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At least 325 records · Page 18

A Demonstration of Intelligent Container Surveillance Using Stationary and Mobile Camera Platforms

Surveillance of nuclear material storage containers is required to ensure that the container safety boundary is maintained during the service life of the container. As many of these container types are the first and only containment barrier to release protecting the worker, public, and environment, it is imperative to develop robust surveillance tools to characterize container degradation. Machine learning (ML) techniques have matured quickly in the past decade and are slowly becoming a routine application in data analysis. While more popular architectures have been developed with different applications in mind, these can be easily translated to container surveillance requirements. In this study, we developed a ML model based on the Detectron2 framework to identify slip lid containers and common exterior container defects, primarily dents. Commercial-off-the-shelf cameras are combined into a stationary camera array or are mounted to a robotic arm to provide more mobility for positioning needs. Results from the model evaluations on the images indicate that the stationary camera arrays outperform the accuracy of the mobile camera systems for both individual camera and composite image detections. Overall, however, the detection accuracies of the systems fell short of 50% and were less than satisfactory. Future efforts to improve the system involve focusing on a single camera deployable solution that combines a controllable light source that eliminates one of the biggest environmental factors that influence ML model detection performance. Additional training set collection is planned to build a more robust model that enables accurate detection from a wider range of imaging conditions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Lifetime extension drop-test of real-world corroded 5 Quart Hagan nuclear material storage container

A 5Qt Hagan container with a 20-year history of nuclear material storage was challenged with three successive drop tests at a height of 3.7 meters. The total mass of the test package was 12.1 kg. The 1st and 2nd drop tests (center of gravity over the container bottom corner but 180 degrees apart on the container bottom face) passed the pre- and post- impact helium leak criterion at less than 1.00E-6 atm-cc/sec (ambient cubic centimeters per second). The 3rd and final test (center of gravity over top corner) failed with a post-impact gross leak of 1.1E-1 atmcc/sec. The RRFMC (Respirable Release Fraction Measurement Chamber) is a drop tower test system that is critical for the sustainability of the SAVY-4000™ series and Hagan-type (NFT Inc. Golden CO) nuclear material storage containers. These are the primary in-use nuclear material storage container types at the Los Alamos National Laboratory TA-55 facility. Results are presented to expand the technical knowledge basis for container lifetime, regarding actual exposure to corrosive gas species on the container inner surfaces. The primary source of general corrosion throughout the container is gaseous hydrogen chloride (HCl). This gas is generated by the degradation of the polyvinylchloride (PVC) bag-out bag. Additionally, in most cases, the nuclear material itself also releases HCl gas (due to residual chemical components associated with the material formation). The RRFMC drop tower gives the end-user the ability record and analyze high-speed video and photography and if needed aerosol mass release measurements. In this report the principal issue is the physical deformation of the 5Qt Hagan container. There were no mass release experiments of test aerosol mass in the present study.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Examination of 3013 Containers Baseline Surface Features

The Surveillance and Monitoring Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was tasked with evaluating the baseline features of 3013 containers. This baseline is to be used as a basis for comparison for 3013 containers that had been packaged with corrosive plutonium materials. The LANL team evaluated an unwelded container, an unused welded container, and a welded container that had held plutonium metal without any corrosive impurities. These three containers had features with depths no larger than 6 µm and had similar depth distributions. The features observed in the baseline containers were all shallower than those seen in containers packaged with corrosive plutonium materials. This work establishes workflows for feature identification and measurement, as well as establishment of baseline data for future comparison with corroded containers.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Vertex-Aligned Model for Packing 4-Hexagonal Clusters in a Regular Hexagonal Container

