Apollo crew procedures, simulation, and flight planning
Apollo crew procedures, simulation and flight planning, discussing navigation, guidance and control procedures
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Apollo crew procedures, simulation and flight planning, discussing navigation, guidance and control procedures
An exploratory study that describes and contrasts two three-person flight crews performing in a B-727 simulator is presented. This study specifically attempts to delineate crew communication patterns accounting for measured differences in performance across routine and nonroutine flight patterns. The communication patterns in the two crews evaluated indicated different modes of coordination, i.e., standardization in the less effective crew and planning/mutual adjustment in the more effective crew.
Accident statistics cite the flight crew as a causal factor in over 60% of large transport aircraft fatal accidents. Yet, a well-trained and well-qualified pilot is acknowledged as the critical center point of aircraft systems safety and an integral safety component of the entire commercial aviation system. The latter statement, while generally accepted, cannot be verified because little or no quantitative data exists on how and how many accidents/incidents are averted by crew actions. A joint NASA/FAA high-fidelity motion-base simulation experiment specifically addressed this void by collecting data to quantify the human (pilot) contribution to safety-of-flight and the methods they use in today's National Airspace System. A human-in-the-loop test was conducted using the FAA's Oklahoma City Flight Simulation Branch Level D-certified B-737-800 simulator to evaluate the pilot's contribution to safety-of-flight during routine air carrier flight operations and in response to aircraft system failures. These data are fundamental to and critical for the design and development of future increasingly autonomous systems that can better support the human in the cockpit. Eighteen U.S. airline crews flew various normal and non-normal procedures over a two-day period and their actions were recorded in response to failures. To quantify the human's contribution to safety of flight, crew complement was used as the experiment independent variable in a between-subjects design. Pilot actions and performance during single pilot and reduced crew operations were measured for comparison against the normal two-crew complement during normal and non-normal situations. This paper details the crew's actions, including decision-making, and responses while dealing with a drive shaft failure - one of 6 non-normal events that were simulated in this experiment.
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) team is preparing for NASA's third scheduled service call to Hubble. This mission, STS-103, will launch from Kennedy Space Center aboard the Space Shuttle Discovery. The seven flight crew members are Commander Curtis L. Brown, Pilot Scott J. Kelly, European Space Agency (ESA) astronaut Jean-Francois Clervoy who will join space walkers Steven L. Smith, C. Michael Foale, John M. Grunsfeld, and ESA astronaut Claude Nicollier. The objectives of the HST Third Servicing Mission (SM3A) are to replace the telescope's six gyroscopes, a Fine-Guidance Sensor, an S-Band Single Access Transmitter, a spare solid-state recorder and a high-voltage/temperature kit for protecting the batteries from overheating. In addition, the crew plans to install an advanced computer that is 20 times faster and has six times the memory of the current Hubble Space Telescope computer. To prepare for these extravehicular activities (EVAs), the SM3A astronauts participated in Crew Familiarization sessions with the actual SM3A flight hardware. During these sessions the crew spent long hours rehearsing their space walks in the Guidance Navigation Simulator and NBL (Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory). Using space gloves, flight Space Support Equipment (SSE), and Crew Aids and Tools (CATs), the astronauts trained with and verified flight orbital replacement unit (ORU) hardware. The crew worked with a number of trainers and simulators, such as the High Fidelity Mechanical Simulator, Guidance Navigation Simulator, System Engineering Simulator, the Aft Shroud Door Trainer, the Forward Shell/Light Shield Simulator, and the Support Systems Module Bay Doors Simulator. They also trained and verified the flight Orbital Replacement Unit Carrier (ORUC) and its ancillary hardware. Discovery's planned 10-day flight is scheduled to end with a night landing at Kennedy.
U.S. space policy directs pursuit of commercial opportunities for providing transportation and other services low Earth orbit and beyond. COTS Project established to implement policy. COTS strategy: Phase 1) Assist industry with system development/demonstrations (COTS Demos); Phase 2) Procure commercial services for ISS logistics support. COTS Demonstrations competition completed in 10 months. Two industry partners selected for funded Space Act Agreements: 1) SpaceX & Rocketplane-Kistler; and 2) Unfunded Space Act Agreements in work with other competitors. COTS budget of $500 M thru 2010, with pay for performance milestone approach. Cargo flight demonstrations planned for 2008 and 2009: Crew flight demonstration options for 2011-2012. Commercial cargo transportation services potentially available as early as 2009-2010. Successful COTS partners may open new space markets and provide reliable, cost effective cargo and crew transportation services, a new era for commercial space.
