Design and Analysis of Digital Communication Within an SoC-Based Control System for Trapped-Ion Quantum Computing
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Systems and methods for reducing data movement in a computer system. The systems and methods use information or knowledge about the structure of an algorithm, operations to be executed at a receiving processing unit, variables or subsets or groups of variables in a distributed algorithm, or other forms of contextual information, for reducing the number of bits transmitted from at least one transmitting processing unit to at least one receiving processing unit or storage device.
RAVEN is a software framework able to perform parametric and stochastic analysis based on the response of complex system codes. The initial development was aimed at providing dynamic risk analysis capabilities to the thermohydraulic code RELAP-7, currently under development at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Although the initial goal has been fully accomplished, RAVEN is now a multi-purpose stochastic and uncertainty quantification platform, capable of communicating with any system code. In fact, the provided Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) allow RAVEN to interact with any code as long as all the parameters that need to be perturbed are accessible by input files or via python interfaces. RAVEN is capable of investigating system response and explore input space using various sampling schemes such as Monte Carlo, grid, or Latin hypercube. However, RAVEN strength lies in its system feature discovery capabilities such as: constructing limit surfaces, separating regions of the input space leading to system failure, and using dynamic supervised learning techniques. The development of RAVEN started in 2012 when, within the Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program, the need to provide a modern risk evaluation framework arose. RAVEN’s principal assignment is to provide the necessary software and algorithms in order to employ the concepts developed by the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) program. RISMC is one of the pathways defined within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program. In the RISMC approach, the goal is not just to identify the frequency of an event potentially leading to a system failure, but the proximity (or lack thereof) to key safety-related events. Hence, the approach is interested in identifying and increasing the safety margins related to those events. A safety margin is a numerical value quantifying the probability that a safety metric (e.g. peak pressure in a pipe) is exceeded under certain conditions. Most of the capabilities, implemented having RELAP-7 as a principal focus, are easily deployable to other system codes. For this reason, several side activates have been employed (e.g. RELAP5-3D, any MOOSE-based App, etc.) or are currently ongoing for coupling RAVEN with several different software. The aim of this document is to provide a set of commented examples that can help the user to become familiar with the RAVEN code usage.
The rapid integration of distributed energy resources, like solar photovoltaics (PVs), can lead to overvolt-age challenges due to reverse power flow and a noticeable decrease in power factor at the substation interface. While existing literature extensively explores utilizing smart inverter capabilities for reactive power flexibility using a volt-var curve (VVC), obtaining time-varying operating points of such curves in real-time is challenging due to computational demands and communication requirements. Similarly, employing optimization-based approaches for reactive power control and active voltage regulation in large-scale distribution feeders is difficult due to the complexity of the problem and the challenges in effectively engaging customer-owned resources. This paper proposes a two-stage strategy to harness smart inverters for reactive power support. The first stage formulates short-term planning by optimally designing VVCs (on a daily or hourly basis) for large-scale solar PVs based on projected system needs and communicating optimal curves to smart inverters in advance. Subsequently, the second stage employs a transactive-based method to involve customer-owned PVs for reactive power support, effectively enhancing overall system performance and addressing real-time demands. In conclusion, the efficacy of this approach will be demonstrated using real-world distribution circuits provided by Vermont Electric Power Company (VELCO) and Vermont Electric Cooperative (VEC).
