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At least 307 records · Page 17

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Lead Verification Test Suite

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 is a simulation tool used to perform deterministic analyses of anticipated events as well as design basis and beyond design basis accidents for advanced liquid-metal-cooled nuclear reactors. With its origin as SAS1A in the late 1960s, the SAS series of codes has been under continuous use and development for over forty-five years and represents a critical investment in safety analysis capabilities for the U.S. Department of Energy. Although SAS4A/SASSYS-1 was developed to support the analysis of any liquid-metal-cooled nuclear reactor, it has primarily been utilized to design and analyze Sodium Fast Reactors (SFRs). As a result, most of the verification basis for SAS4A/SASSYS-1 utilizes sodium as a coolant and geometry descriptions that are typical of a SFR facility. In this work, new verification problems are defined to extend the applicability of the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 verification basis into Lead Fast Reactor (LFR) design space. A review of the existing SAS4A/SASSYS-1 SFR verification test suite is performed to determine the number of test cases that are SFR specific. SFR specific test cases are replicated using lead as a coolant and system layouts that are representative of LFRs. This report provides definitions and reference solutions for seven new test cases that scope lead-specific features and capabilities of the software. For a verification test to be considered acceptable, comparisons of analytical solutions to SAS4A/SASSYS-1 predictions must produce negligible or justifiable errors. All LFR specific test cases are found to be acceptable.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Manufacturing Management System Overview [Slides]

Vision: Institute a trusted manufacturing capability within the ALDWP Production Agency enabling digital product acceptance and access to digital manufacturing post-production activities. Mission: Establish a modern manufacturing infrastructure that ensures operator credentials, minimized human transcription errors, capable of managing all aspects of manufacturing including digital data acquisition, NCR resolution, and product acceptance, while providing an effective and intuitive user experience. Strategy: Constitute the modern manufacturing infrastructure to minimize risk and plant disruption while incrementally involving the capability.

42 ENGINEERING↗

A System Approach to Deep Heating Savings Through Measurement, Management, and Motivation

Across multi-tenant commercial office and multifamily buildings, centrally metered fuel use represents a substantial fraction of whole-building energy use. Energy audit practitioners understand that improving heating distribution efficiency is typically more of an opportunity than combustion efficiency and that differing thermal comfort preferences between tenants are the bane of operators across these building typologies. There is an unmet market need for retrofit technologies that allow for the delivery of the right amount of heat to the right spaces, at the right time. The Energy Management and Information System (EMIS) package fills this gap through enhanced controls and metering, incorporating low-cost sensors and wireless communication infrastructure to provide a platform for ongoing commissioning and tenant feedback, including heat cost allocation. With support from the US DOE Building Technologies Office, Steven Winter Associates, Inc. (SWA) partnered with Sentient Buildings, E Source, building owners, and utility and policy stakeholders, to demonstrate a market viable EMIS that achieves a reduction in space heating energy use by reducing heating load, improving control, and positively impacting behavior while providing an acceptable financial return. In this study, EMIS packages were implemented in two New York City multifamily rental buildings. Both buildings conducted basic mechanical work (e.g., repairing steam traps) to ensure the heating system was operating well before any tenant feedback was layered in. Heating Energy Use Reports (HEUR) were created to provide tenants with social comparisons and energy savings tips to influence their behavior; these were provided monthly to all tenants in both buildings. Additionally, one building allocated heating costs to a portion of the tenants. Heat cost allocation (HCA) has a long history in the European Union (EU), although it is not common in the US or in steam-heated buildings. SWA leveraged existing EU best practices and stakeholder feedback to develop a Heat Cost Allocation algorithm that was considered equitable and intuitive. Energy use and tenant behavior impacts were tracked throughout the study. The basic mechanical repair work saved between 11-20% of heating energy. Those savings rose to 17-24% with the addition of tenant feedback. While it may not be possible to precisely determine the impact of COVID-19 on research studies like this, there may have been additional savings realized had the study taken place in a period of normal occupancy patterns. These types of central heating systems have been a blind spot for utilities, who have traditionally had little visibility into detailed behind-the-meter gas usage. Heating energy savings stayed consistent during the coldest months, indicating the potential for utilities to utilize EMIS packages for peak gas demand reductions or demand response programs. Tenant comfort was also improved. Post installation, room temperatures more closely matched thermostat set points. Perhaps due to this greater level of control, the vast majority of tenants being billed for heating were accepting of the allocation costs. And tenants receiving heat cost allocations were more likely to reduce their thermostat setpoints than tenants receiving behavioral feedback without financial impacts were. Variation in building specifics makes it difficult to provide precise energy and financial savings estimates. But within the range of expected conditions, the study identified a few key variables that can have the greatest impact on financial returns: the cost of fuel, the ability and willingness to allocate heating costs to tenants, and a well-functioning heating system as a starting point. This study focused on two multifamily buildings, but additional use cases, such as commercial buildings and affordable housing, should be explored to better understand the full market potential. While this type of upgrade has the potential for deep energy reductions and cost savings, future projects should take into account the balance of costs and benefits between owners and tenants, especially in the affordable, regulated, or other low-to-moderate income (LMI) segments of the market. Rent credits, utility allowances, or a shared savings program are possible options to accelerate adoption of this strategy in these market segments.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Distributed Wind Resilience Metrics for Electric Energy Delivery Systems: Comprehensive Literature Review

