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At least 307 records · Page 17

Report to NASA Committee on Aircraft Operating Problems Relative to Aviation Safety Engineering and Research Activities

The following report highlights some of the work accomplished by the Aviation Safety Engineering and Research Division of the Flight Safety Foundations since the last report to the NASA Committee on Aircraft Operating Problems on 22 May 1963. The information presented is in summary form. Additional details may be provided upon request of the reports themselves may be obtained from AvSER.

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Risk Analysis of Radiological Release from Pu-238 Targets During Manual Handling

Pu-238 Isotope Production Targets are routinely installed in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) core, transferred, and stored in the spent fuel canal. These evolutions involve manual handling and manipulation of the targets underwater using long handled tools. The ATR Safety Analysis Report (SAR) postulates a design basis accident which results in damage from manual manipulation of targets, and radiological consequences must be determined for receptors inside the reactor facility, as well as public receptors. This presentation presents the analysis used to determine the radiological consequences due to potential target damage in the ATR canal. The analysis considered radionuclide release fractions, damage ratios for handling evolutions, and entrainment of radionuclides in the canal water.

Advanced Test Reactor↗

Phase 1 NuScale SMR FOAK Nuclear Demonstration Readiness Project (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

The overarching objective of the Phase 1 NuScale SMR First-of-a-Kind (FOAK) Nuclear Demonstration Readiness Project was to enhance competitiveness of the U.S. nuclear industry by enabling timely deployment of the NuScale small modular reactor (SMR). The scope of this Phase 1 project continued to advance the licensing and design maturity, particularly in those areas related to supporting customer readiness, supply chain integration, cost competitiveness, and cost confidence. This investment provided by the Government has accelerated development of these designs and technologies so that the existing domestic fleet of nuclear power plants remains viable and the most mature in the nuclear industry. The intent is to have the new, advanced U.S. designs be deployed as early 2026, and be globally competitive. As a part of the First-of-a-Kind Nuclear Demonstration Readiness Project, NuScale has been developing an advanced reactor design, leading the path for other development projects or complex technology advancements for existing plants that have significant technical and licensing risk. The NuScale Power team (NuScale) is advancing licensing, engineering, supply chain development, testing, and other required activities to enhance the innovation and competitiveness of the U.S. nuclear industry by enabling timely deployment of the NuScale SMR. Specifically, NuScale is performing the following activities in Phase 1. Fully supporting the NRC review of the NuScale DCA to ensure approval of a final safety evaluation report by the end of 2020. Improving plant cost confidence and cost competitiveness through design and supply chain advancement, incorporation of constructability best practices, and margin recovery to increase plant power output. Accelerating design maturity, technology development, and operational program readiness to support a customer commitment for plant deployment. The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), a unit of the Office of Science, fulfills agency-wide responsibilities to collect, preserve, and disseminate both unclassified and classified scientific and technical information (STI) emanating from DOE-funded research and development (R&D) activities at DOE national laboratories and facilities and at universities and other institutions nationwide. This scientific and technical report provides summaries of the analyses and research that was performed by NuScale under this project that achieves the objective of disseminating information to the nuclear industry to ensure the innovations realized are shared for the benefit of the industry at large.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff reviews the human factors engineering (HFE) aspects of nuclear power plants in accordance with the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition). The Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model (NUREG-0711, Revision 3, issued November 2012) contains detailed design review procedures. As part of the review process, the interfaces between plant personnel and the plant's systems and components are evaluated for conformance with HFE guidelines. This document, Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700, Revision 3), provides the guidelines necessary to perform this evaluation. The review guidelines address the physical and functional characteristics of human-system interfaces (HSIs). Because these guidelines only address the HFE aspects of design and not other related considerations, such as instrumentation and control and structural design, they are referred to as HFE guidelines. In addition to the review of actual HSIs, the NRC staff can use the NUREG-0700 guidelines to evaluate a design-specific HFE guidelines document or style guide. The HFE guidelines are organized into four basic parts, which are divided into sections. Part I contains guidelines for the basic HSI elements: information displays, user-interface interaction and management, and analog displays and controls. These elements are used as building blocks to develop HSI systems to serve specific functions. Part II contains the guidelines for reviewing the following HSI systems: alarm system, safety parameter display system, group-view display system, soft control system, computer-based procedure system, automation system, and communication system. Part III provides guidelines for the review of workstations and workplaces. Part IV provides guidelines for the review of HSI support (i.e., maintainability of digital systems and degraded HSI and instrumentation and control conditions).

