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NASA NTRS2011

Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Shuttle Decision Making Process

This slide presentation reviews the use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to assist in the decision making for the shuttle design and operation. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and disciplined approach to identifying and analyzing risk in complex systems and/or processes that seeks answers to three basic questions: (i.e., what can go wrong? what is the likelihood of these occurring? and what are the consequences that could result if these occur?) The purpose of the Shuttle PRA (SPRA) is to provide a useful risk management tool for the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) to identify strengths and possible weaknesses in the Shuttle design and operation. SPRA was initially developed to support upgrade decisions, but has evolved into a tool that supports Flight Readiness Reviews (FRR) and near real-time flight decisions. Examples of the use of PRA for the shuttle are reviewed.

Boyer, Roger L.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Evolution of Space Shuttle Range Safety (RS) Ascent Flight Envelope Design

Ascent flight envelopes are trajectories that define the normal operating region of a space vehicle s position from liftoff until the end of powered flight. They fulfill part of the RS data requirements imposed by the Air Force s 45th Space Wing (45SW) on space vehicles launching from the Eastern Range (ER) in Florida. The 45SW is chartered to protect the public by minimizing risks associated with the inherent hazards of launching a vehicle into space. NASA s Space Shuttle program has launched 130+ manned missions over a 30 year period from the ER. Ascent envelopes were delivered for each of those missions. The 45SW envelope requirements have remained largely unchanged during this time. However, the methodology and design processes used to generate the envelopes have evolved over the years to support mission changes, maintain high data quality, and reduce costs. The evolution of the Shuttle envelope design has yielded lessons learned that can be applied to future endevours. There have been numerous Shuttle ascent design enhancements over the years that have caused the envelope methodology to evolve. One of these Shuttle improvements was the introduction of onboard flight software changes implemented to improve launch probability. This change impacted the preflight nominal ascent trajectory, which is a key element in the RS envelope design. While the early Shuttle nominal trajectories were designed preflight using a representative monthly mean wind, the new software changes involved designing a nominal ascent trajectory on launch day using real-time winds. Because the actual nominal trajectory position was not known until launch day, the envelope analysis had to be customized to account for this nominal trajectory variation in addition to the other envelope components.

Brewer, Joan D.↗
NASA NTRS2011

A History of Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Redline Limits Management

The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) has several "redlines", which are operational limits designated to preclude a catastrophic shutdown of the SSME. The Space Shuttle Orbiter utilizes a combination of hardware and software to enable or disable the automated redline shutdown capability. The Space Shuttle is launched with the automated SSME redline limits enabled, but there are many scenarios which may result in the manual disabling of the software by the onboard crew. The operational philosophy for manually enabling and disabling the redline limits software has evolved continuously throughout the history of the Space Shuttle Program, due to events such as SSME hardware changes and updates to Space Shuttle contingency abort software. In this paper, the evolution of SSME redline limits management will be fully reviewed, including the operational scenarios which call for manual intervention, and the events that triggered changes to the philosophy. Following this review, improvements to the management of redline limits for future spacecraft will be proposed.

Arnold, Thomas M.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Space Shuttle Day-of-Launch Trajectory Design Operations