While most people have a general concept of what it means to be “resilient,” an examination of definitions from different sources reveals that there are key commonalities but key differences as well. The lack of a generally accepted definition and application of resilience extends to electric energy delivery systems. Without an accepted definition, it is difficult to implement programs or processes to improve resiliency. In this paper, existing work from industry, regulatory bodies, and national laboratories to define and apply resilience to electric energy delivery systems is studied to understand the key components to define resilience and better understand associated metrics. This understanding is then applied to distributed wind for a specific example of how resilience of a system is affected by the technologies and generation sources used to support it. A key finding is that there is no “one size fits all” process for resilience. Each system has a “distinctiveness” characteristic, which qualifies the possibility of differences in resilience due to different threats, geography, stakeholders, risk tolerance, and mitigations. The distinctiveness characteristic extends to distributed wind, where different configurations may lend the distributed wind to contribute to the resilience of systems in a variety of ways. The findings of this research demonstrate the need for a resilience framework that can be readily applied by stakeholders to improve resilience based on the specific system, threat, risk tolerance and stakeholders.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Extraction, Scrub, and Strip Test Results for the Salt Waste Processing Facility Sample Tank 202

An Extraction, Scrub, and Strip (ESS) test was performed on a sample from Tank-202. The purpose of testing this sample is to determine if the solvent is displaying the correct extraction and stripping behavior with cesium. The ESS test showed acceptable performance of the solvent for extraction, scrub, and strip operations. The extraction D(Cs) measured 14.2, exceeding the required value of 8. This value is consistent with results from previous ESS tests using similar solvent formulations. Similarly, the strip cesium distribution ratios fell within acceptable ranges.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Annual Status Report (FY 2020): Performance Assessment for the Disposal of Low Level Waste in the 200 East Area Burial Grounds

