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NASA NTRS2022

Evidence Report: Risk of Injury and Compromised Performance due to EVA Operations

During future missions to the Moon and Mars, each crewmember will most likely perform up to 24 hours a week of extravehicular activity (EVA) in support of exploration, science, construction, and maintenance tasks. Achieving mission objectives will require EVA systems and operations concepts that maximize human performance and efficiency while minimizing health and safety risks for crewmembers. Currently, over 450 EVAs have been performed in microgravity using the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU). The EMU space suit has enabled the successful assembly and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS) for over 20 years, as well as deployment of payload experiments, solar arrays, satellite launches and repairs. This EVA work was accomplished at a slower cadence than is expected for Moon and Mars, with ISS crewmembers performing no more than 7 EVAs during a single mission and without any back-to-back EVAs. Despite their success, ISS EVAs have resulted in more injury to EVA crewmembers than may be acceptable for long-duration exploration missions. The Apollo astronauts completed EVA tasks in suits that were designed for their short-duration lunar missions, although suit mobility problems were evident. The more frequent EVAs and more varied EVA tasks that are anticipated during the future longer-duration exploration missions will require EVA suits and systems that are better oriented to human health and performance than those used during the Apollo Program. Many of the problems that were encountered with the Apollo EVA suits (e.g., limited mobility and dexterity, high and aft center of gravity, and other features requiring significant crew compensation) will need to be corrected or mitigated to optimize EVA objectives of exploration missions. It is critical that we understand how EVA system design variables such as suit pressure, weight/mass, center-of-gravity location, joint ranges of motion, and biomedical monitoring, affects the ability of astronauts to perform safe, efficient, and effective EVAs. To achieve this understanding, EVA researchers will need to develop and execute an integrated human testing program across multiple environments. The research will provide objective data that will enable informed design decisions and crewmember standards, thereby ensuring EVA systems that optimize crewmember health, safety, efficiency, and performance. This report describes the risks to crew health, safety, performance, and efficiency caused by EVA operations, and it provides the evidence base to substantiate the importance of the risk.

EVA↗
NASA NTRS2005

Formal Safety Certification of Aerospace Software

In principle, formal methods offer many advantages for aerospace software development: they can help to achieve ultra-high reliability, and they can be used to provide evidence of the reliability claims which can then be subjected to external scrutiny. However, despite years of research and many advances in the underlying formalisms of specification, semantics, and logic, formal methods are not much used in practice. In our opinion this is related to three major shortcomings. First, the application of formal methods is still expensive because they are labor- and knowledge-intensive. Second, they are difficult to scale up to complex systems because they are based on deep mathematical insights about the behavior of the systems (t.e., they rely on the "heroic proof"). Third, the proofs can be difficult to interpret, and typically stand in isolation from the original code. In this paper, we describe a tool for formally demonstrating safety-relevant aspects of aerospace software, which largely circumvents these problems. We focus on safely properties because it has been observed that safety violations such as out-of-bounds memory accesses or use of uninitialized variables constitute the majority of the errors found in the aerospace domain. In our approach, safety means that the program will not violate a set of rules that can range for the simple memory access rules to high-level flight rules. These different safety properties are formalized as different safety policies in Hoare logic, which are then used by a verification condition generator along with the code and logical annotations in order to derive formal safety conditions; these are then proven using an automated theorem prover. Our certification system is currently integrated into a model-based code generation toolset that generates the annotations together with the code. However, this automated formal certification technology is not exclusively constrained to our code generator and could, in principle, also be integrated with other code generators such as RealTime Workshop or even applied to legacy code. Our approach circumvents the historical problems with formal methods by increasing the degree of automation on all levels. The restriction to safety policies (as opposed to arbitrary functional behavior) results in simpler proof problems that can generally be solved by fully automatic theorem proves. An automated linking mechanism between the safety conditions and the code provides some of the traceability mandated by process standards such as DO-178B. An automated explanation mechanism uses semantic markup added by the verification condition generator to produce natural-language explanations of the safety conditions and thus supports their interpretation in relation to the code. It shows an automatically generated certification browser that lets users inspect the (generated) code along with the safety conditions (including textual explanations), and uses hyperlinks to automate tracing between the two levels. Here, the explanations reflect the logical structure of the safety obligation but the mechanism can in principle be customized using different sets of domain concepts. The interface also provides some limited control over the certification process itself. Our long-term goal is a seamless integration of certification, code generation, and manual coding that results in a "certified pipeline" in which specifications are automatically transformed into executable code, together with the supporting artifacts necessary for achieving and demonstrating the high level of assurance needed in the aerospace domain.

