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An Assessment of Molten Metal Detachment Hazards During Electron Beam Welding in the Space Shuttle Bay at LEO for the International Space Welding Experiment

In 1997, the United States [NASA] and the Paton Electric Welding Institute are scheduled to cooperate in a flight demonstration on the U.S. Space Shuttle to demonstrate the feasibility of welding in space for a possible repair option for the International Space Station Alpha. This endeavor, known as the International Space Welding Experiment (ISWE), will involve astronauts performing various welding exercises such as brazing, cutting, welding, and coating using an electron beam space welding system that was developed by the E.O. Paton Electric Welding Institute (PWI), Kiev Ukraine. This electron beam welding system known as the "Universal Weld System" consists of hand tools capable of brazing, cutting, autogeneous welding, and coating using an 8 kV (8000 volts) electron beam. The electron beam hand tools have also been developed by the Paton Welding Institute with greater capabilities than the original hand tool, including filler wire feeding, to be used with the Universal Weld System on the U.S. Space Shuttle Bay as part of ISWE. The hand tool(s) known as the Ukrainian Universal Hand [Electron Beam Welding] Tool (UHT) will be utilized for the ISWE Space Shuttle flight welding exercises to perform welding on various metal alloy samples. A total of 61 metal alloy samples, which include 304 stainless steel, Ti-6AI-4V, 2219 aluminum, and 5456 aluminum alloys, have been provided by NASA for the ISWE electron beam welding exercises using the UHT. These samples were chosen to replicate both the U.S. and Russian module materials. The ISWE requires extravehicular activity (EVA) of two astronauts to perform the space shuttle electron beam welding operations of the 61 alloy samples. This study was undertaken to determine if a hazard could exist with ISWE during the electron beam welding exercises in the Space Shuttle Bay using the Ukrainian Universal Weld System with the UHT. The safety issue has been raised with regard to molten metal detachments as a result of several possible causes such as welder procedural error, externally applied impulsive forces(s), filler wire entrainment and snap-out, cutting expulsion, and puddle expulsion. Molten metal detachment from either the weld/cut substrate or weld wire could present harm to a astronaut in the space environment it the detachment was ti burn through the fabric of the astronaut Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMC). In this paper an experimental test was performed in a 4 ft. x 4 ft. vacuum chamber at MSFC enabling protective garment to be exposed to the molten metal drop detachments to over 12 inches. The chamber was evacuated to vacuum levels of at least 1 x 10(exp -5) torr (50 micro-torr) during operation of the 1.0 kW Universal Hand Tool (UHT). The UHT was manually operated at the power mode appropriate for each material and thickness. The space suit protective welding garment, made of Teflon fabric (10 oz. per yard) with a plain weave, was placed on the floor of the vacuum chamber to catch the molten metal drop detachments. A pendulum release mechanism consisting of four hammers, each weighing approximately 3.65 lbs, was used to apply an impact forces to the weld sample/plate during both the electron beam welding and cutting exercises. Measurements were made of the horizontal fling distances of the detached molten metal drops. The volume of a molten metal drop can also be estimated from the size of the cut. Utilizing equations, calculations were made to determine chande in surafec area (Delat a(surface)) for 304 stainless steel for cutting based on measurements of metal drop sizes at the cut edges. For the cut sample of 304 stainless steel based on measurement of the drop size at the edge, Delta-a(surface) was determined to be 0.0054 2 in . Calculations have indicated only a small amount of energy is required to detach a liquid metal drop. For example, approximately only 0.000005 ft-lb of energy is necessary to detach a liquid metal steel drop based on the above theoretical analysis. However, some of the energy will be absorbed by the plate before it reaches the metal drop. Based on the theoretical calculations, it was determined that during a weld cutting exercise, the titanium alloy would be the most difficult to detach molten metal droplets followed by stainless steel and then by aluminum. The results of the experimental effort have shown that molten metal will detach if large enough of a hammer blow is applied to the weld sample plate during the full penetration welding and cutting exercises. However, no molten metal detachments occurred as a result of the filler wire snap-out tests from the weld puddle since it was too difficult to cause the metal to flick-out from the pool. Molten metal detachments, though not large in size, did result from the direct application of the electron beam on the end of the filler weld wire.