This annual review provides the projected dose estimates of radionuclide inventories disposed in the 200 East Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds (LLBGs) since September 26, 1988. These estimates are calculated using the original dose methodology developed in the performance assessment (PA) analysis (WHC-SD-WM-TI-730). The estimates are compared with requirements of DOE O 435.1 Chg 1 and performance objectives defined in companion documents DOE M 435.1-1 Chg 1and DOE-STD-5002-2017). All performance objectives are currently satisfied, and operational waste acceptance criteria (HNF-EP-0063) and waste acceptance practices continue to be sufficient to maintain compliance with performance objectives. Inventory estimates and associated dose estimates from future waste disposal actions are unchanged from previous years’ evaluations that indicate potential impacts well below performance objectives; therefore, future compliance with DOE O 435.1 Chg 1 is expected. A new PA study was initiated in fiscal year (FY) 2019 for evaluation of active disposal sites within the 200 East and 200 West Areas (Trench 94 in 200 East; Trenches 31 and 34 in 200 West) due to extended time elapsing between the current annual status report and the original PA for the active disposal sites. The new PA for the active disposal sites is expected to be completed in FY 2021. Within the active burial grounds in the 200 East Area, low-level waste and mixed low-level waste will continue to be disposed of in the dedicated U.S. Navy reactor compartment trench at the 218-E-12B Burial Ground (Trench 94). During this reporting period (FY 2020, from October 1, 2019, through September 30, 2020), two reactor compartments were disposed in Trench 94. Results from sorption experiments are summarized for this reporting period to quantify the efficacy of concrete waste forms in retaining key radionuclides (e.g., technetium-99 and iodine-129). The test durations ranged from 1 to 3 months. Continued groundwater monitoring of the 200 East Area LLBGs indicates no groundwater contamination due to LLBG waste. Current assumptions about future land use at the Hanford Site are consistent with PA analysis1 assumptions of a post-closure facility that will not be degraded by human activity. The LLBGs are located in an area identified for waste management and containment of residual contamination. This area will remain after final environmental remediation and the proposed shrinkage of Hanford Site boundaries to small sections within the 200 East and 200 West Areas in the Central Plateau (DOE/EIS-0391). The current closure plan for the LLBGs (DOE/RL-2000-707) estimates that the 200 East LLBGs will be closed in the 2050 timeframe. The Disposal Authorization Statement, other technical basis documents, and the radioactive waste management basis are of continued adequacy to meet the performance objectives of DOE O 435.1 Chg 1. Overall, there are no substantive changes to primary PA assumptions nor the PA analysis conclusion; therefore, compliance with DOE O 435.1 Chg 1 and the Disposal Authorization Statement is maintained.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Paths Forward for Nuclear Energy: Using a Nationwide Post-Stratified Hierarchical Model to Facilitate Matching of New Nuclear Technologies to Receptive Host Communities

This project was a collaboration between the University of Oklahoma (OU) and the University of Michigan (UMich). The overall objective of the project was to address a critical problem facing the siting of nuclear facilities, where there is no mechanism for incorporating public attitudes at a state and local level into decision-making. Utilizing recent advances in data modeling over local spatial scales, the research team created a state and county level map of public attitudes towards nuclear energy. Current estimates for public acceptance of nuclear technologies primarily exists on a national level, and sub-national estimates of public opinion about reactor siting, research facilities, transport routes, or storage and disposal facilities are very scarce. Model results from this project provide a systematic basis for technology developers to evaluate public acceptance across alternative siting options as a critical component for weighing potential benefit-cost tradeoffs for alternative paths to deploy new nuclear facilities. The project utilized data from the largest database of nuclear attitudes in the US, coupled with Census and elections-related data as well as data on social vulnerability and proximity to current nuclear facilities. In addition to modeling public support, the team also developed an interactive map to showcase results, using an online tool called Public and Local Attitudes about Nuclear Energy Technologies (PLANET). The tool allows technology developers and stakeholders to interact with the model results and better understand variation in support for nuclear facility siting on a state and county level. The interactive nature of the tool also allows users to analyze results in a targeted way, by comparing levels of support across different states and/or counties as desired.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Post-closure Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations for Disposition of Criticality Control Overpacks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geological repository in southern New Mexico that provides for disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes from atomic energy defense activities. The Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) Report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addresses nuclear criticality safety based on the projected inventory characteristics for the initial compliance certification application of WIPP in 1996. As the inventory, waste forms, and disposal package designs change, revised or new analyses are necessary to demonstrate acceptability for these configurations within the WIPP safety basis and compliance with 10,000-year post-closure standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Saylor and Scaglione evaluated criticality control overpacks (CCOs) in 2017 based on conservative assumptions for post-closure repository structural conditions with resulting effects on containers and container spacing, The Saylor and Scaglione evaluation of CCOs addressed a single waste configuration that represents the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program’s dilute and dispose waste form and composition. This initial CCO study demonstrated that 50 grams of boron carbide (B 4 C) per CCO is sufficient to ensure post-closure criticality safety based on a well-mixed waste composition, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) subsequently determined that this amount of B 4 C does not require constraints on moisture or plastic present as moderator. The Saylor and Scaglione analysis conservatively assumes repository room closure that eliminates all space between fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu masses. The close-packed array was selected based on limited availability of repository salt creep modeling results at that time. In 2019, Brickner provided additional evaluations for pipe overpack containers (POCs), building on the conservative basis provided by Saylor and Scaglione. Brickner’s 2019 analysis made use of new geomechanical data for post-closure spacing that rely on advances in repository modeling as documented in the work by Reedlunn and Bean. This current CCO evaluation for generic waste materials expands on earlier work performed at ORNL and includes evaluation of CCOs across a much broader range of possible waste compositions and geometries. This evaluation is intended to provide input for the required feature, event and process (FEP) screening to determine if post-closure criticality must be included as an event in the 10,000-year regulatory evaluation. As such, the approach to modeling post-closure criticality presented in this report has been coordinated with the Sandia team responsible for FEP screening. The resulting analysis supports disposition of fissile materials in the CCO containing up to 380 FGE 239 Pu and expands conditions acceptable for disposal of fissile material in CCOs. This evaluation builds on the methodology of Saylor and Scaglione and Brickner, using the most recently available geomechanical data for CCO spacing under salt creep compaction scenarios provided by Reedlunn and Bean. The broad range of fissile material configurations analyzed in this report are intended to account for configurations that may occur during the post-closure disposal time period, and it also includes waste configurations that are not physically possible to support analysis of conditions that influence neutron fluence.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

