Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “cyber attacks”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 307 records · Page 17

Cryptography Considerations for Distributed Energy Resource Systems

Distributed energy resource (DER) systems are rapidly being adopted and integrated within the electric power grid. Developments in smart grid devices and communication protocols are advancing the power system domain but are also introducing new cyber attack vectors. In particular, the ability to maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data is of increasing concern. Cryptography is a powerful tool that can be leveraged to protect DER systems and their critical information. This paper discusses prominent methods of cryptographic authentication and encryption that can be used to secure DER communications. Specific considerations and recommendations for applying cryptography to DER systems are provided, including system design constraints and system impact. These will be demonstrated with two case studies that assess cryptography hardware requirements and communications latency in DERs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Computer security approach for Rolls-Royce spinline{sup R} safety platform - 227

The number of digital assets at commercial nuclear power plants is significant and will likely continue to increase with time. As a consequence, these plants have become potential targets for cyber-attacks. Around the world, nuclear safety authorities and national Computer and Information Security Agencies are implementing stricter regulations and inspections for critical systems in nuclear plants. There is a particular focus on instrumentation and control systems as they implement key nuclear safety functions. Rolls-Royce follows a strict computer and information security program based on general and nuclear specific norms, Rolls-Royce group processes, and proven technologies. The Spinline digital safety platform has been designed specifically for nuclear applications and features a secure development and operational environment that provides barriers against unauthorized modifications and implements design requirements promoting integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance. The Rolls-Royce secure development environment provides layers of protection utilizing physical and environmental security, human resource security, and information technology systems access control. The Spinline platform strengthens security functions by providing protection against unauthorized, unintended, and unsafe modifications to the system. The Spinline platform has design features promote integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance in the event of inadvertent operator actions or undesirable behavior of connected equipment. The Spinline technology and these computer security processes are based in a wide spectrum of international standards that were accepted as providing a secure development and operating environment by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2014. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

BioSecure Digital Twin: Manufacturing Innovation and Cybersecurity Resilience

U.S. national security, prosperity, economy, and well-being require secure, flexible, and resilient Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing. The COVID-19 pandemic reaffirmed that the biomedical production value-chain is vulnerable to disruption and has been under attack from sophisticated nation-state adversaries. Current cyber defenses are inadequate, and the integrity of critical production systems and processes are inherently vulnerable to cyber-attacks, human error, and supply chain disruptions. The following chapter explores how a BioSecure Digital Twin will improve U.S. manufacturing resilience and preparedness to respond to these hazards by significantly improving monitoring, integrity, security, and agility of our manufacturing infrastructure and systems. The BioSecure Digital Twin combines a scalable manufacturing framework with a robust platform for monitoring and control to increase U.S. biopharma manufacturing resilience. Then, the chapter discusses some of the inherent vulnerabilities and challenges at the nexus of health and advanced manufacturing. Next, the chapter highlights that as the Pandemic evolves, we need agility and resilience to overcome significant obstacles. This section highlights an innovative application of Cyber Informed Engineering to developing and deploying a BioSecure Digital Twin to improve the resilience and security of the biopharma industrial supply chain and production processes. Finally, the chapter concludes with a process framework to complement the Digital Twin platform, called the Biopharma (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) OODA Loop Framework (BOLF), a four-step approach to decision-making outputs from the Digital Twin. The BOLF will help end users leverage twin technology by distilling the available information, focusing the data on context, and rapidly making the best decision while remaining cognizant of changes that can be made as more data becomes available.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Denial of Service Attack Detection via Differential Analysis of Generalized Entropy Progressions

Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks are one the most common and consequential cyber attacks in computer networks. While existing research offers a plethora of detection methods, the issue of achieving scalability, a low false positive rate, and high detection accuracy remains open. In this work, we address this problem by developing a differential method based on generalized entropy progression. In this method, named as DoDGE, we continuously fit the line of best fit to the entropy progression of destination addresses and check if the derivative, that is, the slope of this line is less than the negative of the dynamically computed standard deviation of the derivatives. Furthermore, to distinguish from flash events, we leverage the symmetry that when a flash event occurs, the derivative of the entropy progression of source addresses is positive. With this design, we omit the usage of the thresholds and the results with five real-world network traffic datasets confirm that DoDGE outperforms threshold-based DoS attack detection by two orders of magnitude in terms of false positives on average. When compared to ten machine learning (ML) models, DoDGE achieves a balanced accuracy of 99%, while the average balanced accuracy for the ML models is 52%. Moreover, the results show that DoDGE successfully differentiates between a flash event and a DoS attack. Furthermore, since the main computation cost of DoDGE is the entropy computation, which is linear in the volume of the unit-time network flow, uses integer only operations, and works on a small fraction of the total flow, it is lightweight and scalable.

Cybersecurity, wireless communication↗

Taxonomies of Cyber Adversaries and Attacks: A Survey of Incidents and Approaches

In this paper we construct taxonomies of cyber adversaries and methods of attack, drawing from a survey of the literature in the area of cyber crime. We begin by addressing the scope of cyber crime, noting its prevalence and effects on the US economy. We then survey the literature on cyber adversaries, presenting a taxonomy of the different types of adversaries and their corresponding methods, motivations, maliciousness, and skill levels. Subsequently we survey the literature on cyber attacks, giving a taxonomy of the different classes of attacks, subtypes, and threat descriptions. The goal of this paper is to inform future studies of cyber security on the shape and characteristics of the risk space and its associated adversaries.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

WISP: Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies (Final Technical Report)

The complex interdependencies of cyber systems (sensors and communications), physical grids and associated electricity market operations make protecting electric power grids a significant challenge. The energy sector is constantly under new, targeted, advanced and dangerous cyber-attacks that have the potential to result in the loss of human life. These threats are further exacerbated by our need to modernize the grid. One focus of cyber security research in smart grids is the securing of the SCADA system through advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and bad data detection algorithms in state estimation. These methods either require full knowledge of the system topology and parameters or fail to understand the physical behaviors under attack. WISP (Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies) is designed to provide additional protection to the power grid using only publicly available data. In particular, WISP exploits the spatio-temporal nature of the real time locational marginal prices (LMPs), in conjunction with other information such as bids, weather, outages and load data to analyze anomalous power pricing behaviors and then correlate those observations to localize regions of interest and identify potential cyber events. WISP is non-intrusive as the tool is deployed as a service in the Cloud or on premise and provides reliable information to system operators for enhanced situational awareness, without impeding energy delivery functions. The WISP technology comprises three modules: the data-driven anomaly detection core, the vulnerability and risk analysis and the root cause analysis. The data-driven anomaly detection core performs the tasks of feature selection, anomaly detection and attack region localization. The vulnerability and risk analysis module provides system level information of the vulnerable variables and times, assisting the operators in selecting monitoring and protection nodes. The root cause analysis module takes the detection results and identifies potential operational conditions that contribute to the detected anomalies. In Phase I, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WISP. We developed a realistic electricity market simulator capable of generating normal and attack market data under various operational conditions. We developed a series of cyber-attack detection and analysis algorithms and evaluated them under multiple data sources. Finally, we integrated all modules into an end-to-end software, providing functions for data management, data analytics and visualization. Specifically, we have achieved: (i) real-time data acceptance from external utility interfaces with >99% acceptance rate; (ii) high performance anomaly detection algorithms with >98% detection accuracy and <0.1% false alarm rate; and (iii) ultra-low computing delay <50 milliseconds. Additionally, our team developed algorithms to identify the vulnerable variables in electricity market operations and root cause analysis functions to identify major contributors to the price spikes. These ancillary modules are necessary when deploying WISP in real world industry environment. In Phase II, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of WISP software on realistic largescale power systems. We performed red team testing for the Phase I WISP software and identified software vulnerabilities and implemented corresponding mitigation solutions. We adapted the electricity market simulator for the Texas synthetic 2000-bus system and generated datasets for the false data injection attacks. We created database and visualization interfaces for the Texas system and the ISO New England system. We performed software optimization in terms of operation efficiency, computing speed and detection accuracy. Finally, we tested the software on the Texas system and the ISO New England system and evaluated the detection performance. Overall, we achieved above 89% detection rate, below 3% false alarm rate and below 37 seconds of end-to-end detection delay.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Reinforcement Learning Approach to Cybersecurity in Space (RELACSS)

