Results for “catastrophic” — Page 17

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Sensor-based Prognostics for Safe Batteries for Electric Aircraft

With a new start awarded under CAS for Fiscal Year 2020, the Sensor-based Prognostics to Avoid Runaway Reactions and Catastrophic Ignition project, or SPARRCI, aims to eliminate safety risks of lithium-ion and next-generation lithium-based batteries. SPARRCI is taking a deeper dive into the inner workings of battery cells by introducing miniature multifunctional sensors within the cells to detect early signs of failure. Combined with nondestructive evaluation techniques to gather complementary battery health data, battery data will be monitored in real-time via prognostics which will ultimately be able to identify when the cell is exhibiting abnormal behavior bordering on failure, with the ability to provide early warning such that the battery may be taken offline prior to catastrophic failure events.

Brianne Demattia↗

NASA NTRS2018

ISS Columbus Heat Exchanger Close Call Investigation Case Study

During International Space Station (ISS) Expedition 38, just days before Christmas 2013, the External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS) on the ISS Columbus Moderate Temperature Loop (MTL) Interface Heat Exchanger (IFHX) shut down due to low temperatures. Engineers on the ground scrambled for several days to troubleshoot a pump module Flow Control Valve (FCV) problem, however; no one recognized that the core temperature of the Columbus MTL IFHX was continuing to drop, to the point that water in the system could freeze. Freezing could rupture the core, resulting in high pressure ammonia entering the cabin of the ISS. With no way to clean up the ammonia, ISS crew would have to evacuate the U.S. segment of the station. Columbus MTL IFHX rupture is considered a catastrophic failure and could potentially result in a loss of crew/loss of vehicle. How did engineers miss this potentially catastrophic issue?

Joyce B Abbey↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Space Radiation Effects on SiC Power Device Reliability

Heavy-ion radiation can result in silicon carbide power device degradation and/or catastrophic failure. Test procedures and data interpretation must consider the impact that heavy-ion induced off-state leakage current increases will have on subsequent single-event effect susceptibility and testability. On orbit, reliable performance in the presence of increased off-state leakage currents due to cumulative ion-induced non-catastrophic single-event effects must be assured over the mission lifetime. This work presents a large body of heavy-ion test data for different diode, power MOSFET, and JFET devices. Susceptibility to single-event effects is compared between SiC and Si power devices. Initial recommendations on heavy-ion radiation test methods for silicon carbide power devices are made and radiation hardness assurance is discussed with the goal of moving one step closer to reliably getting this technology off the ground into a broad array of spacecraft and instruments that will benefit from its unique capabilities.

diode↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Impact histories inferred from exogenic boulders on asteroids Ryugu and Bennu

Rubble-pile asteroids, such as (162173) Ryugu and (101955) Bennu, are formed as a result of catastrophic disruption of a parent body and re-accumulation of the fragments by self-gravity. Therefore, reaccumulated rubble piles could include mixtures of materials from both the parent body and its catastrophic impactor, as they did in the case of 2008 TC3 and the Almahata Sitta meteorites (Jenniskens et al. 2009). Indeed, six unusually bright, basaltic, meter-scale boulders were recently identified on Bennu’s dark surface (DellaGiustina et al. 2021), and their close spectral matches to the Howardite-Eucrite-Diogenite (HED) meteorites and Vesta family members indicate that they originated from asteroid (4) Vesta. In parallel, bright exogenic anhydrous-silicate–rich materials were found on Ryugu (Tatsumi et al. 2021). The bright boulders on Ryugu are consistent with ordinary chondrite meteorites, based on their albedo and weak or even absent absorption band at 2 µm. These exogenous materials on the surfaces of rubble-pile asteroids could be a key to constraining their specific impact conditions and collisional evolution. In this study, we report further study of the visible spectrophotometry and morphology of exogenic boulders on Ryugu and Bennu using two multi-band cameras: the telescopic Optical Navigation Camera (ONC-T) onboard the Hayabusa2 spacecraft, and MapCam onboard the Origins, Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification, and Security–Regolith Explorer (OSIRIS-REx) spacecraft, respectively. For Ryugu, we first detected objects with peak reflectance brighter by a factor of >1.5 than the surrounding area. Tatsumi et al. (2021) found two spectral groups among the bright boulders: S-type with an absorption near 1 µm and C/X-type with a flat spectrum. That study found 6 S-types and 15 C/X-types, and in this work we additionally find one S-type and ~70 C/X-types. We found that S-type bright boulders follow two parallel trends consistent with space weathering of ordinary chondrites. Fragments from projectiles suggest that Ryugu may not have formed directly from the original parent body, i.e., it is from a second or higher generation of collisional descendants (Sugimoto et al. in revision). For Bennu, we directly surveyed absorption near 1 µm, which is indicative of anhydrous silicates. We propose 77 objects of exogenic origin including 6 boulders previously reported by DellaGiustina et al. (2021). We find that proposed exogenic objects follow two mixing trends with respect to the average spectrum of Bennu (Tatsumi and Popescu et al. submitted). One trend can be explained by mixing with HED as discussed in DellaGiustina et al. (2021), and the other trend can be explained by mixing with another, olivine-rich composition. Near-infrared spectra also support the possibility of multiple compositions among exogenic objects on Bennu. Thus, similar to Ryugu, Bennu could represent a second or higher generation. Using high-resolution images, we found that more than half of the exogenic objects that we identified on Bennu have breccia-like or inclusion-like morphologies. We do not observe a correlation between morphology and spectral shape. Direct comparison of reflectance spectra of exogenic object spectra between Ryugu and Bennu suggests a compositional difference. Furthermore, the number density of exogenic objects > 0.5 m on Bennu is ~40 times that on Ryugu (Tatsumi and Popescu et al. submitted). Bennu exhibits much more contamination from exogenic materials than Ryugu, which likely reflects differences in impact conditions, such as impact velocity and impactor size.