IER 557: Godiva Pulse Repeatability and Characterization (CED-3A Report)

Godiva IV is a fast burst critical assembly constructed of approximately 65 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel alloyed with 1.5% molybdenum for strength. Godiva IV is proposed as the radiation source for IER 498: Design a Shielding Benchmark with a Metal Critical Source. IER 498 proposes a two-burst method to determine the performance of shielding samples, comparing the transmission of the source radiation to detectors with and without a shielding sample present. This eliminates the need for an absolute calibration and allows many uncertainties to cancel. However, the source term variability must be low compared to other sources of experimental uncertainty to ensure the overall uncertainty meets acceptable levels to provide useful measurements. The primary goal of this experiment is to quantify the source term variability, or reproducibility, of Godiva bursts, focusing on the 70 °C bursts planned for IER 498 measurements. Discussions during IER 498 noted that a number of bursts (on the order of six to ten) as identical as possible would be performed and that a 5-7% standard deviation in source intensity would be acceptable.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

FY21 Progress of the Oak Ridge Health Physics Research Reactor CAAS Benchmark Evaluation [Slides]

The FY21 version of the evaluation, focusing on element 57 dose at 3 meters, was presented at the ICSBEP Technical Review Group meeting in October 2021 and was not accepted for 2022 publication in the handbook. The main issue was identified and replacement of the element 57 neutron dose benchmark metric by neutron fluence (closer to what was measured) is required. A subgroup was formed, confident for the updated neutron fluence evaluation to be accepted in the ICSBEP handbook. The updated evaluation will be presented again at the 2022 ICSBEP TRG for publication in the 2023 handbook.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Results of the Extraction-Scrub-Strip (ESS) Tests With Solvent Using IBC BOBCalix

Two Extraction, Scrub, and Strip (ESS) tests were performed on two BOBCalix solvent samples prepared using BOBCalix from IBC Advanced Technologies (“IBC”). The purpose of testing this sample is to confirm if the newly sourced BOBCalix displays the correct extraction and stripping behavior with cesium. The first batch of BOBCalix solvent was prepared using IBC lot#220310KC-1. The second batch was prepared using IBC lot#220615KC-3A. The ESS tests showed acceptable performance of the solvent for extraction, scrub, and strip operations. The extraction D (Cs) values for the tests were 12.9 and 13.6. This value is consistent with results from previous ESS tests using similar solvent formulations. Similarly, the strip cesium distribution ratios (0.0588/0.0342/0.0258 and 0.0575/0.0335/0.0262) fell within acceptable ranges.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

