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Pantex Plant Ogallala Aquifer and Perched Groundwater Contingency Plan

The Pantex Plant Ogallala Aquifer and Perched Groundwater Contingency Plan has been developed in accordance with the requirements identified in the: • Interagency Agreement for the Pantex Superfund Site, Article 8.5 Work to be Performed, • Compliance Plan Provision of Hazardous Waste Permit No. 50284, and • Record of Decision for Groundwater, Soil, and Associated Media, Pantex Plant. A Long‐Term Monitoring System Design has been designed to monitor conditions in the perched groundwater including changes in the perched aquifer as a result of implementing the response actions. Monitoring is required for verifying the effectiveness of perched groundwater response actions (i.e., conditions in the perched aquifer are being affected as intended) and for confirming that the perched aquifer and Ogallala Aquifer characterization as defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Facility Investigation Report and the Corrective Measure Studies/Feasibility Study remains accurate. If monitoring results obtained through the monitoring network identify an unexpected condition or deviation, contingent actions will be considered and implemented as necessary to ensure continued protection of the Ogallala Aquifer and human health and the environment. Potential deviations to expected technology performance may be encountered for each of the four primary response actions that compose the selected remedy for perched groundwater; Playa 1 Pump and Treat System, Southeast Area Pump and Treat System, Southeast Area In‐Situ Bioremediation System (comprised of the Southeast In‐Situ Bioremediation System Original System, Southeast Area In‐Situ Bioremediation System Extension System, Offsite In‐Situ Bioremediation System, Perchlorate/Chromium ISB, Northeast ISB and County Road 8 ISB), and Zone 11 In‐Situ Bioremediation System. Monitoring will also be conducted to determine if there are deviations to the expected characterization, e.g., contaminants not expected as a result of the RCRA Facility Investigation characterization. Deviations to expected conditions in the Ogallala Aquifer could also be encountered if the response actions in the perched groundwater are not performing as expected, i.e., preventing contaminants from migrating to the Ogallala Aquifer. Currently, Pantex has begun investigation of detections of high explosives above groundwater protection standards in wells on the Texas Tech University property and a plume that is moving to the northeast from that area. Due to those detections, this Plan recognizes the fact that future detections in the Ogallala will be focused on first‐ time detections of analytes. After a remedy is determined, this Plan will require modification to address-deviations and contingent actions. This Plan was developed to identify the contingent actions necessary to mitigate impacts resulting from deviations to site conditions or response action performance. The Plan defines the environmental problem being addressed by the response actions, clarifies the expected conditions and objectives of the response actions, and identifies the potential deviations to the response actions (due to site conditions or technology performance) that could be encountered. The deviations were evaluated to determine the likelihood of occurrence, potential impact, and time to respond to avoid impact. The Plan also identifies the monitoring outlined in the Long‐Term Monitoring System Design Report (Consolidated Nuclear Security, 2024) and Sampling Analysis Plan (PanTeXas Deterrence, 2024) that will be used to detect the deviations. Lastly, the Plan specifies the contingent actions that could be implemented in response to the deviations. Because each response focuses on a discrete portion of the perched aquifer and contaminant plume, each response action has a different set of expected conditions, and therefore differing impacts from deviations to the site and technology expectations. As a result, the contingent actions are identified for each response action and potential deviation including specific constituents, location, and conditions. If deviations are encountered that impact the ability of the response action to meet performance objectives, the contingent actions will be focused on ensuring the response action can meet the performance objective. Contingent actions may be implemented as interim actions (ISMs/removal actions) in accordance with the Record of Decision, Interagency Agreement, and Hazardous Waste Permit‐50284, if warranted by the specific circumstances. For deviations to site characterization expected conditions, the contingent action will focus on determination of the source of the deviation, determination of the appropriate response, and evaluation of additional work to be completed. However, if the deviation to characterization impacts the performance of the response action, the contingent action will again focus on ensuring performance objectives can be met. Early source term removals and cleanup actions have been implemented to protect the Ogallala Aquifer. Because of these actions and based on modeling results, the expected conditions in the Ogallala Aquifer are that constituents of concern will not be detected above the Groundwater Protection Standards (GWPSs) nor will they reach potential points of exposure above the GWPS. The primary deviation of concern for the Ogallala is if constituents are detected in the Ogallala Aquifer near or above GWPSs. If it occurs, this change in expected conditions would require further evaluation of site and contaminant characteristics to determine an appropriate course of action. The evaluation would include additional monitoring, source identification, implementation of interim protective measures (if necessary), and delineation of extent. These evaluations are necessary to determine an appropriate response action for the Ogallala. The primary goal of the Plan is to provide for the continued protection of the Ogallala Aquifer and the health of its consumers. In recognition, this Plan presents a flexible and rational approach for making future decisions associated with confirming the change in perched and Ogallala aquifer conditions and identifying a response (technical activities, changes to response actions, regulatory oversight, and public involvement).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Discussion of Procedures and Equipment for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty On-Site Inspection Environmental Sampling and Analysis