Fragomeni, James M.↗

Assessment Regarding Impact of Atmospheric Conditions on Space Shuttle Launch Delays

The atmospheric environment definition has played a key role in the development and operation of the NASA Space Shuttle as it has in other NASA Space Vehicle Programs. The objective of any definition of natural environment design requirements for a space vehicle development is to insure that the vehicle will perform safely and in a timely manner relative to the mission(s) for which the vehicle is being developed. The NASA Space Shuttle has enjoyed the longest tenure of any Space Vehicle from an operational standpoint. As such, it has provided a wealth of information on many engineering aspects of a Space Vehicle plus the influence of the atmosphere on operational endeavors. The atmospheric environment associated with the NASA Space Shuttle launches at the NASA Kennedy Space Center in Florida has been reviewed and studied over the entire NASA Space Shuttle flight history. The results of the analysis of atmospheric environment related launch delays relative to other sources of launch delays has been assessed. This paper will provide a summary of those conditions as well as mission analysis examples focused on atmospheric constraints for launch. Atmospheric conditions associated with NASA Space Shuttle launch delays will be presented to provide a reference as to the type conditions experienced which have mainly caused the delays.

Johnson D. L.↗

The Space Shuttle Decision: NASA's Search for a Reusable Space Vehicle

This significant new study of the decision to build the Space Shuttle explains the Shuttle's origins and early development. In addition to internal NASA discussions, this work details the debates in the late 1960s and early 1970s among policymakers in Congress, the Air Force, and the Office of Management and Budget over the roles and technical designs of the Shuttle. Examining the interplay of these organizations with sometimes conflicting goals, the author not only explains how the world's premier space launch vehicle came into being, but also how politics can interact with science, technology, national security, and economics in national government. The weighty policy decision to build the Shuttle represents the first component of the broader story: future NASA volumes will cover the Shuttle's development and operational histories.

Heppenheimer, T. A.↗

Update of the Development of a Low Cost Data Acquisition System for the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Program

The space shuttle solid rocket boosters (SRBs) experience a severe environment during their brief flight. During the last few years several SRB's have sustained noticeable structural damage. The environmental characteristics (vibration, structure, and thermal) encountered by the SRB's during ascent, descent and water impact are in most cases unknown. A developmental flight instrumentation (DFI) system collected data from the SRBs' first four flights in the early 1980's, and after the first three flights during the shuttle return-to-flight phase after the Challenger accident. However, the DFI data collected are of low fidelity and do not correlate well with cases of observed structural damage. The DFI system was evaluated for reuse, but the cost to fly it was prohibitive. The space shuttle is presently scheduled to fly until 2030. To support the shuttle flight schedule, avionics on the SRB's will be upgraded. The environments on the different sections of the SRB will need to be defined more completely to properly qualify the avionics for multiple flights. The DFI data previously gathered do not provide enough information to properly qualify the avionics. Marshall Space Flight Center's (MSFC) SRB Project Office requested the Science and Engineering (S&E) Directorate to develop a stand-alone data acquisition system that could collect data from any area of the booster. In answer to this requirement, S&E developed the Enhanced Data Acquisition System (EDAS). To minimize development time and cost, the development team used state-of-the-art commercial off the shelf (COTS) equipment. The first two flights of this system occurred on shuttle mission STS-91 in June 1998 and STS-95 in October 1998. Twenty-one measurements were successfully recorded on the STS-91 right hand booster, providing new accelerometer, strain, temperature, and heating rate data to analysts. Twenty-four measurements were successfully recorded on the STS-95 left hand booster, providing data from the booster and the external tank. This paper summarizes the effort to develop, test, qualify and fly the EDAS to meet SRB flight and data collection requirements.