WISP: Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies (Final Technical Report)

The complex interdependencies of cyber systems (sensors and communications), physical grids and associated electricity market operations make protecting electric power grids a significant challenge. The energy sector is constantly under new, targeted, advanced and dangerous cyber-attacks that have the potential to result in the loss of human life. These threats are further exacerbated by our need to modernize the grid. One focus of cyber security research in smart grids is the securing of the SCADA system through advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and bad data detection algorithms in state estimation. These methods either require full knowledge of the system topology and parameters or fail to understand the physical behaviors under attack. WISP (Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies) is designed to provide additional protection to the power grid using only publicly available data. In particular, WISP exploits the spatio-temporal nature of the real time locational marginal prices (LMPs), in conjunction with other information such as bids, weather, outages and load data to analyze anomalous power pricing behaviors and then correlate those observations to localize regions of interest and identify potential cyber events. WISP is non-intrusive as the tool is deployed as a service in the Cloud or on premise and provides reliable information to system operators for enhanced situational awareness, without impeding energy delivery functions. The WISP technology comprises three modules: the data-driven anomaly detection core, the vulnerability and risk analysis and the root cause analysis. The data-driven anomaly detection core performs the tasks of feature selection, anomaly detection and attack region localization. The vulnerability and risk analysis module provides system level information of the vulnerable variables and times, assisting the operators in selecting monitoring and protection nodes. The root cause analysis module takes the detection results and identifies potential operational conditions that contribute to the detected anomalies. In Phase I, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WISP. We developed a realistic electricity market simulator capable of generating normal and attack market data under various operational conditions. We developed a series of cyber-attack detection and analysis algorithms and evaluated them under multiple data sources. Finally, we integrated all modules into an end-to-end software, providing functions for data management, data analytics and visualization. Specifically, we have achieved: (i) real-time data acceptance from external utility interfaces with >99% acceptance rate; (ii) high performance anomaly detection algorithms with >98% detection accuracy and <0.1% false alarm rate; and (iii) ultra-low computing delay <50 milliseconds. Additionally, our team developed algorithms to identify the vulnerable variables in electricity market operations and root cause analysis functions to identify major contributors to the price spikes. These ancillary modules are necessary when deploying WISP in real world industry environment. In Phase II, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of WISP software on realistic largescale power systems. We performed red team testing for the Phase I WISP software and identified software vulnerabilities and implemented corresponding mitigation solutions. We adapted the electricity market simulator for the Texas synthetic 2000-bus system and generated datasets for the false data injection attacks. We created database and visualization interfaces for the Texas system and the ISO New England system. We performed software optimization in terms of operation efficiency, computing speed and detection accuracy. Finally, we tested the software on the Texas system and the ISO New England system and evaluated the detection performance. Overall, we achieved above 89% detection rate, below 3% false alarm rate and below 37 seconds of end-to-end detection delay.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Large-scale Hydrogen Storage – Risk Assessment Seattle City Light and Port of Seattle [Abstract]