This paper deals with a problem the packing polyhex clusters in a regular hexagonal container. It is a common problem in many applications with various cluster shapes used, but symmetric polyhex is the most useful in engineering due to its geometrical properties. Hence, we concentrate on mathematical modeling in such an application, where using the “bee” tetrahex is chosen for the new Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS) design upgrade, which is one of four detectors used in Large Hadron Collider (LHC) experiment at European Laboratory for Particle Physics (CERN). We start from the existing hexagonal containers with hexagonal cells packed inside, and uniform clustering applied. We compare the center-aligned (CA) and vertex-aligned (VA) models, analyzing cluster rotations providing the increased packing efficiency. We formally describe the geometrical properties of clustering approaches and show that cluster sharing is inevitable at the container border with uniform clustering. In addition, we propose a new vertex-aligned model decreasing the number of shared clusters in the uniform scenario, but with a smaller number of clusters contained inside the container. Also, we describe a non-uniform tetrahex cluster packing scheme in the proposed container model. With the proposed cluster packing solution, it is accomplished that all clusters are contained inside the container region. Since cluster-sharing is completely avoided at the container border, the maximal packing efficiency is obtained compared to the existing models.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Aluminum-fiber composites containing intermetallic phase at the matrix-fiber interface

A solid aluminum-fiber composite comprising: (i) an aluminum-containing matrix comprising elemental aluminum; (ii) coated or uncoated fibers embedded within said aluminum-containing matrix, wherein said fibers have a different composition than said aluminum-containing matrix and impart additional strength to said aluminum-containing matrix as compared to said aluminum-containing matrix in the absence of said fibers embedded therein; and (iii) an intermetallic layer present as an interface between each of said fibers and the aluminum-containing matrix, wherein said intermetallic layer has a composition different from said aluminum-containing matrix and said fibers, and said intermetallic layer contains at least one element that is also present in the aluminum-containing matrix and at least one element present in the fibers, whether from the coated or interior portion of the fibers. Methods of producing the above-described composite are also described.

Rios, Orlando↗

Load planning in the dark: RH-TRU waste container load planning at Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico - 15116

Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) performed several sets of experiments during the 1970's and 1980's with fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) and uranium oxide (UO{sub 2}) materials designed to simulate various fuel responses under varying reactor conditions. These research materials were from light water and breeder mixed oxide reactors. The experimental vessels and extraneous piece parts resulting from the experiments were identified as eligible for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) waste. Once Sandia received the approval to dispose at WIPP, discussions began with the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and Nuclear Waste Partnerships, LLC (NWP) to provide Central Characterization Program (CCP) support for certified acceptable knowledge, visual examination, and dose-to-curie for the repackaging effort. In addition to the WIPP support, Sandia was required to prepare a load plan describing the configuration of the parent containers and how they could be repackaged to meet WIPP and other regulatory requirements. However, all of these containers were packaged as material twenty (20) or thirty (30) years ago and the records of the packaging process and configuration were not documented as waste. Therefore, it seemed that the load plans were prepared with limited information regarding parent container configuration, hence in the dark. The design of the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF) in technical area (TA) V, where the repackaging was to take place, along with the shipping requirements for the RH 72-B cask, limited the options for repackaging. This configuration required that 0.114 m{sup 3} (30-gallon) containers be packaged in the hot cell, removed and placed into 0.208 m{sup 3} (55-gallon) containers to mitigate contamination issues. The material had been tracked as accountable nuclear material and Sandia had verified Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) data on each parent container. Based on the MC and A data, scaling factors could be determined and sampling and analysis was not required. However, it meant that parent containers could not be split into two daughter containers, though two or more parent containers could be combined into one daughter. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Drop Testing of a Container for the Storage, Transport and Disposal of Intermediate Level Waste - 18078

Impact tests were performed, as part of a corresponding container's substantiation, during design development of a shielded container proposed for use at Sellafield for waste retrieval from the First Generation Magnox Storage Pond (FGMSP) in the UK. The mechanical test program comprised a 9 m free drop test onto an unyielding target in a container long lid edge down orientation at ambient conditions. Further, a 0,5 m free drop test onto a punch target was performed. Here, the container was orientated with the lid downwards in a way that the punch, a mild steel bar, impacts a filter lid. The test specimen was instrumented with strain gauges and accelerometers for the drop tests. Transient strains at selected points of the inner and outer container walls, at the shielding lid, as well as at the lid bolts were measured during the container's impact. Furthermore, decelerations of the container body, container lid, and the skip were measured. The complex geometrical changes of the container due to impact were determined by optical 3d- deformation measures using the projected fringes method in combination with multi-image photogrammetry. This paper summarizes the performance of the drop tests and various drop test results in context with the design development as well as aspects regarding the associated Finite Element (FE) analyses and post-test evaluation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