Crawford, Kevin↗

Using a Commerical off the Shelf Data Acquisition System for the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Program

The space shuttle solid rocket boosters (SRBs) experience a severe environment during their brief flight. During the last few years several SRB's have sustained noticeable structural damage. The environmental characteristics (vibration, structure, and thermal) encountered by the SRB's during ascent, descent and water impact are in most cases unknown. A developmental flight instrumentation (DFI) system collected data from the SRBs' first four flights in the early 1980's, and after the first three flights during the shuttle return-to-flight phase after the Challenger accident. However, the DFI data collected are of low fidelity and do not correlate well with cases of observed structural damage. The DFI system was evaluated for reuse, but the cost to fly it was prohibitive. The space shuttle is presently scheduled to fly until 2030. To support the shuttle flight schedule, avionics on the SRB's will be upgraded. The environments on the different sections of the SRB will need to be defined more completely to properly qualify the avionics for multiple flights. The DFI data previously gathered do not provide enough information to properly qualify the avionics. Marshall Space Flight Center's (MSFC) SRB Project Office requested the Science and Engineering (S&E) Directorate to develop a stand-alone data acquisition system that could collect data from any area of the booster. In answer to this requirement, S&E developed the Enhanced Data Acquisition System (EDAS). To minimize development time and cost, the development team used state-of-the-art commercial off the shelf (COTS) equipment. The first two flights of this system occurred on shuttle mission STS-91 in June 1998 and STS-95 in October 1998. Twenty-one measurements were successfully recorded on the STS-91 right hand booster, providing new accelerometer, strain, temperature, and heating rate data to analysts. Twenty-four measurements were successfully recorded on the STS-95 left hand booster, providing data from the booster and the external tank. This paper summarizes the effort to develop, test, qualify and fly the EDAS to meet SRB flight and data collection requirements.

Crawford, Kevin↗

]Space Shuttle Independent Assessment Team

The Shuttle program is one of the most complex engineering activities undertaken anywhere in the world at the present time. The Space Shuttle Independent Assessment Team (SIAT) was chartered in September 1999 by NASA to provide an independent review of the Space Shuttle sub-systems and maintenance practices. During the period from October through December 1999, the team led by Dr. McDonald and comprised of NASA, contractor, and DOD experts reviewed NASA practices, Space Shuffle anomalies, as well as civilian and military aerospace experience. In performing the review, much of a very positive nature was observed by the SIAT, not the least of which was the skill and dedication of the workforce. It is in the unfortunate nature of this type of review that the very positive elements are either not mentioned or dwelt upon. This very complex program has undergone a massive change in structure in the last few years with the transition to a slimmed down, contractor-run operation, the Shuttle Flight Operations Contract (SFOC). This has been accomplished with significant cost savings and without a major incident. This report has identified significant problems that must be addressed to maintain an effective program. These problems are described in each of the Issues, Findings or Observations summarized, and unless noted, appear to be systemic in nature and not confined to any one Shuttle sub-system or element. Specifics are given in the body of the report, along with recommendations to improve the present systems.

Source record↗

Modal Testing of Seven Shuttle Cargo Elements for Space Station

From December 1996 to May 2001, the Modal and Control Dynamics Team at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) conducted modal tests on seven large elements of the International Space Station. Each of these elements has been or will be launched as a Space Shuttle payload for transport to the International Space Station (ISS). Like other Shuttle payloads, modal testing of these elements was required for verification of the finite element models used in coupled loads analyses for launch and landing. The seven modal tests included three modules - Node, Laboratory, and Airlock, and four truss segments - P6, P3/P4, S1/P1, and P5. Each element was installed and tested in the Shuttle Payload Modal Test Bed at MSFC. This unique facility can accommodate any Shuttle cargo element for modal test qualification. Flexure assemblies were utilized at each Shuttle-to-payload interface to simulate a constrained boundary in the load carrying degrees of freedom. For each element, multiple-input, multiple-output burst random modal testing was the primary approach with controlled input sine sweeps for linearity assessments. The accelerometer channel counts ranged from 252 channels to 1251 channels. An overview of these tests, as well as some lessons learned, will be provided in this paper.

