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At least 307 records · Page 17

Improbability of Nuclear Criticality in Compacted Criticality Control Overpacks after Room Closure by Salt Creep at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Based on the rationale presented, nuclear criticality is improbable after salt creep causes compaction of criticality control overpacks (CCOs) disposed at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality potential has been updated here because of the introduction of CCOs, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCOs during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual salt compaction (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure). Geomechanical models of rock fall demonstrate three tiers of CCOs are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Criticality models of spheres and cylinders of 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular spacing demonstrate that an array of CCOs is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the amount of hydrogenous material shipped in the CCO (usually water and plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Understanding Biases in Sample Preparation Techniques for Coupled Scanning Electron Microscopy and MAMA PuO 2 Morphological Analysis

In this project, the scanning electron microscopy (SEM) sampling method used during the statistical design study (SDS) was investigated to determine if any sampling biases were present in the analyzed data. Using standard particle size distribution powders from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST 1984 standard reference material) with the origin wet dispersion method, it was determined that a bias to smaller particles was present. This was supported by theoretical calculations using Stokes’ law to determine the settling rate of spherical particles of roughly the same size and mass as those found in the SDS. Based on the theoretical calculations, it was determined that the settling rate for each of the 76 powder sets in the SDS could be unique based on specific particle shape and mass distributions, making a universal correction factor/formula not applicable. Therefore, priority shifted to developing an improved wet dispersion method that significantly reduced the particle settling rate for all particle size and shapes. This was achieved by replacing the original solvent (isopropyl alcohol) with a heavy liquid (lithium heteropolytungstates), which dramatically slowed the settling rate and allowed for the capture of a suitable homogeneous aliquot. SEM imaging and Morphological Analysis for Material Attribution (MAMA) software analysis were conducted on the NIST standard, and the SEM/MAMA data were compared to data captured by a dynamic image analysis particle size analyzer. The resulting data confirmed that the new wet dispersion method does indeed deliver an improved representative aliquot to the SEM stub. For instance, in the NIST certificate, the average particle size is ~17.1 µm ± 2.2 µm with a normal distribution. The initial wet dispersion method resulted in a drastically reduced average particle size of 6.1 µm in addition to a non-representative heavy bi-modal distribution whereas the improved LST wet dispersion method resulting in an average particle size that was much closer to the NIST certificate (12.7 µm) with a similar normal distribution. Although the improved method was still short of the NIST certificate average, atomic force microscopy analysis determined that the resulting ~20-25% reduction in size was due to particles sinking into the carbon sticky tape used for SEM imaging. It is believed that that this bias can be calibrated in a much more predicable manner than the original settling rate bias. In addition, the matching normal distribution curves between the NIST certificate and the heavy liquid method indicate a much-improved representative aliquot has been sampled and imaged. A surrogate CeO 2 powder was used to reflect PuO 2 more accurately and to aid in implementing radiological controls and shielding. The resulting data sets from the SEM/MAMA method and the particle size analyzer give almost identical average particle sizes and particle distribution statistics. Future work will re-analyze several select runs from the SDS to determine if morphological signatures can be found with the improved sampling method.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Improbability of Post-Closure Criticality in Compacted Criticality Control Overpacks after Room Closure at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

As part of its periodic re-certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities, the United States Environmental Protection Agency expects a re-evaluation of features, events, and processes, such as post-closure nuclear criticality. Although salt creep beneficially encapsulates the TRU waste in the closed WIPP repository, the spacing between an array of waste packages is disrupted as the salt creep closes disposal rooms and containers lose structural integrity. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality evaluation was updated, however, because of the introduction of criticality control overpack (CCO) containers, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCO containers during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual disposal room closure from salt creep. Geomechanical models of roof fall demonstrate three tiers of CCO containers are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure) were used to predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Models of spheres or cylinders with 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular compacted spacing demonstrate that an array of CCO containers is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the mass of hydrogenous material shipped in CCO containers (usually plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Estimates of Quantum Tunneling Effects for Hydrogen Diffusion in PuO 2