A top priority of any launch vehicle is to insert as much mass into the desired orbit as possible. This requirement must be traded against vehicle capability in terms of dynamic control, thermal constraints, and structural margins. The vehicle is certified to specific structural limits which will yield certain performance characteristics of mass to orbit. Some limits cannot be certified generically and must be checked with each mission design. The most sensitive limits require an assessment on the day-of-launch. To further minimize vehicle loads while maximizing vehicle performance, a day-of-launch trajectory can be designed. This design is optimized according to that day s wind and atmospheric conditions, which increase the probability of launch. The day-of-launch trajectory design and verification process is critical to the vehicle s safety. The Day-Of-Launch I-Load Update (DOLILU) is the process by which the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Shuttle Program tailors the vehicle steering commands to fit that day s environmental conditions and then rigorously verifies the integrated vehicle trajectory s loads, controls, and performance. This process has been successfully used for almost twenty years and shares many of the same elements with other launch vehicles that execute a day-of-launch trajectory design or day-of-launch trajectory verification. Weather balloon data is gathered at the launch site and transmitted to the Johnson Space Center s Mission Control. The vehicle s first stage trajectory is then adjusted to the measured wind and atmosphere data. The resultant trajectory must satisfy loads and controls constraints. Additionally, these assessments statistically protect for non-observed dispersions. One such dispersion is the change in the wind from the last measured balloon to launch time. This process is started in the hours before launch and is repeated several times as the launch count proceeds. Should the trajectory design not meet all constraint criteria, Shuttle would be No-Go for launch. This Shuttle methodology is very similar to other unmanned launch vehicles. By extension, this method would likely be employed for any future NASA launch vehicle. This paper will review the Shuttle s day-of-launch trajectory optimization and verification operations as an example of a more generic application of day-of-launch design and validation. With Shuttle s retirement, it is fitting to document the current state of this critical process and capture lessons learned to benefit current and future launch vehicle endeavors.

Harrington, Brian E.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Flight Planning Branch Space Shuttle Lessons Learned

Planning products and procedures that allow the mission flight control teams and the astronaut crews to plan, train and fly every Space Shuttle mission have been developed by the Flight Planning Branch at the NASA Johnson Space Center. As the Space Shuttle Program ends, lessons learned have been collected from each phase of the successful execution of these Shuttle missions. Specific examples of how roles and responsibilities of console positions that develop the crew and vehicle attitude timelines will be discussed, as well as techniques and methods used to solve complex spacecraft and instrument orientation problems. Additionally, the relationships and procedural hurdles experienced through international collaboration have molded operations. These facets will be explored and related to current and future operations with the International Space Station and future vehicles. Along with these important aspects, the evolution of technology and continual improvement of data transfer tools between the shuttle and ground team has also defined specific lessons used in the improving the control teams effectiveness. Methodologies to communicate and transmit messages, images, and files from Mission Control to the Orbiter evolved over several years. These lessons have been vital in shaping the effectiveness of safe and successful mission planning that have been applied to current mission planning work in addition to being incorporated into future space flight planning. The critical lessons from all aspects of previous plan, train, and fly phases of shuttle flight missions are not only documented in this paper, but are also discussed as how they pertain to changes in process and consideration for future space flight planning.

Price, Jennifer B.↗
NASA NTRS2011

20 plus Years of Computational Fluid Dynamics for the Space Shuttle

This slide presentation reviews the use of computational fluid dynamics in performing analysis of the space shuttle with particular reference to the return to flight analysis and other shuttle problems. Slides show a comparison of pressure coefficient with the shuttle ascent configuration between the wind tunnel test and the computed values. the evolution of the grid system for the space shuttle launch vehicle (SSLv) from the early 80's to one in 2004, the grid configuration of the bipod ramp redesign from the original design to the current configuration, charts with the computations showing solid rocket booster surface pressures from wind tunnel data, calculated over two grid systems (i.e., the original 14 grid system, and the enhanced 113 grid system), and the computed flight orbiter wing loads are compared with strain gage data on STS-50 during flight. The loss of STS-107 initiated an unprecedented review of all external environments. The current SSLV grid system of 600+ grids, 1.8 Million surface points and 95+ million volume points is shown. The inflight entry analyses is shown, and the use of Overset CFD as a key part to many external tank redesign and debris assessments is discussed. The work that still remains to be accomplished for future shuttle flights is discussed.