The Crew Vehicle Interface (CVI) group of the Integrated Intelligent Flight Deck Technologies (IIFDT) has done extensive research in the area of Synthetic Vision (SV), and has shown that SV technology can substantially enhance flight crew situation awareness, reduce pilot workload, promote flight path control precision and improve aviation safety. SV technology is being extended to evaluate its utility for lunar and planetary exploration vehicles. SV may hold significant potential for many lunar and planetary missions since the SV presentation provides a computer-generated view of the terrain and other significant environment characteristics independent of the outside visibility conditions, window locations, or vehicle attributes. SV allows unconstrained control of the computer-generated scene lighting, terrain coloring, and virtual camera angles which may provide invaluable visual cues to pilots/astronauts and in addition, important vehicle state information may be conformally displayed on the view such as forward and down velocities, altitude, and fuel remaining to enhance trajectory control and vehicle system status. This paper discusses preliminary SV concepts for tactical and strategic displays for a lunar landing vehicle. The technical challenges and potential solutions to SV applications for the lunar landing mission are explored, including the requirements for high resolution terrain lunar maps and an accurate position and orientation of the vehicle that is essential in providing lunar Synthetic Vision System (SVS) cockpit displays. The paper also discusses the technical challenge of creating an accurate synthetic terrain portrayal using an ellipsoid lunar digital elevation model which eliminates projection errors and can be efficiently rendered in real-time.
The current shuttle orbiter configuration and its crew module and payload bay accomodations for work and off duty activities are described. The capability of the remote manipulator system and provisions to support extravehicular activities are examined with emphasis on flight crew activities for orbital flight tests and for early operational space transportation system flights. Facilities used to verify crew interfaces are also described.
The Advanced Aircraft Flight Simulator is equipped with a motorized mechanism that simulates a two engine throttle control system that can be operated via a computer driven performance management system or manually by the pilots. The throttle control system incorporates features to simulate normal engine operations and thrust reverse and vary the force feel to meet a variety of research needs. While additional testing to integrate the work required is principally now in software design, since the mechanical aspects function correctly. The mechanism is an important part of the flight control system and provides the capability to conduct human factors research of flight crews with advanced aircraft systems under various flight conditions such as go arounds, coupled instrument flight rule approaches, normal and ground operations and emergencies that would or would not normally be experienced in actual flight.
The NASA/UT Line/LOS checklist is designed to capture critical components of crew interaction. The behaviors deemed critical to flight crew interaction include briefings, communications, inquiry, assertion/advocacy, and decisions communicated and acknowledged. Data shows significant behavioral interaction differences as a function of aircraft type, indicating that crew size and technology level were at least partly driving that difference.
The Forward-Looking Interferometer (FLI) is a new instrument concept for obtaining the measurements required to alert flight crews to potential weather hazards to safe flight. To meet the needs of the commercial fleet, such a sensor should address multiple hazards to warrant the costs of development, certification, installation, training, and maintenance. The FLI concept is based on high-resolution Infrared Fourier Transform Spectrometry (FTS) technologies that have been developed for satellite remote sensing. These technologies have also been applied to the detection of aerosols and gases for other purposes. The FLI concept is being evaluated for its potential to address multiple hazards including clear air turbulence (CAT), volcanic ash, wake vortices, low slant range visibility, dry wind shear, and icing during all phases of flight (takeoff, cruise, and landing). The research accomplished in this second phase of the FLI project was in three major areas: further sensitivity studies to better understand the potential capabilities and requirements for an airborne FLI instrument, field measurements that were conducted in an effort to provide empirical demonstrations of radiometric hazard detection, and theoretical work to support the development of algorithms to determine the severity of detected hazards
The objective of this effort was to show that real-time aircraft control-surface hinge-moment information could be used to provide a robust and reliable prediction of vehicle performance and control authority degradation. For a given airfoil section with a control surface -- be it a wing with an aileron, rudder, or elevator -- the control-surface hinge moment is sensitive to the aerodynamic characteristics of the section. As a result, changes in the aerodynamics of the section due to angle-of-attack or environmental effects such as icing, heavy rain, surface contaminants, bird strikes, or battle damage will affect the control surface hinge moment. These changes include both the magnitude of the hinge moment and its sign in a time-averaged sense, and the variation of the hinge moment with time. The current program attempts to take the real-time hinge moment information from the aircraft control surfaces and develop a system to predict aircraft envelope boundaries across a range of conditions, alerting the flight crew to reductions in aircraft controllability and flight boundaries.