Denney, Ewen↗
NASA NTRS2022

Design and Development Requirements for Mechanisms

This NASA Technical Standard is published by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to provide uniform engineering and technical requirements for processes, procedures, practices, and methods endorsed as standard for NASA programs and projects, including requirements for selection, application, and design criteria of an item. This Standard is approved for use by NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers, including Component Facilities and Technical and Service Support Centers; applicable technical requirements may be cited in contract, program, and other Agency documents. This language applies to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (a Federally Funded Research and Development Center), other contractors, recipients of grants, cooperative agreements, or other agreements only to the extent specified or referenced in the applicable contracts, grants, or agreements. This Standard establishes uniform design, development, and verification requirements for mechanisms and mechanism components whose correct operation is required for safety or mission success.

Mechanism↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Informing New Concepts for UAS and Autonomous System Safety Management using Disaster Management and First Responder Scenarios

As emerging flight operations become more prevalent and increasingly automated and distributed, the capabilities for managing safety of vehicles and operations will also need to evolve. To address this challenge, the National Academies has envisioned an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) capability for a wide range of aviation operations including current commercial operations as well as new entrants envisioned with advanced air mobility (AAM). The suite of IASMS services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) would be implemented in a federated approach and would address trends as well as individual operations. Through predictive modeling and data analysis, IASMS is envisioned to identify arising risks so that they can be mitigated, in-time, before a safety incident occurs. IASMS and its requisite set of SFCs must leverage a wide range of information to perform. To better understand these new needs, FSF worked with the aviation and humanitarian communities to develop and validate scenarios that include traditional aviation operations and UAS operations intermingled as they are deployed for disaster management and first responder (DMFR) situations. The three scenarios developed include: • Post Natural disaster response, such as a hurricane, involving multiple parties utilizing traditional aviation and UAS to support rescue operations, surveil damage, and locate survivors needing assistance. • Wildfire fighting in remote locations with traditional aircraft for transport and fire-retardant delivery combined with UAS for surveillance of fire locations as well as to track individual firefighter locations. • Medical Operations and AAM in Urban Environments including passenger-carrying helicopters and AAM vehicles, medical missions (such as transport of radio-pharmaceuticals), and other UAS delivery operations (such as the delivery of defibrillators). Each scenario was developed and validated by representatives with expertise in humanitarian operations, urban and rural emergency response, air traffic management, UAS operations, and traditional flight operations. The scenario definitions address roles and responsibilities of individual actors, the appropriate utilization of UAS, and the actions taken by those actors to appropriately manage risks associated with the mission and environment. The risks to aviation traffic and to people on the ground explored included potential risks arising from incompatibilities in calculating reference altitudes (eg, differing uses of AGL, MSL, barometric, or GPS-derived values), loss of command and control (C2) communications, rapid changes in weather and winds, and physical interference. For each risk, IASMS SFCs were postulated in the context of monitoring services, risk assessment capabilities, and identifying appropriate mitigation strategies. The identified SFC capabilities were envisioned from known services postulated for IASMS and for UTM. For these unique environments, IASMS SFCs are needed to address conditions such as hazardous payloads, micro-climates and urban canyons, and the need to keep uninvolved air traffic out of the area where DMFR operations are being conducted. The second phase of analysis focused on inferring the specific information needs and the SFCs for IASMS, utilizing a structure of 16 information classes to organize requirements. For each of the risks identified in the workshops, it was postulated what data sources would be necessary to monitor critical aspects of the risk (eg, surrounding air traffic, ground population, terrain, etc). to be directly measured as well as data that would be derived, which implies additional SFCs for different actors to understand what information would likely be exchanged between parties. For an IASMS to be effective, additional research is needed to develop the advanced algorithms that can address the increasingly autonomous and complex operations in differing environments and to develop means of identifying unknown risks. Looking at these scenarios highlighted a number of research issues. These include the ability to quickly "cordon off" airspace thru temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) or other means, developing clear definitions to enable automation-based algorithms for prioritizing operations, defining airspace density metrics, standardization of altitude reporting, and establishing a basis for safety data metrics definition and collection. This paper seeks to outline the development of an IASMS in the context of the DMFR scenarios and resulting demonstrations. Utilizing this contextual approach, NASA will generate recommendations for an assured safety framework for AAM operations that enables AAM operations to safely access the NAS.

