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DOE OSTI2026

FAST-1.2.2: A Computer Code for Thermal-Mechanical Nuclear Fuel Analysis under Steady-state and Transients

Fuel Analysis under Steady-state and Transients (FAST) is the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)’s computer code that calculates the steady-state and transient response of nuclear reactor fuel rods during long-term in-reactor burnup, anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs), design basis accidents (DBAs), and dry storage conditions. The code calculates the temperature, pressure, and deformation of a fuel rod as functions of time-dependent fuel rod power and coolant boundary conditions. The phenomena modeled by the code include heat conduction through the fuel and other materials, heat transfer from the cladding-to-coolant, cladding elastic and plastic deformation (including creep), fuel-cladding mechanical interaction, fission gas release from the fuel, rod internal pressure, void volume, and cladding oxidation. The code contains necessary material and coolant properties, as well as clad-to-coolant heat transfer correlations, for normal operation through postulated accidents and AOOs for today’s U.S.-based light water reactor (LWR) fuel designs. FAST-1.2.2 also contains preliminary materials and models for new LWR fuel concepts, such as accident tolerant fuel (ATF), and non-LWR fuel concepts such as metallic fuels for sodium fast reactors (SFRs). FAST has been developed for use on Windows and Linux operating systems. This document describes FAST-1.2.2 and is one of a series of documents on the code; the other documents detail the material properties used by FAST as well as its integral assessment to experiments and commercial data.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff reviews the human factors engineering (HFE) aspects of nuclear power plants in accordance with the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition). The Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model (NUREG-0711, Revision 3, issued November 2012) contains detailed design review procedures. As part of the review process, the interfaces between plant personnel and the plant's systems and components are evaluated for conformance with HFE guidelines. This document, Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700, Revision 3), provides the guidelines necessary to perform this evaluation. The review guidelines address the physical and functional characteristics of human-system interfaces (HSIs). Because these guidelines only address the HFE aspects of design and not other related considerations, such as instrumentation and control and structural design, they are referred to as HFE guidelines. In addition to the review of actual HSIs, the NRC staff can use the NUREG-0700 guidelines to evaluate a design-specific HFE guidelines document or style guide. The HFE guidelines are organized into four basic parts, which are divided into sections. Part I contains guidelines for the basic HSI elements: information displays, user-interface interaction and management, and analog displays and controls. These elements are used as building blocks to develop HSI systems to serve specific functions. Part II contains the guidelines for reviewing the following HSI systems: alarm system, safety parameter display system, group-view display system, soft control system, computer-based procedure system, automation system, and communication system. Part III provides guidelines for the review of workstations and workplaces. Part IV provides guidelines for the review of HSI support (i.e., maintainability of digital systems and degraded HSI and instrumentation and control conditions).

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2020

Cask RT-100 Type B(U) Self-Certification for DOT 7A, Type A Nuclear Waste Transportation - 20098

The purpose of this Type A certification is to diversify the use of the RT-100 cask by allowing the end user to transport either Type A or Type B radioactive waste in accordance with the handling procedures for each waste category. The project's scope included the development of a matrix that contains all applicable requirements for a Type A package from the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Title 49 for the Department of Transportation (DOT) with a justification for each requirement. Moreover, the scope included the writing of conditions and restrictions list for the transportation of Type A nuclear waste, the writing of a compliance statement, and the design and fabrication of a Type A placard to be permanently placed on the RT-100 cask. Type A packages are self-certified by the end user using one of three methods as permitted by 49 CFR 173.461, either by performance of tests with prototypes or samples of the specimens representing the packaging, or reference to a previous satisfactory demonstration of compliance of a sufficiently similar nature, or calculations or reasoned evaluation using reliable and conservative procedures and parameters. Since the RT-100 cask was licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as a Type B cask, Robatel relied on the method of reference to a previous satisfactory demonstration of compliance of a sufficiently similar nature for Type A certification. This method was determined to be acceptable, since Type B packages are evaluated for more demanding transport conditions than those required for Type A packages. This paper presents Robatel's process for certifying the RT-100 cask for Type A shipments, an overview of the DOT regulations related to Type A packages, and the documents that were generated for the end user. This paper is concluded with a discussion on the advantages of having the option to transport both Type A and Type B nuclear waste, and possible future projects to further improve the operation of the cask when making Type A shipments. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2024

MACCS User Guide (V.5.0)

MACCS is used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and various national and international organizations for probabilistic consequence analysis of nuclear power accidents. This user guide is intended to assist analysts in understanding the MACCS/MACCS-UI User Interface (UI) model and to provide information regarding the code. This user guide version describes MACCS Version 5.0, model history, explains how to set up and execute a problem, and informs the user of the definition of various input parameters and any constraints placed on those parameters. This report is part of a series of reports documenting MACCS. Other reports include the MACCS Theory Manual, MACCS Verification Report, Technical Bases for Consequence Analyses Using MACCS, as well as documentation for preprocessor codes including SecPop, MelMACCS, and COMIDA2.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2026