LCA comparison of container systems in municipal solid waste management

The planning and design of integrated municipal solid waste management (MSWM) systems requires accurate environmental impact evaluation of the systems and their components. This research assessed, quantified and compared the environmental impact of the first stage of the most used MSW container systems. The comparison was based on factors such as the volume of the containers, from small bins of 60-80 l to containers of 2400 l, and on the manufactured materials, steel and high-density polyethylene (HDPE). Also, some parameters such as frequency of collections, waste generation, filling percentage and waste container contents, were established to obtain comparable systems. The methodological framework of the analysis was the life cycle assessment (LCA), and the impact assessment method was based on CML 2 baseline 2000. Results indicated that, for the same volume, the collection systems that use HDPE waste containers had more of an impact than those using steel waste containers, in terms of abiotic depletion, global warming, ozone layer depletion, acidification, eutrophication, photochemical oxidation, human toxicity and terrestrial ecotoxicity. Besides, the collection systems using small HDPE bins (60 l or 80 l) had most impact while systems using big steel containers (2400 l) had less impact. Subsequent sensitivity analysis about the parameters established demonstrated that they could change the ultimate environmental impact of each waste container collection system, but that the comparative relationship between systems was similar.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Ultrasonic, Non-Invasive Classification/Discrimination of Liquid Explosives (LEs) and Threat Liquids from Non-Threat Liquids in Sealed Containers

Government agencies and homeland security organizations are searching for more effective approaches for dealing with the increasing demand for inspections involving potential threat liquids and hazardous chemicals, including liquid explosives (LEs). The quantity and variability of hand-held and cargo-sized containers being shipped worldwide drives the need for rapid and effective ways for conducting non-intrusive inspections of liquid-filled containers of a diverse range of types, shapes and sizes. Such inspections need to quickly classify/discriminate between liquids within containers and also ascertain the presence of unexpected objects within a container. The science base, methodology and prototype device for classification/discrimination between classes of liquids has been developed. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has developed a methodology and prototype device for classification/discrimination of a wide variety of liquids (including threat liquids and their precursors), providing noninvasive liquid classification/discrimination capabilities using a nondestructive ultrasonic measurement approach for inspecting sealed containers. The Container Screening Device (CSD) employs frequency-modulated (FM) chirp excitation and pulse-compression signal processing techniques to measure ultrasonic velocity and a relative attenuation value for liquids within a container, and is capable of determining other acoustic properties from through-transmission, contact measurements over a wide frequency range. Recent algorithm developments are beginning to address the issues of container wall variations and thickness. A description of the basic science, measurement approach and sources of variability in the measurement will be presented and laboratory measurements acquired from a suite of commercial products and precursor liquids used in the manufacturing of Homemade Explosives (HMEs) will be given.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Water Ingress Testing of the Turbula Jar and U-233 Lead Pig Containers

Understanding the water ingress behavior of containers used at the TA-55 Plutonium Facility has significant implications for criticality safety. The purpose of this report is to document the water ingress behavior of the Turbula Jar with Bakelite lid and Viton gaskets (Turbula Jar) used in oxide blending operations and the U-233 lead pig container used to store and transport U-233 material. The technical basis for water resistant containers at TA-55 is described in LA-UR-15-22781, “Water Resistant Container Technical Basis Document for the TA-55 Criticality Safety Program.” Testing of the water ingress behavior of various containers is described in LA-CP-13-00695, “Water Penetration Tests on the Filters of Hagan and SAVY Containers,” LA-UR-15-23121, “Water Ingress into Crimped Convenience Containers under Flooding Conditions,” and in LA-UR- 16-2411, “Water Ingress Testing for TA-55 Containers.” Water ingress criteria are defined in TA55-AP-522 “TA-55 Criticality Safety Program”, and in PA-RD-01009 “TA55 Criticality Safety Requirements.” The water ingress criteria for submersion is no more than 50 ml of water ingress at a 6” water column height for a period of 2 hours.