In Time Aviation Safety Management System↗
NASA NTRS1992

RICIS Symposium 1992: Mission and Safety Critical Systems Research and Applications

This conference deals with computer systems which control systems whose failure to operate correctly could produce the loss of life and or property, mission and safety critical systems. Topics covered are: the work of standards groups, computer systems design and architecture, software reliability, process control systems, knowledge based expert systems, and computer and telecommunication protocols.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1993

Initial exploration of the ASRS database

We applied a standard classification algorithm to a subset of NASA/FAA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database. The subset concerned incidents of aircraft altitude deviations. We are exploring the database to address questions such as: Are there 'natural' classes into which the data will fall? How would these classes correspond to recognizable events or situations? Beyond addressing these we want the data to determine directions for further study. We conducted experiments on different data subsections and analyzed diagnostics such as 'message length reduction'; these characterize the classification in terms of its significance and information content. The classification effort was successful in revealing relationships in the data that were in consonance with other studies of the data and expert opinion.

Kraft, Richard↗
NASA NTRS2000

EPA/NASA/USAF Depainting Effort Concludes

The final report contains strip rate data from all of the methods, lessons learned during processing, metallurgical evaluations of the panels, and summaries of corrosion and hydrogen embrittlement studies. Any changes in surface roughness, fatigue and tensile properties, and crack detectability are noted in the report. No process was singled out above the others, as companies should consider equipment and operational costs when complying with the Aerospace NESHAP (National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants) and new OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) regulations.

Finckenor, Miria M.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Spinning Rocket Simulator Turntable Design

Contained herein is the research and data acquired from the Turntable Design portion of the Spinning Rocket Simulator (SRS) project. The SRS Project studies and eliminates the effect of coning on thrust-propelled spacecraft. This design and construction of the turntable adds a structural support for the SRS model and two degrees of freedom. The two degrees of freedom, radial and circumferential, will help develop a simulated thrust force perpendicular to the plane of the spacecraft model while undergoing an unstable coning motion. The Turntable consists of a ten-foot linear track mounted to a sprocket and press-fit to a thrust bearing. A two-inch high column grounded by a Triangular Baseplate supports this bearing and houses the slip rings and pressurized, air-line swivel. The thrust bearing allows the entire system to rotate under the moment applied through the chain-driven sprocket producing a circumferential degree of freedom. The radial degree of freedom is given to the model through the helically threaded linear track. This track allows the Model Support and Counter Balance to simultaneously reposition according to the coning motion of the Model. Two design factors that hinder the linear track are bending and twist due to torsion. A Standard Aluminum "C" channel significantly reduces these two deflections. Safety considerations dictate the design of all the components involved in this project.

Miles, Robert W.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Hydrogen and Storage Initiatives at the NASA JSC White Sands Test Facility

NASA WSTF Hydrogen Activities: a) Aerospace Test; b) System Certification & Verification; c) Component, System, & Facility Hazard Assessment; d) Safety Training Technical Transfer: a) Development of Voluntary Consensus Standards and Practices; b) Support of National Hydrogen Infrastructure Development.

Maes, Miguel↗
NASA NTRS2018

Metrology and Calibration

The purpose of this NASA Technical Standard is to ensure the accuracy of measurements affecting safety and mission success through the proper selection, calibration, and use of Measuring and Test Equipment (MTE).

Mathews, Kenneth W.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Urban Air Mobility (UAM) Working Groups

The NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) is bringing together public, private, and academic organizations to collaborate with NASA in Urban Air Mobility (UAM) working groups. The primary purpose of the working groups is to accelerate the development of safe, high-volume UAM flight operations in the existing and anticipated future national airspace system. In coordination with the Grand Challenge series, industry developments and other ARMD efforts, these working groups will contribute to the enablement of UAM markets. Working group activities will seek to align the community on concepts to enable UAM, including communicating industry demonstrations and R&D priorities. The collaborative efforts will facilitate the identification of critical parameters and standards necessary to develop the framework and approach for safety, certification, airspace, aircraft concepts, technologies, and architectures. The realization of the UAM vision will be possible only though the efforts and contributions of multiple stakeholders, each possessing the necessary authority, expertise, and/or resources to fulfill a critical role in UAM's development, approval, and implementation. The applicable participants will become integral to the UAM working groups and will provide a platform for those stakeholders to collaborate and impact the overall ecosystem.

