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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 307 records · Page 17
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the active thermal control subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical (PCIs) items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Active Thermal Control Subsystem (ATCS) are documented. The major purpose of the ATCS is to remove the heat, generated during normal Shuttle operations from the Orbiter systems and subsystems. The four major components of the ATCS contributing to the heat removal are: Freon Coolant Loops; Radiator and Flow Control Assembly; Flash Evaporator System; and Ammonia Boiler System. In order to perform the analysis, the IOA process utilized available ATCS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 310 failure modes analyzed, 101 were determined to be PCIs.

Sinclair, S. K.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the guidance, navigation, and control subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) is presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) Subsystem hardware are documented. The function of the GNC hardware is to respond to guidance, navigation, and control software commands to effect vehicle control and to provide sensor and controller data to GNC software. Some of the GNC hardware for which failure modes analysis was performed includes: hand controllers; Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly (RPTA); Speed Brake Thrust Controller (SBTC); Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU); Star Tracker (ST); Crew Optical Alignment Site (COAS); Air Data Transducer Assembly (ADTA); Rate Gyro Assemblies; Accelerometer Assembly (AA); Aerosurface Servo Amplifier (ASA); and Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC). The IOA analysis process utilized available GNC hardware drawings, workbooks, specifications, schematics, and systems briefs for defining hardware assemblies, components, and circuits. Each hardware item was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Trahan, W. H.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Input Range Testing for the General Mission Analysis Tool (GMAT)

This document contains a test plan for testing input values to the General Mission Analysis Tool (GMAT). The plan includes four primary types of information, which rigorously define all tests that should be performed to validate that GMAT will accept allowable inputs and deny disallowed inputs. The first is a complete list of all allowed object fields in GMAT. The second type of information, is test input to be attempted for each field. The third type of information is allowable input values for all objects fields in GMAT. The final piece of information is how GMAT should respond to both valid and invalid information. It is VERY important to note that the tests below must be performed for both the Graphical User Interface and the script!! The examples are illustrated using a scripting perspective, because it is simpler to write up. However, the test must be performed for both interfaces to GMAT.

Hughes, Steven P.↗
NASA NTRS2025

SOMD LOX/Methane Assessment, Data Analysis Subteam: MOX-E Test Series Analysis Summary

Fundamental explosive testing was conducted by the NASA/MSFC Blast Team (N2L) to determine yields produced from cryogenic liquid mixtures of methane and oxygen for a range of oxygen-to-fuel ratios. The blast wave overpressure and high-speed video data were processed by the NASA led multi-agency data analysis team. This document serves to provide a summary of the optimized data analysis produced and the resulting conclusions regarding the yields achieved during this test program.

Combustion↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the atmospheric revitalization pressure control subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Atmospheric Revitalization and Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS) are documented. The ARPCS hardware was categorized into the following subdivisions: (1) Atmospheric Make-up and Control (including the Auxiliary Oxygen Assembly, Oxygen Assembly, and Nitrogen Assembly); and (2) Atmospheric Vent and Control (including the Positive Relief Vent Assembly, Negative Relief Vent Assembly, and Cabin Vent Assembly). The IOA analysis process utilized available ARPCS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Saiidi, M. J.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the nose wheel steering subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) hardware are documented. The NWS hardware provides primary directional control for the Orbiter vehicle during landing rollout. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. The original NWS design was envisioned as a backup system to differential braking for directional control of the Orbiter during landing rollout. No real effort was made to design the NWS system as fail operational. The brakes have much redundancy built into their design but the poor brake/tire performance has forced the NSTS to upgrade NWS to the primary mode of directional control during rollout. As a result, a large percentage of the NWS system components have become Potential Critical Items (PCI).

Mediavilla, Anthony Scott↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the orbiter main propulsion system

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware are documented. The Orbiter MPS consists of two subsystems: the Propellant Management Subsystem (PMS) and the Helium Subsystem. The PMS is a system of manifolds, distribution lines and valves by which the liquid propellants pass from the External Tank (ET) to the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) and gaseous propellants pass from the SSMEs to the ET. The Helium Subsystem consists of a series of helium supply tanks and their associated regulators, check valves, distribution lines, and control valves. The Helium Subsystem supplies helium that is used within the SSMEs for inflight purges and provides pressure for actuation of SSME valves during emergency pneumatic shutdowns. The balance of the helium is used to provide pressure to operate the pneumatically actuated valves within the PMS. Each component was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticalities were assigned based on the worst possible effect of each failure mode. Of the 690 failure modes analyzed, 349 were determined to be PCIs.