RAVEN is a generic software framework to perform parametric and probabilistic analysis based on the response of complex system codes. The initial development was aimed to provide dynamic risk analysis capabilities to the Thermo-Hydraulic code RELAP-7, currently under development at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Although the initial goal has been fully accomplished, RAVEN is now a multi-purpose probabilistic and uncertainty quantification platform, capable to agnostically communicate with any system code. This agnosticism includes providing Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). These APIs are used to allow RAVEN to interact with any code as long as all the parameters that need to be perturbed are accessible by inputs files or via python interfaces. RAVEN is capable of investigating the system response, and investigating the input space using Monte Carlo, Grid, or Latin Hyper Cube sampling schemes, but its strength is focused to- ward system feature discovery, such as limit surfaces, separating regions of the input space leading to system failure, using dynamic supervised learning techniques. The development of RAVEN has started in 2012, when, within the Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program, the need to provide a modern risk evaluation framework became stronger. RAVEN principal assignment is to provide the necessary software and algorithms in order to employ the concept developed by the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) program. RISMC is one of the pathways defined within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program. In the RISMC approach, the goal is not just the individuation of the frequency of an event potentially leading to a system failure, but the closeness (or not) to key safety-related events. Hence, the approach is interested in identifying and increasing the safety margins related to those events. A safety margin is a numerical value quantifying the probability that a safety metric (e.g. for an important process such as peak pressure in a pipe) is exceeded under certain conditions. The initial development of RAVEN has been focused on providing dynamic risk assessment capability to RELAP-7, currently under development at the INL and, likely, future replacement of the RELAP5-3D code. Most the capabilities that have been implemented having RELAP-7 as principal focus are easily deployable for other system codes. For this reason, several side activates are currently ongoing for coupling RAVEN with soft- ware such as RELAP5-3D, etc. The aim of this document is the explanation of the input requirements, focalizing on the input structure.
Electric power systems provide the backbone of modern industrial societies. Enabling scalable grid analytics is the keystone to successfully operating large transmission and distribution systems. However, today's power systems are suffering from ever-increasing computational burdens in sustaining the expanding communities and deep integration of renewable energy resources, as well as managing huge volumes of data accordingly. These unprecedented challenges call for transformative analytics to support the resilient operations of power systems. Recently, the explosive growth of quantum computing techniques has ignited new hopes of revolutionizing power system computations. Quantum computing harnesses quantum mechanisms to solve traditionally intractable computational problems, which may lead to ultra-scalable and efficient power grid analytics. This paper reviews the newly emerging application of quantum computing techniques in power systems. We present a comprehensive overview of existing quantum-engineered power analytics from different operation perspectives, including static analysis, transient analysis, stochastic analysis, optimization, stability, and control. We thoroughly discuss the related quantum algorithms, their benefits and limitations, hardware implementations, and recommended practices. We also review the quantum networking techniques to ensure secure communication of power systems in the quantum era. Finally, we discuss challenges and future research directions. This paper will hopefully stimulate increasing attention to the development of quantum-engineered smart grids.
The integration of synchronous generators and energy storage systems operated through communication networks introduces new challenges and vulnerabilities to the electric grid, where cyber attacks can corrupt sensor measurements or control inputs and interrupt functions such as frequency regulation. This paper proposes a defense methodology for the design of resilient operating constraints imposed on each generation and storage unit in order to prevent any attack sequence from driving the system's frequency to unsafe conditions. The resilient operating constraints are found by using ellipsoidal approximations of the reachable set of the power system, leading to a convex optimization problem with linear matrix inequalities. Numerical results in a single-area power system with synchronous generation and energy storage demonstrate how the resilient constraints provide security guarantees against any type of attack affecting frequency measurements or controller setpoints.
Utilities have been installing microgrids because of the increased resilience and reliability advantages they may provide to the distribution system. A microgrid controller is a critical component in microgrids. It is of great benefit to derisk the installation of microgrid controllers before field deployment. Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testing is used by controller developers and utilities to evaluate the controllers under stressful conditions. In this work, a microgrid control function developed by the Synchrophasor Grid Monitoring and Automation (SyGMA) laboratory at the University of California, San Diego is tested in a remote HIL (RHIL) setup. The digital real-time simulation of the detailed microgrid system was operated at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's Energy Systems Integration Facility. Under such RHIL setup, successful controller operation is contingent on understanding and characterizing the communications channel and in particular network latencies. The novelty of this paper is the proposed use of a RHIL setup that leverages existing power system communications protocols to evaluate the controller in conjunction with the simulation capabilities of a remote facility. The work presented here will provide the complete setup of the HIL evaluation platform, the details of the communications protocols used by the setup for data transfer between the two organizations, test cases developed to evaluate the controller, and the results from the experiments.
