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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1991

Nuclear safety for the space exploration initiative

The results of a study to identify potential hazards arising from nuclear reactor power systems for use on the lunar and Martian surfaces, related safety issues, and resolutions of such issues by system design changes, operating procedures, and other means are presented. All safety aspects of nuclear reactor power systems from prelaunch ground handling to eventual disposal were examined consistent with the level of detail for SP-100 reactor design at the 1988 System Design Review and for launch vehicle and space transport vehicle designs and mission descriptions as defined in the 90-day Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) study. Information from previous aerospace nuclear safety studies was used where appropriate. Safety requirements for the SP-100 space nuclear reactor system were compiled. Mission profiles were defined with emphasis on activities after low earth orbit insertion. Accident scenarios were then qualitatively defined for each mission phase. Safety issues were identified for all mission phases with the aid of simplified event trees. Safety issue resolution approaches of the SP-100 program were compiled. Resolution approaches for those safety issues not covered by the SP-100 program were identified. Additionally, the resolution approaches of the SP-100 program were examined in light of the moon and Mars missions.

Dix, Terry E.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Development of a software safety process and a case study of its use

The goal of this research is to continue the development of a comprehensive approach to software safety and to evaluate the approach with a case study. The case study is a major part of the project, and it involves the analysis of a specific safety-critical system from the medical equipment domain. The particular application being used was selected because of the availability of a suitable candidate system. We consider the results to be generally applicable and in no way particularly limited by the domain. The research is concentrating on issues raised by the specification and verification phases of the software lifecycle since they are central to our previously-developed rigorous definitions of software safety. The theoretical research is based on our framework of definitions for software safety. In the area of specification, the main topics being investigated are the development of techniques for building system fault trees that correctly incorporate software issues and the development of rigorous techniques for the preparation of software safety specifications. The research results are documented. Another area of theoretical investigation is the development of verification methods tailored to the characteristics of safety requirements. Verification of the correct implementation of the safety specification is central to the goal of establishing safe software. The empirical component of this research is focusing on a case study in order to provide detailed characterizations of the issues as they appear in practice, and to provide a testbed for the evaluation of various existing and new theoretical results, tools, and techniques. The Magnetic Stereotaxis System is summarized.

Knight, John C.↗
NASA NTRS1997

NASA Software Safety Standard

If software is a critical element in a safety critical system, it is imperative to implement a systematic approach to software safety as an integral part of the overall system safety programs. The NASA-STD-8719.13A, "NASA Software Safety Standard", describes the activities necessary to ensure that safety is designed into software that is acquired or developed by NASA, and that safety is maintained throughout the software life cycle. A PDF version, is available on the WWW from Lewis. A Guidebook that will assist in the implementation of the requirements in the Safety Standard is under development at the Lewis Research Center (LeRC). After completion, it will also be available on the WWW from Lewis.

Rosenberg, Linda↗
NASA NTRS1997

Demonstration of a Safety Analysis on a Complex System

For the past 17 years, Professor Leveson and her graduate students have been developing a theoretical foundation for safety in complex systems and building a methodology upon that foundation. The methodology includes special management structures and procedures, system hazard analyses, software hazard analysis, requirements modeling and analysis for completeness and safety, special software design techniques including the design of human-machine interaction, verification, operational feedback, and change analysis. The Safeware methodology is based on system safety techniques that are extended to deal with software and human error. Automation is used to enhance our ability to cope with complex systems. Identification, classification, and evaluation of hazards is done using modeling and analysis. To be effective, the models and analysis tools must consider the hardware, software, and human components in these systems. They also need to include a variety of analysis techniques and orthogonal approaches: There exists no single safety analysis or evaluation technique that can handle all aspects of complex systems. Applying only one or two may make us feel satisfied, but will produce limited results. We report here on a demonstration, performed as part of a contract with NASA Langley Research Center, of the Safeware methodology on the Center-TRACON Automation System (CTAS) portion of the air traffic control (ATC) system and procedures currently employed at the Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach CONtrol). CTAS is an automated system to assist controllers in handling arrival traffic in the DFW area. Safety is a system property, not a component property, so our safety analysis considers the entire system and not simply the automated components. Because safety analysis of a complex system is an interdisciplinary effort, our team included system engineers, software engineers, human factors experts, and cognitive psychologists.