E. Tatsumi↗

NASA NTRS2021

Local Ultrasonic Resonance Spectroscopy of Lithium Metal Batteries for Aerospace Applications

As next-generation aircraft and vehicles continue to develop, so do their associated energy demands. Lithium metal batteries are a leading candidate to fulfill this energy requirement, but these batteries are prone to internal dendrite defects that can lead to catastrophic thermal runaway events. Current battery management systems are capable of mitigating such risks, but are unable to detect such defects until thermal runaway has already begun. Various nondestructive evaluation (NDE) techniques, particularly ultrasonic NDE, can directly monitor internal battery parameters giving them the potential to detect critical defects prior to catastrophic failure. However, most of the current battery NDE research has focused on improved battery state-of-charge (SOC) and stateof- health (SOH) monitoring with little emphasis on critical defect detection. Thus, a measurement technique sensitive to subtle battery defects is needed. In addition, the complex mechanics of ultrasound in porous, thin, multilayered batteries prompt the use of physics-based simulation to guide inspections. In this work, an ultrasonic NDE technique has been developed utilizing frequency domain analysis of local battery resonances to detect the presence of battery defects. This technique is a practical extension of local ultrasonic resonance spectroscopy (LURS) – which previously required non-contact laser ultrasonics – to measurements with piezoelectric contact and immersion scan transducers. To extend the technique to work with piezoelectric transducers, ultrasonic battery measurements were compared to a sans-battery calibration measurement. Then, a linear systems deconvolution was used to eliminate the transfer functions of extraneous factors such as the transducer and electronics, leaving only the frequency-dependent battery reflection coefficient. The LURS technique was first validated on stainless steel and aluminum plates, producing reflection coefficients in line with analytical and numerical finite element modeling (FEM) results. Functioning Li-metal pouch cells were then seeded with lithium chip defects prior to LURS measurements. The presence of these defects is shown to cause a measurable shift in the battery’s through-thickness local resonances. 2D, frequency-domain poroelastic models of ultrasonic propagation in a single-cell lithium metal pouch battery were created and corroborated these findings. Thus, this work has both extended and proven the feasibility of the LURS technique in the detection of local battery defects.

Ultrasound↗

NASA NTRS2020

Fault Propagation, EMI Propagation, and Fault Containment in Aerospace Systems

The occurrence of faults in aerospace system hardware and software have consequences ranging from minor effects to catastrophic effects, and such faults can directly affect the safety of hardware and personnel. There are many origins to fault conditions, and the hardware that is capable of still meeting its performance requirements after experiencing itself a fault is said to be fault tolerant. A fault tolerant hardware is capable of detecting, isolating, and recovering from a fault condition; and this is a subfield of control engineering. An aerospace system that has been shown to have electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) in all its subsystems and systems cannot induced faults caused by electromagnetic interference (EMI). It can be proposed that the presence of EMI (or lack of EMC) is analogous to a potential fault initiator and the effects can likewise range from minor to severe. This paper starts by addressing the consequences of hardware failure in aerospace systems from a fault perspective, because the design of fault tolerant system is a major endeavor in aerospace. To arrive to this goal the paper starts with the concepts of fault, fault propagation, and a new concept called fault containment region. The paper then proceeds to provide two very recent examples in the aircraft industry of fault propagation with catastrophic effects. The paper proceeds to introduce the concept of EMI fault containment and a brief introduction to another new concept called the EMI containment region. The paper proceeds with an example of EMI fault containment region. The paper ends with a lesson learned conclusions.

