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At least 307 records · Page 17

Experiences with Extra-Vehicular Activities in Response to Critical ISS Contingencies

The maturation of the International Space Station (ISS) design from the proposed Space Station Freedom to today's current implementation resulted in external hardware redundancy vulnerabilities in the final design. Failure to compensate for or respond to these vulnerabilities could put the ISS in a posture to where it could no longer function as a habitable space station. In the first years of ISS assembly, these responses were to largely be addressed by the continued resupply and Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) capabilities of the Space Shuttle. Even prior to the decision to retire the Space Shuttle, it was realized that ISS needed to have its own capability to be able to rapidly repair or replace external hardware without needing to wait for the next cargo resupply mission. As documented in a previous publicatoin5, in 2006 development was started to baseline Extra- Vehicular Activity (EVA, or spacewalk) procedures to replace hardware components whose failure would expose some of the ISS vulnerabilities should a second failure occur. This development work laid the groundwork for the onboard crews and the ground operations and engineering teams to be ready to replace any of this failed hardware. In 2010, this development work was put to the test when one of these pieces of hardware failed. This paper will provide a brief summary of the planning and processes established in the original Contingency EVA development phase. It will then review how those plans and processes were implemented in 2010, highlighting what went well as well as where there were deficiencies between theory and reality. This paper will show that the original approach and analyses, though sound, were not as thorough as they should have been in the realm of planning for next worse failures, for documenting Programmatic approval of key assumptions, and not pursuing sufficient engineering analysis prior to the failure of the hardware. The paper will further highlight the changes made to the Contingency EVA preparation team structure, approach, goals, and the resources allocated to its work after the 2010 events. Finally, the authors will overview the implementation of these updates in addressing failures onboard the ISS in 2012, 2013, and 2014. The successful use of the updated approaches, and the application of the approaches to other spacewalks, will demonstrate the effectiveness of this additional work and make a case for putting significant time and resources into pre-failure planning and analysis for critical hardware items on human-tended spacecraft.

Van Cise, E. A.↗

Study of a unified hardware and software fault-tolerant architecture

A unified architectural concept, called the Fault Tolerant Processor Attached Processor (FTP-AP), that can tolerate hardware as well as software faults is proposed for applications requiring ultrareliable computation capability. An emulation of the FTP-AP architecture, consisting of a breadboard Motorola 68010-based quadruply redundant Fault Tolerant Processor, four VAX 750s as attached processors, and four versions of a transport aircraft yaw damper control law, is used as a testbed in the AIRLAB to examine a number of critical issues. Solutions of several basic problems associated with N-Version software are proposed and implemented on the testbed. This includes a confidence voter to resolve coincident errors in N-Version software. A reliability model of N-Version software that is based upon the recent understanding of software failure mechanisms is also developed. The basic FTP-AP architectural concept appears suitable for hosting N-Version application software while at the same time tolerating hardware failures. Architectural enhancements for greater efficiency, software reliability modeling, and N-Version issues that merit further research are identified.

Lala, Jaynarayan↗

Applying Model-based Diagnosis to a Rapid Propellant Loading System

The overall objective of the US Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Rapid Propellant Loading (RPL) Program is to develop a launch vehicle, payload and ground support equipment that can support a rapid propellant load and launch within one hour. NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) has been funded by AFRL to develop hardware and software to demonstrate this capability. The key features of the software would be the ability to recognize and adapt to failures in the physical hardware components, advise operators of equipment faults and workarounds, and put the system in a safe configuration if unable to fly. In December 2008 NASA KSC and NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) demonstrated model based simulation and diagnosis capabilities for a scaled-down configuration of the RPL hardware. In this paper we present a description of the model-based technologies that were included as part of this demonstration and the results that were achieved. In continuation of this work we are currently testing the technologies on a simulation of the complete RPL system. Later in the year, when the RPL hardware is ready, we will be integrating these technologies with the real-time operation of the system to provide live state estimates. In future years we will be developing the capability to recover from faulty conditions via redundancy and reconfiguration.

Goodrich, Charlie H.↗

A Proposal for the Creation of a Diagnostics and Power Port Standard

The contents of this paper discuss plans for communication failure due to lost hardware during Moon and Mars exploration missions. The author proposes a Diagnostics and Power Port (DPP) creation in the face of total communication failure. DDP would have a number of different power channels to replicate computer diagnostic abilities to find the root cause of failure.