Utilities have been installing microgrids because of the increased resilience and reliability advantages they may provide to the distribution system. A microgrid controller is a critical component in microgrids. It is of great benefit to derisk the installation of microgrid controllers before field deployment. Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testing is used by controller developers and utilities to evaluate the controllers under stressful conditions. In this work, a microgrid control function developed by the Synchrophasor Grid Monitoring and Automation (SyGMA) laboratory at the University of California, San Diego is tested in a remote HIL (RHIL) setup. The digital real-time simulation of the detailed microgrid system was operated at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's Energy Systems Integration Facility. Under such RHIL setup, successful controller operation is contingent on understanding and characterizing the communications channel and in particular network latencies. The novelty of this paper is the proposed use of a RHIL setup that leverages existing power system communications protocols to evaluate the controller in conjunction with the simulation capabilities of a remote facility. The work presented here will provide the complete setup of the HIL evaluation platform, the details of the communications protocols used by the setup for data transfer between the two organizations, test cases developed to evaluate the controller, and the results from the experiments.
Recent technological advancement has created a growing convergence of innovation. From machine learning to ubiquitous computing to wireless networks and automation, the world is seeing new technology increasingly capable of connecting with each other. Devices and systems use open communications networks to interact, process information, and react. This is called the Internet of Things (IoT) and is comprised of physical devices that exchange data over networks, creating revolutionary possibilities. The most common way most people interact with an IoT is through ‘smart home’ products like Amazon’s Alexa, which use microphones, speakers, and phones to control a variety of devices, from lights and thermostats, to cameras, to appliances and vacuum cleaners. But the open nature of IoT networks—necessary for their ability to communicate and operate—also introduces privacy and security concerns. At a personal level, this might mean a hack into a home to steal private information, but when applied in broader industries like healthcare, transportation, manufacturing, or the military, this vulnerability can have serious consequences. As IoT usage and interconnectivity increases, so too does the susceptibility to malicious actors. And the entire system is only as secure as its least secure member. This creates particular risk and vulnerability to radiological material industries, as a competent insider adversary could utilize the IoT to potentially steal or access classified or sensitive information about employees, sites, or systems; or simply sabotage security or maintenance from a more remote—and less secure—device. The IoT relies on a secure network across the entire system, especially in transport which may lack the security of more permanent locations; if one device fails, it can create a ripple effect and an insider threat may seek to exploit that connectivity. While IoT benefits drive increased innovation and usage, there are also vulnerabilities an insider threat could exploit; this risk of an IoT to radiological material must be addressed in any mitigation effort.
The complex interdependencies of cyber systems (sensors and communications), physical grids and associated electricity market operations make protecting electric power grids a significant challenge. The energy sector is constantly under new, targeted, advanced and dangerous cyber-attacks that have the potential to result in the loss of human life. These threats are further exacerbated by our need to modernize the grid. One focus of cyber security research in smart grids is the securing of the SCADA system through advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and bad data detection algorithms in state estimation. These methods either require full knowledge of the system topology and parameters or fail to understand the physical behaviors under attack. WISP (Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies) is designed to provide additional protection to the power grid using only publicly available data. In particular, WISP exploits the spatio-temporal nature of the real time locational marginal prices (LMPs), in conjunction with other information such as bids, weather, outages and load data to analyze anomalous power pricing behaviors and then correlate those observations to localize regions of interest and identify potential cyber events. WISP is non-intrusive as the tool is deployed as a service in the Cloud or on premise and provides reliable information to system operators for enhanced situational awareness, without impeding energy delivery functions. The WISP technology comprises three modules: the data-driven anomaly detection core, the vulnerability and risk analysis and the root cause analysis. The data-driven anomaly detection core performs the tasks of feature selection, anomaly detection and attack region localization. The vulnerability and risk analysis module provides system level information of the vulnerable variables and times, assisting the operators in selecting monitoring and protection nodes. The root cause analysis module takes the detection results and identifies potential operational conditions that contribute to the detected anomalies. In Phase I, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WISP. We developed a realistic electricity market simulator capable of generating normal and attack market data under various operational conditions. We developed a series of cyber-attack detection and analysis algorithms and evaluated them under multiple data sources. Finally, we integrated all modules into an end-to-end software, providing functions for data management, data analytics and visualization. Specifically, we have achieved: (i) real-time data acceptance from external utility interfaces with >99% acceptance rate; (ii) high performance anomaly detection algorithms with >98% detection accuracy and <0.1% false alarm rate; and (iii) ultra-low computing delay <50 milliseconds. Additionally, our team developed algorithms to identify the vulnerable variables in electricity market operations and root cause analysis functions to identify major contributors to the price spikes. These ancillary modules are necessary when deploying WISP in real world industry environment. In Phase II, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of WISP software on realistic largescale power systems. We performed red team testing for the Phase I WISP software and identified software vulnerabilities and implemented corresponding mitigation solutions. We adapted the electricity market simulator for the Texas synthetic 2000-bus system and generated datasets for the false data injection attacks. We created database and visualization interfaces for the Texas system and the ISO New England system. We performed software optimization in terms of operation efficiency, computing speed and detection accuracy. Finally, we tested the software on the Texas system and the ISO New England system and evaluated the detection performance. Overall, we achieved above 89% detection rate, below 3% false alarm rate and below 37 seconds of end-to-end detection delay.