This paper is intended to serve as a scientific basis to start discussions of the available environmental sampling techniques and equipment that have been used in the past that could be considered for use within the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on-site inspections (OSI). This work contains information on the techniques, equipment, costs, and some operational procedures associated with environmental sampling that have actually been used in the past by the United States for the detection of nuclear explosions. This paper also includes a discussion of issues, recommendations, and questions needing further study within the context of the sampling and analysis of aquatic materials, atmospheric gases, atmospheric particulates, vegetation, sediments and soils, fauna, and drill-back materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

On the use of remote infrasound and seismic stations to constrain the eruptive sequence and intensity for the 2014 Kelud eruption

The February 2014 eruption of Kelud volcano (Indonesia) destroyed most of the instruments near it. We use remote seismic and infrasound sensors to reconstruct the eruptive sequence. The first explosions were relatively weak seismic and infrasound events. A major stratospheric ash injection occurred a few minutes later and produced long-lasting atmospheric and ground-coupled acoustic waves that were detected as far as 11,000 km by infrasound sensors and up to 2300 km away on seismometers. A seismic event followed ~12 minutes later and was recorded 7000 km away by seismometers. We estimate a volcanic intensity around 10.9, placing the 2014 Kelud eruption between the 1980 Mount St. Helens and 1991 Pinatubo eruptions intensities. As a result, we demonstrate how remote infrasound and seismic sensors are critical for the early detection of volcanic explosions, and how they can help to constrain and understand eruptive sequences.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

DETECTION OF AN OUTBURST ONE YEAR PRIOR TO THE EXPLOSION OF SN 2011ht

Using imaging from the Pan-STARRS1 survey, we identify a precursor outburst at 287 and 170 days prior to the reported explosion of the purported Type IIn supernova (SN) 2011ht. In the Pan-STARRS data, a source coincident with SN 2011ht is detected exclusively in the z {sub P1} and y {sub P1}-bands. An absolute magnitude of M{sub z} ≅ –11.8 suggests that this was an outburst of the progenitor star. Unfiltered, archival Catalina Real Time Transient Survey images also reveal a coincident source from at least 258 to 138 days before the main event. We suggest that the outburst is likely to be an intrinsically red eruption, although we cannot conclusively exclude a series of erratic outbursts which were observed only in the redder bands by chance. This is only the fourth detection of an outburst prior to a claimed SN, and lends credence to the possibility that many more interacting transients have pre-explosion outbursts, which have been missed by current surveys.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Measurement of Argon-37 Background Concentrations in the Atmosphere

Radioisotopes of noble gases, primarily xenon and argon, are important indicators of underground nuclear explosions. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) includes monitoring capabilities to identify potential nuclear explosions conducted in violation of the CTBT. This monitoring currently focuses on measurement of the xenon isotopes 133 Xe, 135 Xe, 131 mXe and 133 mXe. However, it is predicted that within 100 days of an underground nuclear explosion (UNE) 37 Ar would be released to the atmosphere at higher concentrations than xenon isotopes (Haas et al. 2010). Therefore, inclusion of 37 Ar measurement capabilities at atmospheric International Monitoring System (IMS) stations could improve the capability to detect a nuclear explosion. At an IMS station, it could be difficult to determine what constitutes an elevated concentration as a result of an UNE without first understanding the expected range of background concentrations. This work describes our analysis of atmospheric samples for 37 Ar to evaluate the range of background concentrations. The range of 37 Ar concentrations measured in atmospheric air samples was relatively narrow ranging between less than 1 mBq/m 3 to greater than 2 mBq/m 3 . The average atmospheric concentration of all samples was 0.98 mBq/m 3 , with a standard deviation of 0.5 mBq/m 3 . This is consistent with previous published results. The results presented here demonstrate the capability to detect background concentrations of 37 Ar in atmospheric air.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

The 2014 Integrated Field Exercise of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty revisited: The case for data fusion