Leveson, Nancy↗
NASA NTRS2000

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report for 1999

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for the calendar year 1999.This was a year of notable achievements and significant frustrations. Both the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs were delayed.The Space Shuttle prudently postponed launches after the occurrence of a wiring short during ascent of the STS-93 mission. The ISS construction schedule slipped as a result of the Space Shuttle delays and problems the Russians experienced in readying the Service Module and its launch vehicle. Each of these setbacks was dealt with in a constructive way. The STS-93 short circuit led to detailed wiring inspections and repairs on all four orbiters as well as analysis of other key subsystems for similar types of hidden damage. The ISS launch delays afforded time for further testing, training, development, and contingency planning. The safety consciousness of the NASA and contractor workforces, from hands-on labor to top management, continues high. Nevertheless, workforce issues remain among the most serious safety concerns of the Panel. Cutbacks and reorganizations over the past several years have resulted in problems related to workforce size, critical skills, and the extent of on-the-job experience. These problems have the potential to impact safety as the Space Shuttle launch rate increases to meet the demands of the ISS and its other customers. As with last year's report, these work- force-related issues were considered of sufficient import to place them first in the material that follows. Some of the same issues of concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS arose in a review of the launch vehicle for the Terra mission that the Panel was asked by NASA to undertake. Other areas the Panel was requested to assess included the readiness of the Inertial Upper Stage for the deployment of the Chandra X-ray Observatory and the possible safety impact of electromagnetic effects on the Space Shuttle. The findings and recommendations in this report do not highlight any major, immediate issues that might compromise the safe pursuit of the various NASA programs. They do, however, cover concerns that the Panel believes should be addressed in the interest of maintaining NASA's excellent safety record.The Panel is pleased to note that remedial efforts for some of the findings raised are underway. Given appropriate funding and cooperative efforts among the Administration, the Congress and the various contractors, the Panel is convinced that safety problems can be avoided or solved resulting in lower risk for NASA's human space and aeronautics programs. Section II of this report contains specific findings and recommendations generated by Panel activities during the calendar year 1999. Section III presents more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. A current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff is included as Appendix A. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1998 annual report. It has been augmented this year to include brief explanations of why the Panel classified the NASA response as " open,""continuing," or "closed." Appendix C lists the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1999.

Blomberg, Richard D.↗
NASA NTRS2001

A Synthetic Vision Preliminary Integrated Safety Analysis

This report documents efforts to analyze a sample of aviation safety programs, using the LMI-developed integrated safety analysis tool to determine the change in system risk resulting from Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) technology implementation. Specifically, we have worked to modify existing system safety tools to address the safety impact of synthetic vision (SV) technology. Safety metrics include reliability, availability, and resultant hazard. This analysis of SV technology is intended to be part of a larger effort to develop a model that is capable of "providing further support to the product design and development team as additional information becomes available". The reliability analysis portion of the effort is complete and is fully documented in this report. The simulation analysis is still underway; it will be documented in a subsequent report. The specific goal of this effort is to apply the integrated safety analysis to SV technology. This report also contains a brief discussion of data necessary to expand the human performance capability of the model, as well as a discussion of human behavior and its implications for system risk assessment in this modeling environment.

Hemm, Robert↗
NASA NTRS2000

A Safety Index and Method for Flightdeck Evaluation

If our goal is to improve safety through machine, interface, and training design, then we must define a metric of flightdeck safety that is usable in the design process. Current measures associated with our notions of "good" pilot performance and ultimate safety of flightdeck performance fail to provide an adequate index of safe flightdeck performance for design evaluation purposes. The goal of this research effort is to devise a safety index and method that allows us to evaluate flightdeck performance holistically and in a naturalistic experiment. This paper uses Reason's model of accident causation (1990) as a basis for measuring safety, and proposes a relational database system and method for 1) defining a safety index of flightdeck performance, and 2) evaluating the "safety" afforded by flightdeck performance for the purpose of design iteration. Methodological considerations, limitations, and benefits are discussed as well as extensions to this work.

Latorella, Kara A.↗
NASA NTRS2005

International Cooperation in the Field of International Space Station (ISS) Payload Safety

In the frame of the International Space Station (ISS) Program cooperation, in 1998, the European Space Agency (ESA) approached the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) with the unique concept of a Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) "franchise" based at the European Space Technology Center (ESTEC), where the panel would be capable of autonomously reviewing flight hardware for safety. This paper will recount the course of an ambitious idea as it progressed into a fully functional reality. It will show how a panel initially conceived at NASA to serve a national programme has evolved into an international safety cooperation asset. The PSRP established at NASA began reviewing ISS payloads approximately in late 1994 or early 1995 as an expansion of the pre-existing Shuttle Program PSRP. This paper briefly describes the fundamental Shuttle safety process and the establishment of the safety requirements for payloads intending to use the Space Transportation System and International Space Station (ISS). The paper will also offer some historical statistics about the experiments that completed the payload safety process for Shuttle and ISS. The paper 1 then presents the background of ISS agreements and international treaties that had to be taken into account when establishing the ESA PSRP. The detailed franchising model will be expounded upon, followed by an outline of the cooperation charter approved by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Space Flight, and ESA Director of Manned Spaceflight and Microgravity. The resulting ESA PSRP implementation and its success statistics to date will then be addressed. Additionally the paper presents the ongoing developments with the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency. The discussion will conclude with ideas for future developments, such to achieve a fully integrated international system of payload safety panels for ISS.