Securing satellite groundstations against cyber-attacks is vital to national security missions. However, these cyber threats are constantly evolving. As vulnerabilities are discovered and patched, new vulnerabilities are discovered and exploited. In order to automate the process of discovering existing vulnerabilities and the means to exploit them, a reinforcement learning framework is presented in this report. We demonstrate that this framework can learn to successfully navigate an unknown network and detect nodes of interest despite the presence of a moving target defense. The agent then exfiltrates a file of interest from the node as quickly as possible. This framework also incorporates a defensive software agent that learns to impede the attacking agents progress. This setup allows for the agents to work against each other and improve their abilities. We anticipate that this capability will help uncover unforeseen vulnerabilities and the means to mitigate them. The modular nature of the framework enables users to swap out learning algorithms and modify the reward functions in order to adapt the learning tasks to various use cases and environments. Several algorithms, viz., tabular Q learning, deep Q networks, proximal policy optimization, advantage actor-critic, generative adversarial imitation learning, are explored for the agents and the results highlighted. The agent learns to solve the tasks in a light-weight abstract environment. Once the agent learns to perform sufficiently well, it can be deployed in a minimega virtual machine environment (or a real network) with wrappers that map abstract actions to software commands. The agent also uses a local representation of the actions called a ‘slot-mechanism’. This allows the agent to learn in a certain network and generalize it to different networks. The defensive agent learns to predict the actions taken by an offensive agent and uses that information to anticipate the threat. This information can then either be used to raise an alarm or to take actions to thwart the attack. We believe that with the appropriate reward design, a representative environment, and action set, this framework can be generalized to tackle other cybersecurity tasks. By sufficiently training these agents, we can anticipate vulnerabilities leading to robust future designs. We can also deploy automated defensive agents that can help secure satellite groundstation and their vital national security missions.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Enhancing the Survivability of Power Systems With Grid-Edge DERs Against DoS Attacks

Power system survivability, defined as the ability of a system to maintain steady-state functionality under varying operational conditions, reflects its resilience against disturbances. While existing research primarily focuses on physical-layer disturbances, the increasing prevalence of grid-edge DERs, which are primarily used for integrating renewable energy, has significantly expanded the cyber attack surface. As a result, operational disruptions caused by cyber threats are posing significant challenges to system survivability and cannot be overlooked. To fill this gap, we redefine system survivability to incorporate the cyber layer’s status and propose a Distributionally Robust Optimization (DRO) approach to enhance power system survivability against potential cyber-physical threats. In this paper, we first analyze the operational guidelines of systems with a high penetration of DERs under various cyber network conditions and redefine survivability in this context. Next, we focus on the most common cyber threat, Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, and develop a corresponding attack model. This model allows for the creation of a kernel-based ambiguity set that captures attack uncertainties using historical data. Finally, we transform the proposed DRO model as a tractable optimization problem, with its solution providing an optimal cyber redundancy plan to enhance system survivability in DoS attack scenarios. Simulation results on the IEEE 13-node and 123-node test feeders demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed model in improving system survivability. This model can also be expanded to include other types of common attacks and serve as a comprehensive planning tool to improve overall cyber physical survival of the system.

cybersecurity↗

Efficient Modeling of HIL Multi-Grid System for Scalability & Concurrency in CPS Security Testbed