Methods, devices, and systems for transmitting data over a computer communications network are disclosed. A queue of communications commands can be pre-generated using a central processing unit (CPU) and stored in a device memory of a network interface controller (NIC). Thereafter, if a graphics processing unit (GPU) has data to communicate to a remote GPU, it can store the data in a send buffer, where the location in the buffer is pointed to by a pre-generated command. The GPU can then signal to the interface device that the data is ready, triggering execution of the pre-generated command to send the data.
The power grid is undergoing several changes that are increasing its complexity as nexuses between electric-gas, transmission-distribution, and energy-communications continue to become increasingly critical. This system is heavily dependent on communication infrastructure and controls, and it relies on humans in operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT) roles to manage the increasing breadth, depth, and speed of data. Many technical challenges have presented themselves and will need to be addressed to provide reliable grid operations. With increased reliance on distributed controls and communication infrastructure, cybersecurity becomes an inherent requirement. When considering current cyber-physical security solutions for the power grid, one can notice a clear divide between information technology and operation technology networks. However, in real-life applications, these networks are interdependent. This work presents results of interviews with key utility cybersecurity personnel, analyzes the results, and makes recommendations towards solution of existing technical and operational challenges realized. Existing workflows are presented, wireframe interviews are discussed, and tool requirements are described. The existence of easy-to-implement solutions, based on existing energy management systems, highlight the potential for real-life applications.
Here this paper presents autonomous restoration of networked microgrids using distributed energy resources (DERs), inverter-based resources (IBRs) in general, and controllable assets of intelligence without communication to achieve a extremely resilient power system restoration. The main innovation of this work lies in use of real-time smart sensing and decision making that enable autonomous recombination of islanded microgrids, which are individually black-started by local grid-forming (GFM) inverter units. The smart circuit breakers (SCBs) designed and demonstrated here play critical roles in the restoration process to achieve autonomy; the autonomous restoration scheme is not pre-engineered and may be subject to encounter overloading, live or downed segments as the boundary of the microgrids dynamically expands without prior knowledge and only with local measurement. We demonstrate autonomous microgrid restoration both in simulation of a modified IEEE 13-bus system, and in a hardware testbed comprising 24 GFM-IBRs and 6-SCBs, depicting several scenarios to evaluate their functionalities and interoperability. This work validates high potential of extremely resilient microgrid using novel approaches for inverter-based bottom-up system restoration in a communication-free paradigm.
With a transition to a smarter grid, we are witnessing a significant growth in smart metering infrastructure and sensor deployment in the distribution system. The underlying communication infrastructure is stressed due to the large volume of data that is generated by the smart meters/sensors. Furthermore, real time operations such as state estimation and control are impaired due to the lack of reliable aggregation of the data. In this paper, we exploit the underlying sparsity in grid data to implement two recursive dynamic compressive sensing (CS) approaches-streaming modified weighted-`1 CS and Kalman filtered CS. These approaches aim to reconstruct the sparse signal using the current underdetermined measurements and the prior information about the sparse signal and its support set. Slow signal and support change is in distribution grid data is validated using Pecan Street data. Both the IEEE 34 node test feeder system and PecanStreet data are considered as two examples to validate the superior performance of the two recursive CS techniques relative to classic CS.
