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We present an independent investigation of heavy-ion single event effect data for the Microsemi RTG4 field programmable gate array (FPGA).
Radiation effects in electrical, electronic, electro-motive, and electro-optical (EEEE) hardware encompass a complex variety of interactions, processes, environments, and an evolving landscape of relevant hardware. Appropriately mitigating the effects of radiation in sensors, data acquisition, and control hardware is among the most significant challenges associated with deploying space nuclear power and propulsion systems. The expertise within EEEE radiation effects disciplines require working knowledge that is at least as complex and diverse as the problem itself, but that should not dissuade stakeholders and engineers in adjacent disciplines from attempting to understand the general principles associated with the problem at hand. This brief overview seeks to bring to the foreground a set of relevant topics that are of special importance for space nuclear propulsion applications that involve high rates of neutron and gamma radiation. The unique set of environments and design requirements for space nuclear systems mean that the experience and utility for methods applied to typical spaceflight hardware or terrestrial nuclear systems must not be applied naively. Forward consideration on the applicability of testing methods applied to either existing or bespoke hardware is likely to drive early decisions on system-wide radiation effects mitigation strategies, and will influence procurement requirements for providers of radiation tolerant hardware who are unlikely to have experience in this unique set of environments. Radiation hardness assurance (RHA) guidance should be adapted and emphasize the importance of hardware testing in the relevant environment. These must consider the combined effects of temperature, total ionizing dose (TID), non-ionizing/displacement damage (TNID/DD), and single event effects (SEE), and should consider the impacts of flux (rate) in addition to cumulative effects.
Radiation effects in photonic and microelectronic components can impact the performance of high-speed digital optical data link in a variety of ways. This segment of the short course focuses on radiation effects in digital optical data links operating in the MHz to GHz regime. (Some of the information is applicable to frequencies above and below this regime) The three basic component level effects that should be considered are Total Ionizing Dose (TID), Displacement Damage Dose (DDD) and Single Event Effects (SEE). In some cases the system performance degradation can be quantified from component level tests, while in others a more holistic characterization approach must be taken. In Section 2.0 of this segment of the Short Course we will give a brief overview of the space radiation environment follow by a summary of the basic space radiation effects important for microelectronics and photonics listed above. The last part of this section will give an example of a typical mission radiation environment requirements. Section 3.0 gives an overview of intra-satellite digital optical data link systems. It contains a discussion of the digital optical data link and it's components. Also, we discuss some of the important system performance metrics that are impacted by radiation effects degradation of optical and optoelectronic component performance. Section 4.0 discusses radiation effects in optical and optoelectronic components. While each component effect will be discussed, the focus of this section is on degradation of passive optical components and SEE in photodiodes (other mechanisms are covered in segment II of this short course entitled "Photonic Devices with Complex and Multiple Failure Modes"). Section 5.0 will focus on optical data link system response to the space radiation environment. System level SEE ground testing will be discussed. Then we give a discussion of system level assessment of data link performance when operating in the space radiation environment.
A low cost, flexible and modular spacecraft power system design was developed in response to a call for an architecture that could accommodate multiple missions in the small to medium load range. Three upcoming satellites will use this design, with one launch date in 1999 and two in the year 2000. The design consists of modular hardware that can be scaled up or down, without additional cost, to suit missions in the 200 to 600 Watt orbital average load range. The design will be applied to satellite orbits that are circular, polar elliptical and a libration point orbit. Mission unique adaptations are accomplished in software and firmware. In designing this advanced, adaptable power system, the major goals were reduction in weight volume and cost. This power system design represents reductions in weight of 78 percent, volume of 86 percent and cost of 65 percent from previous comparable systems. The efforts to miniaturize the electronics without sacrificing performance has created streamlined power electronics with control functions residing in the system microprocessor. The power system design can handle any battery size up to 50 Amp-hour and any battery technology. The three current implementations will use both nickel cadmium and nickel hydrogen batteries ranging in size from 21 to 50 Amp-hours. Multiple batteries can be used by adding another battery module. Any solar cell technology can be used and various array layouts can be incorporated with no change in Power System Electronics (PSE) hardware. Other features of the design are the standardized interfaces between cards and subsystems and immunity to radiation effects up to 30 krad Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and 35 Mev/cm(exp 2)-kg for Single Event Effects (SEE). The control algorithm for the power system resides in a radiation-hardened microprocessor. A table driven software design allows for flexibility in mission specific requirements. By storing critical power system constants in memory, modifying the system code for other programs is simple. These constants can be altered also by ground command, or in response to an anomolous event. All critical power system functions have backup hardware functions to prevent a software or computer glitch from propagating. A number of battery charge control schemes can be implemented by selecting the proper control terms in the code. The architecture allows the design engineer to tune the system response to various system components and anticipated load profiles without costly alterations. A design trade was made with the size, weight and power dissipation of the electronics versus the performance of the power bus to load variations. Linear, fine control is maintained with a streamlined electronics design. This paper describes the hardware design as well as the software control algorithm. The challenges of closing the system control loop digitally is discussed. Control loop margin and power system performance is presented. Lab measurements are shown and compared to the system response of a hardware model running actual flight software.