Kappus, Kathy O.↗

Characterization of Space Shuttle External Tank Thermal Protection System (TPS) Materials in Support of the Columbia Accident Investigation

NASA suffered the loss of the seven-member crew of the Space Shuttle Columbia on February 1, 2003 when the vehicle broke apart upon re-entry to the Earth's atmosphere. The final report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) determined that the accident was caused by a launch ascent incident-a suitcase-sized chunk of insulating foam on the Shuttle's External Tank (ET) broke off, and moving at almost 500 mph, struck an area of the leading edge of the Shuttle s left wing. As a result, one or more of the protective Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels on the wing leading edge were damaged. Upon re-entry, superheated air approaching 3,000 F breached the wing damage and caused the vehicle breakup and loss of crew. The large chunk of insulating foam that broke off during the Columbia launch was determined to come from the so-called bipod ramp area where the Shuttle s orbiter (containing crew) is attached to the ET. Underneath the foam in the bipod ramp area is a layer of TPS that is a cork-filled silicone rubber composite. In March 2003, the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama received cured samples of the foam and composite for testing from the Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) in New Orleans, Louisiana. The MAF is where the Shuttle's ET is manufactured. The foam and composite TPS materials for the ET have been well characterized for mechanical property data at the super-cold temperatures of the liquid oxygen and hydrogen fuels used in the ET. However, modulus data on these materials is not as well characterized. The TA Instruments 2980 Dynamic Mechanical Analyzer (DMA) was used to determine the modulus of the two TPS materials over a range of -145 to 95 C in the dual cantilever bending mode. Multi-strain, fixed frequency DMA tests were followed by multi-frequency, fixed strain tests to determine the approximate bounds of linear viscoelastic behavior for the two materials. Additional information is included in the original extended abstract.

Wingard, Charles D.↗

Acoustic Emission Detection of Impact Damage on Space Shuttle Structures

The loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia as a result of impact damage from foam debris during ascent has led NASA to investigate the feasibility of on-board impact detection technologies. AE sensing has been utilized to monitor a wide variety of impact conditions on Space Shuttle components ranging from insulating foam and ablator materials, and ice at ascent velocities to simulated hypervelocity micrometeoroid and orbital debris impacts. Impact testing has been performed on both reinforced carbon composite leading edge materials as well as Shuttle tile materials on representative aluminum wing structures. Results of these impact tests will be presented with a focus on the acoustic emission sensor responses to these impact conditions. These tests have demonstrated the potential of employing an on-board Shuttle impact detection system. We will describe the present plans for implementation of an initial, very low frequency acoustic impact sensing system using pre-existing flight qualified hardware. The details of an accompanying flight measurement system to assess the Shuttle s acoustic background noise environment as a function of frequency will be described. The background noise assessment is being performed to optimize the frequency range of sensing for a planned future upgrade to the initial impact sensing system.

Prosser, William H.↗

Griffin Lifts Off at NASA With Calls for Speeding Shuttle Replacement, Reopening Hubble Decision

Michael D. Griffin launched his tenure as NASA's 11th administrator on a fast track, using his "emergency" confiimation by the U.S. Senate to plug himself into space shuttle return-to-flight decision-making and urging faster development of the shuttle replacement. He also deftly sidestepped the treacherous issue of letting the aging Hubble Space Telescope die that was left behind by former Administrator Sean O'Keefe. Griffin told the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee that he would take another look at a shuttle mission to service the telescope, but not until the redesigned shuttle system makes a couple of test flights. Griffin made clear at his confirmation hearing Apr. 12 that he has long supported the ideas embodied in President Bush s push to move human exploration out of low Earth orbit, while finishing the International Space Station and retiring the space shuttle as soon as possible. And he showed right out of the blocks that his technical training and management background should serve him well in implementing Bush's directives.

Morring, Frank, Jr.↗

The Role of Structural Dynamics and Testing in the Shuttle Flowliner Crack Investigation

During a normal inspection of the main propulsion system at Kennedy Space Center, small cracks were noticed near a slotted region of a gimbal joint flowliner located just upstream from one of the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME). These small cracks sparked an investigation of the entire Space Shuttle fleet main propulsion feedlines. The investigation was initiated to determine the cause of the small cracks and a repair method that would be needed to return the Shuttle fleet back to operation safely. The cracks were found to be initiated by structural resonance caused by flow fluctuations from the SSME low pressure fuel turbopump interacting with the flowliner. The pump induced backward traveling wakes that excited the liner and duct acoustics which also caused the liner to vibrate in complex mode shapes. The investigation involved an extensive effort by a team of engineers from the NASA civil servant and contractor workforce with the goal to characterize the root cause of the cracking behavior of the fuel side gimbal joint flowliners. In addition to working to identify the root cause, a parallel path was taken to characterize the material properties and fatigue capabilities of the liner material such that the life of the liners could be ascertained. As the characterization of the material and the most probable cause matured, the combination of the two with pump speed restrictions provided a means to return the Shuttle to flight in a safe manner. This paper traces the flowliner investigation results with respect to the structural dynamics analysis, component level testing and hot-fire flow testing on a static testbed. The paper will address the unique aspects of a very complex problem involving backflow from a high performance pump that has never been characterized nor understood to such detail. In addition, the paper will briefly address the flow phenomena that excited the liners, the unique structural dynamic modal characteristics and the variability of SSME operation which has ultimately ensured the safe and reliable operation of the shuttle main engines for each flight.