We detail the estimation of activation energies and quantum nuclear vibrational tunneling effects for hydrogen diffusion in PuO 2 based on Density Functional Theory calculations and a quantum double well approximation. We find that results are relatively insensitive to choice of exchange correlation functional. In addition, the representation of spin in the system and use of an extended Hubbard U correction has only a small effect on hydrogen point defect formation energies when the PuO 2 lattice is held fixed at the experimental density. We then compute approximate activation energies for transitions between hydrogen interstitial sites seeded by a semi-empirical quantum model and determine the quantum tunneling enhancement relative to classical kinetic rates. Our model indicates that diffusion rates in H/PuO 2 systems could be enhanced by more than one order of magnitude at ambient conditions and that these effects persist at high temperature. The method we propose here can be used as a fast screening tool for assessing possible quantum nuclear vibrational effects in any number of condensed phase materials and surfaces, where hydrogen hopping tends to follow well defined minimum energy pathways.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗

Shipment of Non-traditional Contents in the 9977 Type B Package

The 9977 is a certified Type B Packaging authorized to ship uranium and plutonium in metal and oxide forms. These materials are typically confined within metallic containers designed for ease of handling and to prevent the spread of contamination. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) uses Pu and U sources for the training of domestic and international customs agents in the identification and detection of radioactive materials (RAM). These materials are packed in polycarbonate containers which permit the trainees to view the RAM. The safety basis was made to authorize the use of these unusual containers. The inclusion of the PNNL Training Source Contents into the 9977 Packaging imposed unique conditions previously unanalyzed. The use of polycarbonate as a content container material, while different from any configuration previously considered, does not raise any safety issues with the package which continues to operate with a large safety margin for temperatures, pressures, containment, dose rates, and subcriticality.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

QUALIFICATION OF THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE 252CF SHUFFLER FOR RECEIPT VERIFICATION MEASUREMENTS OF MIXED U-PU OXIDES STORED IN 9975 SHIPPING CONTAINERS

To extend their ability to perform accountability and verification measurements of {sup 235}U in a U-Pu oxide matrix, the K-Area Material Storage facility commissioned the development and construction of a Passive/Active {sup 252}Cf Shuffler. A series of {sup 252}Cf, PuO{sub 2}, and U-Pu oxide standards, in addition to a single U{sub 3}O{sub 8} standard, were measured to characterize and calibrate the shuffler. Accompanying these measurements were simulations using MCNP5/MCNPX, aimed at isolating the neutron countrate contributions for each of the isotopes present. Two calibration methods for determining the {sup 235}U content in mixed UPu oxide were then developed, yielding comparable results. The first determines the {sup 235}U mass by estimating the {sup 239}Pu/{sup 235}U ratio-dependent contributions from the primary delayed neutron contributors. The second defines an average linear response based on the {sup 235}U and {sup 239}Pu mass contents. In each case, it was observed that self-shielding due to {sup 235}U mass has a large influence on the observed rates, requiring bounds on the applicable limits of each calibration method.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Enhancing the Material Control & Accounting Measurement System at the State Scientific Center of the Russian Federation - Institute for Physics and Power Engineering named after A.I. Leypunsky

Nuclear material control and accounting (NMCA) system is improving under cooperation with USA national laboratories. Standard reference materials (RMs) and measurement techniques certified at IPPE level are required for: instrument calibration, verification measurements of parameters of items and materials, measurement error estimation, and quality control measurements. We present the main results for development of nuclear RMs for two uranium strata and the results for certification of three measurement techniques (MT) for U-235 mass fraction in uranium and U-235 mass in items. We present the results for developing measurement techniques for Pu-239 in PuO{sub 2}.

ACCOUNTING↗

Characterization of Pu-238 Heat Source Granule Containment

The Milliwatt Radioisotopic Themoelectric Generator (RTG) provides power for permissive-action links. Essentially these are nuclear batteries that convert thermal energy to electrical energy using a doped silicon-germanium thermopile. The thermal energy is provided by a heat source made of 238 Pu, in the form of 238 PuO 2 granules. The granules are contained by 3 layers of encapsulation. A thin T-111 liner surrounds the 238 PuO 2 granules and protects the second layer (strength member) from exposure to the fuel granules. An outer layer of Hastalloy-C protects the T-111 from oxygen embrittlement. The T-111 strength member is considered the critical component in this 238 PuO 2 containment system. Any compromise in the strength member seen during destructive testing required by the RTG surveillance program is characterized. The T-111 strength member is characterized through Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM), and Metallography. SEM is used in the Secondary Electron mode to reveal possible grain boundary deformation and/or cracking in the region of the strength member weld. Deformation and cracking uncovered by SEM are further characterized by Metallography. Metallography sections are mounted and polished, observed using optical microscopy, then documented in the form of microphotographs. SEM mat further be used to examine polished Metallography mounts to characterize elements using the SEM mode of Energy Dispersive X-ray spectroscopy (EDS).