The results of recent Single Event Effect (SEE) testing of newly available power MOSFETS are presented.
The primary purpose of this testing is to characterize the Texas Instruments AZ88923 post amplifier for susceptibility to single-event latchup (SEL) and other destructive Single-Event Effects (SEE). These data will be used to assess the destructive SEE risk for the OSIRIS-REx Laser Altimeter (OLA). A secondary goal is to assess the susceptibility of the post amplifier to single-event transients (SET) and other nondestructive SEE. In particular, the loss-of-signal feature could give rise to some significant anomalies. However, it is not used on OLA.
We have irradiated engineering samples of Freescale 4M nonvolatile memories with heavy ions. They use Silicon nanocrystals as the storage element, rather than the more common floating gate. The irradiations were performed using the Texas A&M University cyclotron Single Event Effects Test Facility. The chips were tested in the static mode, and in the dynamic read mode, dynamic write (program) mode, and dynamic erase mode. All the errors observed appeared to be due to single, isolated bits, even in the program and erase modes. These errors appeared to be related to the micro-dose mechanism. All the errors corresponded to the loss of electrons from a programmed cell. The underlying physical mechanisms will be discussed in more detail later. There were no errors, which could be attributed to malfunctions of the control circuits. At the highest LET used in the test (85 MeV/mg/sq cm), however, there appeared to be a failure due to gate rupture. Failure analysis is being conducted to confirm this conclusion. There was no unambiguous evidence of latchup under any test conditions. Generally, the results on the nanocrystal technology compare favorably with results on currently available commercial floating gate technology, indicating that the technology is promising for future space applications, both civilian and military.
The effects of radiation on various commercial power devices are presented. The devices have proved to be very fragile to single event effects, with some of the devices actually succumbing to catastrophic SEE with protons.
The role of structural shielding mass in the design, verification, and in-flight performance of International Space Station (ISS), in both the natural and induced orbital ionizing radiation (IR) environments, is reported. Detailed consideration of the effects of both the natural and induced ionizing radiation environment during ISS design, development, and flight operations has produced a safe, efficient manned space platform that is largely immune to deleterious effects of the LEO ionizing radiation environment. The assumption of a small shielding mass for purposes of design and verification has been shown to be a valid worst-case approximation approach to design for reliability, though predicted dependences of single event effect (SEE) effects on latitude, longitude, SEP events, and spacecraft structural shielding mass are not observed. The Figure of Merit (FOM) method over predicts the rate for median shielding masses of about 10g/cm(exp 2) by only a factor of 3, while the Scott Effective Flux Approach (SEFA) method overestimated by about one order of magnitude as expected. The Integral Rectangular Parallelepiped (IRPP), SEFA, and FOM methods for estimating on-orbit (Single Event Upsets) SEU rates all utilize some version of the CREME-96 treatment of energetic particle interaction with structural shielding, which has been shown to underestimate the production of secondary particles in heavily shielded manned spacecraft. The need for more work directed to development of a practical understanding of secondary particle production in massive structural shielding for SEE design and verification is indicated. In contrast, total dose estimates using CAD based shielding mass distributions functions and the Shieldose Code provided a reasonable accurate estimate of accumulated dose in Grays internal to the ISS pressurized elements, albeit as a result of using worst-on-worst case assumptions (500 km altitude x 2) that compensate for ignoring both GCR and secondary particle production in massive structural shielding.
