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295 records · Page 17

Cyber Threat Landscape for Distribution Systems

INL cyber analysts will present an overview of the current threat landscape for distribution systems. We will begin with examples of known attacks that have occurred recently to motivate the threat analysis and mitigation discussed in the remainder of the presentation. Examples may include the attacks affecting wind plants in Europe in Spring 2022, ransomware attacks on city utilities and commercial distribution systems, and advanced persistent threats (APTs) including the attacks on Ukrainian electric system in 2015 and 2016, as well as more recent evidence of other APT activity. We will present the end-to-end attack paths and discuss the various attacker skills, financing, motivations, and access that contributed to these attacks. In the second part of this presentation, we will discuss mitigating the cyber threats for distribution systems. We will discuss recent publicly disclosed vulnerabilities and explain their relevant context for distribution system security. Likely attacks to affect distribution systems, such as denial-of-service (DoS), ransomware, edge-device compromise, and advanced persistent threats (APTs) will be described. In addition to an overview of these kinds of attacks, we will provide examples of the various ways in which these attacks can start and what systems they can affect. Simple, cost-effective counter-measures to these attacks will be discussed and we will emphasize how these mitigations can reduce threats when properly applied and maintained.

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Impact of cyberattacks on safety and stability of connected and automated vehicle platoons under lane changes

Connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) offer a huge potential to improve the operations and safety of transportation systems. However, the use of smart devices and communications in CAVs introduce new risks. CAVs would leverage vehicle to vehicle (V2V) and vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) communication, thus providing additional system access points compared to traditional systems. Automation makes these systems more vulnerable and increases the consequences of cyberattacks. This study utilizes an infrastructure-based communication platform consisting of cooperative adaptive cruise control and lane control advisories developed by the authors to perform cyber risk assessment of CAVs. The study emulates three types of cyberattacks (message falsification, dedicated denial of service, and spoofing attacks) in a representative traffic environment consisting of multiple CAV platoons and lane change events to analyze the safety and stability impacts of the cyberattacks. Simulation experiments using VISSIM reveals that traffic stream and CAV string is unstable under all three types of cyberattacks. The worst case is represented by the message falsification attack. Increases in volatility are observed over a no attack case, with variations increasing by an average of 43%–51% along with an increase of over 3000 crash conflicts. Similarly, lane change crash conflicts are observed to be more severe compared to rear end crash conflicts, showing a higher probability of severe injuries. Further, the case of slight cyberattack on a single CAV also creates significant disruption in the traffic stream. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) reveals the statistical significance of the results. Furthermore, these results pave the way for future design of secure systems from a monitoring perspective.

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Optimized V1G and V2G Electric Vehicle Fleet Management and Grid Transaction at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar in San Diego, CA

The overall technical goal of the project was to demonstrate an all-electric bi-directional non-tactical fleet at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar that was integrated and controlled with other distributed energy resources (DERs) (i.e., PV, stationary battery, and building loads) to provide resilience to critical electric loads in the event of grid outages, to minimize charging costs, and to provide economic energy resources to electricity markets. In this project, the specific, technical objectives were: 1. Demonstrate that bi-directional electric vehicles can provide critical complementary services to fixed storage batteries in microgrid applications while performing function as non-tactical vehicles. 2. Demonstrate participation of bi-directional (V2G) and unidirectional (V1G) PEVs for demand management and minimization of charging costs. 3. Demonstrate integration of multiple DERs for grid service participation. US Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar in San Diego was the site of this electric vehicle-to-microgrid-utility grid test and demonstration project. Existing microgrid assets in this study included (1) a public works building; (2) a 30-kW rooftop photovoltaic (PV) system and (3) a separate 250 kW carport PV system. In this project, six bi-directional V2G vans were located at the MCAS Miramar’s showcase building-scale microgrid to develop and test technical capabilities that V2G can provide in microgrid applications (e.g., cost reduction and resiliency). These resources provided aggregated demand management and simulated participation in current retail DR programs. The vehicles used in this demonstration were selected because they provided functionality that MCAS Miramar needed, 15 passenger transport and facilities work cargo carrying capacity, and bi-directional charging capability that the research project required. All vehicles in this study were manufactured and distributed by VIA Motors, Inc. There were six vehicles total and each was VIA’s VTRUX eREV V2G model, a modified General Motors Chevrolet 2500 2WD van. Three of the vans were configured as passenger vans and the other three were configured as cargo vans. Each van had an on-board bi-direcrtional inverter/charger, Bel Power Solutions model 350INVCHGT150-120-240-8G nominally rated at +/-15 kW. The VIA van’s charging connector follows the J1772 charging protocol. The bi-directional EVSEs demonstrated in this study were manufactured by Coritech, Inc. Each VGI-80-AC charging station enabled enhanced V2G charging capability to a Clipper Creek CS-100 charging module. The enhanced capabilities included ethernet communication following the SEP2.0 protocol with a distributed energy resource function set and an operator screen displaying real-time SOC, voltage, and current. The VGI-80-AC charging stations are classified as level 2 with a maximum current output of 80 A or effectively 19 kW. The VIA van’s onboard charger limited the charging and discharging power to 15 kW in each direction. A control computer was installed in the EWOC and connected to an existing monitor. The V2G control communication network was a completely stand-alone closed system that did not have any connection to any other networks on the base. A cybersecure remote communication connection was created with a cellular modem, firewall hardware, and a virtual private network configuration.