42 ENGINEERING↗

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for calendar year 1998-a year of sharp contrasts and significant successes at NASA. The year opened with the announcement of large workforce cutbacks. The slip in the schedule for launching the International Space Station (ISS) created a five-month hiatus in Space Shuttle launches. This slack period ended with the successful and highly publicized launch of the STS-95 mission. As the year closed, ISS assembly began with the successful orbiting and joining of the Functional Cargo Block (FGB), Zarya, from Russia and the Unity Node from the United States. Throughout the year, the Panel maintained its scrutiny of NASA's safety processes. Of particular interest were the potential effects on safety of workforce reductions and the continued transition of functions to the Space Flight Operations Contractor. Attention was also given to the risk management plans of the Aero-Space Technology programs, including the X-33, X-34, and X-38. Overall, the Panel concluded that safety is well served for the present. The picture is not as clear for the future. Cutbacks have limited the depth of talent available. In many cases, technical specialties are 'one deep.' The extended hiring freeze has resulted in an older workforce that will inevitably suffer significant departures from retirements in the near future. The resulting 'brain drain' could represent a future safety risk unless appropriate succession planning is started expeditiously. This and other topics are covered in the section addressing workforce. The major NASA programs are also limited in their ability to plan property for the future. This is of particular concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS because these programs are scheduled to operate well into the next century. In the case of the Space Shuttle, beneficial and mandatory safety and operational upgrades are being delayed because of a lack of sufficient present funding. Likewise, the ISS has little flexibility to begin long lead-time items for upgrades or contingency planning. For example, the section on computer hardware and software contains specific findings related to required longer range safety-related actions. NASA can be proud of its accomplishments this past year, but must remain ever vigilant, particularly as ISS assembly begins to accelerate. The Panel will continue to focus on both the short- and long-term aspects of risk management and safety planning. This task continues to be made manageable and productive by the excellent cooperation the Panel receives from both NASA and its contractors. Particular emphasis will continue to be directed to longer term workforce and program planning issues as well as the immediate risks associated with ISS assembly and the initial flights of the X-33 and X-34. Section 2 of this report presents specific findings and recommendations generated by ASAP activities during 1998. Section 3 contains more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. Appendix A is a current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1997 ASAP Annual Report. Appendix C details the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1998. During the year, Mr. Richard D. Blomberg was elected chair of the Panel and Vice Admiral (VADM) Robert F Dunn was elected deputy chair. VADM Bernard M. Kauderer moved from consultant to member. Mr. Charles J. Donlan retired from the Panel after many years of meritorious service. Ms. Shirley C. McCarty and Mr. Robert L. ('Hoot') Gibson joined the Panel as consultants.

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Combined Effort to De-Inventory the New Brunswick Laboratory of Plutonium Certified Reference Materials - 20504

To de-inventory plutonium Certified Reference Materials standards (CRMs) from the New Brunswick National Laboratory (NBL), the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) formed a unique team. This teaming arrangement leveraged the different capabilities and expertise of both laboratories, helping to ensure the effort would be performed both safely and cost-effectively. With the NBL then physically housed on the ANL site, ANL served as the host-site, providing the necessary facilities and support services (e.g., supplying everything from hoods, loading equipment, and scales to Health Physics supports). From a packaging perspective, ANL's responsibilities focused mainly on characterizing and preparing the contents for shipment, followed by performing the Shipper of Record activities. With SRNL being the Package Design Authority of the 9978, the Type B packaging used for this effort, SRNL's scope included developing a Safety Analysis Report in Packaging (SARP) Letter Amendment to add the CRMs as authorized contents to the 9978. Recognizing competency, ANL prodigiously tasked SRNL to perform the actual loading of the CRMs into the 9978s, while physically on the ANL site. This paper details five different aspects of this effort. They are: 1. Characterization/validation of the CRM contents. 2. Development of the 9978 SARP Letter Amendment for the content change. 3. Development of the nitrogen inerting method to address SARP identified potential flammability concerns. 4. Renewal of the SRNL 9978 loading procedure. 5. Performance of the actual work execution activities. In 2017, the first nine packages were successfully loaded and shipped from NBL, while in 2019, the last ten were successfully loaded and planned for shipment. Without ANL leveraging SRNL's strengths, the de-inventorying of NBL of its plutonium CRMs would have likely taken many years longer. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Expanded Validation of Uranium Systems with the KENO Monte Carlo Codes and SCALE 6.2.4