Heimann, Timothy↗
NASA NTRS2005

The Importance of Multilateral Safety Requirements for Human Spaceflight

The International Space Station (ISS) Program initially implemented safety requirements in a series of bilateral agreements between NASA and each International Partner. As the program matured and multilateral processes began to be developed, the differences between these bilaterally agreed requirement sets became more significant. Efforts to develop multilateral safety requirements were hampered for many reasons including assessment of national standards used in the bilateral agreements, requirements baselines for existing contracts, and resource limitations to address requirements changes late in the development and operations phases. To avoid similar requirements issues in the future, international safety requirements need to be developed for human spaceflight. This paper will provide the background of the ISS bilateral Safety and Mission Assurance requirements and processes, describe the activities to develop multilateral safety requirements and processes, and give examples of issues that were encountered. Further, the paper will make recommendations regarding the development of international safety requirements for human spaceflight and the safety topics to be addressed.

Pido, Kelle↗
NASA NTRS2005

NASA's Software Safety Standard

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) relies more and more on software to control, monitor, and verify its safety critical systems, facilities and operations. Since the 1960's there has hardly been a spacecraft (manned or unmanned) launched that did not have a computer on board that provided vital command and control services. Despite this growing dependence on software control and monitoring, there has been no consistent application of software safety practices and methodology to NASA's projects with safety critical software. Led by the NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Software Safety Standard (STD-18l9.13B) has recently undergone a significant update in an attempt to provide that consistency. This paper will discuss the key features of the new NASA Software Safety Standard. It will start with a brief history of the use and development of software in safety critical applications at NASA. It will then give a brief overview of the NASA Software Working Group and the approach it took to revise the software engineering process across the Agency.

Ramsay, Christopher M.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Verification and Implementation of Operations Safety Controls for Flight Missions

There are several engineering disciplines, such as reliability, supportability, quality assurance, human factors, risk management, safety, etc. Safety is an extremely important engineering specialty within NASA, and the consequence involving a loss of crew is considered a catastrophic event. Safety is not difficult to achieve when properly integrated at the beginning of each space systems project/start of mission planning. The key is to ensure proper handling of safety verification throughout each flight/mission phase. Today, Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) operations engineers continue to conduct these flight product reviews across all open flight products. As such, these reviews help ensure that each mission is accomplished with safety requirements along with controls heavily embedded in applicable flight products. Most importantly, the S&MA operations engineers are required to look for important design and operations controls so that safety is strictly adhered to as well as reflected in the final flight product.

Smalls, James R.↗
NASA NTRS2010

2009 NASA Range Safety Annual Report

This year, NASA Range Safety transitioned to a condensed annual report to allow for Secretariat support to the Range Safety Group, Risk Committee. Although much shorter than in previous years, this report contains full-length articles concerning various subject areas, as well as links to past reports. Additionally, summaries from various NASA Range Safety Program activities that took place throughout the year are presented, as well as information on several projects that may have a profound impact on the way business will be done in the future. The sections include a program overview and 2009 highlights; Range Safety Training; Range Safety Policy; Independent Assessments Support to Program Operations at all ranges conducting NASA launch operations; a continuing overview of emerging range safety-related technologies; and status reports from all of the NASA Centers that have Range Safety responsibilities.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2010

2010 NASA Range Safety Annual Report

this report provides a NASA Range Safety overview for current and potential range users. This report contains articles which cover a variety of subject areas, summaries of various NASA Range Safety Program activities conducted during the past year, links to past reports, and information on several projects that may have a profound impact on the way business will be done in the future. Specific topics discussed in the 2010 NASA Range Safety Annual Report include a program overview and 2010 highlights; Range Safety Training; Range Safety Policy revision; Independent Assessments; Support to Program Operations at all ranges conducting NASA launch/flight operations; a continuing overview of emerging range safety-related technologies; and status reports from all of the NASA Centers that have Range Safety responsibilities. Every effort has been made to include the most current information available. We recommend this report be used only for guidance and that the validity and accuracy of all articles be verified for updates. Once again, the web-based format was used to present the annual report.