Frady, Gregory P.↗

Artificial Neural Network Test Support Development for the Space Shuttle PRCS Thrusters

A significant anomaly, Fuel Valve Pilot Seal Extrusion, is affecting the Shuttle Primary Reaction Control System (PRCS) Thrusters, and has caused 79 to fail. To help address this problem, a Shuttle PRCS Thruster Process Evaluation Team (TPET) was formed. The White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) and Boeing members of the TPET have identified many discrete valve current trace characteristics that are predictive of the problem. However, these are difficult and time consuming to identify and trend by manual analysis. Based on this exhaustive analysis over months, 22 thrusters previously delivered by the Depot were identified as high risk for flight failures. Although these had only recently been installed, they had to be removed from Shuttles OV103 and OV104 for reprocessing, by directive of the Shuttle Project Office. The resulting impact of the thruster removal, replacement, and valve replacement was significant (months of work and hundreds of thousands of dollars). Much of this could have been saved had the proposed Neural Network (NN) tool described in this paper been in place. In addition to the significant benefits to the Shuttle indicated above, the development and implementation of this type of testing will be the genesis for potential Quality improvements across many areas of WSTF test data analysis and will be shared with other NASA centers. Future tests can be designed to incorporate engineering experience via Artificial Neural Nets (ANN) into depot level acceptance of hardware. Additionally, results were shared with a NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Super Problem Response Team (SPRT). There was extensive interest voiced among many different personnel from several centers. There are potential spin-offs of this effort that can be directly applied to other data acquisition systems as well as vehicle health management for current and future flight vehicles.

Lehr, Mark E.↗

STS-114: Discovery Shuttle Processing Overview Briefing

This video of a briefing to representatives from the national media took the form of a slide show presentation by Jon Cowart, Manager of the Resident Office at Johnson Space Center. The presentation was an overview of ground maintainance facilities and procedures at Kennedy Space Center used to support Space Shuttle operations. The photographs in the slide show: Shuttle ground transport, maintenance, computers, and payloads, the Vehicle Assembly Building, ground operations, launch operations, crew boarding, liftoff, Pad A and Pad B, Solid Rocket Motor retrieval, crew procedures on-orbit, and landing. After the presentation is a brief question and answer session, in which reporters ask Cowart about Shuttle readiness, changes in Shuttle operations made for the Return to Flight, and how weather affects Shuttle operations.

Source record↗

Space Shuttle UHF Communications Performance Evaluation

An extension boom is to be installed on the starboard side of the Space Shuttle Orbiter (SSO) payload bay for thermal tile inspection and repairing. As a result, the Space Shuttle payload bay Ultra High Frequency (UHF) antenna will be under the boom. This study is to evaluate the Space Shuttle UHF communication performance for antenna at a suitable new location. To insure the RF coverage performance at proposed new locations, the link margin between the UHF payload bay antenna and Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Astronauts at a range distance of 160 meters from the payload bay antenna was analyzed. The communication performance between Space Shuttle Orbiter and International Space Station (SSO-ISS) during rendezvous was also investigated. The multipath effects from payload bay structures surrounding the payload bay antenna were analyzed. The computer simulation tool based on the Geometrical Theory of Diffraction method (GTD) was used to compute the signal strengths. The total field strength was obtained by summing the direct fields from the antennas and the reflected and diffracted fields from the surrounding structures. The computed signal strengths were compared to the signal strength corresponding to the 0 dB link margin. Based on the results obtained in this study, RF coverage for SSO-EVA and SSO- ISS communication links was determined for the proposed payload bay antenna UHF locations. The RF radiation to the Orbiter Docking System (ODS) pyros, the payload bay avionics, and the Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS) from the new proposed UHF antenna location was also investigated to ensure the EMC/EMI compliances.