The development of accident-tolerant fuel and advanced reactors fueled with high-assay low-enriched uranium has created an increased focus on systems with uranium enrichments between 5 and 20 wt % 235 U. SCALE criticality safety validation reports generated at Oak Ridge National Laboratory contain very few benchmark experiments in this range. The work presented herein is an initial investigation of expanded validation of the entire range of enrichments for uranium-fueled systems, including consideration of over 300 newly developed KENO models. The vast majority of the new models are between 4.4 wt % and 37.5 wt % enrichment and include a variety of thermal, intermediate, and mixed neutron spectra. This work finds no strong evidence of an enrichment-dependent bias, but there are indications of a spectrum-dependent bias. There are, however, only a limited number of independent experiments included at this time to distinguish intermediate enrichment effects from intermediate spectrum effects. Further work in this area is ongoing for intermediate enrichment systems. In the long run, the addition of these models to the Verified, Archived Library and Inputs and Data is planned, as funding and staff availability allow.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

SCALE inventory and reactivity analysis as part of the Hermes 2021 PSAR review

The readiness of SCALE for comprehensive studies of pebble-bed reactors has been demonstrated through detailed analysis of a fluoride salt–cooled, high-temperature pebble-bed reactor (PB-FHR). The methods developed for pebble-bed reactor modeling in SCALE, particularly for inventory generation, have proven effective in gaining insights into the reactor physics of this advanced reactor. Excellent agreement with another code package has been observed, further highlighting SCALE’s strong performance. The SCALE results supported the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s construction permit application review of the Hermes low-power PB-FHR demonstration reactor. A SCALE model of the Hermes reactor was developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory using information from the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) and supplemented with publicly available data. SCALE reactivity coefficient simulations reproduced PSAR results within 1σ statistical uncertainties. Sensitivity studies emphasized the importance of graphite specifications for accurate keff predictions.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Verification and Validation of the PLTEMP/ANL Code for Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis of Experimental and Test Reactors

The document compiles in a single volume the verification and validation works done for the PLTEMP/ANL code during the years of its development and improvement. The verification of sixteen capabilities of the PLTEMP/ANL Version 4.3 code that were identified by research reactor analysts as frequently used in their thermal-hydraulic analysis are described and documented. Each chapter of the document deals with the verification or validation of a specific model. The model verification is usually done by comparing the code with hand calculation, Microsoft spreadsheet calculation, or Mathematica calculation. The model validation is done by comparing the code with experimental data or a widely tested code like the RELAP5 code. In addition, some PLTEMP/ANL verification works that are available in the open literature are simply referenced and not included in the document. PLTEMP/ANL has been used in conversion safety analysis reports of several US and foreign research reactors that have been licensed and converted. A list of such reactors is given.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Thermal Evaluation of the SAVY-4000 1 Quart Container at High Heat Loads

The SAVY-4000 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) was published in 2013 which established the design life of the container series through physical testing that meets applicable requirements from DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. One critical requirement in DOE M 441.1-1 is to set a maximum heat load for the entire series to ensure that throughout the lifetime of the container, each of the components still performs within manufacture specifications. The original maximum decay heat limit has been defined within the SAVY-4000 SAR, which was accomplished by completing a series of tests that heat loaded the SAVY-4000 series and measured the steady state temperature and graded it against manufacture specifications. The container series is comprised of a corrosion resistant 316L stainless steel containment boundary, ceramic composite filter for the prevention of radiological particulate release and a chemically stable O-ring made of Viton ® . Currently, the SAVY 4000 maximum decay heat load is set at 25 Watts and the heat load expected during normal handling and storage is considered sufficient that the SAVY 4000 container requirements will not be the limiting factor for storage of most common material in use at TA-55, e.g. weapons grade oxide, americium, Pu-238 oxide and encapsulated heat sources. The SAVY 4000 lifetime was originally set as 5 years within the SAVY-4000 SAR, but in July 2019 the lifetime was extended to 15 years through a technical basis justification approved by the Department of Energy (DOE) Los Alamos Field Office. The 25 Watt limit applies to all SAVY 4000 container sizes; 1-quart, 2-quart, 3-quart, 5-quart, 8-quart, 12-quart, 5-gallon, and 10-gallon.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor LEU Fuel Element Flow Test Conceptual Design – Hydraulic Reactor Design Parameters