The International Monitoring System of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) uses a global network of radionuclide monitoring stations to detect evidence of a nuclear explosion. The two radionuclide technologies employed—particulate and noble gas (radioxenon) detection—have applications for data fusion to improve detection of a nuclear explosion. Using the hypothetical 0.5 kT nuclear explosive test scenario of the CTBTO 2014 Integrated Field Exercise, the intrinsic relationship between particulate and noble gas signatures has been examined. Here this study shows that, depending upon the time of the radioxenon release, the particulate progeny can produce the more detectable signature. Thus, as both particulate and noble gas signatures are inherently coupled, the authors recommend that the sample categorization schemes should be linked.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Inspecting the minefield and residual explosives by fast neutron activation method

As an upgrade of a robotic mobile system for antipersonnel land-mine clearance, a fast neutron probe has been considered for the detection of mines and explosive residues. Laboratory tests were made by using the 14 MeV 6 x 10{sup 7} neutrons/sec beam with the associated alpha particle detection and with a LaBr{sub 3} gamma ray detector. Simulant of the anti-personal mine was used as a target. Several measurements were made with the target buried into the soil at different depths. For each depth minimal time measurement was estimated for false negative 0.4 % and false positive equal to 10 %. Tests showed that is possible to detect buried land-mine as well as residual explosives; however, in order to reach the optimal speed of 10 cm/s for de-mining vehicle it is necessarily to use several sealed tube neutron generators and few tens of LaBr{sub 3} gamma ray detectors. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Comparison of near-background concentrations of Argon-37 and Xenon-133 in the Atmosphere

Radioisotopes of noble gases xenon and argon can be important indicators of underground nuclear explosions. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) includes monitoring capabilities to identify potential nuclear explosions conducted in violation of the CTBT. This monitoring currently focuses on measurement of the xenon isotopes 133Xe, 135Xe, 131mXe and 133mXe. However, it is predicted that within 100 days of an underground nuclear explosion (UNE) 37Ar would be released to the atmosphere at higher concentrations than xenon isotopes (Haas et al. 2010) and with a higher signal to background ratio, depending on the radioxenon background levels. Therefore, inclusion of 37Ar measurement capabilities at atmospheric International Monitoring System (IMS) stations may represent an improvement in the capability to detect a nuclear explosion. At an IMS station, it could be difficult to determine what constitutes an elevated concentration as a result of an UNE without first understanding the expected range of background concentrations. This work describes our analysis of atmospheric samples for 37Ar to evaluate the range of background concentrations. Samples were collected at multiple locations, with approximately half coming from a sampler co-located with an IMS xenon monitoring station (RN75). The range of 37Ar concentrations measured in atmospheric air samples was relatively narrow; for samples considered detectable, the minimum and maximum measured concentrations were 0.56 and 2.3 mBq/m3, respectively. Comparison of 37Ar and 133Xe concentrations measured at the IMS station indicated some correlation between the measured concentrations. The results presented here demonstrate the capability to detect background concentrations of 37Ar in atmospheric air and provide a basis for potential implementation of 37Ar monitoring at IMS stations.

Fritz, Brad G.↗

False alarms and the IMS infrasound network: Understanding the factors influencing the creation of false events

The International Monitoring System (IMS) infrasound network has been designed to acquire the necessary data to detect and locate explosions in the atmosphere with a yield equivalent to 1 kiloton of TNT anywhere on Earth. A major associated challenge is the task of automatically processing data from all IMS infrasound stations to identify possible nuclear tests for subsequent review by analysts. This paper is the first attempt to quantify the false alarm rate (FAR) of the IMS network, and in particular to assess how the FAR is affected by the numbers and distributions of detections at each infrasound station. To ensure that the results are sufficiently general, and not dependent entirely on one detection algorithm, the assessment is based on two detection algorithms that can be thought of as end members in their approach to the trade-off between missed detections and false alarms. The results show that the FAR for events formed at only two arrays is extremely high (ranging from 10’s to 100’s of false events per day across the IMS network, depending on the detector tuning). It is further shown that the FAR for events formed at three or more IMS arrays is driven by ocean-generated waves (microbaroms), despite efforts within both detection algorithms for avoiding these signals, indicating that further research into this issue is merited. Overall, the results highlight the challenge of processing data from a globally sparse network of stations to detect and form events. On the basis of these results, it is shown that further work on understanding signal and noise characteristics is needed before attempting to automatically form events detected at only two arrays on the global network. In particular, more work is required to reduce false alarms caused by the detection of microbarom signals.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

A Novel Approach to Detect Accelerated Aged and Surface-Mediated Degradation in Explosives by UPLC-ESI-MS.