Gomez, Reynaldo J., III↗
NASA NTRS2011

Microbiological Lessons Learned from the Space Shuttle

After 30 years of being the centerpiece of NASA s human spacecraft, the Space Shuttle will retire. This highly successful program provided many valuable lessons for the International Space Station (ISS) and future spacecraft. Major microbiological risks to crewmembers include food, water, air, surfaces, payloads, animals, other crewmembers, and ground support personnel. Adverse effects of microorganisms are varied and can jeopardize crew health and safety, spacecraft systems, and mission objectives. Engineering practices and operational procedures can minimize the negative effects of microorganisms. To minimize problems associated with microorganisms, appropriate steps must begin in the design phase of new spacecraft or space habitats. Spacecraft design must include requirements to control accumulation of water including humidity, leaks, and condensate on surfaces. Materials used in habitable volumes must not contribute to microbial growth. Use of appropriate materials and the implementation of robust housekeeping that utilizes periodic cleaning and disinfection will prevent high levels of microbial growth on surfaces. Air filtration can ensure low levels of bioaerosols and particulates in the breathing air. The use of physical and chemical steps to disinfect drinking water coupled with filtration can provide safe drinking water. Thorough preflight examination of flight crews, consumables, and the environment can greatly reduce pathogens in spacecraft. The advances in knowledge of living and working onboard the Space Shuttle formed the foundation for environmental microbiology requirements and operations for the International Space Station (ISS) and future spacecraft. Research conducted during the Space Shuttle Program resulted in an improved understanding of the effects of spaceflight on human physiology, microbial properties, and specifically the host-microbe interactions. Host-microbe interactions are substantially affected by spaceflight. Astronaut immune functions were found to be altered. Selected microorganisms were found to become more virulent during spaceflight. The increased knowledge gained on the Space Shuttle resulted in further studies of the host-microbe interactions on the ISS to determine if countermeasures were necessary. Lessons learned from the Space Shuttle Program were integrated into the ISS resulting in the safest space habitat to date.

Pierson, Duane L.↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA Flight Planning Branch Space Shuttle Lessons Learned

Planning products and procedures that allowed the mission Flight Control Teams and the Astronaut crews to plan, train and fly every Space Shuttle mission were developed by the Flight Planning Branch at the NASA Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. As the Space Shuttle Program came to a close, lessons learned were collected from each phase of the successful execution of these Space Shuttle missions. Specific examples of how roles and responsibilities of console positions that develop the crew and vehicle attitude timelines have been analyzed and will be discussed. Additionally, the relationships and procedural hurdles experienced through international collaboration have molded operations. These facets will be explored and related to current and future operations with the International Space Station and future vehicles. Along with these important aspects, the evolution of technology and continual improvement of data transfer tools between the Space Shuttle and ground team has also defined specific lessons used in improving the control team s effectiveness. Methodologies to communicate and transmit messages, images, and files from the Mission Control Center to the Orbiter evolved over several years. These lessons were vital in shaping the effectiveness of safe and successful mission planning and have been applied to current mission planning work in addition to being incorporated into future space flight planning. The critical lessons from all aspects of previous plan, train, and fly phases of Space Shuttle flight missions are not only documented in this paper, but are also discussed regarding how they pertain to changes in process and consideration for future space flight planning.

Clevenger, Jennifer D.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV): Flight Rationale for the Space Shuttle Program