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Why SRS Matters - H Canyon

A video series presenting an overview of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) mission and operations. Each episode features a specific area/operation and how it contributes to help make the world safer. This episode features H Canyon's mission and operations. H Canyon and its adjoining H B Line facility represent the last full-scale radio chemical processing capabilities left in the United States.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Idaho National Laboratory Radioisotope Power Systems Nuclear Operations: Readiness Assessments Supporting a Nuclear-enabled NASA Mission

Idaho National Laboratory Radioisotope Power Systems Nuclear Operations: Preparations, Documentation, Readiness Assessments and Conduct of Operations Supporting a Nuclear-enabled NASA Mission Kelly L. Lively, Eric S. Clarke, Robert P. Gomez Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho Falls, ID 83415 208-533-7388; Kelly.Lively@inl.gov Abstract. The Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS) Program, located at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), is responsible for assembling, testing, and delivering plutonium oxide-fueled RPSs for use in powering missions in remote, harsh environments such as deep space. An informative presentation will be given discussing the preparations, documents, readiness assessments, human capital and conduct of operations involved in performing nuclear operations to support providing these systems to end users for the Department of Energy (DOE). DOE is the start-up authority for performing nuclear operations. Readiness for start-up is determined through independent assessment against established acceptance criteria to ensure activities can be performed safely and within a well defined nuclear safety envelope. There is also an RPS Program approval element requiring additional readiness review before nuclear operations can begin. The programmatic readiness review is performed to ascertain readiness to proceed with nuclear operations from the perspective of product quality. The assessments and reviews are conducted in series in the following order of progression: Management Self Assessment (MSA), Contractor Readiness Assessment (CRA), DOE Readiness Assessment (DOE RA) and lastly, the Programmatic Production Readiness Review (PRR). The CRA, DOE RA, and PRR requires an independent technical review team. Twelve assessment criteria are reviewed and a selection of the criteria is identified for review on a graded approach. Typically, the assessments/review criteria requires, at a minimum, review of operating instructions to ensure technical safety requirements are adequately identified, review of training records to ensure personnel are adequately trained to perform the specified work scope, personnel are interviewed to determine adequacy of level of knowledge for work scope, and a high-fidelity performance of the operation to ensure the operating instructions and conduct of operations are adequate to perform the work scope. As each assessment/review is conducted a formal report delineating any issues in the form of findings, observations, and noteworthy practices will be issued. Before start-up approval is obtained all issues must be resolved to the satisfaction of the individual teams. Start-up notification is formally communicated by memorandum from DOE. Programmatic approval is documented in a Segmented Readiness Review where vested Program representatives in the RPS community (to include DOE NE 75 and DOE ID representatives) ensure personnel, documentation, and materials are in place to perform the activity. The four assessments/reviews can be completed in a 16-week period of time, provided ample resources and a relatively small work scope is identified. RPS assembly and testing operations to support the Mars 2020 Mission, the next planned space mission using a nuclear power system, will require about of year of assessments/reviews before the nuclear operations are performed. Keywords: INL, Operations, Assessments, DOE

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Surface Mediated Processes in the Interaction of Spent Fuel or {alpha}-doped UO{sub 2} with H{sub 2}