Cyber-event-triggered power grid blackout compels utility operators to intensify cyber-aware and physics-constrained recovery and restoration process. Recently, coordinated cyber attacks on the Ukrainian grid witnessed such a cyber-event-triggered power system blackout. Various cyber-physical system (CPS) testbeds have attempted with multitude designs to analyze such interdependent events and evaluate remedy measures. However, resource constraints and modular integration designs have been significant barriers while modeling large-scale grid models (scalability) and multi-grid isolated models (concurrency) under a single real-time execution environment for the hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) CPS security testbeds. This paper proposes a meticulous design and effective modeling for simulating large-scale grid models and multi-grid isolated models in a HIL realtime digital simulator environment integrated with industry-grade hardware and software systems. We have used our existing HIL CPS security testbed to demonstrate scalability by the realtime performance of a Texas-2000 bus US synthetic grid model and concurrency by the real-time performance of simultaneous ten IEEE-39 bus grid models and an IEEE-118 bus grid model. The experiments demonstrated significant results by 100% realtime performance with zero overruns, low latency while receiving and executing control signals from SEL Relays via IEC-61850 protocol and low latency while computing and transmitting grid data streams including stability measures via IEEE C37.118 synchrophasor data protocol to SEL Phasor Data Concentrators.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Towards a Research Agenda for Cyber Friendly Fire

Historical assessments of combat fratricide reveal principal contributing factors in the effects of stress, degradation of skills due to continuous operations or sleep deprivation, poor situation awareness, and lack of training and discipline in offensive/defense response selection. While these problems are typically addressed in R&D focusing on traditional ground-based combat, there is also an emerging need for improving situation awareness and decision making on defensive/offensive response options in the cyber defense arena, where a mistaken response to an actual or perceived cyber attack could lead to destruction or compromise of friendly cyber assets. The purpose of this report is to examine cognitive factors that may affect cyber situation awareness and describe possible research needs to reduce the likelihood and effects of "friendly cyber fire" on cyber defenses, information infrastructures, and data. The approach is to examine concepts and methods that have been described in research applied to the more traditional problem of mitigating the occurrence of combat identification and fratricide. Application domains of interest include cyber security defense against external or internal (insider) threats.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Detecting CAN Masquerade Attacks with Signal Clustering Similarity

Vehicular Controller Area Networks (CANs) are susceptible to cyber attacks of different levels of sophistication. Fabrication attacks are the easiest to administer—an adversary simply sends (extra) frames on a CAN—but also the easiest to detect because they disrupt frame frequency. To overcome time-based detection methods, adversaries must administer masquerade attacks by sending frames in lieu of (and therefore at the expected time of) benign frames but with malicious payloads. Research efforts have proven that CAN attacks, and masquerade attacks in particular, can affect vehicle functionality. Examples include causing unintended acceleration, deactivation of vehicle’s brakes, as well as steering the vehicle. We hypothesize that masquerade attacks modify the nuanced correlations of CAN signal time series and how they cluster together. Therefore, changes in cluster assignments should indicate anomalous behavior. We confirm this hypothesis by leveraging our previously developed capability for reverse engineering CAN signals (i.e., CAN-D [Controller Area Network Decoder]) and focus on advancing the state of the art for detecting masquerade attacks by analyzing time series extracted from raw CAN frames. Specifically, we demonstrate that masquerade attacks can be detected by computing time series clustering similarity using hierarchical clustering on the vehicle’s CAN signals (time series) and comparing the clustering similarity across CAN captures with and without attacks. We test our approach in a previously collected CAN dataset with masquerade attacks (i.e., the ROAD dataset) and develop a forensic tool as a proof of concept to demonstrate the potential of the proposed approach for detecting CAN masquerade attacks.

Moriano Salazar, Pablo↗

Cyber-physical security framework for Photovoltaic Farms

With the evolution of PV converters, a growing number of vulnerabilities in PV farms are exposing to cyber threats. To mitigate the influence of cyber-attack on PV farms, it is necessary to study attacks' impact and propose detection methods. To meet this requirement, a cyber-physical security framework is proposed for PV farms. Data integrity attacks (DIAs) are studied on different control loops. As μPMU is gaining in popularity, a lower sampling rate of μPMU data is applied to develop a detection algorithm. We have evaluated two data-driven methods, which are support vector machine (SVM) and long short-term memory (LSTM). Lastly, the data-driven methods verify the feasibility of μPMU data in attack detection.