Willeke, Thomas↗

Management of SSME hardware life utilization

Statistical and probabilistic reliability methodologies were developed for the determination of hardware life limits for the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). Both methodologies require that a mathematical reliability model of the engine (system) performance be developed as a function of the reliabilities of the components and parts. The system reliability model should be developed from the Failute Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List. The statistical reliability methodology establishes hardware life limits directly from the failure distributions of the components and parts obtained from statistically-designed testing. The probabilistic reliability methodology establishes hardware life limits from a decision analysis methodology which incorporates the component/part reliabilities obtained from a probabilistic structural analysis, a calibrated maintenance program, inspection techniques, and fabrication procedures. Probilistic structural analysis is recommended as a tool to prioritize upgrading of the components and parts. The Weibull probability distribution is presently being investigated by NASA/MSFC to characterize the failure distribution of the SSME hardware from a limited data base of failures.

Pauschke, J. M.↗

Corrosion study of bare and coated stainless steel

A program was conducted at Kennedy Space Center from February 1968 to February 1971 to evaluate the performance of austenitic stainless steel alloys used in fluid systems lines. For several years, there had been numerous failures of stainless steel hardware caused by pitting and stress corrosion cracking. Several alloys were evaluated for effectiveness of certain sacrificial-type protective coverings in preventing corrosion failures. Samples were tested in specially designed racks placed 91 meters (100 yards) above high-tide line at Cape Kennedy. It is concluded that: (1) unprotected tubing samples showed evidence of pitting initiation after 2 weeks; (2) although some alloys develop larger pits than others, it is probable that the actual pitting rate is independent of alloy type; (3) the deepest pitting occurred in the sheltered part of the samples; and (4) zinc-rich coatings and an aluminum-filled coating have afforded sacrificial protection against pitting for at least 28 months. It is believed that a much longer effective coating life can be expected.

Morrison, J. D.↗

A case study in nonconformance and performance trend analysis

As part of NASA's effort to develop an agency-wide approach to trend analysis, a pilot nonconformance and performance trending analysis study was conducted on the Space Shuttle auxiliary power unit (APU). The purpose of the study was to (1) demonstrate that nonconformance analysis can be used to identify repeating failures of a specific item (and the associated failure modes and causes) and (2) determine whether performance parameters could be analyzed and monitored to provide an indication of component or system degradation prior to failure. The nonconformance analysis of the APU did identify repeating component failures, which possibly could be reduced if key performance parameters were monitored and analyzed. The performance-trending analysis verified that the characteristics of hardware parameters can be effective in detecting degradation of hardware performance prior to failure.

Maloy, Joseph E.↗

ACIS Door Failure Investigation and Mitigation Procedures

NASA's Chandra X-ray Observatory (formerly AXAF) was launched on July 23, 1999 and is currently in orbit performing scientific studies. Chandra is the third of NASA's Great Observatories to be launched, following the Hubble Space Telescope and the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory. One of four primary science instruments on Chandra, and one of only two focal plane instruments, is the Advanced CCD Imaging Spectrometer, or ACIS. The ACIS focal plane and Optical Blocking Filter (OBF) must be launched under vacuum, so a tightly sealed, functioning door and venting subsystem were implemented. The door was opened two and one-half weeks after launch (after most out-gassing of composite materials) and allowed X-rays to be imaged by the ACIS CCD's in the focal plane. A failure of this door to open on-orbit would have eliminated all ACIS capabilities, severely degrading mission science. During the final pre-flight thermal-vacuum test of the fully integrated Chandra Observatory at TRW, the ACIS door failed to open when commanded to do so. This paper describes the efforts, under considerable time pressure, by NASA, its contractors and outside review teams to investigate the failure and to develop modified hardware and procedures which would correct the problem. Of interest is the fact that the root cause of the test failure was never clearly identified despite massive effort. We ultimately focussed on hardware and procedures designed to mitigate the effects of potential, but unproven, failure modes. We describe a frequent real-world engineering situation in which one must proceed on the best basis possible in the absence of the complete set of facts.