Abstract Cyclotron-produced astatine-211 ( 211 At) shows tremendous promise in targeted alpha therapy (TAT) applications due to its attractive half-life and its 100% α-emission from nearly simultaneous branched alpha decay. Astatine-211 is produced by alpha beam bombardment of naturally monoisotopic bismuth metal ( 209 Bi) via the ( α, 2n ) reaction. In order to isolate the small mass of 211 At (specific activity = 76 GBq·µg −1 ) from several grams of acid-dissolved Bi metal, a manual milliliter-scale solvent extraction process using diisopropyl ether (DIPE) is routinely performed at the University of Washington. As this process is complex and time consuming, we have developed a fluidic workstation that can perform the method autonomously. The workstation employs two pumps to concurrently deliver the aqueous and organic phases to a mixing tee and in-line phase mixer. The mixed phases are routed to a phase settling reservoir, where they gravity settle. Finally, each respective phase is withdrawn into its respective pump. However, development of a phase boundary sensor, placed in tandem with the phase settling reservoir, was necessary to communicate to the system when withdrawal of the denser aqueous phase was complete (i.e., the intersection of the two phases was located). The development and optimization of the autonomous solvent extraction system is described, and the 211 At yields from several ~1.1 GBq-level 211 At processing runs are reported.
This study introduces a novel “Digital Grid Twin–Direct Communication Scheme” test bed. This advanced platform evaluates point-to-point communication between transmitter and receiver relays with optical fiber and radio omnidirectional antenna systems, implemented at the Advanced Protection lab in the Grid Research Innovation and Development Center at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The increased diversity of energy sources has led to more protective relay misoperations. In North America, microgrid protection schemes now use point-to-point communication along distribution lines between relays to implement advanced logic in nonradial grids that include both high- and low-inertia generators. This trend challenges utilities to minimize misoperations while ensuring rapid fault clearance and accurate selectivity coordination between primary and backup relays. This study assesses relay-to-relay communication schemes by introducing an advanced testing platform based on a digital grid twin protection test bed using a synchronized time source system. The platform evaluates the communication system using radio antennas or optical fiber links by integrating protective relays that operate breakers within the digital twin and record relay events and communication signals. In the experiments, transmitter and receiver relays were configured with inverse time overcurrent and breaker trip detection logic to assess the total time of the communication protection schemes based on the sum of the relay protection element operating time, radio latency, propagation delay, baud rate delay, and relay processing time. These delays were derived from recorded relay events and communication signals from the interface of a real-time simulator set as a digital grid twin. The test bed successfully simulated various electrical faults along a distribution line while ensuring effective and reliable point-to-point communication between transmitter and receiver relays. The radio antenna communication system exhibited latency because of the radio. This latency depends on the baud rate setting and type of radio application; in general, the higher the baud rate, the lower the radio latency. The measured radio latency (for Mirrored Bits with an encryption card at 9,600 bps) was about 9–10 ms. Additionally, calculated propagation delay per mile for radio antennas and optical fiber was 5.36 µs/mi and 8.04 µs/mi, respectively. Optical fiber communication did not demonstrate radio latency. Instead, the protection element operating time depends mainly on the protection logic function set in the relay, and the relay processing time depends on the processing rate of the relay in samples per power system cycle.
Network communication is crucial in the Energy Grid of Things (EGoT). Without a network connection, the energy grid becomes just a power grid where the energy resources are available to the customer uni-directionally. A mechanism to analyze and optimize the energy usage of the grid can only happen through a medium, a communications network, that enables information exchange between the grid participants and the service provider. Security implementers of EGoT network communication take extraordinary measures to ensure the safety of the energy grid, a critical infrastructure, as well as the safety and privacy of the grid participants. With the dynamic nature of network communication of the EGoT, the information provided by the customer or the service provider can be falsified by a malicious attacker. Therefore, a trust model is necessary to monitor any abnormal activities. This paper describes a distributed trust model system that meets the need of the EGoT. This paper describes methods for evaluating and improving the distributed trust model using standard hypothesis testing metrics such as true positive, false positive, true negative, false negative, equal error rate, and F1 score. Example calculations are shown based on generated sample data.