Perez, Reinaldo↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Predicting Thermal Response in a Li-ion Cell on a UAV Fight Profile

As the energy storage devices continue to "pack" more energy in a small space, any damage, battery component failure, manufacturing defect, or electrically abusing the battery can lead to catastrophic thermal runaway events. A catastrophic thermal event in a cell leads to high temperature, in some instances spewing of battery materials due to gas development from side reactions initiated due to high internal temperatures. Also, a thermal runaway event can propagate from a single "failed" cell to the pack in a battery pack, leading to a more significant event. Mitigating a thermal runaway event is important in the commercial and automotive sectors. However, preventing such events in an electric aircraft (or air taxis) is paramount due to the lack of alternatives in the event of a failure. Battery prognostics algorithms allow the prediction of state-of-charge (SOC) and end-of-life (EOL) of a Li-ion battery in a UAV (unmanned air vehicle) [1]. For this presentation, we will extend this two-level battery predictive algorithm to predict SOC, EOL, and estimated maximum temperature during a simulated flight. The model is extended by integrating a lumped physics-driven thermal model for high current densities [2]. The parameters used to control SOC and EOL are maximum storable charge, time constant for Li-ion diffusivity in the carbon particles, and internal cell resistance. Cycling leads to an increase in the heat generated by an aged Li-ion cell with a LiyCoO2 (LCO) cathode and a LixC6 (MCMB) anode. The aging of a cell leads to increase in SEI layer thickness, the diffusion time for the lithium ions inside the electrodes, and the local reaction rates, in addition to the thermodynamic abuse caused by fixed cycling voltages controlled by a Battery Management System. As the battery ages, the cell resistance increases, while the onset temperature of the thermal runaway decreases (depends on the cell chemistry and cell abuse history). Any large deviation of the cell temperature from the estimated (expected) value can identify a faulty cell. Since SEI decomposition has the lowest onset temperature in the series of reactions leading to thermal runaway, the model considers the self-heating rate of the SEI decomposition as onset temperature (similar to Ref. [3]). The parameters in the Arrhenius equation for the SEI heating rate depend on the number of cycles, the cell's operating temperature, and the cell's abuse history [4,5]. Coupling the electrochemical, thermal, and aging model allow the prognostic algorithm to estimate a typical cell voltage and temperature as a function of age (cycling and calendar), whose departure from measured values from the BMS is used to identify a safety event. In addition, we will present the results from two simulated flight scenarios for a UAV: typical and extreme, since the power requirements vary significantly during take-off, landing, and changing altitudes, while the power requirements remain low during the cruise. For this presentation, the power requirement for a battery pack in a UAV is scaled to a single cell. This cell is cycled through a simulated profile, and the data is collected and used to predict a safety event.

Li-ion↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Predicting Maximum Thermal Response in a Li-ion Cell as a Thermal Runaway Predictor for a UAV Fight

As the energy storage devices continue to "pack" more energy in a small space, any damage, battery component failure, manufacturing defect, or electrically abusing the battery can lead to catastrophic thermal runaway events. A catastrophic thermal event in a cell leads to high temperature, in some instances to spewing of battery materials due to gas development from side reactions initiated due to high internal temperatures. Moreover, a thermal runaway can propagate from a single "failed" cell to a whole battery pack, resulting in a more serious event. The commercial and automotive sectors need to mitigate thermal runaway events. An electric aircraft (or air taxi) has no alternative in the event of a failure, so preventing such events is paramount. Currently, battery prognostics algorithms only predict the state-of-charge (SOC) and end-of-life (EOL) of a Li-ion battery in a UAV (unmanned air vehicle), but do not predict the maximum temperature during a flight or the likelihood of thermal runaway. Our current work focuses on adding the thermal model (based on Birkl's OCV model, in Ref. [1]) to the existing hybrid electrochemical model (single-particle model with lumped parameters as in Ref. [2]) to determine end-of-discharge, end-of-life, and maximum temperature during discharge.