MACCS User Guide - Version 5.2

MACCS is used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and various national and international organizations for probabilistic consequence analysis of nuclear power accidents. This user guide is intended to assist analysts in understanding the MACCS/MACCS-UI User Interface (UI) model and to provide information regarding the code. This user guide version describes MACCS Version 5.2, model history, explains how to set up and execute a problem, and informs the user of the definition of various input parameters and any constraints placed on those parameters. This report is part of a series of reports documenting MACCS. Other reports include the MACCS Theory Manual, MACCS Verification Report, Technical Bases for Consequence Analyses Using MACCS, as well as documentation for preprocessor codes including SecPop, MelMACCS, and COMIDA2.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2025

Participation in and Assessment of the Second DNCSH Public Workshop

The DOE/NRC Criticality Safety for Commercial-Scale HALEU Fuel Cycle and Transportation (DNCSH) project was established through the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (H.R. 5376) to support the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry in addressing critical experiment validation gaps that impede the licensing basis and regulatory approval of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) operations. An initial public workshop was held in February 2024 to address HALEU transportation validation gaps. The resulting call for proposals was released in April and resulted in funding for the execution and/or evaluation of 16 critical experiments. A second public workshop was held in August 2025 to address facility and operational validation gaps, precluding a second call for proposals. A list of attendees is provided in APPENDIX A, Table A-1. A total of 319 participants joined the meeting, which was hosted online via Microsoft Teams as well as in person. The slides from the meeting were uploaded online to the NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). The meeting agenda is provided in Table 1-1. In preparation for the meeting, a study was performed to examine expected fissile forms for the fuel cycles of various fuel types at different stages of production and the apparent validation gaps. The resulting report, titled “Benchmark Gap Assessment for the Manufacturing of High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium Fuels,” provided the foundation for the discussions that took place during the workshop. The discussions and the validation gaps in the report were used to develop the second call for proposals. The present report presents the feedback received before, during, and after the second workshop. All the data presented are based on voluntarily self-reported identification, opinions from workshop participants, and survey responses and are assumed to be as accurate as practically reasonable. The discussions during the workshop and the subsequent survey responses were intended to direct attention to industry-specific areas of interest and to collect feedback on the work performed to date by the DNCSH project.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Guideline for Characterizing and Evaluating a Candidate Project Site for Solar Thermal Applications

This document presents a structured procedure for characterizing and evaluating candidate project sites for concentrating solar power (CSP) and solar heat for industrial processes (SHIP) applications. The objective is to provide project developers, researchers, and other stakeholders with a consistent, technology-agnostic framework for early-stage site assessment, enabling informed decision-making prior to significant investment in project development. Site selection is a critical factor in project success or failure for both CSP and SHIP projects. Key factors such as solar resource availability, land characteristics, environmental and regulatory constraints, infrastructure availability, and community context are determined by the choice of project site and can materially impact project performance, cost, schedule, and overall viability. This procedure is designed to systematically evaluate these factors, identify potential fatal flaws, and prioritize the most favorable candidate sites for further development. The process begins with rapid screening-level evaluation, using publicly available data to assess solar resource, land availability and suitability, zoning and land-use compatibility, and exclusion zones such as protected lands or sensitive habitats. Sites that meet the minimum screening criteria advance to a more detailed characterization. Subsequent sections of this report provide guidance for a next-level assessment of the most important technical and environmental parameters, including: 1) Solar resource quality, variability, and uncertainty using multiyear datasets and, where appropriate, on-site measurement campaigns; 2) Meteorological conditions such as wind, temperature, extreme weather events, and soiling impacts; 3) Land characteristics including slope, shading, and geotechnical conditions; and 4) Environmental and regulatory considerations, including permitting processes, endangered species, cultural resources, and visual impacts. The procedure also addresses infrastructure and integration considerations, including: 1) Grid interconnection requirements for CSP power generation projects; 2) Electrical and operational integration for SHIP facilities; 3) Water availability, quality, and permitting constraints, which are particularly critical for CSP in arid regions; and 4) Site access, construction logistics, and availability of workforce and supporting services. Recognizing the importance of social and economic context, the procedure includes evaluation of community engagement factors, such as stakeholder sentiment, proximity to sensitive visual receptors, workforce development opportunities, and local economic incentives. The outputs of these assessments are synthesized in a cost and risk evaluation, translating site characteristics into expected impacts on capital cost, operating cost, schedule, and technical risk. This is complemented by screening-level performance modeling, including 8760 simulations and long-term projections, to quantify expected energy or thermal output, assess variability thereof, and support comparison between candidate sites. Finally, the procedure provides high-level guidance on a structured go/no-go decision framework, categorizing sites based on identified risks and constraints, and outlining a clear path forward to feasibility studies and front-end engineering design for viable projects. By standardizing the site characterization process across both CSP and SHIP applications, this guideline aims to: 1) Improve consistency and transparency in early-stage project evaluation; 2) Reduce development risk and avoid investment in nonviable project sites; 3) Support collaboration between developers, researchers, and public agencies; and 4) Accelerate successful deployment of concentrating solar technologies for both power generation and industrial process heat.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2023