A new approach was created for studying energetic material degradation. This approach involved detecting and tentatively identifying non-volatile chemical species by liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry (LC-MS) with multivariate statistical data analysis that form as the CL-20 energetic material thermally degraded. Multivariate data analysis showed clear separation and clustering of samples based on sample group: either pristine or aged material. Further analysis showed counter-clockwise trends in the principal components analysis (PCA), a type of multivariate data analysis, Scores plots. These trends may indicate that there was a discrete shift in the chemical markers as the went from pristine to aged material, and then again when the aged CL-20 mixed with a potentially incompatible material was thermally aged for 4, 6, or 9 months. This new approach to studying energetic material degradation should provide greater knowledge of potential degradation markers in these materials.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Synthesis and Electrochemical Behavior of Electron-Rich s-Tetrazine and Triazolo-tetrazine Nitrate Esters

Here, we have prepared energetic nitrate ester derivatives of 1,2,4,5-tetrazine and 1,2,4-triazolo[4,3-b]-[1,2,4,5]-tetrazine ring systems as model compounds to study the electrochemical behavior of tetrazines in the presence of explosive groups. The model compounds showed lower thermal stabilities relative to PETN (pentaerythritol tetranitrate), but slightly improved mechanical sensitivities. The presence of electron-rich amine donors leads to a cathodic shift of the tetrazine redox potentials relative to those of previously reported tetrazine explosives. At these potentials, electron-rich tetrazines with either covalently bound or co-dissolved nitrate ester groups are irreversibly reduced. Effectively, changes in the electronic structure of tetrazines affect their electrochemical response to the presence of nitrate ester groups. Thus, it may be possible to develop tetrazine-based electrochemical sensors for the detection of specific explosives and electrocatalysts for their disposal.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Amchitka Island, Alaska, Biological Monitoring Report 2011 Sampling Results

The Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance (LTS&M) Plan for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) Amchitka Island sites describes how LM plans to conduct its mission to protect human health and the environment at the three nuclear test sites located on Amchitka Island, Alaska. Amchitka Island, near the western end of the Aleutian Islands, is approximately 1,340 miles west-southwest of Anchorage, Alaska. Amchitka is part of the Aleutian Island Unit of the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge, which is administered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). Since World War II, Amchitka has been used by multiple U.S. government agencies for various military and research activities. From 1943 to 1950, it was used as a forward air base for the U.S. Armed Forces. During the middle 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) used a portion of the island as a site for underground nuclear tests. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the U.S. Navy constructed and operated a radar station on the island. Three underground nuclear tests were conducted on Amchitka Island. DOD, in conjunction with AEC, conducted the first nuclear test (named Long Shot) in 1965 to provide data that would improve the United States' capability of detecting underground nuclear explosions. The second nuclear test (Milrow) was a weapons-related test conducted by AEC in 1969 as a means to study the feasibility of detonating a much larger device. Cannikin, the third nuclear test on Amchitka, was a weapons-related test detonated on November 6, 1971. With the exception of small concentrations of tritium detected in surface water shortly after the Long Shot test, radioactive fission products from the tests remain in the subsurface at each test location As a continuation of the environmental monitoring that has taken place on Amchitka Island since before 1965, LM in the summer of 2011 collected biological and seawater samples from the marine and terrestrial environment of Amchitka Island adjacent to the three detonation sites and at a background or reference site, Adak Island, 180 miles to the east. Consistent with the goals of the Amchitka LTS&M Plan, four data quality objectives (DQOs) were developed for the 2011 sampling event.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

The AtmoSOFAR Channel: First Direct Observations of an Elevated Acoustic Duct

The Sound Fixing and Ranging (SOFAR) channel in the ocean allows for low frequency sound to travel thousands of kilometers, making it particularly useful for detecting underwater nuclear explosions. Suggestions that an elevated SOFAR-like channel should exist in the stratosphere date back over half a century and imply that sources within this region can be reliably sensed at vast distances. However, this theory has not been supported with evidence of direct observations from sound within this channel. Here we show that an infrasound sensor on a solar hot air balloon recorded the first infrasound detection of a ground truth airborne source while within this acoustic channel, which we refer to as the AtmoSOFAR channel. Our results support the existence of the AtmoSOFAR channel, demonstrate that acoustic signals can be recorded within it, and provide insight into the characteristics of recorded signals. Results also show a lack of detections on ground-based stations, highlighting the advantages of using balloon-borne infrasound sensors to detect impulsive sources at altitude.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