This CRADA presents the strategy that Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) will take to support Seattle City Light (SCL), and the Port of Seattle (Port) in performing a risk assessment of large-scale hydrogen storage. Risk assessment is often used to ensure that adequate measures are taken to protect workers and the public, the environment, infrastructure, and assets. A detailed risk assessment can also be used to direct funding and upgrades, to specific components and sub-systems in order to mitigate risks to the larger system. In this way risk assessments are often employed as a part of a larger risk management strategy, with the goal of minimizing the occurrence of hazards and to identify means to limit their consequences. Risk assessment is often used to engage and inform regulators, and to communicate how specific regulations are being met. However, it is important to note that the proposed work is not intended for SCL and the Port to use in order to gain regulatory acceptance for their proposed activities. The work performed as a part of this effort will be a preliminary risk assessment for early-stage component and system designs and should be considered research and development (R&D). As such, the proposed work will be performed to a quality level and design maturity consistent with R&D and is not considered appropriate for final safety analysis and regulatory compliance purposes. Previous and on-going work at SCL and the Port demonstrated the utility of deploying hydrogen systems at the Port. The deployment of hydrogen at the Port is a part of a larger vision of using hydrogen to address a range of issues for SCL and the Port. These include large-scale fueling of MD/HD vehicles, cargo-handling equipment (CHE), and harbor vessels to reduce emissions; support of adjacent LD vehicles; support of critical port operations during extreme events (i.e., resiliency); deferral of more capital- and time-intensive electrical distribution system upgrades while still supporting evolving port operations and decarbonization efforts; facilitating electrification by establishing energy storage as a grid resource, starting at strategic port locations; creation of a flexible market resource that can be used by SCL to generate revenue via arbitrage; support of planned future maritime operations that involve heavy use of hydrogen for ocean-going vessels; and future end-use applications involving natural gas pipeline hydrogen injection. Ultimately, the success of these activities is underpinned by the deployed storage capacity. Large-scale deployment of hydrogen systems will require hydrogen storage at a scale that has not been demonstrated. In addition, the ideal location for such multi-use systems is near the end user which will often necessitate deploying into urban and/or industrial areas. A detailed risk assessment using the Port as a test case is necessary to ensure the deployment of large-scale hydrogen is successful. Many technologies have been proposed for hydrogen storage; however, these technologies need to be analyzed as they apply to an actual site. The physical infrastructure and hydrogen use cases for the Port will be analyzed, and a risk assessment for compressed hydrogen, liquified hydrogen, and Liquid Organic Hydrogen Carrier (LOHC) storage will be performed. These risk assessments will be useful for understanding how each of these technologies would perform in terms of facility and public safety. The operating states of the proposed hydrogen systems at the Port will be analyzed and incorporated into the storage risk assessment. Scalability will also be analyzed to understand how future port uses would affect the overall risk assessment. Finally, using the risk assessment as a tool to inform engagement and to gain stakeholder acceptance will be explored.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Innovative Strategies for Long-Term Monitoring of Complex Groundwater Plumes at DOE’s Legacy Sites (Workshop Report)

Most remaining Department of Energy (DOE) sites will require extended periods of institutional control, especially at complex groundwater sites where attenuation-based strategies have been implemented to facilitate closure. The current practice of monitoring—obtaining and analyzing contaminant concentration in groundwater samples at numerous wells—will account for a large portion of the projected life-cycle at these DOE sites unless a new approach is adopted. State-of-the-art technologies are being developed, including in situ sensors, geophysics, radiation mapping, numerical modeling and AI/ML. These technologies can optimize monitoring strategies in space and time, provide spatially extensive information at vulnerable regions and/or provide more continuous monitoring at lower cost. As part of DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM’s) efforts to advance long-term monitoring systems, an in-person/virtual hybrid workshop was hosted by Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) on January 24 and 25, 2023, in Augusta, Georgia. Because DOE-EM’s complex sites will eventually be transferred to DOE’s Office of Legacy Management (DOE-LM), representatives of DOE-LM were important participants in the workshop. The purpose of the workshop was to identify challenges and opportunities for deploying advanced technologies for long-term monitoring at DOE sites. The key questions during the workshop were: 1) the regulatory acceptance of replacing a process that traditionally has used laboratory sampling and analysis of groundwater samples, and 2) the application of this strategy to the southwestern arid sites that include many of the remaining DOE-EM and DOE-LM complex groundwater plumes. Characteristics common to most arid sites present both limitations and opportunities for advanced technologies. DOE-EM has funded a National Laboratory team from SRNL, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to establish the overarching framework of long-term monitoring by systematically combining advanced hardware and software technologies. This project is titled “Advanced Long-Term Environmental Monitoring Systems (ALTEMIS)” and is sponsored by the DOE-EM Technology Development Program. The multi-laboratory team is currently developing and testing innovative monitoring strategies, including the use of in situ groundwater sensors, geophysics, drone/satellite-based remote sensing, reactive transport modeling, and artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML). The project’s demonstration testbed is at the Savannah River Site (SRS) F-Area Seepage Basins, where a well-characterized complex groundwater plume composed of uranium and other radionuclides is in the latter stages of remediation. The workshop included more than 70 participants, presentations, a field visit to F-Area, breakout working groups, and large group discussion. Participants developed recommendations on five topics: in situ sensors, spatially integrative tools, challenges to regulatory acceptance, AI/ML strategies, and transitioning sites to DOE-LM.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Performance Assessment for the Disposal of Low-Level Waste in the 200 East Area Burial Grounds (Annual Status Report FY 2022)