PV Stormwater Management Research and Testing (PV-SMaRT) (Final Technical Report)

The objective of the Photovoltaic Stormwater Management Research and Testing (PV-SMaRT) project was to develop and disseminate research-based, solar-specific resources for estimating stormwater runoff at ground-mounted PV facilities and detail stormwater management and water quality best practices. The intended use of stormwater management and water quality best practices and stormwater runoff estimation resources is to reduce balance of system soft costs associated with stormwater infrastructure requirements and improve water quality through research-tested best practices. Currently, stormwater regulations and guidelines vary by jurisdiction and can lead to regulatory uncertainty and increased compliance costs for managing stormwater runoff at solar sites. To address these concerns, the NREL team and its partners (University of Minnesota, Great Plains Institute, and Fresh Energy) established and engaged an advisory Water Quality Task Force (WQTF); conducted field research on stormwater infiltration and runoff at five ground-mounted PV sites; validated a 3-D hydrologic model to predict water runoff and generate stormwater runoff coefficients for a range of site conditions and PV designs; developed a stormwater management and water quality best practices document; and engaged with local jurisdictions and other stakeholders to disseminate best practices, stormwater runoff coefficients, and other tools. Key outputs of this project were a PV-SMaRT Runoff Calculator developed by University of Minnesota, a webinar detailing project outcomes and how to use the PV-SMaRT runoff calculator, and a document on Best Practices for regulators and developers regarding stormwater runoff at PV sites.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

NASA NTRS2021

NASA / NIST / FAA Technical Interchange Meeting on Computational Materials Approaches for Qualification by Analysis for Aerospace Applications

This report documents the goals, organization and outcomes of a Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM) on Computational Materials Approaches for Qualification by Analysis, co-organized by NASA, NIST and the FAA. The TIM was held at NASA Langley Research Center on January 15-16, 2020. Approximately 60 subject matter experts (SMEs) representing 8 aerospace manufacturers, 7 government organizations and 2 universities participated. Expertise of the SMEs spanned the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) scale from the low-to-mid TRL focus of government laboratories and universities to the high TRL perspective of the regulatory organizations and aerospace manufacturers. During this TIM, the future needs of the government regulators and manufacturers motivated the overall discussion and framed the input given by the participants. Hence, the key objectives of the TIM were to understand existing gaps in model-based, e.g., computational materials, processing and performance predictions for aerospace materials and components and forecast how they can be matured to support material, process and part-level qualification and certification (Q&C). The TIM focused on process-intensive metallic materials technologies, including, but not limited to, additive manufacturing. Participation was roughly evenly divided among the processing and performance tracks, suggesting that both topic areas are generally perceived as being both valuable and requiring additional investment. The output of this TIM may be used by both participating and other organizations, in part, as guidance for future national efforts on maturing computational materials capabilities for use in the Q&C of advanced metallic material systems in aerospace applications.

Edward H Glaessgen↗

DOE OSTI2022

Triton Field Trials - Changes in Habitats, a Literature Review of Monitoring Technologies

Marine energy devices are installed in highly dynamic environments and have the potential to affect benthic and pelagic habitats around them. Regulatory bodies often require baseline characterization and/or post-installation monitoring to determine whether changes in these habitats are being observed. However, a great diversity of technologies is available for surveying and sampling marine habitats. Selecting the most suitable instrument to identify and measure changes in habitats at marine energy sites can become a daunting task. We conducted a thorough review of journal articles, survey reports, and grey literature to extract information about the technologies used, the data collection and processing methods, and the performance and effectiveness of these instruments. We examined documents related to marine energy development, offshore wind farms, oil and gas offshore sites, and other marine industries around the world over the last 20 years, as well as national and international guidelines for surveying habitats around offshore activities. A total of 120 different technologies were identified across six main habitat categories: seafloor, sediment, infauna, epifauna, pelagic, and biofouling. The technologies were organized into 12 broad technology classes: acoustic, corer, dredge, grab, hook and line, net and trawl, plate, remote sensing, scrape samples, trap, visual, and others. Visual was the most common and the most diverse technology class, with applications across all six habitat categories. Sampling designs varied considerably among the reviewed studies but transect was the predominant design for surveying seafloor, epifauna, and pelagic habitats. The most common data analyses were univariate and multivariate statistical analyses aimed at calculating and comparing biodiversity indices, characterizing faunal assemblages or sediment classes, or modeling the distribution of animals related to abiotic parameters. Technologies and sampling methods adaptable and designed to work efficiently in energetic environments have greater success at marine energy sites. In addition, sampling designs and statistical analyses should be carefully thought through to identify differences in faunal assemblages and spatiotemporal changes in habitats.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗

DOE OSTI2023

MACCS User Guide (V.4.2)

MACCS is used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and various national and international organizations for probabilistic consequence analysis of nuclear power accidents. This User Guide is intended to assist analysts in understanding the MACCS/WinMACCS model and to provide information regarding the code. This user guide version describes MACCS Version 4.2. This User Guide provides a brief description of the model history, explains how to set up and execute a problem, and informs the user of the definition of various input parameters and any constraints placed on those parameters. This report is part of a series of reports documenting MACCS. Other reports include the MACCS Theory Manual, MACCS Verification Report, Technical Bases for Consequence Analyses Using MACCS, as well as documentation for preprocessor codes including SecPop, MelMACCS, and COMIDA2.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

What’s in My Toolkit? A Review of Technologies for Assessing Changes in Habitats Caused by Marine Energy Development

Marine energy devices are installed in highly dynamic environments and have the potential to affect the benthic and pelagic habitats around them. Regulatory bodies often require baseline characterization and/or post-installation monitoring to determine whether changes in these habitats are being observed. However, a great diversity of technologies is available for surveying and sampling marine habitats, and selecting the most suitable instrument to identify and measure changes in habitats at marine energy sites can become a daunting task. We conducted a thorough review of journal articles, survey reports, and grey literature to extract information about the technologies used, the data collection and processing methods, and the performance and effectiveness of these instruments. We examined documents related to marine energy development, offshore wind farms, oil and gas offshore sites, and other marine industries around the world over the last 20 years. A total of 120 different technologies were identified across six main habitat categories: seafloor, sediment, infauna, epifauna, pelagic, and biofouling. The technologies were organized into 12 broad technology classes: acoustic, corer, dredge, grab, hook and line, net and trawl, plate, remote sensing, scrape samples, trap, visual, and others. Visual was the most common and the most diverse technology class, with applications across all six habitat categories. Technologies and sampling methods that are designed for working efficiently in energetic environments have greater success at marine energy sites. In addition, sampling designs and statistical analyses should be carefully thought through to identify differences in faunal assemblages and spatiotemporal changes in habitats.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗

NASA NTRS2015

Common Cause Failure Modeling in Space Launch Vehicles

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFs are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused for example by system environments, manufacturing, transportation, storage, maintenance, and assembly. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, they can be reduced, but are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and dependent CCF. Because common cause failure data is limited in the aerospace industry, the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Team at Bastion Technology Inc. is estimating CCF risk using generic data collected by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Consequently, common cause risk estimates based on this database, when applied to other industry applications, are highly uncertain. Therefore, it is important to account for a range of values for independent and CCF risk and to communicate the uncertainty to decision makers. There is an existing methodology for reducing CCF risk during design, which includes a checklist of 40+ factors grouped into eight categories. Using this checklist, an approach to produce a beta factor estimate is being investigated that quantitatively relates these factors. In this example, the checklist will be tailored to space launch vehicles, a quantitative approach will be described, and an example of the method will be presented.

Hark, Frank↗

DOE OSTI2020

Summary of Nuclear Regulatory Commission Flood Barrier Testing Strategies Workshop

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) organized a half-day workshop on flood barrier testing strategies (FBTS) at NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD, via a webinar as well, on March 12, 2020. The workshop was a public meeting attended by members of the public and staff from NRC, INL, and other agencies. The workshop served multiple objectives: (1) present preliminary research results from the FBTS research project conducted by INL for NRC, and (2) engage industry stakeholders and technical experts to provide inputs and insights on testing strategies. This letter report documents the materials presented, participant questions and answers, and summaries of an open discussion during this FBTS workshop.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2021

CLOSURE REPORT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 577 AREA 5 CHROMIUM CONTAINING WASTE DISPOSAL CELLS

Report will be submitted to the state of Nevada Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS), was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office on April 25, 2019. The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste cells and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents (NDEP 2019). As stipulated in Paragraph 5C of the SA, a Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) was prepared that identified and evaluated risks and corrective action alternatives (CAAs) for CAU 577, provided the plan for implementing the recommended CAA, and presented the post-closure plan (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021).

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NASA NTRS2015

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshall Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗

NASA NTRS2016

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshal Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗

DOE OSTI2023

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