Controlled Rest (CR) refers to a short, voluntary nap opportunity taken by pilots on the flight deck as a countermeasure to unanticipated sleepiness in flight. This study explores the profile of CR use in a long-haul commercial airline. Forty-four pilots wore actiwatches and filled in an application-based sleep/work diary for approximately 2 weeks. After merging sleep diary, actigraphy, and schedule data, complete records were analyzed from 240 flights. Sleep was estimated during CR intervals using the Philips Actiware 6.0.9 (Bend, OR) software with wake threshold set to medium. Timing of sleep periods and flight schedules were analyzed relative to home-base time. A mixed-effects binary logistics regression was used to analyze the impact of schedule factors on CR. Preliminary analyses revealed that CR was taken on 45% (n=107) of flights. Average sleep duration within these rest periods was estimated as 24.8 ± 16.1 minutes. CR was more frequent on return flights (arriving at home-base; 58%, n=69) vs. outbound flights (departing from home-base, 31%, n=38; p<0.001). There was no difference for direction of travel (eastbound: 49%, n= 56; westbound: 40%, n= 44; northbound/southbound: 50%, n=7; p=0.272). CR was more frequent on 2-pilot flights (62%, n=81) compared to augmented crew flights (24%, n=26; p<0.001). Of note, 21% (n=23) of augmented flights contained both CR and Bunk Rest. CR was more frequent on flights <10h duration (<10h: 59%, n=78; >10h: 27%, n=29; p<0.001). Flights departing between 12:00h-19:59h (25%, n=23; p<0.026) had the lowest frequency of CR. Data from this airline show that CR is most commonly used as a countermeasure to sleepiness on return, unaugmented, <10h duration, and nighttime flights. The direction of travel did not influence the use of CR. Future studies are required to determine generalizability of these results to other airlines.
Proactive consideration of ground crew factors enhances the designs of space vehicles and vehicle safety by: (1) Reducing the risk of undetected ground crew errors and collateral damage that compromise vehicle reliability and flight safety (2) Ensuring compatibility of specific vehicle to ground system interfaces (3) Optimizing ground systems. During ground processing and launch operations, public safety, flight crew safety, ground crew safety, and the safety of high-value spacecraft are inter-related. For extended Exploration missions, surface crews perform functions that merge traditional flight and ground operations.
The concept of providing flight crews with intensive training in crew coordination and interpersonal skills (cockpit resource management training - CRM) is outlined with emphasis on full mission simulator training (line-oriented flight training - LOFT). Findings from several airlines that have instituted CRM and LOFT are summarized. Four types of criteria used for evaluating CRM programs: observer ratings of crew behavior, measures of attitudes regarding cockpit management, self-reports by participants on the value of the training, and case studies of CRM-related incidents and accidents are covered. Attention is focused on ratings of the performance of crews during line flights and during simulator sessions conducted as a part of LOFT. A boomerang effect - the emergence of a subgroup that has changed the attitudes in the opposite direction from that desired is emphasized.
The purpose of the Human Integration Design Processes (HIDP) document is to provide human-systems integration design processes, including methodologies and best practices that NASA has used to meet human systems and human rating requirements for developing crewed spacecraft. HIDP content is framed around human-centered design methodologies and processes in support of human-system integration requirements and human rating. NASA-STD-3001, Space Flight Human-System Standard, is a two-volume set of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Agency-level standards established by the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer, directed at minimizing health and performance risks for flight crews in human space flight programs. Volume 1 of NASA-STD-3001, Crew Health, sets standards for fitness for duty, space flight permissible exposure limits, permissible outcome limits, levels of medical care, medical diagnosis, intervention, treatment and care, and countermeasures. Volume 2 of NASASTD- 3001, Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health, focuses on human physical and cognitive capabilities and limitations and defines standards for spacecraft (including orbiters, habitats, and suits), internal environments, facilities, payloads, and related equipment, hardware, and software with which the crew interfaces during space operations. The NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8705.2B, Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems, specifies the Agency's human-rating processes, procedures, and requirements. The HIDP was written to share NASA's knowledge of processes directed toward achieving human certification of a spacecraft through implementation of human-systems integration requirements. Although the HIDP speaks directly to implementation of NASA-STD-3001 and NPR 8705.2B requirements, the human-centered design, evaluation, and design processes described in this document can be applied to any set of human-systems requirements and are independent of reference missions. The HIDP is a reference document that is intended to be used during the development of crewed space systems and operations to guide human-systems development process activities.