Podgorski, William A.↗

AirSTAR Hardware and Software Design for Beyond Visual Range Flight Research

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Airborne Subscale Transport Aircraft Research (AirSTAR) Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) is a facility developed to study the flight dynamics of vehicles in emergency conditions, in support of aviation safety research. The system was upgraded to have its operational range significantly expanded, going beyond the line of sight of a ground-based pilot. A redesign of the airborne flight hardware was undertaken, as well as significant changes to the software base, in order to provide appropriate autonomous behavior in response to a number of potential failures and hazards. Ground hardware and system monitors were also upgraded to include redundant communication links, including ADS-B based position displays and an independent flight termination system. The design included both custom and commercially available avionics, combined to allow flexibility in flight experiment design while still benefiting from tested configurations in reversionary flight modes. A similar hierarchy was employed in the software architecture, to allow research codes to be tested, with a fallback to more thoroughly validated flight controls. As a remotely piloted facility, ground systems were also developed to ensure the flight modes and system state were communicated to ground operations personnel in real-time. Presented in this paper is a general overview of the concept of operations for beyond visual range flight, and a detailed review of the airborne hardware and software design. This discussion is held in the context of the safety and procedural requirements that drove many of the design decisions for the AirSTAR UAS Beyond Visual Range capability.

Laughter, Sean↗

Man-rated flight software for the F-8 DFBW program

The design, implementation, and verification of the flight control software used in the F-8 DFBW program are discussed. Since the DFBW utilizes an Apollo computer and hardware, the procedures, controls, and basic management techniques employed are based on those developed for the Apollo software system. Program Assembly Control, simulator configuration control, erasable-memory load generation, change procedures and anomaly reporting are discussed. The primary verification tools--the all-digital simulator, the hybrid simulator, and the Iron Bird simulator--are described, as well as the program test plans and their implementation on the various simulators. Failure-effects analysis and the creation of special failure-generating software for testing purposes are described. The quality of the end product is evidenced by the F-8 DFBW flight test program in which 42 flights, totaling 58 hours of flight time, were successfully made without any DFCS inflight software, or hardware, failures.

Bairnsfather, R. R.↗

Space Transportation System Availability Requirements and Its Influencing Attributes Relationships

It is essential that management and engineering understand the need for an availability requirement for the customer's space transportation system as it enables the meeting of his needs, goal, and objectives. There are three types of availability, e.g., operational availability, achieved availability, or inherent availability. The basic definition of availability is equal to the mean uptime divided by the sum of the mean uptime plus the mean downtime. The major difference is the inclusiveness of the functions within the mean downtime and the mean uptime. This paper will address tIe inherent availability which only addresses the mean downtime as that mean time to repair or the time to determine the failed article, remove it, install a replacement article and verify the functionality of the repaired system. The definitions of operational availability include the replacement hardware supply or maintenance delays and other non-design factors in the mean downtime. Also with inherent availability the mean uptime will only consider the mean time between failures (other availability definitions consider this as mean time between maintenance - preventive and corrective maintenance) that requires the repair of the system to be functional. It is also essential that management and engineering understand all influencing attributes relationships to each other and to the resultant inherent availability requirement. This visibility will provide the decision makers with the understanding necessary to place constraints on the design definition for the major drivers that will determine the inherent availability, safety, reliability, maintainability, and the life cycle cost of the fielded system provided the customer. This inherent availability requirement may be driven by the need to use a multiple launch approach to placing humans on the moon or the desire to control the number of spare parts required to support long stays in either orbit or on the surface of the moon or mars. It is the intent of this paper to provide the visibility of relationships of these major attribute drivers (variables) to each other and the resultant system inherent availability, but also provide the capability to bound the variables providing engineering the insight required to control the system's engineering solution. An example of this visibility will be the need to provide integration of similar discipline functions to allow control of the total parts count of the space transportation system. Also the relationship visibility of selecting a reliability requirement will place a constraint on parts count to achieve a given inherent availability requirement or accepting a larger parts count with the resulting higher reliability requirement. This paper will provide an understanding for the relationship of mean repair time (mean downtime) to maintainability, e.g., accessibility for repair, and both mean time between failure, e.g., reliability of hardware and the system inherent availability. Having an understanding of these relationships and resulting requirements before starting the architectural design concept definition will avoid considerable time and money required to iterate the design to meet the redesign and assessment process required to achieve the results required of the customer's space transportation system. In fact the impact to the schedule to being able to deliver the system that meets the customer's needs, goals, and objectives may cause the customer to compromise his desired operational goal and objectives resulting in considerable increased life cycle cost of the fielded space transportation system.