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR-II, also referred to as MITR) is one of six U.S. high performance research reactors (USHPRR), including one critical facility, that is actively collaborating with the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Material Management and Minimization (M 3 ) Reactor Conversion Program to convert to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU, < 20 wt% 235 U) fuel. The MIT Nuclear Reactor Laboratory has been working with the USHPRR Reactor Conversion (RC) Pillar at Argonne National Laboratory to perform fuel element design and fuel cycle performance analyses, steady-state thermal hydraulics safety analyses, and accident safety analyses in preparation for the conversion of MITR and support a preliminary Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for conversion to LEU fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Verification and Validation of the PLTEMP/ANL Code for Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis of Experimental and Test Reactors (Code Version 4.3)

The document compiles in a single volume the verification and validation works done for the PLTEMP/ANL code during the years of its development and improvement. The verification of sixteen capabilities of the PLTEMP/ANL Version 4.3 code that were identified by research reactor analysts as frequently used in their thermal-hydraulic analysis are described and documented. Each chapter of the document deals with the verification or validation of a specific part of the software that calculates a specific phenomenon, e.g., channel flow calculation, coolant property calculation, heat transfer calculation, and flow instability calculation. The software verification work is usually done by comparing the code with hand calculation, Microsoft spreadsheet calculation, or Mathematica calculation. The software validation is done by comparing the code with experimental data or a widely tested code like the RELAP5 code. In addition, some PLTEMP/ANL verification works that are available in the open literature are simply referenced and not included in the document. PLTEMP/ANL has been used in conversion safety analysis reports of several US and foreign research reactors that have been licensed and converted. A list of such reactors is given.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) LEU Fuel Fluid-Structure Interaction Analysis

The University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR ® ) is one of five U.S. high performance research reactors (USHPRR), plus one critical facility, that are actively collaborating with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Material Management and Minimization (M 3 ) Reactor Conversion Program to convert from highly enriched uranium (HEU, ≥ 20 wt.% U-235) to low-enriched uranium (LEU, < 20 wt.% U-235) fuel. A new type of LEU fuel with very high density, based on an alloy of uranium and 10 weight percent molybdenum (U-10Mo), is expected to allow the conversion to LEU of USHPRR that have been found unable to be converted with previously qualified uranium silicide-aluminum (U 3 Si 2 -Al) dispersion fuel. MURR has been working with the USHPRR Reactor Conversion (RC) Pillar at Argonne National Laboratory to perform fuel element design and fuel cycle performance analyses, steady-state thermal hydraulics safety analyses, and accident safety analyses in preparation for the conversion of MURR and to support a preliminary Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for conversion to LEU fuel. In this work, Fluid-structure interaction (FSI) analysis at the fuel element level, as compared to the fuel plate level of the previous work. is performed which models all components of the MURR LEU fuel element, including fuel plates and the supporting structures e.g., side plates, end fittings, and combs. Therefore, the effect of supporting structures on the coolant flow distribution, the fuel plate deflection, and the resulting coolant channel gap reduction can be evaluated. In addition to the nominal element geometry and flow rate, the tolerances in the geometry dimensions of coolant channel and plate thickness, the effect of a comb on plate deflection, and the uncertainty of the flow rate per element are considered in this work. The effect of comb on plate displacement is quantified through two bounding cases: the case assuming a perfect bond between the comb and plates and the case neglecting the comb effect. Note that in this analysis, the FSI has been decoupled from the other structural effects caused by irradiation (e.g., swelling and irradiation creep). Assessment of combined effects is planned for a later stage of this project.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Foam Degradation Model during Thermal Hypothetical Accident Conditions