42 ENGINEERING↗

He Leak Testing of 3013 Inner Container Lids

The 3013-container package is used for the long-term storage of plutonium bearing materials at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. The package consists of three nested stainless-steel containers: outer, inner and convenience, which are made of stainless steel. The requirements of the DOE 3013 Standarda, also entail the development of a surveillance program, tasked to ensure structural integrity of the outer container for at least 50 years. The Materials Identification and Surveillance Working Group (MIS-WG) is specified to be responsible for selecting the containers for the surveillance as well as analyzing results. The MIS-WG determined that corrosion is a potential mechanism for container degradation with the most credible type of failure to be stress corrosion cracking (SCC) through wall breach of the inner container closure weld region (ICCWR). A breach of the inner container has the potential of allowing corrosive gases to be released into the safety class outer container.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Complex-wide representation of material packaged in 3013 containers

The DOE sites packaging plutonium oxide materials packaged according to Department of Energy 3013 Standard (DOE-STD-3013) are responsible for ensuring that the materials are represented by one or more samples in the Materials Identification and Surveillance (MIS) program. The sites categorized most of the materials into process groups, and the remaining materials were characterized, based on the prompt gamma analysis results. The sites issued documents to identify the relationships between the materials packaged in 3013 containers and representative materials in the MIS program. These “Represented” documents were then reviewed and concurred with by the MIS Working Group. However, these documents were developed uniquely at each site and were issued before completion of sample characterization, small-scale experiments, and prompt gamma analysis, which provided more detailed information about the chemical impurities and the behavior of the material in storage. Therefore, based on the most recent data, relationships between the materials packaged in 3013 containers and representative materials in the MIS program been revised. With the prompt gamma analysis completed for Hanford, Rocky Flats, and Savannah River Site 3013 containers, MIS items have been assigned to the 3013 containers for which representation is based on the prompt gamma analysis results. With the revised relationships and the prompt gamma analysis results, a Master “Represented” table has been compiled to document the linkages between each 3013 container packaged to date and its representative MIS items. This table provides an important link between the Integrated Surveillance Program database, which contains information about each 3013 container to the MIS items database, which contains the characterization, prompt gamma data, and storage behavior data from shelf-life experiments for the representative MIS items.

42 ENGINEERING↗

COMPUTATION FLUID DYNAMICS ANALYSIS FOR GENERIC SMALL MODULAR REACTOR CONTAINMENT SEPARATE EFFECTS TEST

It is desirable for fourth-generation Small Modular Reactors to be passively cooled in standard and accident operations. Passive Containment Cooling Systems can reject heat from the containment structure, without using pumps or blowers. The targeted design containment structure is a large, domed, stainless steel, cylindrical vessel. In a postulated Design Basis Accident, steam will flash inside containment. Steam condensation occurs on the inner containment wall and transfers heat through the steel containment into a large body of water known as the annular reservoir (AR) surrounding the vessel serving as the ultimate heat sink. Natural circulation drives the flow in the AR and heat will be released to the environment by evaporation of water. Unique containment geometry requires a separate effects test (SET) facility for the verification and validation of the computer code and evaluation model development and assessment for reactor licensing efforts. In this study, STAR-CCM+, a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) code was used to inform the decision-making process on the design of the SET. The CFD simulation modeled, a two-phase turbulent flow with fluid film development and heat transfer for different containment geometries. The Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program will also be used in a code-to-code verification against the CFD results.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

CONTAINER MATERIALS, FABRICATION AND ROBUSTNESS

The multi-barrier 3013 container used to package plutonium-bearing materials is robust and thereby highly resistant to identified degradation modes that might cause failure. The only viable degradation mechanisms identified by a panel of technical experts were pressurization within and corrosion of the containers. Evaluations of the container materials and the fabrication processes and resulting residual stresses suggest that the multi-layered containers will mitigate the potential for degradation of the outer container and prevent the release of the container contents to the environment. Additionally, the ongoing surveillance programs and laboratory studies should detect any incipient degradation of containers in the 3013 storage inventory before an outer container is compromised.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Syntheses, crystal structures, and water adsorption behaviors of jungle-gym-type porous coordination polymers containing nitro moieties