In most deep disposal concepts, large amounts of hydrogen are expected to be produced by the anoxic corrosion of massive iron containers. At repository temperatures, hydrogen is quite inert and is not expected to contribute to the redox capacity of the deep groundwaters. In several recent works, a large impact of dissolved hydrogen on the dissolution of the LWR or MOX fuel and UO{sub 2}(s) doped with {sup 233}U or {sup 238}Pu has been observed. For hydrogen concentrations above a certain limit, the dissolution rates of these highly radioactive materials drop to very low values. A discussion of the results obtained with spent fuel or {alpha}-doped UO{sub 2} in the presence of a range of hydrogen concentrations is presented. Typical for all measurements under such conditions are the very low long term concentrations of uranium and other redox-sensitive radionuclides, such as Tc and the minor actinides. The concentrations of U are systematically lower than the values measured during UO{sub 2}(s) solubility measurements carried out in the presence of strong reducing agents. Measurements of the radiolytic oxygen after long leaching periods result in values below detection limit. The investigation of the surface of spent fuel or UO{sub 2}(s) pellets doped with {sup 233}U by XPS after long periods of testing shows absence of oxidation. The kinetics of the release of non-redox sensitive elements such as Sr and Cs, used to estimate fuel matrix dissolution rates, is also discussed. An attempt is made to propose potential mechanisms responsible for the observed behaviour, based mainly on data from studies on the interaction of water adsorbed on the surfaces of metal oxides or actinide oxides with radiation. Another important effect observed in recent studies is the existence of a threshold for the specific alpha activity below which no measurable influence of the alpha radiolysis on the uranium release from UO{sub 2} is observed. The importance of such a threshold for the behaviour of spent fuel under repository conditions encompassing very long time scales will be discussed, as well as the necessity to better investigate the mechanisms of recombination reactions in a thin water layer on the surface of actinide oxides affected by {alpha}- radiolysis. (authors)

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

A Non-Destructive Investigation of Plutonium Reference Items Used for Calibration

The calibration of Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) equipment relies on the availability of certified items of known content and construction. Increasing use is being made of calculational tools to create calibration data and so representative standards are no longer always needed. However, even with this approach it is invaluable to benchmark the tools against the measured response under well known conditions and to apply the Measured: Calculated ratio as a scaling factor. Reference sources for Pu are typically doubly encapsulated for safety reasons and contain Pu of well known chemical form, elemental composition, relative isotopic composition and mass. Destructive analysis techniques are used to characterize the materials and so these attributes are usually known with far greater accuracy than that achievable by the NDA methods to which they are being applied. Construction details are also usually provided in order to permit attenuation and related factors to be estimated. This work concerns the empirical investigation of a set of encapsulated PuO{sub 2} powder standards. The characterization and fabrication of the items is adequately documented with the exception of fill height. The fill height governs the powder density and in turn both the self attenuation of photons and the self multiplication of neutrons, consequently this is an important omission. Initially the location and dimensions of the internal plunger cup was used as a basis to estimate the packing density, but later records of plunger positions made at the time of filling were found and significant revisions followed. As a consequence of discrepancies observed in measurements designed to evaluate a new lump correction algorithm we were led to investigate the powder density and distribution directly by gamma-ray scanning. In some cases this resulted in revised density estimates. Equally importantly it was discovered that for the smallest mass items, the powder was not held fixed in the form of a uniform disc by the spring loaded plunger but rather could flow inside the inner capsule. In this paper we describe the nature of the investigation, report the salient findings and explain the implications for modeling the sources for the calibration of NDA equipment. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

A view of treatment process of melted nuclear fuel on a severe accident plant using a molten salt system

At severe accident such as Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident, the nuclear fuels in the reactor would melt and form debris which contains stable UO2-ZrO2 mixture corium and parts of vessel such as zircaloy and iron component. The requirements for solution of issues are below; -) the reasonable treatment process of the debris should be simple and in-situ in Fukushima Daiichi power plant, -) the desirable treatment process is to take out UO{sub 2} and PuO{sub 2} or metallic U and TRU metal, and dispose other fission products as high level radioactive waste; and -) the candidate of treatment process should generate the smallest secondary waste. Pyro-process has advantages to treat the debris because of the high solubility of the debris and its total process feasibility. Toshiba proposes a new pyro-process in molten salts using electrolysing Zr before debris fuel being treated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Recycle of Am-241 obtained from long term stored plutonium for use in radioisotope power systems - 15035