Dumont, Alan G.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Launch Services Safety Overview

NASA/KSC Launch Services Division Safety (SA-D) services include: (1) Assessing the safety of the launch vehicle (2) Assessing the safety of NASA ELV spacecraft (S/C) / launch vehicle (LV) interfaces (3) Assessing the safety of spacecraft processing to ensure resource protection of: - KSC facilities - KSC VAFB facilities - KSC controlled property - Other NASA assets (4) NASA personnel safety (5) Interfacing with payload organizations to review spacecraft for adequate safety implementation and compliance for integrated activities (6) Assisting in the integration of safety activities between the payload, launch vehicle, and processing facilities

Loftin, Charles E.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Systems Analysis of NASA Aviation Safety Program: Final Report

A three-month study (February to April 2010) of the NASA Aviation Safety (AvSafe) program was conducted. This study comprised three components: (1) a statistical analysis of currently available civilian subsonic aircraft data from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system to identify any significant or overlooked aviation safety issues; (2) a high-level qualitative identification of future safety risks, with an assessment of the potential impact of the NASA AvSafe research on the National Airspace System (NAS) based on these risks; and (3) a detailed, top-down analysis of the NASA AvSafe program using an established and peer-reviewed systems analysis methodology. The statistical analysis identified the top aviation "tall poles" based on NTSB accident and FAA incident data from 1997 to 2006. A separate examination of medical helicopter accidents in the United States was also conducted. Multiple external sources were used to develop a compilation of ten "tall poles" in future safety issues/risks. The top-down analysis of the AvSafe was conducted by using a modification of the Gibson methodology. Of the 17 challenging safety issues that were identified, 11 were directly addressed by the AvSafe program research portfolio.

Jones, Sharon M.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Overview of Risk Mitigation for Safety-Critical Computer-Based Systems

This report presents a high-level overview of a general strategy to mitigate the risks from threats to safety-critical computer-based systems. In this context, a safety threat is a process or phenomenon that can cause operational safety hazards in the form of computational system failures. This report is intended to provide insight into the safety-risk mitigation problem and the characteristics of potential solutions. The limitations of the general risk mitigation strategy are discussed and some options to overcome these limitations are provided. This work is part of an ongoing effort to enable well-founded assurance of safety-related properties of complex safety-critical computer-based aircraft systems by developing an effective capability to model and reason about the safety implications of system requirements and design.

Torres-Pomales, Wilfredo↗
NASA NTRS2015

"Evidence" Under a Magnifying Glass: Thoughts on Safety Argument Epistemology

Common definitions of "safety case" emphasize that evidence is the basis of a safety argument, yet few widely referenced works explicitly define "evidence". Their examples suggest that similar things can be regarded as evidence. But the category evidence seems to contain (1) processes for finding things out, (2) information resulting from such processes, and (3) relevant documents. Moreover, any item of evidence could be replaced by further argument. Normative models of informal argumentation do not offer clear guidance on when a safety argument should cite evidence rather than appeal to a more detailed argument. Disciplines such as the law address the problem with a practical, domain-specific epistemology. In this paper, we explore these problems associated with evidence citations in safety arguments, identify goals for a theory of safety argument evidence and a practical safety argument epistemology, propose a model of safety evidence citation that advances the identified goals, and present a related extension to the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN).

Graydon, P. J.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Potential Improvements to the Nuclear Safety and Launch Approval Process for Nuclear Reactors Utilized for Space Power and Propulsion Applications

This study examines potential improvements that could be made to the nuclear safety and launch approval process for fission reactors to reduce the associated uncertainties in cost and schedule while continuing to ensure public safety and environmental protection. It concentrates on the launch approval and mission safety of fission power and propulsion applications of nuclear energy. Improvements to the launch approval process for radioisotope power systems (RPSs) are being considered elsewhere but are acknowledged throughout the report. The study considered technical, process, and organizational improvements to the launch approval processes. The study exclusively evaluated reactors that would not be started up prior to achieving a “sufficiently high orbit,” per United Nations (UN) Resolution 47/68.Potential criticality accidents were considered that could occur during a launch failure or abort or during reentry. Numerous scenarios were examined that might involve one or more Earth flybys as well as potential transportation missions that could intentionally return an active, or previously active fission reactor to Earth orbit. The Study Group was guided in its deliberations according to a number of fundamental principles. These included the paramount importance of adequate and appropriate levels of public safety and environmental protection as well as the importance of the inclusion of independent scientific, engineering, and safety reviews of the applications and proposals as a critical part of the process. Also considered was the need for the development of launch approval processes that might be different, depending upon the source of the application for launch approval, whether it be derived as a governmental launch, a commercial launch, or a hybrid/combination of the two. It is clear that all launches of nuclear reactors into space should have similar safety requirements; however, the safety review effort and the details of the analysis that are required should be commensurate with the potential hazards and the actual risk, which may differ based on the reactor design and its intended purpose. Finally, the study aimed at ensuring that whatever processes and procedures are developed should maximize the sufficiency, simplicity, and transparency of the processes. The Study Group reached five Conclusions and makes thirteen Recommendations. The Conclusions and Recommendations presented here are extensions of those presented previously in other studies. This report attempts to add specificity to the actions that need to be taken in order to move forward with successful space fission reactor programs. Without action to address the perceived and real problems in the launch approval process, designers and mission managers will be reluctant to commit the resources necessary to make space fission reactors a reality.

Camp, Allen↗