Each Orbiter Vehicle (Space Shuttle Program) contains up to 24 Kevlar49/Epoxy Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV) for storage of pressurized gases. In the wake of the Columbia accident and the ensuing Return To Flight (RTF) activities, Orbiter engineers reexamined COPV flight certification. The original COPV design calculations were updated to include recently declassified Kevlar COPV test data from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and to incorporate changes in how the Space Shuttle was operated as opposed to orinigially envisioned. 2005 estimates for the probability of a catastrophic failure over the life of the program (from STS-1 through STS-107) were one-in-five. To address this unacceptable risk, the Orbiter Project Office (OPO) initiated a comprehensive investigation to understand and mitigate this risk. First, the team considered and eventually deemed unfeasible procuring and replacing all existing flight COPVs. OPO replaced the two vessels with the highest risk with existing flight spare units. Second, OPO instituted operational improvements in ground procedures to signficiantly reduce risk, without adversely affecting Shuttle capability. Third, OPO developed a comprehensive model to quantify the likelihood of occurrance. A fully-instrumented burst test (recording a lower burst pressure than expected) on a flight-certified vessel provided critical understanding of the behavior of Orbiter COPVs. A more accurate model was based on a newly-compiled comprehensive database of Kevlar data from LLNL and elsewhere. Considering hardware changes, operational improvements and reliability model refinements, the mean reliability was determined to be 0.998 for the remainder of the Shuttle Program (from 2007, for STS- 118 thru STS-135). Since limited hardware resources precluded full model validation through multiple tests, additional model confidence was sought through the first-ever Accelerated Stress Rupture Test (ASRT) of a flown flight article. A Bayesian statistical approach was developed to interpret possible test results. Since the lifetime observed in the ASRT exceeded initial estimates by one to two orders of magnitude, the Space Shuttle Program deemed there was significant conservatism in the model and accepted continued operation with existing flight hardware. Given the variability in tank-to-tank original prooftest response, a non-destructive evaluation (NDE) technique utilizing Raman Spectroscopy was developed to directly measure COPV residual stress state. Preliminary results showed that patterns of low fiber elastic strains over the outside vessel surface, together with measured permanent volume growth during proof, could be directly correlated to increased fiber stress ratios on the inside fibers adjacent to the liner, and thus reduced reliability.

Kezirian, Michael T.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Legacy of Environmental Research During the Space Shuttle Program

The Space Shuttle Program provided many opportunities to study the role of spaceflight on human life for over the last 30 years and represents the longest and largest U.S. human spaceflight program. Risks to crewmembers were included in the research areas of nutrition, microbiology, toxicology, radiation, and sleep quality. To better understand the Shuttle environment, Crew Health Care System was developed. As part of this system, the Environmental Health Subsystem was developed to monitor the atmosphere for gaseous contaminants and microbial contamination levels and to monitor water quality and radiation. This program expended a great deal of effort in studying and mitigating risks related to contaminations due to food, water, air, surfaces, crewmembers, and payloads including those with animals. As the Shuttle had limited stowage space and food selection, the development of nutritional requirements for crewmembers was imperative. As the Shuttle was a reusable vehicle, microbial contamination was of great concern. The development of monitoring instruments that could withstand the space environment took several years and many variations to come up with a suitable instrument. Research with space radiation provided an improved understanding of the various sources of ionizing radiation and the development of monitoring instrumentation for space weather and the human exposure within the orbiter's cabin. Space toxicology matured to include the management of offgassing products that could pollute the crewmembers air quality. The Shuttle Program implemented a 5-level toxicity rating system and developed new monitoring instrumentation to detect toxic compounds. The environment of space caused circadian desynchrony, sleep deficiency, and fatigue leading to much research and major emphasis on countermeasures. Outcomes of the research in these areas were countermeasures, operational protocols, and hardware. Learning Objectives: This symposium will provide an overview of the major environmental lessons learned and the development of countermeasures, monitoring hardware, and procedures.

Lane, Helen W.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Which Way is Up? Lessons Learned from Space Shuttle Sensorimotor Research