Hwu, Shian U.↗

Space Shuttle Hot Cabin Emergency Responses

Methods: Human thermal tolerance, countermeasures, and thermal model data were reviewed and compared to existing shuttle ECS failure temperature and humidity profiles for each failure mode. Increases in core temperature associated with cognitive impairment was identified, as was metabolic heat generation of crewmembers, temperature monitoring, and communication capabilities after partial power-down and other limiting factors. Orbiter landing strategies and a hydration and salt replacement protocol were developed to put wheels on deck in each failure mode prior to development of significant cognitive impairment or collapse of crewmembers. Thermal tradeoffs for use of the Advanced Crew Escape Suit (ACES), Liquid Cooling Garment, integrated G-suit and Quick Don Mask were examined. candidate solutions involved trade-offs or conflicts with cabin oxygen partial pressure limits, system power-downs to limit heat generation, risks of alternate and emergency landing sites or compromise of Mode V-VIII scenarios. Results: Rehydration and minimized cabin workloads are required in all failure modes. Temperature/humidity profiles increase rapidly in two failure modes, and deorbit is recommended without the ACES, ICU and g-suit. This latter configuration limits several shuttle approach and landing escape modes and requires communication modifications. Additional data requirements were identified and engineering simulations were recommended to develop more current shuttle temperature and humidity profiles. Discussion: After failure of the shuttle ECS, there is insufficient cooling capacity of the ACES to protect crewmembers from rising cabin temperature and humidity. The LCG is inadequate for cabin temperatures above 76 F. Current shuttle future life policy makes it unlikely that major engineering upgrades necessary to address this problem will occur.

Stepaniak, P.↗

Nitrile/Buna N Material Failure Assessment for an O-Ring used on the Gaseous Hydrogen Flow Control Valve (FCV) of the Space Shuttle Main Engine

After the rollout of Space Shuttle Discovery in April 2005 in preparation for return-to-flight, there was a failure of the Orbiter (OV-103) helium signature leak test in the gaseous hydrogen (GH2) system. Leakage was attributed to the Flow Control Valve (FCV) in Main Engine 3. The FCV determined to be the source of the leak for OV-103 is designated as LV-58. The nitrile/Buna N rubber O-ring seal was removed from LV-58, and failure analysis indicated radial cracks providing leak paths in one quadrant. Cracks were eventually found in 6 of 9 FCV O-rings among the three Shuttle Orbiters, though none were as severe as those for LV-58, OV-103. Testing by EM10 at MSFC on all 9 FCV O- rings included: laser dimensional, Shore A hardness and properties from a dynamic mechanical analyzer (DMA) and an Instron tensile machine. The following test data was obtained on the cracked quadrant of the LV-58, OV-103 O-ring: (1) the estimated compression set was only 9.5%, compared to none for the rest of the O-ring; (2) Shore A hardness for the O.D. was higher by almost 4 durometer points than for the rest of the O-ring; and (3) DMA data showed that the storage/elastic modulus E was almost 25% lower than for the rest of the O-ring. Of the 8 FCV O-rings tested on an Instron, 4 yielded tensile strengths that were below the MIL spec requirement of 1350 psi-a likely influence of rubber cracking. Comparisons were made between values of modulus determined by DNA (elastic) and Instron (Young s). Each nitrile/Buna N O-ring used in the FCV conforms to the MIL-P-25732C specification. A number of such O-rings taken from shelf storage at MSFC and Kennedy Space Center (KSC) were used to generate a reference curve of DMA glass transition temperature (Tg) vs. shelf storage time ranging from 8 to 26 years. A similar reference curve of TGA onset temperature (of rubber weight loss) vs. shelf storage time was also generated. The DMA and TGA data for the used FCV O-rings were compared to the reference curves. Correlations were also made between the DMA modulus (at 22 C) and Shore A hardness for all 9 of the FCV O-rings used among the three Shuttle Orbiters. The radial cracking in the FCV O-rings was determined to be due to ozone attack, as nitrile/Buna N rubber is susceptible to such attack. Nitrile/Buna N material under MIL-P25732C should be used in a hydraulic fluid environment to help protect it from cracking. However, the FCV O-rings were used in an air only environment. The FCV design has as much as a 9-mil gap that allows the O.D. of the O-ring to be directly exposed to ozone, pressurized air and some elevated temperatures, accelerating the weathering process that leads to O-ring cracking. Space Shuttle flights will likely not continue past 2010. Therefore, Shuttle management decided to continue using the nitrile/Buna N material for the FCVs, but have each O-ring replaced after 3 years to minimize any chances for crack initiation.