Microelectronic and photonic systems in the natural space environment are bombarded by a variety of charged particles including electrons, trapped protons, cosmic rays, and solar particles (protons and other heavy ions). These incident particles cause both ionizing and non-ionizing effects when traversing a device, and the effects can be either transient or permanent. The vast majority of the kinetic energy of an incident proton is lost to ionization, creating the single event effects (SEES) and total ionizing dose (TID) effects described in section IVA. However, the small portion of energy lost in non-ionizing processes causes atoms to be removed from their lattice sites and form permanent electrically active defects in semiconductor materials. These defects, i.e., "displacement damage," can significantly degrade device performance. In general, most of the displacement damage effects in the natural space environment can be attributed to protons since they are plentiful and extremely energetic (and therefore not readily shielded against). For this reason, we consider only proton induced displacement damage in this course. (Nevertheless, we identify solar cells as an important example of a case where both electron and proton damage can be important since only very light shielding is feasible.) The interested reader is encouraged to explore the three previous NSREC and RADECS short courses [Srou88a, Summ92, Hopk97] which also treat displacement damage issues for satellite applications. Part A of this segment of the short course introduces the space environment, proton shielding issues, and requirements specifications for proton-rich environments. In order to exercise the displacement damage analysis tools for on-orbit performance predictions, the requirements document must provide the relevant proton spectra in addition to the usual total ionizing dose-depth curves.
Microelectronic and photonic systems in the natural space environment are bombarded by a variety of charged particles including electrons, trapped protons, cosmic rays, and solar particles (protons and other heavy ions). These incident particles cause both ionizing and non-ionizing effects when traversing a device, and the effects can be either transient or permanent. The vast majority of the kinetic energy of an incident proton is lost to ionization, creating the single event effects (SEES) and total ionizing dose (TID) effects. However, the small portion of energy lost in non-ionizing processes causes atoms to be removed from their lattice sites and form permanent electrically active defects in semiconductor materials. These defects, i.e., "displacement damage," can significantly degrade device performance. In general, most of the displacement damage effects in the natural space environment can be attributed to protons since they are plentiful and extremely energetic (and therefore not readily shielded against). For this reason, we consider only proton induced displacement damage in this course. (Nevertheless, we identify solar cells as an important example of a case where both electron and proton damage can be important since only very light shielding is feasible.) The interested reader is encouraged to explore the three previous NSREC and RADECS short courses which also treat displacement damage issues for satellite applications. Part A of this segment of the short course introduces the space environment, proton shielding issues, and requirements specifications for proton-rich environments. In order to exercise the displacement damage analysis tools for on-orbit performance predictions, the requirements document must provide the relevant proton spectra in addition to the usual total ionizing dose-depth curves. Ion-solid interactions and the nature of the displacement damage they generate have been studied extensively for over half a century, yet they still remain a subject of investigation. In this section, a description of the mechanisms by which displacement damage is produced will be followed by a summary of the major consequences for device performance in a space environment. Often the degradation of a device parameter can be characterized by a damage factor (measured in a laboratory using monoenergetic protons) that is simply the change in a particular electrical or optical parameter per unit proton fluence. In addition, we will describe the concept of a non-ionizing energy loss rate (NIEL) which quantifies that portion of the energy lost by an incident ion that goes into displacements. It has been calculated as a function of proton energy, and is analogous to (and has the same units as) the linear energy transfer (LET) for ionizing energy. We will discover that, to first order, the calculated NIEL describes the energy dependence of the measured device damage factors. This observation provides the basis for predicting proton induced device degradation in a space environment based on both the calculated NIEL and relatively few laboratory test measurements. The methodology of such on-orbit device performance predictions will be described, as well as the limitations. Several classes of devices for which displacement damage is a significant (if not the dominant) mode of radiation induced degradation will be presented.
We describe a tool suite, CREME, which combines existing capabilities of CREME96 and CREME86 with new radiation environment models and new Monte Carlo computational capabilities for single event effects and total ionizing dose.