NO{sub 2} containing dicarboxylate bridging ligands, nitroterephthalate (bdc-NO{sub 2}) and 2,5-dinitroterephthalate (bdc-(NO{sub 2}){sub 2}), afford porous coordination polymers, {l_brace}[Zn{sub 2}(bdc-NO{sub 2}){sub 2}(dabco)].solvents{r_brace}{sub n} (2 contains solvents) and {l_brace}[Zn{sub 2}(bdc-(NO{sub 2}){sub 2}){sub 2}(dabco)].solvents{r_brace}{sub n} (3 contains solvents). Both compounds form jungle-gym-type regularities, where a 2D square grid composed of dinuclear Zn{sub 2} units and dicarboxylate ligands is bridged by dabco molecules to extend the 2D layers into a 3D structure. In 2 contains solvents and 3 contains solvents, a rectangle pore surrounded by eight Zn{sub 2} corners contains two and four NO{sub 2} moieties, respectively. Thermal gravimetry (TG) and X-ray powder diffraction (XRPD) measurements reveal that both compounds maintain the frameworks regularities without guest molecules and with solvents such as MeOH, EtOH, i-PrOH, and Me{sub 2}CO. Adsorption measurements reveal that dried 2 and 3 adsorb H{sub 2}O molecules to be {l_brace}[Zn{sub 2}(bdc-NO{sub 2}){sub 2}(dabco)].4H{sub 2}O{r_brace}{sub n} (2 contains 4H{sub 2}O) and {l_brace}[Zn{sub 2}(bdc-(NO{sub 2}){sub 2}){sub 2}(dabco)].6H{sub 2}O{r_brace}{sub n} (3 contains 6H{sub 2}O), showing the pore hydrophilicity enhancement caused by NO{sub 2} group introduction. - Graphical abstract: Two hydrophilic porous coordination polymers, [Zn{sub 2}(bdc-NO{sub 2}){sub 2}(dabco)]{sub n} (2, bdc-NO{sub 2}=nitroterephthalate, dabco=1,4-diazabicyclo[2.2.2]octane) and [Zn{sub 2}(bdc-(NO{sub 2}){sub 2}){sub 2}(dabco)]{sub n} (3, bdc-(NO{sub 2}){sub 2}=2,5-dinitroterephthalate), have been synthesized and characterized by single X-ray analyses, thermal gravimetry, and adsorption measurements.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Enhancing reproducibility in scientific computing: Metrics and registry for Singularity containers

Here we present Singularity Hub, a framework to build and deploy Singularity containers for mobility of compute, and the singularity-python software with novel metrics for assessing reproducibility of such containers. Singularity containers make it possible for scientists and developers to package reproducible software, and Singularity Hub adds automation to this workflow by building, capturing metadata for, visualizing, and serving containers programmatically. Our novel metrics, based on custom filters of content hashes of container contents, allow for comparison of an entire container, including operating system, custom software, and metadata. First we will review Singularity Hub’s primary use cases and how the infrastructure has been designed to support modern, common workflows. Next, we conduct three analyses to demonstrate build consistency, reproducibility metric and performance and interpretability, and potential for discovery. This is the first effort to demonstrate a rigorous assessment of measurable similarity between containers and operating systems. We provide these capabilities within Singularity Hub, as well as the source software singularity-python that provides the underlying functionality. Singularity Hub is available at https://singularity-hub.org, and we are excited to provide it as an openly available platform for building, and deploying scientific containers.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Syracuse University Test Report On Uptake Factor Resulting From A Dropped Storage Container