The Space Shuttle Program provided the opportunity to examine sensorimotor adaptation to space flight in unprecedented numbers of astronauts, including many over multiple missions. Space motion sickness (SMS) severity was highly variable across crewmembers. SMS generally lasted 2-3 days in-flight with approximately 1/3 of crewmembers experiencing moderate to severe symptoms, and decreased incidence in repeat flyers. While SMS has proven difficult to predict from susceptibility to terrestrial analogs, symptoms were alleviated by medications, restriction of early activities, maintaining familiar orientation with respect to the visual environment and maintaining contact cues. Adaptive changes were also reflected by the oculomotor and perceptual disturbances experienced early inflight and by the perceptual and motor coordination problems experienced during re-entry and landing. According to crew self-reports, systematic head movements performed during reentry, as long as paced within one's threshold for motion tolerance, facilitated the early readaptation process. The Shuttle provided early postflight crew access to document the initial performance decrements and time course of recovery. These early postflight measurements were critical to inform the program of risks associated with extending the duration of Shuttle missions. Neurological postflight deficits were documented using a standardized subjective rating by flight surgeons. Computerized dynamic posturography was also implemented as a quantitative means of assessing sensorimotor function to support crew return-to-duty assessments. Towards the end of the Shuttle Program, more emphasis has been placed on mapping physiological changes to functional performance. Future commercial flights will benefit from pre-mission training including exposures to launch and entry G transitions and sensorimotor adaptability assessments. While SMS medication usage will continue to be refined, non-pharmacological countermeasures (e.g., sensory aids) will have both space and Earth-based applications. Early postflight field tests are recommended to provide the evidence base for best practices for future commercial flight programs. Learning Objective: Overview of the Space Shuttle Program regarding adaptive changes in sensorimotor function, including what was learned from research, what was implemented for medical operations, and what is recommended for commercial flights.

Wood, S. J.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Launch Vehicle Demonstrator Using Shuttle Assets

The Marshall Space Flight Center Advanced Concepts Office (ACO) has the leading role for NASA s preliminary conceptual launch vehicle design and performance analysis. Over the past several years the ACO Earth-to-Orbit Team has evaluated thousands of launch vehicle concept variations for a multitude of studies including agency-wide efforts such as the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS), Constellation, Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HLLV), Heavy Lift Propulsion Technology (HLPT), Human Exploration Framework Team (HEFT), and Space Launch System (SLS). NASA plans to continue human space exploration and space station utilization. Launch vehicles used for heavy lift cargo and crew will be needed. One of the current leading concepts for future heavy lift capability is an inline one and a half stage concept using solid rocket boosters (SRB) and based on current Shuttle technology and elements. Potentially, the quickest and most cost-effective path towards an operational vehicle of this configuration is to make use of a demonstrator vehicle fabricated from existing shuttle assets and relying upon the existing STS launch infrastructure. Such a demonstrator would yield valuable proof-of-concept data and would provide a working test platform allowing for validated systems integration. Using shuttle hardware such as existing RS-25D engines and partial MPS, propellant tanks derived from the External Tank (ET) design and tooling, and four-segment SRB s could reduce the associated upfront development costs and schedule when compared to a concept that would rely on new propulsion technology and engine designs. There are potentially several other additional benefits to this demonstrator concept. Since a concept of this type would be based on man-rated flight proven hardware components, this demonstrator has the potential to evolve into the first iteration of heavy lift crew or cargo and serve as a baseline for block upgrades. This vehicle could also serve as a demonstration and test platform for the Orion Program. Critical spacecraft systems, re-entry and recovery systems, and launch abort systems of Orion could also be demonstrated in early test flights of the launch vehicle demo. Furthermore, an early demonstrator of this type would provide a stop-gap for retaining critical human capital and infrastructure while affording the current emerging generation of young engineers opportunity to work with and capture lessons learned from existing STS program offices and personnel, who were integral in the design and development of the Space Shuttle before these resources are no longer available. The objective of this study is to define candidate launch vehicle demonstration concepts that are based on Space Shuttle assets and determine their performance capabilities and how these demonstration vehicles could evolve to a heavy lift capability to low earth orbit.