This annual review provides the projected dose estimates of radionuclide inventories disposed in the 200 East Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds (LLBGs) since September 26, 1988. These estimates are calculated using the original dose methodology developed in the performance assessment (PA) analysis (WHC-SD-WM-TI-730). The estimates are compared with the performance objectives defined in U.S. Department of Energy requirements (DOE O 435.1 and its companion documents DOE M 435.1-1 and DOE-STD-5002-2017). All performance objectives are currently satisfied, and operational waste acceptance criteria (HNF-EP-0063) and waste acceptance practices continue to be sufficient to maintain compliance with performance objectives. Inventory estimates and associated dose estimates from future waste disposal actions are unchanged from previous years’ evaluations that indicate potential impacts well below performance objectives; therefore, future compliance with DOE O 435.1 is expected.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Performance Assessment for the Disposal of Low-Level Waste in the 200 West Area Burial Grounds (Annual Status Report FY 2022)

This annual review provides the projected dose estimates of radionuclide inventories disposed in the active 200 West Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds (LLBGs) since September 26, 1988. These estimates are calculated using the original dose methodology developed in the performance assessment (PA) analysis (WHC-EP-0645). The estimates are compared with the performance objectives defined in U.S. Department of Energy requirements (DOE O 435.1 and its companion documents DOE M 435.1-1 and DOE-STD-5002-2017). All performance objectives are currently satisfied, and operational waste acceptance criteria (HNF-EP-0063) and waste acceptance practices continue to be sufficient to maintain compliance with performance objectives. Inventory estimates and associated dose estimates from future waste disposal actions are unchanged from previous years’ evaluations that indicate potential impacts well below performance objectives; therefore, future compliance with DOE O 435.1 is expected. Within the active burial grounds, low-level and mixed low-level waste currently may be disposed only in two lined trenches in the 218-W-5 Burial Ground (Trenches 31 and 34) until they are either filled or a decision is made to close these trenches. Some mixed low-level waste is also disposed at the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility in the 200 West Area (which is covered under a separate PA). During this (fiscal year 2022) reporting period (October 1, 2021, through September 30, 2022), waste was disposed to the 200 West Area LLBGs. Continued groundwater monitoring of the 200 West Area LLBGs indicates no groundwater contamination due to LLBG waste. Current assumptions about future land use at the Hanford Site are consistent with PA analysis assumptions of a postclosure facility that will not be degraded by human activity. The LLBGs are in an area identified for waste management and containment of residual contamination (DOE/EIS-0391). The current closure plan for the LLBGs (DOE/RL-2000-70) estimates that the 200 West LLBGs will be closed in the 2050 timeframe. The Disposal Authorization Statement, other technical basis documents, and the radioactive waste management basis are of continued adequacy to meet the performance objectives of DOE O 435.1. Overall, there are no substantive changes to primary PA assumptions and no changes to the PA analysis conclusion; therefore, compliance with DOE O 435.1 and the Disposal Authorization Statement is maintained. A new PA to evaluate the long-term impacts of three disposal trenches that are currently active within the 200 East and 200 West Areas (Trench 94 in the 200 East Area and Trenches 31 and 34 in the 200 West Area) was initiated in fiscal year 2019 and completed in fiscal year 2022. Corrective actions addressing 3 key issues and 31 secondary issues identified during the review process were developed and submitted to the Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Federal Review Group Co-Chairs for review and approval. This PA provides additional technical basis for the continued adequacy of the existing Operating Disposal Authorization Statement.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Performance Assessment for the Disposal of Low-Level Waste in the 200 West Area Burial Grounds (Annual Status Report FY 2021)