Kopardekar, Parimal H.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Applying Sensor Uncertainty Mitigation Schemes to Detect-and-Avoid Systems

Impact of sensor noise on the performance of Detect-And-Avoid (DAA) systems can be reduced by implementing various mitigation schemes. This paper evaluates the Sensor Uncertainty Mitigation (SUM) method, implemented in the Detect and Avoid Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems (DAIDALUS) algorithm, a reference implementation in the DAA minimum operational performance standards. DAIDALUS SUM performance is evaluated using a few safety and operational suitability metrics and compared with more traditional approaches using static safety buffers. A large number of encounters representative of low-speed unmanned aircraft against non-cooperative manned aircraft are simulated and evaluated. An air-to-air radar model produces representative sensor noise for the DAA system. Results show that increasing the tunable parameters for horizontal and vertical uncertainty in DAIDALUS SUM improves the safety metric at the cost of increasing the number of system alerts leading to increased workload. A range of SUM parameters is recommended as suitable values for the type of operations considered for this work. General trends and optimal SUM configurations were found to be nearly the same for two large and very different encounter data sets.

detect and avoid↗
NASA NTRS2021

There is More to the Autopilot Button than Meets the Eye

Following a series of crashes in which semiautonomous cars collided with high-visibility emergency vehicles, this article looks at the human factors challenges of partially automated driving. I review recent research that investigates the capabilities of driver assist systems, the limits of human attention and vigilance, the impact of automation use on driver fatigue, and driver understanding of all of the above. I review the efforts being made to align driver understanding with system reality: instructions and warnings, point-of-sale driver training, automation training standards, and vehicle design. I conclude that several important safety concepts, revealed by research, have yet to be effectively communicated to drivers who will need them to operate these cars safely.

automation↗
NASA NTRS2021

Wire Rope Inspection Report Safety Division, Code 360

The purpose of this report is to review Federal Regulations, Voluntary Consensus Standards (VCS), and best practices associated with WRI requirements within the government and industry. This report provides an analysis to NASA Headquarters regarding the limited risks that wire ropes present to the Agency based on the interpretation of Section 29 CFR 1910.179 (m) of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements that allow inspections of OHC wire rope based on the operational status of the crane. This report also provides details and recommendations for the reduction of personnel exposure to safety risk associated with working at heights while inspecting wire rope on inactive lifting devices.

Wire Rope↗
NASA NTRS2016

Piloted Well Clear Performance Evaluation of Detect and Avoid Systems with Suggestive Guidance

Regulations to establish operational and performance requirements for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are being developed by a consortium of government, industry and academic institutions (RTCA, 2013). Those requirements will apply to the new detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems and other equipment necessary to integrate UAS with the United States (U.S) National Airspace System (NAS) and will be determined according to their contribution to the overall safety case. That safety case requires demonstration that DAA-equipped UAS collectively operating in the NAS meet an airspace safety threshold (AST). Several key gaps must be closed in order to link equipment requirements to an airspace safety case. Foremost among these is calculation of the systems risk ratio, the degree to which a particular system mitigates violation of an aircraft separation standard (FAA, 2013). The risk ratio of a DAA system, in combination with risk ratios of other collision mitigation mechanisms, will determine the overall safety of the airspace measured in terms of the number of collisions per flight hour. It is not known what the effectiveness is of a pilot-in-the-loop DAA system or even what parameters of the DAA system most improve the pilots ability to maintain separation. The relationship between the DAA system design and the overall effectiveness of the DAA system that includes the pilot, expressed as a risk ratio, must be determined before DAA operational and performance requirements can be finalized. Much research has been devoted to integrating UAS into non-segregated airspace (Dalamagkidis, 2009, Ostwald, 2007, Gillian, 2012, Hesselink, 2011, Santiago, 2015, Rorie 2015 and 2016). Several traffic displays intended for use as part of a DAA system have gone through human-in-the-loop simulation and flight-testing. Most of these evaluations were part of development programs to produce a deployable system, so it is unclear how to generalize particular aspects of those designs to general requirements for future traffic displays (Calhoun, 2014). Other displays have undergone testing to collect data that may generalize to new displays, but have not been evaluated in the context of the development of an overall safety case for UAS equipped with DAA systems in the NAS (Bell, 2012). Other research efforts focus on DAA surveillance performance and separation standards. Together with this work, they are expected to facilitate validation of the airspace safety case (Park, 2014 and Johnson, 2015). The contribution of the present work is to quantify the effectiveness of the pilot-automation system to remain well clear as a function of display features and surveillance sensor error. This quantification will help enable selection of a minimum set of DAA design features that meets the AST, a set that may not be unique for all UAS platforms. A second objective is to collect and analyze pilot performance parameters that will improve the modeling of overall DAA system performance in non-human-in-the-loop simulations. Simulating the DAA-equipped UAS in such batch experiments will allow investigation of a much larger number of encounters than is possible in human simulations. This capability is necessary to demonstrate that a particular set of DAA requirements meets the AST under all foreseeable operational conditions.