Threet, Grady E., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Launch Vehicle Demonstrator Using Shuttle Assets

The Advanced Concepts Office at NASA's George C. Marshall Space Flight Center undertook a study to define candidate early heavy lift demonstration launch vehicle concepts derived from existing space shuttle assets. The objective was to determine the performance capabilities of these vehicles and characterize potential early demonstration test flights. Given the anticipated budgetary constraints that may affect America's civil space program, and a lapse in U.S. heavy launch capability with the retirement of the space shuttle, an early heavy lift launch vehicle demonstration flight would not only demonstrate capabilities that could be utilized for future space exploration missions, but also serve as a building block for the development of our nation s next heavy lift launch system. An early heavy lift demonstration could be utilized as a test platform, demonstrating capabilities of future space exploration systems such as the Multi Purpose Crew Vehicle. By using existing shuttle assets, including the RS-25D engine inventory, the shuttle equipment manufacturing and tooling base, and the segmented solid rocket booster industry, a demonstrator concept could expedite the design-to-flight schedule while retaining critical human skills and capital. In this study two types of vehicle designs are examined. The first utilizes a high margin/safety factor battleship structural design in order to minimize development time as well as monetary investment. Structural design optimization is performed on the second, as if an operational vehicle. Results indicate low earth orbit payload capability is more than sufficient to support various vehicle and vehicle systems test programs including Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle articles. Furthermore, a shuttle-derived, hydrogen core vehicle configuration offers performance benefits when trading evolutionary paths to maximum capability.

Creech, Dennis M.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Shuttle Propulsion Overview - The Design Challenges

The major elements of the Space Shuttle Main Propulsion System include two reusable solid rocket motors integrated into recoverable solid rocket boosters, an expendable external fuel and oxidizer tank, and three reusable Space Shuttle Main Engines. Both the solid rocket motors and space shuttle main engines ignite prior to liftoff, with the solid rocket boosters separating about two minutes into flight. The external tank separates, about eight and a half minutes into the flight, after main engine shutdown and is safely expended in the ocean. The SSME's, integrated into the Space Shuttle Orbiter aft structure, are reused after post landing inspections. The configuration is called a stage and a half as all the propulsion elements are active during the boost phase, with only the SSME s continuing operation to achieve orbital velocity. Design and performance challenges were numerous, beginning with development work in the 1970's. The solid rocket motors were large, and this technology had never been used for human space flight. The SSME s were both reusable and very high performance staged combustion cycle engines, also unique to the Space Shuttle. The multi body side mount configuration was unique and posed numerous integration and interface challenges across the elements. Operation of the system was complex and time consuming. This paper describes the design challenges and key areas where the design evolved during the program.

Owen, James W.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Shuttle Propulsion System Major Events and the Final 22 Flights

Numerous lessons have been documented from the Space Shuttle Propulsion elements. Major events include loss of the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB's) on STS-4 and shutdown of a Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) during ascent on STS-51F. On STS-112 only half the pyrotechnics fired during release of the vehicle from the launch pad, a testament for redundancy. STS-91 exhibited freezing of a main combustion chamber pressure measurement and on STS-93 nozzle tube ruptures necessitated a low liquid level oxygen cut off of the main engines. A number of on pad aborts were experienced during the early program resulting in delays. And the two accidents, STS-51L and STS-107, had unique heritage in history from early program decisions and vehicle configuration. Following STS-51L significant resources were invested in developing fundamental physical understanding of solid rocket motor environments and material system behavior. And following STS-107, the risk of ascent debris was better characterized and controlled. Situational awareness during all mission phases improved, and the management team instituted effective risk assessment practices. The last 22 flights of the Space Shuttle, following the Columbia accident, were characterized by remarkable improvement in safety and reliability. Numerous problems were solved in addition to reduction of the ascent debris hazard. The Shuttle system, though not as operable as envisioned in the 1970's, successfully assembled the International Space Station (ISS). By the end of the program, the remarkable Space Shuttle Propulsion system achieved very high performance, was largely reusable, exhibited high reliability, and was a heavy lift earth to orbit propulsion system. During the program a number of project management and engineering processes were implemented and improved. Technical performance, schedule accountability, cost control, and risk management were effectively managed and implemented. Award fee contracting was implemented to provide performance incentives. The Certification of Flight Readiness and Mission Management processes became very effective. A key to the success of the propulsion element projects was related to relationships between the MSFC project office and support organizations with their counterpart contractor organizations. The teams worked diligently to understand and satisfy requirements and achieve mission success.