IT'S ALIVE{exclamation_point} THE SUPERNOVA IMPOSTOR 1961V

Reports of the death of the precursor of supernova (SN) 1961V in NGC 1058 are exaggerated. Consideration of the best astrometric data shows that the star, known as 'Object 7', lies at the greatest proximity to SN 1961V and is the likely survivor of the 'SN impostor' super-outburst. SN 1961V does not coincide with a neighboring radio source and is therefore not a radio SN. Additionally, the current properties of Object 7, based on data obtained with the Hubble Space Telescope, are consistent with it being a quiescent luminous blue variable (LBV). Furthermore, post-explosion non-detections by the Spitzer Space Telescope do not necessarily and sufficiently rule out a surviving LBV. We therefore consider, based on the available evidence, that it is still a bit premature to reclassify SN 1961V as a bona fide SN. The inevitable demise of this star, though, may not be too far off.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

EVIDENCE THAT GAMMA-RAY BURST 130702A EXPLODED IN A DWARF SATELLITE OF A MASSIVE GALAXY

GRB 130702A is a nearby long-duration gamma-ray burst (LGRB) discovered by the Fermi satellite whose associated afterglow was detected by the Palomar Transient Factory. Subsequent photometric and spectroscopic monitoring has identified a coincident broad-lined Type Ic supernova (SN), and nebular emission detected near the explosion site is consistent with a redshift of z = 0.145. The SN-GRB exploded at an offset of {approx}7.''6 from the center of an inclined r = 18.1 mag red disk-dominated galaxy, and {approx}0.''6 from the center of a much fainter r = 23 mag object. We obtained Keck-II DEIMOS spectra of the two objects and find a 2{sigma} upper limit on their line-of-sight velocity offset of {approx}<60 km s{sup -1}. If we calculate the inclination angle of the massive red galaxy from its axis ratio and assume that its light is dominated by a very thin disk, the explosion would have a {approx}60 kpc central offset, or {approx}9 times the galaxy's half-light radius. A significant bulge or a thicker disk would imply a higher inclination angle and greater central offset. The substantial offset suggests that the faint source is a separate dwarf galaxy. The star-formation rate of the dwarf galaxy is {approx}0.05 M{sub Sun} yr{sup -1}, and we place an upper limit on its oxygen abundance of 12 + log(O/H) < 8.16 dex. The identification of an LGRB in a dwarf satellite of a massive, metal-rich primary galaxy suggests that recent detections of LGRBs spatially coincident with metal-rich galaxies may be, in some cases, superpositions.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Development of the Photonuclear Method for Detection of Hidden (N; C) Concentrations with Registration of Induced ({sup 12}N; {sup 12}B) Activities

An overview of the studies devoted to the development of the photonuclear method of external detection of hidden explosives and narcotic drugs using the registration of induced activities of the short-lived radioisotopes {sup 12}N and {sup 12}B is presented. The main aspects of this method are considered: the involved nuclear reactions; emission of γ-quanta, electrons, and positrons from irradiated objects upon ({sup 12}N; {sup 12}B) decays; radiation safety problems; detectors for registration of ({sup 12}N; {sup 12}B) activities at pulsed electron accelerators; and model descriptions of the attempts to implement the method.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

DEVELOPMENT OF DECISION MAKING ALGORITHM FOR CONTROL OF SEA CARGO CONTAINERS BY 'TAGGED' NEUTRON METHOD

Nowadays in Russia and abroad there are several groups of scientists, engaged in development of systems based on 'tagged' neutron method (API method) and intended for detection of dangerous materials, including high explosives (HE). Particular attention is paid to possibility of detection of dangerous objects inside a sea cargo container. Energy gamma-spectrum, registered from object under inspection is used for determination of oxygen/carbon and nitrogen/carbon chemical ratios, according to which dangerous object is distinguished from not dangerous one. Material of filled container, however, gives rise to additional effects of rescattering and moderation of 14 MeV primary neutrons of generator, attenuation of secondary gamma-radiation from reactions of inelastic neutron scattering on objects under inspection. These effects lead to distortion of energy gamma-response from examined object and therefore prevent correct recognition of chemical ratios. These difficulties are taken into account in analytical method, presented in the paper. Method has been validated against experimental data, obtained by the system for HE detection in sea cargo, based on API method and developed in VNIIA. Influence of shielding materials on results of HE detection and identification is considered. Wood and iron were used as shielding materials. Results of method application for analysis of experimental data on HE simulator measurement (tetryl, trotyl, hexogen) are presented.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