Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “HAZARD”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 325 records · Page 18

Assessing Resilience in Lane Detection Methods: Infrastructure-Based Sensors and Traditional Approaches for Autonomous Vehicles

Traditional autonomous vehicle perception subsystems that use onboard sensors have the drawbacks of high computational load and data duplication. Infrastructure-based sensors, which can provide high quality information without the computational burden and data duplication, are an alternative to traditional autonomous vehicle perception subsystems. However, these technologies are still in the early stages of development and have not been extensively evaluated for lane detection system performance. Therefore, there is a lack of quantitative data on their performance relative to traditional perception methods, especially during hazardous scenarios, such as lane line occlusion, sensor failure, and environmental obstructions. We address this need by evaluating the influence of hazards on the resilience of three different lane detection methods in simulation: (1) traditional camera detection using a U-Net algorithm, (2) radar detections using infrastructure-based radar retro-reflectors (RRs), and (3) direct communication of lane line information using chip-enabled raised pavement markers (CERPMs). The performance of each of these methods is assessed using resilience engineering metrics by simulating the individual methods for each sensor technology’s response to related hazards in the CARLA simulator. Using simulation techniques to replicate these methods and hazards acquires extensive datasets without lengthy time investments. Specifically, the resilience triangle was used to quantitatively measure the resilience of the lane detection system to obtain unique insights into each of the three lane detection methods; notably the infrastructure-based CERPMs and RRs had high resistance to hazards and were not as easily affected as the vision-based U-Net. However, while U-Net was able to recover the fastest from the disruption as compared to the other two methods, it also had the most performance loss. Overall, this study demonstrates that while infrastructure-based lane keeping technologies are still in early development, they have great potential as alternatives to traditional ones.

Patil, Pritesh↗

Powered By ERAD [Slides]

Energy Resilience Analysis for Distribution Power System (ERAD) is a free, open-source Python toolkit for estimating the energy and service impacts of hazards like earthquakes and flooding. It uses a graph-based approach to capture high resolution connectivity among the grid, critical services, and customers and rapidly compute household level metrics and aggregated statistics across large distribution systems. It uses asset fragility curves that relate hazard severity to survival probability for power system equipment including cables, transformers, substations, etc. The tool is designed to be modular and extensible, allowing it to interface with third-party hazard simulators and integrate into broader resilience analysis workflows. ERAD enables researchers, students, communities, distribution utilities, and other stakeholders to understand hazard impacts and evaluate the effectiveness of different programs to improve energy resilience. The webinar was hosted by NLR researcher Aadil Latif.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