In an effort to increase airport capacity, the U.S. plans on investing nearly $6 billion a year to properly maintain and improve the nation's major airports. Current FAA standards however, require a reduction in terminal operations during instrument-weather conditions at many airports, causing delays and reducing airport capacity. NASA, in cooperation with the FAA, has developed the Terminal Area Productivity Program to achieve clear-weather capacity in instrument- weather conditions for all phases of flight. This paper describes a series of experiments planned to investigate the conceptual design of different systems that provide information to flight crews regarding nearby traffic during the approach phase of flight. The purpose of this investigation is to identify and evaluate different display and auditory interfaces to the crew for use in closely-spaced parallel runway operations. Three separate experiments are planned for the investigation. The first two experiments will be conducted using part-task flight simulators located at the MIT Aeronautical Systems Laboratory and at NASA Ames. The third experiment will be conducted in the Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator, a generic "glass-cockpit" simulator at NASA Ames. Subjects for each experiment will be current glass-cockpit pilots from major U.S. air carriers. Subject crews will fly several experimental scenarios in which pseudo-aircraft are "blundered" into the subject aircraft simulation. Runway spacing, longitudinal aircraft separation, aircraft performance and traffic information will be varied. Analyses of the subject reaction times in evading the blundering aircraft and the resulting closest points of approach will be conducted. This paper presents a preliminary examination of the data recorded during the part-task experiments. The impact of traffic information on closely-spaced parallel runway operations is discussed, cockpit displays to aid these operations are examined, and topics for future research are suggested.
Flight crew confusion, excessive stressworkload, and ineffective Crew Resource Management among other issues arising from dependence on automated systems on the flight deck have been identified as major causal factors in multiple fatal accidents, significant incidents and near misses. Many Loss of Control events have been traced to display of erroneous flight data and auto-flight system mode status to the crew. Safety was compromised by not having sufficiently obvious and unambiguous information available in order to permit quick diagnosis of aircraft status and then appropriate action to regain control of the aircraft energy state or trajectory. Continually evolving training and operational requirements related to aircraft automation have also presented critical challenges to commercial aviation. During times of high demand and low supply of experienced pilots (which is today the case in South-East Asia, for instance), basic training in manual flight may be minimal and as low as a few hundred flight hours on light aircraft before beginning training on advanced, highly automated aircraft. Predominant use of automation may cause aircrew trained in this way to have trouble performing traditionally simple operations such as manually switching to other runways or overriding the autopilot in tight situations. Inadequate crew training andor experience coupled with attempted manual flight in highly automated airplanes may more easily lead to loss of aircraft control in unusual situations such as high-altitude stallsupsets, traffic avoidance or maneuvering. Loss of basic piloting skills through increasing dependence on automation may exacerbate this problem. Finally, design changes by nature take a long time and are very costly. Incorporating novel automated functionality into new aircraft designs is technically feasible and desirable. However, it may take many years for these changes to have a significant impact on tomorrows fleet, given the time it takes to develop a new aircraft and for these aircraft to become a significant fraction of the fleet. This paper will review and summarize the findings and recommendations from a 2004 study of the topic, Increasing reliance on flight deck automation conducted by the Future Aviation Safety Team at the behest of the Joint Safety Strategy Initiative (JSSI) within the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) organization that existed at the time. Although this study was conducted more than ten years ago, its findings and recommendations are as relevant now as then and into the future.
The Apollo 13 lithium hydroxide canister test was conducted to evaluate emergency measures designed to enable the Apollo 13 crew to use command module lithium hydroxide canisters in the lunar module. The test verified the effectiveness of the emergency system and established that the canisters in the command module would provide ample carbon dioxide removal for the return of the Apollo 13 crew. The time interval between canister changes on the flight was also determined in the test. This reduced power demand on the lunar module by eliminating the need for telemetry in determining canister replacement times. Details of the canister modifications were relayed to the flight crew and a replica of the test system was assembled in the flight vehicle. Graphs of the parameters which were measured during the simulation are presented.