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Gridtrust: Electricity Grid Root-of-Trust Decentralized Supply Chain Cyber-Security (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

GridTrust represents a departure from reliance on a single organization or a single person to multiple organizations and therefore multiple people across organizational structures. The motivating idea behind involving multiple organizations is the increase in security due to human factors. More specifically, the requirement that distinct people in different organizations sign off on a change or an update makes a cyberattack much less likely due to the inherent requirement that both organizations be penetrated and fooled. GridTrust focuses on the software update process as the primary exemplar for the research and development work. A novel hardware-based technology referred to as a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) provides a microchip Root-of-Trust (RoT), i.e., a starting point for verifying that the hardware being communicated with is the hardware the control center believes the hardware to be. As a result, staff at power grid control centers can ensure the accurate and reliable identification of hardware devices from the outset. The GridTrust protocol introduces two key innovations, as detailed in this report. Firstly, the utilization of a PUF as a root-of-trust in the initial phase of a software or firmware update. Secondly, the application of multiple cryptographic signatures from two or more organizations to the update binary. These signatures are verified before implementing the update on a power grid device in the field. In terms of GridTrust hardware design, this report outlines two main components. The first is the GridTrust Native Device, integrating PUF technology intrinsically into the hardware device itself. The second is the GridTrust Interfacing Device, which incorporates PUF technology and multiple cryptographic signatures. These signatures are cross-checked within a separate hardware positioned between the power grid control center and the legacy power grid device, functioning as an intermediary. While the GridTrust Interfacing Device offers the advantage of being applicable to existing power grid equipment, it may have reduced security if the intermediary component is targeted. On the other hand, the GridTrust Native Device boasts increased security due to protocol integration within a unified form factor. The effectiveness of GridTrust technology has been extensively demonstrated, with multiple external red-team attackers unable to breach GridTrust's security measures. This was observed both in controlled laboratory settings during Phase 1 of the project and in real-world conditions within a City of Marietta substation during Phase 2 of the project.

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A Computational Review of Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms for the Smart Grid

Smart grid technologies have rapidly become one of the largest and most comprehensive sources of data for the modern utility. For the most part, data streams are seen as an essential tool that enable utilities to carry their day-to-day business operations, but they also create the need for efficient and secure data management strategies. In the context of the smart grid, ensuring data privacy is becoming an increasing concern due to a combination of factors that range from shifts in operational paradigms and rapid technology evolution to changes in legislation. Furthermore, researchers have highlighted the risks associated with improperly protected energy records. For example, energy consumption data from homes could be used to infer the behaviors and habits of home occupants through activity recognition or user profiling (Fan, 2017), which may lead to unfair service pricing, targeted advertising, or other personal security violations. Similarly, Electric Vehicles’ (EVs) charging metadata could be used to reveal private information about the owner such as their payment methods, preferred charging stations, and other locational and timing information that could be used to reconstruct the vehicle owner’s behaviors. The privacy of user data, even when used for statistical analysis or machine learning training processes, also needs to be carefully considered, as an individual’s private traits may still be vulnerable if their inclusion/exclusion greatly impacts the result or could be linked to a public dataset through cross-reference. The breach of user privacy also has severe impacts for organizations that store, transmit, or work on the data in the form of diminishing the public’s trust in them while potentially incurring legal consequences (e.g., fines and suspensions under the European Union General Data Protection Regulation, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, etc.). Because of these risks, several privacy-preserving mechanisms are available to help organizations comply with privacy legislations and prevent the unauthorized and malicious use of user data. In light of these concerns, this report focuses on performing a computational review of privacy-preserving mechanisms that have received a significant amount of interest in literature. It specifically focuses on 1) homomorphic encryption, 2) zero-knowledge proofs, 3) differential privacy, and 4) federated learning. It is worth noting that although many of the methods presented in this document rely on cryptographic primitives, their intent is not to provide perfect secrecy, but rather to enable users to maintain privacy, and thus they shall not be compared or equated to other constructs that are aimed to address cybersecurity constructs.