Thermal runaway↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Program Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program’s objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, more onboard systems autonomy and functionality will be needed to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with-audio, video, lighting, and crew controls. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program-especially crew controls which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error-especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA’s approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that embraces NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements-ensuring human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering, and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

Human-Rating↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Campaign Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the Moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program's objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, the crew will need more onboard systems autonomy and functionality to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft to ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with: audio, video, lighting, and crew controls subsystems. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program--especially crew controls, which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable enough to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error--especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA's approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls, is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that focuses on incorporating NASA's Human-Rating Requirements-that ensures human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

artemis↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Campaign Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the Moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program's objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, the crew will need more onboard systems autonomy and functionality to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft to ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with: audio, video, lighting, and crew controls subsystems. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program--especially crew controls, which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable enough to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error--especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA's approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls, is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that focuses on incorporating NASA's Human-Rating Requirements-that ensures human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

artemis↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Historical Overview of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Nearly 300 spacewalks have been conducted over the last 25 years to help build and maintain the International Space Station (ISS). During the nearly 2,000 hours of extra-vehicular activity (EVA), crew members wear extra-vehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuits” to mitigate hazards of the space environment including impacts from meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles. NASA includes detailed EMU MMOD risk analyses as part of the ISS EVA review and approval process. This paper provides a general historical overview of the ISS EVA MMOD risks and the associated risk assessment process. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team produces the ISS EVA MMOD risk analyses using the Bumper3 MMOD risk analysis code in conjunction with detailed information about the EVA including crew-member EVA work sites, crew translation paths, suit orientation, and duration. Detailed physical models of the EMU spacesuits and the ISS are included and tailored for each EVA analysis. Two types of MMOD risk are included: (1) Penetration, and (2) Catastrophic. Penetration risk is for any size leak in the EMU suit. Catastrophic risk is a subset of Penetration Risk and only includes penetrations that cause a 4mm diameter hole (or larger) in the inner “bladder” layer of the EMU suit. This size hole will exceed the ability of the EMU suit to compensate. The MMOD risk analyses also utilize the latest orbital debris environment and meteoroid environment models including additional transient factors to account for recent satellite break-ups and annual meteor storms. These additional factors and the associated increase in EVA MMOD risk are considered when scheduling an EVA to reduce EMU MMOD risk.

Dana M. Lear↗

NASA NTRS2023

A Compilation of Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel Research (2015–2021)

This document presents the results of a series of studies performed to develop data-driven rupture limit equations and ballistic limit equations for composite overwrapped pressure vessels. These equations can be used to differentiate between impact conditions that would result in only a small hole or crack from those that would cause catastrophic tank failure. This information would be useful in selecting tank materials to avoid catastrophic tank failure in the event of a perforating on-orbit micrometeoroid or orbital debris particle impact.

Rupture Limit Equations↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Review of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Nearly 300 spacewalks have been conducted over the last 25 years to support the construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS). During the nearly 2,000 hours of extra-vehicular activity (EVA), crew wore extra-vehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuits” to help mitigate hazards of the space environment including impacts from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducts detailed EMU MMOD risk analyses as part of the ISS EVA review and approval process. This paper provides a general historical overview of the ISS EVA MMOD risks and the associated risk assessment process. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team produces the ISS EVA MMOD risk analyses using the Bumper MMOD risk analysis code in conjunction with detailed information about the EVA including crew member EVA work sites, crew translation paths, suit orientation, and durations. Detailed physical models of the EMU spacesuit and the ISS are included and tailored for each EVA analysis. Two types of MMOD risk are included: (1) Penetration, and (2) Catastrophic. Penetration risk is for any size leak in the EMU suit. Catastrophic risk is a subset of Penetration Risk and only includes penetrations that cause a 4mm diameter hole (or larger) in the pressure-maintaining “bladder” layer of the EMU suit. This size hole will exceed the ability of the EMU suit to compensate. The MMOD risk analyses also utilize the latest orbital debris environment and meteoroid environment models including additional transient factors to account for recent satellite break-ups and annual meteor storms. These additional factors and the associated increase in EVA MMOD risk are considered when scheduling EVAs to reduce EMU MMOD risk.

Dana M. Lear↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Review of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Nearly 300 spacewalks have been conducted over the last 25 years to support the construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS). During the nearly 2,000 hours of extra-vehicular activity (EVA), crew wore extra-vehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuits” to help mitigate hazards of the space environment including impacts from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducts detailed EMU MMOD risk analyses as part of the ISS EVA review and approval process. This paper provides a general historical overview of the ISS EVA MMOD risks and the associated risk assessment process. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team produces the ISS EVA MMOD risk analyses using the Bumper MMOD risk analysis code in conjunction with detailed information about the EVA including crew member EVA work sites, crew translation paths, suit orientation, and durations. Detailed physical models of the EMU spacesuit and the ISS are included and tailored for each EVA analysis. Two types of MMOD risk are included: (1) Penetration, and (2) Catastrophic. Penetration risk is for any size leak in the EMU suit. Catastrophic risk is a subset of Penetration Risk and only includes penetrations that cause a 4mm diameter hole (or larger) in the pressure-maintaining “bladder” layer of the EMU suit. This size hole will exceed the ability of the EMU suit to compensate. The MMOD risk analyses also utilize the latest orbital debris environment and meteoroid environment models including additional transient factors to account for recent satellite break-ups and annual meteor storms. These additional factors and the associated increase in EVA MMOD risk are considered when scheduling EVAs to reduce EMU MMOD risk.