Under certain circumstances, powder from an accidently dropped container can become airborne and inhaled by people nearby such as those who are moving the containers. The inhaled fine particles can deposit on respiratory tracts and lungs, causing asthma, lung cancer, and other acute respiratory illnesses and chronic symptoms. The objective of this study was to develop a standard procedure to measure the airborne concentrations of different size particles within the vicinity of a dropped container where a significant portion of the contained powder is ejected. Tungsten oxide (WO{sub 3}) was selected in this study to represent relatively heavy powders (7.16 g/cm3 specific gravity for WO{sub 3}). A typical can with the outer dimensions of 4.25” diameter and 4.875” tall was used as the container. The powder was dropped in two different configurations: 1) contained within a can covered by a lid that has a 0.25” diameter hole, and 2) contained within a can without a lid. The packing volume of the powder was 51.4 in{sup 3} (842.7 cm{sup 3}) and the target mass was 1936 g. The tests were carried out in a full-scale stainless steel environmental chamber with an interior volume of 852 ft{sup 3} (24.1 m{sup 3}). The chamber system includes an internal recirculation loop with a rectangular air diffuser and 10 variable frequency drive fans to provide a typical room air recirculation flow pattern. Two air filters were installed in the chamber air supply duct and return duct to achieve the required low background particle concentration. The initial chamber air conditions were set at 70°F (± 5°F) and 50% (± 10%) RH. A supporting frame and releasing device were designed and built to trigger consistently the dropping of the can at a height of 8 feet from the bottom of the can to the impacting surface. The particle sampling inlet was placed 5 ft above the floor and 6 inches laterally away from the can’s falling path. Concentrations of particles between 0.5 μm and 20 μm were recorded in units of mass and number of particles per unit volume. The data acquisition rate was once every 2 seconds during the first 2 hours and every 20 seconds thereafter. A test procedure was developed and a total of nine drop tests were performed. In most cases (seven tests), the can tipped over after dropping. The can in Test 1 stayed upright. The can in Test 7 showed a special behavior: after the rebound, it turned upside down and stayed upright. Major findings are summarized below: The amount of spilled powder varied from 0.12 g to 252.35 g and the non-recovered powder varied from 0.11 g to 1.18 g. The corresponding percentage of the spilled powder ranged from 0.01% to 13%;The peak value of particle number concentration after the dropping of the can occurred at approximately 0.9 μm particle size per measured data of individual channels. The peak value of particle mass concentration occurred in the range of 4.3 - 10 μm particle size per grouped data calculated from the measured data with the exception of Test 4 where a different batch powder with unexpectedly different bulk density and particle size distribution; After the dropping of the can, the total airborne mass concentrations ranged from 0.03 to 0.35 mg/m{sup 3}, while the total airborne number concentrations ranged from 2 to 125 #/cm{sup 3} except for Test 4. The number concentration in Test 4 was 1 or 2 orders of magnitude less than those of other tests because the powder was from a different batch. However, its mass concentration was comparable to that in Test 7 because relatively more big airborne particles were detected in Test 4. In general, tests with lid (Test 5, 6, 7 and 8) had smaller concentrations than tests without lid (Test 0, 1, 2, and 3). The influence of lid was not as prominent as the powder (Test 4). However, this needs more tests for verification; The ratio of airborne mass to non-recovered mass ranged from 0.1% to 2%. This means that it is challenging to use this method to check the mass balance, while the uptake factor and associated inhalation exposure can be readily assesse; The calculated cumulative uptake mass within first 10 minutes after the dropping of the can for each test was within the range of 0.002 mg to 0.035 mg. Assuming a breathing rate of 1.2 m{sup 3}/h, the uptake factor during the first 10 minutes was calculated to be between 10{sup -9} and 2×10{sup -8} in reference to the amount loaded; or between 10{sup -8} and 6×10{sup -5} in reference to the amount spilled. The experimental results of this study will be useful for standardizing the test method and provide data for estimating the exposure and associated risk to building occupants in the case of an accidental dropping of heavy powder containers.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Residual Stresses in SAVY 4000 and Hagan Container Bodies

Chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (SCC) has been investigated as a potential failure mechanism for the SAVY 4000 and the Hagan containers used to store plutonium-bearing materials at Los Alamos National Laboratory. This report discusses the regions of the container bodies most susceptible to SCC and the magnitude of the residual stresses in those regions. Boiling MgCl2 testing indicated that for both containers the region near the top weld was most susceptible to SCC. The Hagan showed through wall cracking after 22-24 hours of exposure both parallel (axial stresses) and perpendicular (hoop stresses) to the weld. The SAVY 4000 container showed significant cracking above and below the weld after 47 hours of exposure but there was no visual evidence of a through wall crack and the cracks did not leak water. Two through wall holes formed in the bottom of the SAVY 4000 container after 44-46 hours of exposure. For both containers, average “through wall” residual stresses were determined from hole drilling data 4 mm below the weld. In the Hagan body, average tensile hoop stresses were 194 MPa and average compressive axial stresses were -120 MPa. In the SAVY 4000 body, average compressive hoop stresses were 11 MPa and average tensile axial stresses were 25 MPa. Results suggest that because the Hagan container exhibited through wall cracking in a shorter time in boiling MgCl2 and had the higher average tensile stress, 194 MPa hoop stress, it is more susceptible to SCC than the SAVY 4000 container.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