Rhodes, Russel E.↗

Application of Fault Containment Principles to EMC

A hardware fault in aerospace is an undesired response to a designed engineering function in hardware. Therefore, in aerospace systems fault management is of prime importance. An important aspect of hardware faults is fault propagation. Fault propagation (also known as failure propagation) is a condition where a fault will not only produce an undesired hardware response, at its location of origin, but the fault will also propagate to other interfaced hardware and cause additional faults, or failures. Fault containment is necessary to avoid fault propagation. A fault containment region is an electronic or electromechanical region within a given hardware assembly where a fault in that region will not physically propagate to other regions of the assembly, and beyond. Rather, the fault will cause a functional failure of the hardware, where the fault occurred, without causing any additional propagated failures. Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) is a desired state in aerospace hardware. Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) in aerospace hardware is a fault condition of EMC. Like other faults EMI can also propagate to other aerospace hardware unless it occurs inside an EMI containment region. The paper addresses the concepts of fault containment region and introduces the concept of EMI containment region with examples of both.

Perez, Reinaldo↗

International Space Station (ISS) Major Constituent Analyzer (MCA) On-Orbit Performance

The Major Constituent Analyzer (MCA) is an essential part of the International Space Station (ISS) environmental control and life support system. The analyzer provides continuous readout of the partial pressures of six gases, nitrogen (N2), oxygen (O2), hydrogen (H2), carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and water vapor (H2O) in the various ISS US. on-orbit modules. Continuous readout of the partial pressures of these gases is critical to verifying safe operation of the Atmosphere Revitalization (AR) system, Atmosphere Control System (ACS), and crew safety for Airlock Extravehicular Activities (EVAs). The MCA encountered some operational interruptions since being launched to orbit on Flight 5A in February 2001. Electronic, software, and hardware modifications and on-orbit crew maintenance of the MCA were necessary to restore its capability. This paper describes the modifications and the on-orbit maintenance performed to return the MCA to operational status, including brief explanations of the MCA failures and the associated hardware and electronic modifications. Operational procedures that were required to return the MCA to operational status, and the more recent successes of supporting both Russian and U.S. ISS EVA preparations, are also discussed

Reysa, Richard↗

Autonomous failure detection and correction on Landsat-4

An integrated hardware/software fault tolerant system for an earth oriented, computer controlled spacecraft is described. The design philosophy as well as the rationale behind the chosen fault tolerant system is outlined. In-flight performance of the system is included for several different instances where the Failure Detection and Correction system acted autonomously to protect the spacecraft. This system exceeded the expectations of the designers by demonstrating the capability to provide a measure of safety to the spacecraft for inadvertent and undesirable ground commands as well as satisfying its primary function of monitoring the flight hardware and software for failures.

Welch, R. V.↗

Redundancy management of inertial systems.

The paper reviews developments in failure detection and isolation techniques applicable to gimballed and strapdown systems. It examines basic redundancy management goals of improved reliability, performance and logistic costs, and explores mechanizations available for both input and output data handling. The meaning of redundant system reliability in terms of available coverage, system MTBF, and mission time is presented and the practical hardware performance limitations of failure detection and isolation techniques are explored. Simulation results are presented illustrating implementation coverages attainable considering IMU performance models and mission detection threshold requirements. The implications of a complete GN&C redundancy management method on inertial techniques are also explored.

Mckern, R. A.↗

Recurrent Neural Network Attention Mechanisms for Interpretable System Log Anomaly Detection

Deep learning has recently demonstrated state-of-the art performance on key tasks related to the maintenance of computer systems, such as intrusion detection, denial of service attack detection, hardware and software system failures, and malware detection. In these contexts, model interpretability is vital for administrator and analyst to trust and act on the automated analysis of machine learning models. Deep learning methods have been criticized as black box oracles which allow limited insight into decision factors. In this work we seek to "bridge the gap'' between the impressive performance of deep learning models and the need for interpretable model introspection. To this end we present recurrent neural network (RNN) language models augmented with attention for anomaly detection in system logs. Our methods are generally applicable to any computer system and logging source. By incorporating attention variants into our RNN language models we create opportunities for model introspection and analysis without sacrificing state-of-the art performance. We demonstrate model performance and illustrate model interpretability on an intrusion detection task using the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) cyber security dataset, reporting upward of 0.99 area under the receiver operator characteristic curve despite being trained only on a single day's worth of data.

Anomaly detection, Attention, Recurrent Neural Net↗

CalWave Open Water Demo - FMEA Update Budget Period 2

The Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a qualitative reliability technique for systematically analyzing each possible failure mode within a hardware system, and identifying the resulting effect on that system, the mission, and the personnel. This submission includes an updated FMEA summary for CalWave's open water demonstration including pre- and post-mitigation results, hazard identification (HAZID) analysis, and component/function rooted FMEA.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