This annual review provides the projected dose estimates of radionuclide inventories disposed in the active 200 West Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds (LLBGs) since September 26, 1988. These estimates are calculated using the original dose methodology developed in the performance assessment (PA) analysis (WHC-EP-0645). The estimates are compared with the performance objectives defined in U.S. Department of Energy requirements (DOE O 435.1 and its companion documents DOE M 435.1-1 and DOE-STD-5002-2017). All performance objectives are currently satisfied, and operational waste acceptance criteria (HNF-EP-0063). and waste acceptance practices continue to be sufficient to maintain compliance with performance objectives. Inventory estimates and associated dose estimates from future waste disposal actions are unchanged from previous years’ evaluations that indicate potential impacts well below performance objectives; therefore, future compliance with DOE O 435.1 is expected.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Valuing Resilience for Microgrids: Challenges, Innovative Approaches, and State Needs

The United States depends on the delivery of reliable, affordable, clean, and safe electricity. Electric utilities invest billions of dollars each year in generation, transmission, and distribution assets to meet this need. However, experiences with recent natural disasters of increasing frequency and duration demonstrate the shortcomings of this approach in the face of modern threats. Further, as customers rely on electricity for a broader range of important needs, such as transportation, as well as critical life-saving services and mission critical facilities such as water treatment, medical care, shelters, telecommunications, and more, the need to minimize the likelihood and impacts of outages grows. Against this backdrop, resilience has emerged as a key consideration to guide electricity spending, whether from utilities, customers, or taxpayers. Although reliability has been defined and measured for decades with broadly accepted metrics that measure how many customers lose power and at what frequency and duration, resilience considers the electricity system’s response to a disruption and its subsequent impacts on customers. Developing tools and methods to accurately assess the costs and benefits of resilience investments is a critical step toward the goal of mitigating the impacts of outages on customers and society. Today, electric system resilience is largely treated as an externality due to challenges estimating the costs of long-duration outages, impacts of outages on society, and increasing reliance on electricity for a growing set of interdependent services. These interdependencies include the water, wastewater, telecommunications, natural gas, and health sectors. Without knowing how much a given resilience investment will benefit customers or society more broadly, investors, policymakers, and regulators are less likely to make or approve such investments, and less able to prioritize those investments. State Energy Offices and public utility commissions (PUCs) lead the development of state-level energy policy and utility regulation, respectively, and each has interests in encouraging appropriate public and private investments in resilience. To this end, the National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO) and National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), with the support of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Electricity (OE), formed a joint Microgrids State Working Group to explore the costs and benefits of microgrids, barriers to broader deployment of microgrids to meet resilience and other objectives, and policy and regulatory strategies to optimize investments in resilience, including but not limited to microgrids. Although no universally accepted valuation tool for resilience exists, National Laboratories, utilities, researchers, and state and federal agencies have collaborated to develop, apply, and improve a number of approaches to quantify resilience, several of which are still in progress at the time this report is published. This report seeks to share these important advances by discussing current definitions of resilience (Section 1), how microgrids are defined and used to meet resilience objectives (Section 2), new approaches to valuing resilience (Section 3), steps State Energy Offices and PUCs have taken to further resilience valuation efforts (Section 4), and finally, considerations and suggested next steps for State Energy Offices and PUCs (Section 5). Relevant examples of specific microgrid projects and resilience valuation efforts are included throughout the report. While this report is written specifically for NASEO and NARUC members, it may be useful for utilities, local governments, and individual customers interested in improving the way public and private dollars are spent to achieve resilience outcomes.

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