The NASA Cooperative Agreement NAG4-210 was granted under the FY2000 Faculty Awards for Research (FAR) Program. The project was proposed to examine the effects of charged particles and neutrons on selected random access memory (RAM) technologies. The concept of the project was to add to the current knowledge of Single Event Effects (SEE) concerning RAM and explore the impact of selected forms of radiation on Error Detection and Correction Systems. The project was established as an extension of a previous FAR awarded to Prairie View A&M University (PVAMU), under the direction of Dr. Richard Wilkins as principal investigator. The NASA sponsored Center for Applied Radiation Research (CARR) at PVAMU developed an electronic test-bed to explore and quantify SEE on RAM from charged particles and neutrons. The test-bed was developed using 486DX microprocessor technology (PC-104) and a custom test board to mount RAM integrated circuits or other electronic devices. The test-bed had two configurations - a bench test version for laboratory experiments and a 400 Hz powered rack version for flight experiments. The objectives of this project were to: 1) Upgrade the Electronic Test-bed (ETB) to a Pentium configuration; 2) Accommodate more than only 8 Mbytes of RAM; 3) Explore Error Detection and Correction Systems for radiation effects; 4) Test modern RAM technologies in radiation environments.
- NAIRAS Model Description - Nowcast of Aerospace Ionizing RAdiation System (NAIRAS) Model - Running in real-time on LaRC computer cluster since 2011, results hosted on Space Environment Technologies server/website - Running in real-time at CCMC since 2020 - Key Model Features - Global ionizing radiation environment model - Physics-based HZETRN (High Charge (Z) and Energy TRaNsport) code - Real-time inclusion of solar energetic particle (SEP) radiation - Real-time solar-magnetospheric effects on radiation (cutoff model by Kress et al. [2004, 2010]) - New/Current Model Development - Improved SEP dose nowcast and forecast - Extend to low-Earth orbit (LEO) environment - Single-Event Effects (SEE) radiation risk assessment quantities - Run-on-Request (RoR) @ CCMC
We present an independent investigation of heavy-ion single event effect data for the Microsemi RTG4 field programmable gate array (FPGA).
The purpose of this test was to determine the heavy ion-induced single-event effect (SEE) susceptibility of the Samsung solid state drive (SSD) containing the Vertical-NAND (VNAND) flash technology. This test was supported by the NASA Electronics Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program.
Single-event-effect test results for hi-rel total-dose-hardened power MOSFETs are presented in this report. The 2N7616 and the 2N7425 from Semicoa and the 2N7480 from International Rectifier were tested to NASA test condition standards and requirements. The 2N7480 performed well and the data agree with the manufacture's data. The 2N7616 and 2N7425 were entry parts from Semicoa using a new device architecture. Unfortunately, the device performed poorly and Semicoa is withdrawing power MOSFETs from it line due to these data. Vertical metal-oxide-semiconductor field-effect transistors (MOSFETs) are the most commonly used power transistor. MOSFETs are typically employed in power supplies and high current switching applications. Due to the inherent high electric fields in the device, power MOSFETs are sensitive to heavy ion irradiation and can fail catastrophically as a result of single-event gate rupture (SEGR) or single-event burnout (SEB). Manufacturers have designed radiation-hardened power MOSFETs for space applications. See [1] through [5] for more information. The objective of this effort was to investigate the SEGR and SEB responses of two power MOSFETs recently produced. These tests will serve as a limited verification of these parts. It is acknowledged that further testing on the respective parts may be needed for some mission profiles.
This portion of the Short Course is divided into two segments to separately address the two major proton-related effects confronting satellite designers: ionization effects and displacement damage effects. While both of these topics are deeply rooted in "traditional" descriptions of space radiation effects, there are several factors at play to cause renewed concern for satellite systems being designed today. For example, emphasis on Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) technologies in both commercial and government systems increases both Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Single Event Effect (SEE) concerns. Scaling trends exacerbate the problems, especially with regard to SEEs where protons can dominate soft error rates and even cause destructive failure. In addition, proton-induced displacement damage at fluences encountered in natural space environments can cause degradation in modern bipolar circuitry as well as in many emerging electronic and opto-electronic technologies.