Wingard, Doug↗

Space Shuttle Underside Astronaut Communications Performance Evaluation

The Space Shuttle Ultra High Frequency (UHF) communications system is planned to provide Radio Frequency (RF) coverage for astronauts working underside of the Space Shuttle Orbiter (SSO) for thermal tile inspection and repairing. This study is to assess the Space Shuttle UHF communication performance for astronauts in the shadow region without line-of-sight (LOS) to the Space Shuttle and Space Station UHF antennas. To insure the RF coverage performance at anticipated astronaut worksites, the link margin between the UHF antennas and Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Astronauts with significant vehicle structure blockage was analyzed. A series of near-field measurements were performed using the NASA/JSC Anechoic Chamber Antenna test facilities. Computational investigations were also performed using the electromagnetic modeling techniques. The computer simulation tool based on the Geometrical Theory of Diffraction (GTD) was used to compute the signal strengths. The signal strength was obtained by computing the reflected and diffracted fields along the propagation paths between the transmitting and receiving antennas. Based on the results obtained in this study, RF coverage for UHF communication links was determined for the anticipated astronaut worksite in the shadow region underneath the Space Shuttle.

Hwu, Shian U.↗

Metallic Concepts for Repair of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Space Shuttle Leading Edges

The Columbia accident has focused attention on the critical need for on-orbit repair concepts for wing leading edges in the event that potentially catastrophic damage is incurred during Space Shuttle Orbiter flight. The leading edge of the space shuttle wings consists of a series of eleven panels on each side of the orbiter. These panels are fabricated from reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) which is a light weight composite with attractive strength at very high temperatures. The damage that was responsible for the loss of the Colombia space shuttle was deemed due to formation of a large hole in one these RCC leading edge panels produced by the impact of a large piece of foam. However, even small cracks in the RCC are considered as potentially catastrophic because of the high temperature re-entry environment. After the Columbia accident, NASA has explored various means to perform on-orbit repairs in the event that damage is sustained in future shuttle flights. Although large areas of damage, such as that which doomed Columbia, are not anticipated to re-occur due to various improvements to the shuttle, especially the foam attachment, NASA has also explored various options for both small and large area repair. This paper reports one large area repair concept referred to as the "metallic over-wrap." Environmental conditions during re-entry of the orbiter impose extreme requirements on the RCC leading edges as well as on any repair concepts. These requirements include temperatures up to 3000 F (1650 C) for up to 15 minutes in the presence of an extremely oxidizing plasma environment. Figure 1 shows the temperature profile across one panel (#9) which is subject to the highest temperatures during re-entry. Although the RCC possesses adequate mechanical strength at these temperatures, it lacks oxidation resistance. Oxidation protection is afforded by converting the outer layers of the RCC to SiC by chemical vapor deposition (CVD). At high temperatures in an oxidizing environment, the SiC layer forms a protective SiO2 scale. However, CVD processing to form the SiC layer can result in the formation of small cracks in the outer surface. Hence, as a final fabrication step, a sodium silicate glass, known as "Type A," is applied as a sealant to fill any surface porosity and/or cracks in the coating and the outer portions of the RCC[1]. At relatively low temperatures, the Type A glass melts and flows into the cracks providing oxidation protection at the higher temperatures. In addition, the Type A coating, provides a "dark" coating with a high emissivity. This high emissivity allows the RCC to transfer heat by radiating outward to space as well as dispersing heat within the leading edge cavity. Lastly, the Type A possesses low catalycity which reduces surface temperatures by limiting oxygen recombination on the surface during re-entry.

Ritzert, Frank↗