Mcnicoll, W. J.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the ascent thrust vector control actuator subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC) Actuator hardware are documented. The function of the Ascent Thrust Vector Control Actuators (ATVC) is to gimbal the main engines to provide for attitude and flight path control during ascent. During first stage flight, the SRB nozzles provide nearly all the steering. After SRB separation, the Orbiter is steered by gimbaling of its main engines. There are six electrohydraulic servoactuators, one pitch and one yaw for each of the three main engines. Each servoactuator is composed of four electrohydraulic servovalve assemblies, one second stage power spool valve assembly, one primary piston assembly and a switching valve. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Critical failures resulting in loss of ATVC were mainly due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid contamination and mechanical failures.

Wilson, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Overview of MSFC's Applied Fluid Dynamics Analysis Group Activities

This document is a presentation graphic which reviews the activities of the Applied Fluid Dynamics Analysis Group at Marshall Space Flight Center (i.e., Code TD64). The work of this group focused on supporting the space transportation programs. The work of the group is in Computational Fluid Dynamic tool development. This development is driven by hardware design needs. The major applications for the design and analysis tools are: turbines, pumps, propulsion-to-airframe integration, and combustion devices.

Garcia, Roberto↗
DOE OSTI2024

Documentation for Python Automation in CYME for DER Hosting Capacity Analysis of Different Feeder Configurations

This file provides the documentation for several Python scripts that were developed by Sandia National Laboratories to enhance the automation and customization capabilities for performing various distribution system planning and analysis tasks in CYME. Specifically, these scripts (.py files detailed in Figure 1) enable the user to evaluate different distribution system configurations and the resulting impacts on hosting capacity results and other metrics. In general, these scripts—and the accompanying documentation—provide the foundation upon which future customized tools can be created. For example, the scripts show how to extract and modify parameters of various circuit components, set up and run analyses using built-in CYME tools (iteratively), and export reports for further evaluations and comparisons. Thus, the capabilities and syntaxes used in the scripts can be adapted and leveraged for countless other objectives.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS2008

Certifying Auto-Generated Flight Code

Model-based design and automated code generation are being used increasingly at NASA. Many NASA projects now use MathWorks Simulink and Real-Time Workshop for at least some of their modeling and code development. However, there are substantial obstacles to more widespread adoption of code generators in safety-critical domains. Since code generators are typically not qualified, there is no guarantee that their output is correct, and consequently the generated code still needs to be fully tested and certified. Moreover, the regeneration of code can require complete recertification, which offsets many of the advantages of using a generator. Indeed, manual review of autocode can be more challenging than for hand-written code. Since the direct V&V of code generators is too laborious and complicated due to their complex (and often proprietary) nature, we have developed a generator plug-in to support the certification of the auto-generated code. Specifically, the AutoCert tool supports certification by formally verifying that the generated code is free of different safety violations, by constructing an independently verifiable certificate, and by explaining its analysis in a textual form suitable for code reviews. The generated documentation also contains substantial tracing information, allowing users to trace between model, code, documentation, and V&V artifacts. This enables missions to obtain assurance about the safety and reliability of the code without excessive manual V&V effort and, as a consequence, eases the acceptance of code generators in safety-critical contexts. The generation of explicit certificates and textual reports is particularly well-suited to supporting independent V&V. The primary contribution of this approach is the combination of human-friendly documentation with formal analysis. The key technical idea is to exploit the idiomatic nature of auto-generated code in order to automatically infer logical annotations. The annotation inference algorithm itself is generic, and parametrized with respect to a library of coding patterns that depend on the safety policies and the code generator. The patterns characterize the notions of definitions and uses that are specific to the given safety property. For example, for initialization safety, definitions correspond to variable initializations while uses are statements which read a variable, whereas for array bounds safety, definitions are the array declarations, while uses are statements which access an array variable. The inferred annotations are thus highly dependent on the actual program and the properties being proven. The annotations, themselves, need not be trusted, but are crucial to obtain the automatic formal verification of the safety properties without requiring access to the internals of the code generator. The approach has been applied to both in-house and commercial code generators, but is independent of the particular generator used. It is currently being adapted to flight code generated using MathWorks Real-Time Workshop, an automatic code generator that translates from Simulink/Stateflow models into embedded C code.

Denney, Ewen↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power generation/power reactant storage and distribution subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NAA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Generation (EPG)/Power Reactants Storage and Distribution (PRSD) System Hardware is documented. The EPG/PRSD hardware is required for performing critical functions of cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen storage and distribution to the Fuel Cell Powerplants (FCP) and Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS). Specifically, the EPG/PRSD hardware consists of the following: Hydryogen (H2) tanks; Oxygen (O2) tanks; H2 Relief Valve/Filter Packages (HRVFP); O2 Relief Valve/Filter Packages (ORVFP); H2 Valve Modules (HVM); O2 Valve Modules (OVM); and O2 and H2 lines, components, and fittings.