Current practice in Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) thermal analysis for hypothetical accident conditions (HAC) of packages is to not explicitly model the consequence to the foam impact limiting material, but instead to make conservative estimates of those consequences and begin calculations from that point. This approach is typically used for the foam regression distance, which is the thickness of the degraded foam layer after the 30-minute fire event. Estimates for regression distance can come directly from package burn test results or from correlations based on one-dimensional testing by the foam manufacturer. In either case, this is a subjective process, and although it can be used to produce a conservative result, it is a significant approximation in the analysis. This paper describes testing and refinement of a simplified foam regression model. Comparisons are made against available data from laboratory experiments. Model refinements were tested until satisfactory agreement was achieved. The final modeling approach was then compared with post-test inspection results from HAC burn test data. A new model with an effective thermal conductivity based on foam to char density variation was shown successful in representing laboratory-scale foam thermal degradation experiments and full-scale burn tests of a current package. This model offers a technically defensible and predictive approach for modeling thermal degradation of rigid polyurethane insulation in transport packages.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Verification and Validation of the PLTEMP/ANL Code for Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis of Experimental and Test Reactors, Volume 1

This is Volume 1 of a two-volume document that collects the verification and validation (V&V) works done for the PLTEMP/ANL code during the years of its development and improvement. Volume 1 describes the V&V of sixteen capabilities of the PLTEMP/ANL code that were identified by research reactor analysts as frequently used in their thermal-hydraulic analysis. Volume 2 describes the V&V of developments and improvements since the release of PLTEMP/ANL Version 4.3. Each chapter of the document focuses on verifying or validating a specific part of the software that calculates a specific phenomenon, e.g., channel flow calculation, coolant property calculation, heat transfer calculation, and flow instability calculation. Software verification is performed by comparing the code with hand calculation, Microsoft spreadsheet calculation, Mathematica calculation, or MATLAB calculation. The software validation is done by comparing the code with experimental data or a widely tested code like the RELAP5 code. In addition, some PLTEMP/ANL V&V works that are available in the open literature are simply cited in Volume 1 of the document. PLTEMP/ANL has been used in the safety analysis reports of several US and foreign research reactors licensed and converted from highly enriched uranium fuel to low-enriched uranium fuel. A list of such reactors is given in Volume 1 of the document.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Verification and Validation of the PLTEMP/ANL Code for Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis of Experimental and Test Reactors, Volume 2

This is Volume 2 of a two-volume document that collects the verification and validation (V&V) works done for the PLTEMP/ANL code during the years of its development and improvement. Volume 1 describes the V&V of sixteen capabilities of the PLTEMP/ANL code that were identified by research reactor analysts as frequently used in their thermal-hydraulic analysis. Volume 2 describes the V&V of developments and improvements since the release of PLTEMP/ANL Version 4.3. Each chapter of the document focuses on verifying or validating a specific part of the software that calculates a particular phenomenon, e.g., channel flow calculation, coolant property calculation, heat transfer calculation, and flow instability calculation. Software verification is performed by comparing the code with a hand calculation, Microsoft spreadsheet calculation, Mathematica calculation, or MATLAB calculation. The software validation is achieved by comparing the code with experimental data or a widely tested code like the RELAP5 code. In addition, some PLTEMP/ANL V&V works that are available in the open literature are simply referenced in Volume 1 of the document. PLTEMP/ANL has been used in safety analysis reports of several US and foreign research reactors licensed and converted from highly enriched uranium fuel to low-enriched uranium fuel. A list of such reactors is given in Volume 1 of the document.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Best Practices for Nuclear Experiment Data Preservation at Idaho National Laboratory: A Guide for Researchers and Reactor Operators

Preserving experimental data is essential for supporting advancements in nuclear science and ensuring the longevity of Idaho National Laboratory's contributions to reactor technology and safety. This report provides a comprehensive guide to best practices for experimental data management and preservation, focusing on standardized data formats, redundancy in storage, metadata documentation, and alignment with international standards. By following these recommendations, experimentalists and reactor operators can enhance the accessibility, reproducibility, and utility of critical datasets for regulatory review, validation computational methods, and future research.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