Attack Impact Analysis↗

A Context-Centered Research Approach to Phishing and Operational Technology in Industrial Control Systems

Advanced persistent threats (APT’s) that leverage phishing against operational technology (OT) are cyber-attacks that endanger critical infrastructure assets nationwide. Today phishing, a human focused exploit, constitutes 91% of successful attack vectors against Federal assets. This means Human Introduced Vulnerabilities (HICV’s) are the weakest cyber defense link. The success of these attacks also suggests HICV’s are not well understood nor mitigated. To characterize HICV’s and provide the necessary context in which they exist, this paper introduces a research approach derived from the mature science of Social Ecology. The desired end result of this research is an HICV focused risk assessment framework.

Advanced Persistent Threats↗

Bayesian Attack Model (BAM) User Story

This document presents a user story for the Bayesian Attack Model (BAM) tool designed to aggregate and analyze cyber-attack observables for operational technology (OT) systems. BAM aims to empower cybersecurity analysts by providing a streamlined interface for collecting observable data from various sources, enabling real-time analysis of potential adversary activity. By enhancing the response capabilities of security teams, BAM facilitates risk-informed decision-making and improves organizational security posture. This user story outlines the key functionalities, user interactions, and requirements necessary to successfully integrate BAM with other security information and event management (SIEM) technology and cybersecurity operations centers (CSOCs).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Incentivizing Cyber Security Investment in the Power Sector Using An Extended Cyber Insurance Framework

Collaboration between the DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and public- sector partners has revealed that a dearth of cyber- incident data combined with the unpredictability of cyber attacks have contributed to a shortfall in first-party cyber insurance protection in the critical infrastructure community. This research explores the foundations of insurance theory and adopts behavioral manipulation methods to incentivize cyber-security investment. We validate the model by applying power industry performance data from 2013-2015 to assess risk facing the industry. Results show that the model can successfully discriminate between individual power companies as well as geographic regions on the basis of risk and can recommend cyber risk- management strategies tailored to individual risk profiles. Here, the adoption of this framework could invite more market participation, which will create a more robust cyber- incident reporting environment, contributing directly to the DHS goal of creating a national cyber- incident data repository.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Decision Tree Based Anomaly Detection for Remedial Action Scheme in Smart Grid using PMU Data

The advanced and persistent cyber threats facing the critical infrastructure such as the smart grid are exponentially rising which require sophisticated defense strategy. Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), also known as Special Protection Scheme (SPS), relies on the interconnected cyber physical system for automated protection which is exposed to the multitude of vulnerabilities. In this paper, we propose an innovative approach to develop an Intelligent Remedial Action Scheme (IRAS) which can detect and distinguish cyber attacks from the physical disturbances in smart grid and later take smart corrective actions as required to minimize the impact on system reliability and economy. Specifically, we have proposed the decision tree based anomaly detection methodology which can distinguish between the normal tripping during power line faults and malicious tripping attack on the physical relays in the context of RAS. The classification model is developed using differential features of voltage and current phasors. Next, as a proof of concept, we have implemented and validated the proposed methodology in cyber physical environment at Iowa State's PowerCyber testbed. Finally, the proposed methodology is tested on modified IEEE 39 bus system in offline and real-time mode. Our experimental results show that the proposed method is efficient in detecting attacks and performing corrective actions within an acceptable time frame.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Does practice make perfect? Lessons learned from full-scale power system incident response exercise

While threats to the energy sector occur daily, few utilities get the opportunity to fully test out their detection and response mechanisms to advanced threats in the real world. With the high demand for reliability, few grid operators would allow execution of simulated cyber-attacks on their live systems. The DOE-funded Liberty Eclipse project offers a unique opportunity for small and large utilities and coops to practice their combined IT/OT responses to a live red team executing attacks against an isolated power system on an island in New York. Both cyber teams and power operations teams must work together to detect and respond to attacks, even restoring the power system against extreme impacts. Lessons learned from these exercises reveal key takeaways for understanding what a real attack against the electric sector will look like, gaps in execution of the best-laid plans when the pressure of a real event is bearing down, and how organizations can better prepare for advanced attacks by optimizing participation in exercises. This presentation will discuss successes and opportunities for improvement both in how utilities can prepare for and respond to events, as well as how full-scale IT/OT exercises can be coordinated.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