen. A total of 29 ORUs are in the ECLS system, each designed to be replaced by the ISS crew when necessary. The NESC assembled a team to review the ISS ECLS regeneration system and evaluate the potential for biofouling and corrosion. This document contains the outcome of the evaluation.

Squire, Michael D.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Computer-Aided Design (CAD) Tools to Support the Human Factors Design Teams

The scope of this assessment was to develop a library of basic 1-Gravity (G) human posture and motion elements used to construct complex virtual simulations of ground processing and maintenance tasks for spaceflight vehicles, including launch vehicles, crewed spacecraft, robotic spacecraft, satellites, and other payloads. The report herein describes the task, its purpose, performance, findings, NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) recommendations, and conclusions in the definition and assemblage of the postures and motions database (PMD).

Null, Cynthia H.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Review of Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) Tools for Verifying Command and Control Software

The Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Standing Review Board (SRB) requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) conduct an independent review of the plan developed by Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) for identifying models and emulators to create a tool(s) to verify their command and control software. The NESC was requested to identify any issues or weaknesses in the GSDO plan. This document contains the outcome of the NESC review.

Aguilar, Michael L.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Development Testing and Subsequent Failure Investigation of a Spring Strut Mechanism

Commodities are transferred between the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) crew module (CM) and service module (SM) via an external umbilical that is driven apart with spring-loaded struts after the structural connection is severed. The spring struts must operate correctly for the modules to separate safely. There was no vibration testing of strut development units scoped in the MPCV Program Plan; therefore, any design problems discovered as a result of vibration testing would not have been found until the component qualification. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) and Lockheed Martin (LM) performed random vibration testing on a single spring strut development unit to assess its ability to withstand qualification level random vibration environments. Failure of the strut while exposed to random vibration resulted in a follow-on failure investigation, design changes, and additional development tests. This paper focuses on the results of the failure investigations including identified lessons learned and best practices to aid in future design iterations of the spring strut and to help other mechanism developers avoid similar pitfalls.

Dervan, Jared↗
NASA NTRS2014

Development Testing and Subsequent Failure Investigation of a Spring Strut Mechanism

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) and Lockheed Martin (LM) performed random vibration testing on a single spring strut development unit to assess its ability to withstand qualification level random vibration environments. Failure of the strut while exposed to random vibration resulted in a follow-on failure investigation, design changes, and additional development tests. This paper focuses on the results of the failure investigations referenced in detail in the NESC final report including identified lessons learned to aid in future design iterations of the spring strut and to help other mechanism developers avoid similar pitfalls.

Dervan, Jared↗
NASA NTRS2014

A Comprehensive Analysis of the X-15 Flight 3-65 Accident

The November 15, 1967, loss of X-15 Flight 3-65-97 (hereafter referred to as Flight 3-65) was a unique incident in that it was the first and only aerospace flight accident involving loss of crew on a vehicle with an adaptive flight control system (AFCS). In addition, Flight 3-65 remains the only incidence of a single-pilot departure from controlled flight of a manned entry vehicle in a hypersonic flight regime. To mitigate risk to emerging aerospace systems, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) proposed a comprehensive review of this accident. The goal of the assessment was to resolve lingering questions regarding the failure modes of the aircraft systems (including the AFCS) and thoroughly analyze the interactions among the human agents and autonomous systems that contributed to the loss of the pilot and aircraft. This document contains the outcome of the accident review.

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Maximum Expected Wall Heat Flux and Maximum Pressure After Sudden Loss of Vacuum Insulation on the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) Liquid Helium (LHe) Dewars

The aircraft-based Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) is a platform for multiple infrared observation experiments. The experiments carry sensors cooled to liquid helium (LHe) temperatures. A question arose regarding the heat input and peak pressure that would result from a sudden loss of the dewar vacuum insulation. Owing to concerns about the adequacy of dewar pressure relief in the event of a sudden loss of the dewar vacuum insulation, the SOFIA Program engaged the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). This report summarizes and assesses the experiments that have been performed to measure the heat flux into LHe dewars following a sudden vacuum insulation failure, describes the physical limits of heat input to the dewar, and provides an NESC recommendation for the wall heat flux that should be used to assess the sudden loss of vacuum insulation case. This report also assesses the methodology used by the SOFIA Program to predict the maximum pressure that would occur following a loss of vacuum event.