Pu-238 has been used as a power source for spacecraft since the early days of space exploration. It has proven to be an effective source of power where the use of solar generated power is impractical. Its application for use in spacecraft power systems was developed by the USA and Russia who have spent many $ 100s of millions on its development and production. However, the original facilities for the production of Pu-238 are no longer in use and existing worldwide stockpiles have reduced to levels sufficient for only one or two further missions. Production of Pu-238 requires considerable facilities including a nuclear reactor and reprocessing plants that are very expensive to build and operate. The European Space Agency (ESA) has assessed the options for post-launch power generation in future European space missions and has made the decision to pursue the use of Am-241 as an alternative isotope to power future European Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS). What makes Am-241 attractive for the European market is its 100% isotopically pure production from the decay of Pu-241 in separated civil plutonium stockpiles. Historically, Europe has relied on collaborations with the USA or Russia to access these nuclear power sources. During 2009, the European Space Agency (ESA) funded a project to examine the cost and practicality of establishing a European source of material suitable for Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS). The study concluded that a small number of radioisotopes could be used in RPSs. On further review two leading candidates, Am-241 and Pu-238, were selected for further study. Whilst Pu-238 was recognized as the isotope of choice for use in RPSs, the costs of setting up a European based production facility was prohibitively expensive. Although Am-241 has a number of limitations compared to Pu-238, the much reduced production costs make Am-241 an attractive option for European based production of RPSs. Despite its lower power density of ∼ 0.11 Wth/g, Am-241 is viewed as a potential alternative to Pu-238 because of its availability within the nuclear fuel cycle. During the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel plutonium is separated as a chemically pure PuO{sub 2} product, containing around 3-11% w/w of the Pu-241 isotope, and placed into storage. During storage the Pu-241 isotope beta decays to Am-241 with a half-life of 14.4 years. {sub 94}{sup 241}Pu → (β 14.4 y) {sub 95}{sup 241}Am. This process has resulted in many 100 kgs of americium growing into the civil plutonium stockpile in the UK; material that is of value in generating heat sources and is able to be recycled. The key benefit of Am-241 as a potential European RPS source isotope is the availability of feed material along with the facilities to process it. It is expected that aged civil PuO{sub 2} will contain 25-50 g Am-241 per kg PuO{sub 2} depending on the source. A conceptual flowsheet using facilities for separating americium from plutonium is expected to produce on average 8.4 kg Am/year. ESA are now following their published road-map of studies to develop flight ready RTGs and RHUs. This has included the development and testing of the flowsheet to be used for production of Am-241. The project has focused on underpinning the conceptual flowsheet, using aged plutonium in NNL's PuMA laboratory. This has underpinned the design of a plant to produce a steady supply of Am-241. The scope of the overall project is 'store to store' - the starting point is aged plutonium currently housed in existing Sellafield stores and the end point is the storage of separated plutonium and americium powders on the Sellafield site. The full scale process is planned to be housed within the NNL's Central Laboratory in an existing facility designed for plutonium active operations. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Opportunities to Reuse and Recycle Redundant Radioisotopes - 16023

Sixty plus years of nuclear research and operation in the UK has produced significant quantities of nuclear material. To those involved in decommissioning a site or facility, this material represents a liability that needs to be managed and eventually disposed of. However to those in the wider nuclear industry and supply chain, the radioisotopes represent a potential resource of valuable, and in some cases irreplaceable material for future work. There is therefore an opportunity to create a win-win by identifying material that could be recycled or reused, removing it from being a liability and creating value from what is considered a waste. The UK is currently focused on the clean up of nuclear sites and the safe disposal of legacy nuclear material. Whilst the bulk of legacy material on these sites is mixed wastes in various solid and liquid forms, some of it consists of material produced for research purposes in the form of radioisotopes or exotic fuels. This has resulted in a plethora of unirradiated and irradiated materials in store across the UK including: Depleted and natural Uranium, Enriched Uranium, Mixed U/Pu oxides, Uranium carbide and mixed U/Pu carbides, Thorium as metal and oxides, Research radioisotopes. The material exists in almost every conceivable state from pure metal and oxides to solutions. Some material is well characterised and free from extraneous debris, other material is poorly characterised and contaminated with chemicals, experimental residues and sweepings. In addition, to reduce the risk and potential hazard across the UK there has also been a period of consolidation of obsolete radioactive sources from a wide variety of industrial or medical facilities to secure storage within a licensed site. The waste hierarchy is an established principle for the management of wastes, radioactive or otherwise. Its principles are set out and it gives top priority to prevention in the first place. Where waste is produced, it gives priority to preparation for re-use, then recycling before consideration for disposal as a last resort. The term wastes may only be applicable to the owner of the material where they may view the material as unwanted, unusable, or a by-product. It does not necessarily follow that the material is a waste to all potential owners. Therefore it is important to consider the potential value of material before it is considered for disposal since there is a significant and growing market for radioisotopes across the world. This paper will outline some of the opportunities in the UK for the recycle of surplus radioisotopes and orphan material. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