detect and avoid↗
NASA NTRS2015

Characteristics of a Well Clear Definition and Alerting Criteria for Encounters Between UAS and Manned Aircraft in Class E Airspace

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) will be required to equip with a detect-and-avoid (DAA) system in order to satisfy the federal aviation regulations to remain well clear of other aircraft. For a DAA system to satisfy the requirement to stay well clear of other airborne traffic, a quantitative definition of well clear needs to be defined and evaluated. This study investigates the implications of UAS using proposed well clear definitions as a separation standard for conducting operations in the National Airspace System (NAS). The first analysis considers three well clear definitions and presents the relative state conditions of intruder aircraft as they encroach upon the well clear boundary. The second analysis focuses on the definition of the alerting criteria needed to inform the UAS operator of a potential loss of well clear. All analyses are conducted in a NAS-wide fast-time simulation environment using UAS aircraft models, proposed UAS missions, and historical air defense radar data to populate the background traffic operating under visual flight rules. The results presented in this study inform the safety case, requirements development, and the operational environment for DAA minimum operational performance standards.

Safety↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

What Went Wrong: A Survey of Wildfire UAS Mishaps through Named Entity Recognition

Increasingly, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are being applied to wildfire incidents for tasks such as mapping, aerial ignition, and delivery. As a result, aviation incident reporting systems for wildfires are beginning to accumulate data related to UAS mishaps in wildfire response. In this research, we apply state-of-the-art natural language processing (NLP) techniques to develop a custom Named Entity Recognition (NER) model which extracts entities relevant to safety analysts. The custom NER model is built by fine-tuning an existing Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) model, resulting in a generalizable NER model that can extract engineering relevant entities including failure modes, causes, effects, control processes, and recommendations from failure-relevant text. This model performs passably, with a weighted average f1 score of 0.33 across entity types, indicating more labeled training data is needed. Extracted entities are used to form a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)-style survey of wildfire UAS mishaps reported using the SAFECOM system. Similar mishaps are manually clustered and reported as single rows within an FMEA. Foreach cluster, we compute frequency, severity, and overall riskin accordance with FAA standards. This methodology can beapplied as part of a broader safety management system totrack trends in mishaps (e.g., likelihood, severity) and discoverknowledge (e.g., causes, effects) that can be utilized to improvesafety outcomes and system performance.

Machine Learning↗
NASA NTRS1999

Chemical Hygiene Program

The Chemical Management Team is responsible for ensuring compliance with the OSHA Laboratory Standard. The program at Lewis Research Center (LeRC) evolved over many years to include training, developing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) for each laboratory process, coordinating with other safety and health organizations and teams at the Center, and issuing an SOP binder. The Chemical Hygiene Policy was first established for the Center. The Chemical Hygiene Plan was established and reviewed by technical, laboratory and management for viability and applicability to the Center. A risk assessment was conducted for each laboratory. The laboratories were prioritized by order of risk, higher risk taking priority. A Chemical Management Team staff member interviewed the lead researcher for each laboratory process to gather the information needed to develop the SOP for the process. A binder containing the Chemical Hygiene Plan, the SOP, a map of the laboratory identifying the personal protective equipment and best egress, and glove guides, as well as other guides for safety and health. Each laboratory process has been captured in the form of an SOP. The chemicals used in the procedure have been identified and the information is used to reduce the number of chemicals in the lab. The Chemical Hygiene Plan binder is used as a training tool for new employees. LeRC is in compliance with the OSHA Standard. The program was designed to comply with the OSHA standard. In the process, we have been able to assess the usage of chemicals in the laboratories, as well as reduce or relocate the chemicals being stored in the laboratory. Our researchers are trained on the hazards of the materials they work with and have a better understanding of the hazards of the process and what is needed to prevent any incident. From the SOP process, we have been able to reduce our chemical inventory, determine and implement better hygiene procedures and equipment in the laboratories, and provide specific training to our employees. As a result of this program, we are adding labeling to the laboratories for emergency responders and initiating a certified chemical user program.

Mayor, Antoinette C.↗