Dana M. Lear↗

NASA NTRS2025

On the Stability Analysis of Astrophysical Cooling Functions

To model the temperature evolution of optically thin astrophysical environments at MHD scales, radiative and collisional cooling rates are typically either pretabulated or fit into a functional form and then input into MHD codes as a radiative loss function. Thermal balance requires estimates of the analogous heating rates, which are harder to calculate, and due to uncertainties in the underlying dissipative heating processes these rates are often simply parameterized. The resulting net cooling function defines an equilibrium curve that varies with density and temperature. Such cooling functions can make the gas prone to thermal instability (TI), which will cause departures from equilibrium. There has been no systematic study of thermally unstable parameter space for nonequilibrium states. Motivated by our recent finding that there is a related linear instability, catastrophic cooling instability, that can dominate over TI, here we carry out such a study. We show that Balbus instability criteria for TI can be used to define a critical cooling rate, Λc, that permits a nonequilibrium analysis of cooling functions through the mapping of TI zones. We furthermore illustrate how thermal conduction modifies the shape of TI zones. Upon applying a Λc-based stability analysis to coronal loop simulations, we find that loops undergoing periodic episodes of coronal rain formation are linearly unstable to catastrophic cooling instability, while TI is stabilized by thermal conduction.

Amanda Stricklan↗

DOE OSTI2020

Noise-Based Selection of Robust Inherited Model for Accurate Continual Learning

There is a growing demand for an intelligent system to continually learn knowledge from a data stream. Continual learning requires both the preservation of previous knowledge (i.e., avoiding catastrophic forgetting) and the acquisition of new knowledge. Different from previous works that focus only on model adaptation (e.g., regularization, network expansion, memory rehearsal, etc.), we propose a novel training scheme named acquisitive learning (AL), which emphasizes both the knowledge inheritance and knowledge acquisition. AL starts from an elaborately selected model with pre-trained knowledge (the inherited model) and then adapts it to new data using segmented training. The selection is achieved by injecting random noise to various inherited models for better model robustness, which promises higher accuracy in further knowledge acquisition. The approach is validated by the visualization of the loss landscape and quantitative roughness measurement. The combination of the selective inherited model and knowledge acquisition reduces catastrophic forgetting by 10X on the CIFAR-100 dataset.

Du, Xiaocong↗

DOE OSTI2024

Engineering in Cyber Resilience with Cyber-Informed Engineering

Engineers have super powers to provide cybersecurity resilience with deterministic engineering solutions and to protect systems from the most catastrophic consequences that a cyber saboteur could cause. Come to this session to learn how to use engineering risk management skills to harden your engineered systems from cyberattacks. Objective 1 Identify what system functions could be digitally induced to cause undesired high-impact consequences. Objective 2 Analyze how loss or instability of digital controls in a subsystem could lead to high-impact consequences. Objective 3 Analyze how loss or instability in the digital connectivity between systems could lead to high-impact consequences. Objective 4 Identify engineering controls which could build resilience by eliminating digital loss or instability pathways or reduce the impact of digital loss or instability. This presentation will introduce Cyber-Informed Engineering, described below, and walk participants through specific engineering use cases to show how engineers can consider the potential for cyber sabotage in their existing system designs and enact deterministic engineering-based controls which eliminate pathways for attack or mitigate specific consequences. A wide variety of application use cases will be considered so that audience members can align the material with familiar engineering applications. CIE is an engineering approach that integrates cyber resilience into the conception, design, build, and operation of any physical system that has digital connectivity, sensors, monitoring, or control. CIE offers the opportunity to use engineering to eliminate or mitigate avenues for cyber attack—starting from the earliest stage of design and continuing throughout the system’s lifecycle. Today, engineers and industrial control system (ICS) technicians build engineered systems with specific goals for safety, reliability, and functionality. While systems engineering includes considerable safety and failure mode analysis, cybersecurity risks are often not specifically addressed—particularly the risks of intentional cyber compromise, exploitation, and misuse. Cyber-Informed Engineering pairs well with traditional cyber defenses and offers an extra designed-in protection to eliminate the most catastrophic consequences which can be realized by an adversary should traditional cyber defenses fail.

42 ENGINEERING↗