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Application of Cyber-Informed Engineering for Protecting BESS

This white paper synthesizes an array of crucial grid services provided by BESS technology, assesses its architecture and communications, and presents a case study for analysis against the principles introduced by Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). Furthermore, in walking through the analysis, this paper presents a framework to evaluate risks and solutions when considering BESS components. Asset owners and buyers could perform this analysis to assess their BESS product implementations, alternative inverter-based resources (IBR), and energy management systems (EMS). Battery systems fulfill various roles contingent on the unique market demands and the specific challenges presented by regional grid infrastructures. These roles also vary due to the differing utility models for ownership and operation, which are adapted to meet regional and local capabilities and requirements. Concerns have been raised regarding the potential for adversaries to exploit knowledge of battery operational patterns to orchestrate decisive attacks. However, the security of operational data for these systems may not be the primary vulnerability, as much of this information is already well-understood within the community. Applying a modest degree of subject matter expertise can often yield valuable predictions regarding how a battery will respond under certain conditions, such as grid emergencies, high or low-temperature days, Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) events, and outages. The operational characteristics of batteries are well-documented, and their capabilities, including the risks associated with misoperation and the resulting consequences, are published and understood within the industry. CIE practices represent the next step in gaining functional assurance and providing an acceptable level of risk, regardless of whether a battery vendor can support a trusted and validated supply chain. While this issue has exacerbated supply chain challenges, it is not an isolated condition. This foreign supply route is the primary source of BESS for the U.S. market. Significant efforts are underway through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) to change that. Still, strategic short-term operational mitigations are needed to ensure the security of our operational technology (OT) systems, which are enhanced by instilling trust and are separate from vendors implementing CIE principles.

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Support for the Core Research Activities and Studies of the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board (CSTB)

The Computer Science and Telecommunications Board of the National Research Council considers technical and policy issues pertaining to computer science (CS), telecommunications, and information technology (IT). The functions of the board include: (1) monitoring and promoting the health of the CS, IT, and telecommunications fields, including attention as appropriate to issues of human resources and funding levels and program structures for research; (2) initiating studies involving CS, IT, and telecommunications as critical resources and sources of national economic strength; (3) responding to requests from the government, non-profit organizations, and private industry for expert advice on CS, IT, and telecommunications issues; and to requests from the government for expert advice on computer and telecommunications systems planning, utilization, and modernization; (4) fostering interaction among CS, IT, and telecommunications researchers and practitioners, and with other disciplines; and providing a base of expertise in the National Research Council in the areas of CS, IT, and telecommunications. This award has supported the overall operation of CSTB. Reports resulting from the Board's efforts have been widely disseminated in both electronic and print form, and all CSTB reports are available at its World Wide Web home page at cstb.org. The following reports, resulting from projects that were separately funded by a wide array of sponsors, were completed and released during the award period: 2007: * Summary of a Workshop on Software-Intensive Systems and Uncertainty at Scale * Social Security Administration Electronic Service Provision: A Strategic Assessment * Toward a Safer and More Secure Cyberspace * Software for Dependable Systems: Sufficient Evidence? * Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age * Improving Disaster Management: The Role of IT in Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery 2006: * Renewing U.S. Telecommunications Research * Letter Report on Electronic Voting * Summary of a Workshop on the Technology, Policy, and Cultural Dimensions of Biometric System 2005: * Catalyzing Inquiry at the Interface of Computing and Biology * Summary of a Workshop on Using IT to Enhance Disaster Management * Asking the Right Questions About Electronic Voting * Building an Electronic Records Archive at NARA: Recommendations for a Long-Term Strategy * Signposts in Cyberspace: The Domain Name System and Internet Navigation 2004: * ITCP: Information Technology and Creative Practices (brochure) * Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Technologies: A Workshop Summary * Getting up to Speed: The Future of Supercomputing * Summary of a Workshop on Software Certification and Dependability * Computer Science: Reflections on the Field, Reflections from the Field CSTB conducted numerous briefings of these reports and transmitted copies of these reports to researchers and key decision makers in the public and private sectors. It developed articles for journals based on several of these reports. As requested, and in fulfillment of its congressional charter to act as an independent advisor to the federal government, it arranged for congressional testimony on several of these reports. CSTB also convenes a number of workshops and other events, either as part of studies or in conjunctions with meetings of the CSTB members. These events have included the following: two 2007 workshops explored issues and challenges related to state voter registration databases, record matching, and database interoperability. A Sept. 2007 workshop, Trends in Computing Performance, explored fundamental trends in areas such as power, storage, programming, and applications. An Oct. 2007, workshop presented highlights of CSTB's May 2007 report, Software for Dependable Systems: Sufficient Evidence?, along with several panels discussing the report's conclusions and their implications. A Jan. 2007 workshop, Uncertainty at Scale, explored engineering uncertainty, system complexity, and scale issues in developing large software systems. A Feb. 2007 workshop explored China's and India's roles in the IT R&D ecosystem; observations about the ecosystem over the long term; perspectives from serial entrepreneurs about the evolution of the ecosystem; and a cross-industry, global view of the R&D ecosystem. A Nov. 2006 event brought together participants from government, industry, and academia to share their perspectives on the health of the ecosystem, patterns of funding and investment, and the Potomac-area IT startup environment. A symposium entitled 2016, held in Oct. 2006, featured a number of distinguished speakers who shared their views on how computer science and telecommunications will look in 10 years. This well-attended event was also the subject of an Oct. 31, 2006, feature essay in the New York Times, "Computing, 2016: What Won't Be Possible?"

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