Gotch, S. M.↗
DOE OSTI2020

NCSP IER 476 CED-4A Documentation

This document is a memo to the National Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) management that details the KRUSTY high temperature run for the KRUSTY experiment, which took place in March of 2018. The goal for writing this memo was to collect all of the available information into one document, so that researchers can use this document for modeling and analysis. One important part to this document is the data package, which is referenced in the document and contains all the available experimental data for the KRUSTY high temperature run. The data package itself is quite large (1.6 GB) and is not included in the document itself. However, sample files have been provided in the document, in addition to plots of the data as well as a description of each data set.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

BSU-8242 As-Run Thermal Analysis

This report contains the Engineering Calculations and Analysis Report (ECAR)-5510 documenting the thermal as-run analysis of the 1 and 3 DPA capsules that comprised the BSU-8242 Nuclear Science User Facilities Experiment.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
NASA NTRS1976

Atmospheric, Magnetospheric and Plasmas in Space (AMPS) spacelab payload definition study - program analysis and planning for phase C/D document - Volume 7

Typical missions identified for AMPS flights in the arly 1980's are described. Experiment objectives and typical scientific instruments selected to accomplish these objectives are discussed along with mission requirements and shuttle and Spacelab capabilities assessed to determine any AMPS unique requirements. Preliminary design concepts for the first two AMPS flights form the basis for the Phase C/D program plan. This plan implements flights 1 and 2 and indicates how both the scientific and flight support hardware can be systematically evolved for future AMPS flights.

Keeley, J. T.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Analysis of the Meteorology Associated with the 1997 NASA Glenn Twin Otter Icing Events

This part of the document contains an analysis of the meteorology associated with the premier icing encounters from the January-March 1997 NASA Twin Otter dataset. The purpose of this analysis is to provide a meteorological context for the aircraft data collected during these flights. For each case, the following data elements are presented: (1) A detailed discussion of the Twin Otter encounter, including locations, liquid water contents, temperatures and microphysical makeup of the clouds and precipitation aloft, (2) Upper-air charts, providing hand-analyzed locations of lows, troughs, ridges, saturated/unsaturated air, temperatures, warm/cold advection, and jet streams, (3) Balloon-borne soundings, providing vertical profiles of temperature, moisture and winds, (4) Infrared satellite data, providing cloud locations and cloud top temperature, (5) 3-hourly surface charts, providing hand-analyzed locations of lows, highs, fronts, precipitation (including type) and cloud cover, (6) Hourly plots of icing pilot reports, providing the icing intensity, icing type, icing altitudes and aircraft type, (7) Hourly, regional radar mosaics, providing fine resolution of the locations of precipitation (including intensity and type), pilot reports of icing (including intensity and type), surface observations of precipitation type and Twin Otter tracks for a one hour window centered on the time of the radar data, and (8) Plots of data from individual NEXRAD radars at times and elevation angles that have been matched to Twin Otter flight locations. Outages occurred in nearly every dataset at some point. All relevant data that was available is presented here. All times are in UTC and all heights are in feet above mean sea level (MSL).

Bernstein, Ben C.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the manned maneuvering unit

Results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve indepedence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU) hardware. The MMU is a propulsive backpack, operated through separate hand controllers that input the pilot's translational and rotational maneuvering commands to the control electronics and then to the thrusters. The IOA analysis process utilized available MMU hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware subsystems, assemblies, components, and hardware items. Final levels of detail were evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the worst case severity of the effect for each identified failure mode. The IOA analysis of the MMU found that the majority of the PCIs identified are resultant from the loss of either the propulsion or control functions, or are resultant from inability to perform an immediate or future mission. The five most severe criticalities identified are all resultant from failures imposed on the MMU hand controllers which have no redundancy within the MMU.

Bailey, P. S.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power generation/fuel cell powerplant subsystem

Results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Generation (EPG)/Fuel Cell Powerplant (FCP) hardware. The EPG/FCP hardware is required for performing functions of electrical power generation and product water distribution in the Orbiter. Specifically, the EPG/FCP hardware consists of the following divisions: (1) Power Section Assembly (PSA); (2) Reactant Control Subsystem (RCS); (3) Thermal Control Subsystem (TCS); and (4) Water Removal Subsystem (WRS). The IOA analysis process utilized available EPG/FCP hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Brown, K. L.↗