Owen, James W.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Effect of Clouds on Optical Imaging of the Space Shuttle During the Ascent Phase: A Statistical Analysis Based on a 3D Model

Clouds are highly effective in obscuring optical images of the Space Shuttle taken during its ascent by ground-based and airborne tracking cameras. Because the imagery is used for quick-look and post-flight engineering analysis, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommended the return-to-flight effort include an upgrade of the imaging system to enable it to obtain at least three useful views of the Shuttle from lift-off to at least solid rocket booster (SRB) separation (NASA 2003). The lifetimes of individual cloud elements capable of obscuring optical views of the Shuttle are typically 20 minutes or less. Therefore, accurately observing and forecasting cloud obscuration over an extended network of cameras poses an unprecedented challenge for the current state of observational and modeling techniques. In addition, even the best numerical simulations based on real observations will never reach "truth." In order to quantify the risk that clouds would obscure optical imagery of the Shuttle, a 3D model to calculate probabilistic risk was developed. The model was used to estimate the ability of a network of optical imaging cameras to obtain at least N simultaneous views of the Shuttle from lift-off to SRB separation in the presence of an idealized, randomized cloud field.

FROM↗
NASA NTRS2013

Shuttle Topography Data Inform Solar Power Analysis

The next time you flip on a light switch, there s a chance that you could be benefitting from data originally acquired during the Space Shuttle Program. An effort spearheaded by Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in 2000 put together the first near-global elevation map of the Earth ever assembled, which has found use in everything from 3D terrain maps to models that inform solar power production. For the project, called the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM), engineers at JPL designed a 60-meter mast that was fitted onto Shuttle Endeavour. Once deployed in space, an antenna attached to the end of the mast worked in combination with another antenna on the shuttle to simultaneously collect data from two perspectives. Just as having two eyes makes depth perception possible, the SRTM data sets could be combined to form an accurate picture of the Earth s surface elevations, the first hight-detail, near-global elevation map ever assembled. What made SRTM unique was not just its surface mapping capabilities but the completeness of the data it acquired. Over the course of 11 days, the shuttle orbited the Earth nearly 180 times, covering everything between the 60deg north and 54deg south latitudes, or roughly 80 percent of the world s total landmass. Of that targeted land area, 95 percent was mapped at least twice, and 24 percent was mapped at least four times. Following several years of processing, NASA released the data to the public in partnership with NGA. Robert Crippen, a member of the SRTM science team, says that the data have proven useful in a variety of fields. "Satellites have produced vast amounts of remote sensing data, which over the years have been mostly two-dimensional. But the Earth s surface is three-dimensional. Detailed topographic data give us the means to visualize and analyze remote sensing data in their natural three-dimensional structure, facilitating a greater understanding of the features and processes taking place on Earth."

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2007

Image Analysis Based on Soft Computing and Applied on Space Shuttle During the Liftoff Process

Imaging techniques based on Soft Computing (SC) and developed at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) have been implemented on a variety of prototype applications related to the safety operation of the Space Shuttle during the liftoff process. These SC-based prototype applications include detection and tracking of moving Foreign Objects Debris (FOD) during the Space Shuttle liftoff, visual anomaly detection on slidewires used in the emergency egress system for the Space Shuttle at the laJlIlch pad, and visual detection of distant birds approaching the Space Shuttle launch pad. This SC-based image analysis capability developed at KSC was also used to analyze images acquired during the accident of the Space Shuttle Columbia and estimate the trajectory and velocity of the foam that caused the accident.

Dominquez, Jesus A.↗