Ungar, Eugene K.↗
NASA NTRS2014

International Space Station (ISS) External Thermal Control System (ETCS) Loop A Pump Module (PM) Jettison Options Assessment

On December 11, 2013, the International Space Station (ISS) experienced a failure of the External Thermal Control System (ETCS) Loop A Pump Module (PM). To minimize the number of extravehicular activities (EVA) required to replace the PM, jettisoning the faulty pump was evaluated. The objective of this study was to independently evaluate the jettison options considered by the ISS Trajectory Operations Officer (TOPO) and to provide recommendations for safe jettison of the ETCS Loop A PM. The simulation selected to evaluate the TOPO options was the NASA Engineering and Safety Center's (NESC) version of Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories II (POST2) developed to support another NESC assessment. The objective of the jettison analysis was twofold: (1) to independently verify TOPO posigrade and retrograde jettison results, and (2) to determine jettison guidelines based on additional sensitivity, trade study, and Monte Carlo (MC) analysis that would prevent PM recontact. Recontact in this study designates a propagated PM trajectory that comes within 500 m of the ISS propagated trajectory. An additional simulation using Systems Tool Kit (STK) was run for independent verification of the POST2 simulation results. Ultimately, the ISS Program removed the PM jettison option from consideration. However, prior to the Program decision, the retrograde jettison option remained part of the EVA contingency plan. The jettison analysis presented showed that, in addition to separation velocity/direction and the atmosphere conditions, the key variables in determining the time to recontact the ISS is highly dependent on the ballistic number (BN) difference between the object being jettisoned and the ISS.

Murri, Daniel G.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Review of Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Integrated Hazard Development Process: Appendices - Volume 1

The Chief Engineer of the Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Office requested that the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) perform an independent assessment of the ESD's integrated hazard development process. The focus of the assessment was to review the integrated hazard analysis (IHA) process and identify any gaps/improvements in the process (e.g., missed causes, cause tree completeness, missed hazards). This document contains the outcome of the NESC assessment.

Smiles, Michael D.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Review of Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Integrated Hazard Development Process: Volume 2 - Appendices

The Chief Engineer of the Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Office requested that the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) perform an independent assessment of the ESD's integrated hazard development process. The focus of the assessment was to review the integrated hazard analysis (IHA) process and identify any gaps/improvements in the process (e.g. missed causes, cause tree completeness, missed hazards). This document contains the outcome of the NESC assessment.

Smiles, Michael D.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Development Testing and Subsequent Failure Investigation of a Spring Strut Mechanism

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) and Lockheed Martin (LM) performed random vibration testing on a single spring strut development unit to assess its ability to withstand qualification level random vibration environments. Failure of the strut while exposed to random vibration resulted in a follow-on failure investigation, design changes, and additional development tests. This paper focuses on the results of the failure investigations referenced in detail in the NESC final report [1] including identified lessons learned to aid in future design iterations of the spring strut and to help other mechanism developers avoid similar pitfalls.

Dervan, Jared↗
NASA NTRS2013

Modeling Complex Cross-Systems Software Interfaces Using SysML

The complex flight and ground systems for NASA human space exploration are designed, built, operated and managed as separate programs and projects. However, each system relies on one or more of the other systems in order to accomplish specific mission objectives, creating a complex, tightly coupled architecture. Thus, there is a fundamental need to understand how each system interacts with the other. To determine if a model-based system engineering approach could be utilized to assist with understanding the complex system interactions, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) sponsored a task to develop an approach for performing cross-system behavior modeling. This paper presents the results of applying Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) principles using the System Modeling Language (SysML) to define cross-system behaviors and how they map to crosssystem software interfaces documented in system-level Interface Control Documents (ICDs).

Earth orbit↗