MH-1A Sturgis Decommissioning and Dismantlement - 20281

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) with its prime contractor, Aptim Federal Services, LLC (APTIM), recycled 5,260 metric tons (11.6 million pounds) of material from Sturgis Barge (Sturgis) during the Decommissioning and Dismantlement of the MH-1A nuclear power reactor. The overall objective of the project was to reduce residual radioactivity associated with MH-1A to levels that permitted release of Sturgis for dismantlement and termination of the Army Reactor Office permit. By effectively applying waste hierarchy's three Rs - reduce, reuse and recycle - the Sturgis project not only minimized the amount of waste that required disposal at landfills, but also reduced the potential for long-term environmental liability emanating from these landfills. The project team completed the physical decommissioning efforts in June 2018 in Galveston, TX. In September 2018, radiological surveys were completed to demonstrate the vessel could be released for shipbreaking. Sturgis was towed from Galveston, TX to Brownsville, TX in late September 2018. Shipbreaking, dismantlement and recycling efforts began in early October 2018 and were completed on 15 March 2019. As part of the decommissioning effort in Galveston, the team shipped 69 shipments (860 metric tons) of low-level radioactive waste and radioactive components to the Waste Control Specialist (WCS) facility in Andrews TX for disposal. Certain radioactive components had to be transferred to the Department of Energy prior to placing the materials into the Federal Waste Facility located within WCS. However, most of the radioactive waste was characterized, profiled, approved and managed under the WCS permitted radioactive waste exemption process authorized and implemented by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) and the Radioactive Materials Division. This allows LLRW and LLMW to be shipped as regulated waste and then upon receipt at WCS through satisfying the relevant waste acceptance criteria the waste is exempted and placed into the WCS RCRA permitted cell. An additional 35 shipments (544 metric ton) of contaminated hazardous waste water were transported to U.S. Ecology in Robstown, TX for treatment/disposal. An additional 36 shipments (500 metric tons) of non-hazardous wastewater was sent to Republic Waste Services' facility in Fresno, TX. The disposal of these materials required close coordination with State of Texas regulators. During decommissioning, the project team recycled approximately 270 metric tons (600,000 pounds) of lead and steel. As part of the dismantlement in Brownsville, TX the team recycled approximately 5,000 metric tons (11 million pounds) of ferrous and non-ferrous material, limiting our disposal requirements to about 180 metric tons (400,000 pounds) of material (<4% from entire shipbreaking activity). Although the primary hazard being mitigated by this project was radiological, recycling was always a priority for the project. The team strived to achieve sustainability goals as we implemented this one of a kind project. Scrap metal recycling has a large positive impact on the environment and can also favorably impact project disposal costs. Steel is among the most recycled material in the world. Nearly 40% of the world's steel production is made from scrap. Recycling steel also requires 75% less energy than producing it from raw materials. By using recycled steel rather than virgin materials, 2.33 kg of carbon emissions are eliminated per kg of steel [1]. The project recycled more than 4,500 metric tons (10 million pounds) of steel, which eliminated about 10,400 metric tons (23 million pounds) of CO{sub 2}. By implementing a recycling initiative for the Sturgis project, the team was able to realize cost avoidance for disposal of scrap, cost savings from the metals recycled, plus the project provided benefits to the environment through our recycling efforts. Once the dismantlement was complete, the team prepared a detailed decommissioning closure report, which allowed for the termination of the Army Reactor Decommissioning Permit. While it not only reduced any potential long-term environmental liability, this project to decommission and dismantle a floating nuclear power plant is truly unprecedented - it is a prime example of the USACE mission which is: 'Engineering solutions for the Nation's toughest challenges'. This unique, one of a kind, historical power plant was never designed to be taken apart, and the available information about its construction was lacking in many details. The hazards that required mitigation dictated a painstaking and deliberate process in order to avoid any release to the environment and the community, and to protect the health and safety of the workers involved while keeping the waste hierarchy's three R's - reduce, reuse and recycle at the forefront. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) Sensing XXI

This volume contains 12 sessions, 28 papers and 26 presentations on the following topics: Photonic Integrated Circuits and Plasmonic Sensing; Advancs in CBE Signature Modeling and Sensor Algorithms I; Standoff Sensing of CBRNE Hazards I; Standoff Sensing of CBRNE Hazards II; Advances in CBE Signature Modeling and Sensor Algorithms II; Biological Hazard Sensing; Chemical Hazard Sensing; Joint Session with Conferences 11390 and 11416: Spectroscopy for CBRNE Detection and Warning; Radiological and Nuclear Sensing; Explosive Material Sensing; Poster Session.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Systems Theory Principles and Complex Systems Engineering Concepts for Protection and Resilience in Critical Infrastructure: Lessons from the Nuclear Sector

Part of the Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21) (PPD 2013) mandate includes evaluating safety, security, and safeguards (or nonproliferation) mechanisms traditionally implemented within the nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector of critical infrastructure—including a complex, dynamic set of risks and threats within an all-hazards approach. In response, research out of Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) explores the ability of systems theory principles (hierarchy and emergence) and complex systems engineering concepts (multidomain interdependence) to better understand and address these risks and threats. Herein, this Sandia research explores the safety, safeguards, and security risks of three different nuclear sector-related activities—spent nuclear fuel transportation, small modular reactors, and portable nuclear power reactors—to investigate the complex and dynamic risk related to the PPD-21-mandated all-hazards approach. This research showed that a systems-theoretic approach can better identify inter-dependencies, conflicts, gaps, and leverage points across traditional safety, security, and safeguards hazard mitigation strategies in the nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector. Resulting from this, mitigation strategies from applying systems theoretic principles and complex systems engineering concepts can be (1) designed to better capture interdependencies, (2) implemented to better align with real-world operational uncertainties, and (3) evaluated as a systems-level whole to better identify, characterize, and manage PPD-21's all hazards strategies.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Weather effects on the lifecycle of U.S. Department of Defense equipment replacement (WELDER)

Extreme weather has a direct and significant impact on buildings and infrastructure, resulting in billions of dollars of damage each year. This problem continues to grow as climate patterns change and buildings are exposed to new and different hazards than what they were designed to withstand. In order to better plan for the long-range sustainment, restoration, modernization, and eventual recapitalization of these buildings, organizations with large building portfolios, such as the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), must have an awareness of the risks that these extreme weather events present. This research aimed to develop an approach to estimate condition loss and reduction in service life for the components of a building due to extreme weather hazards, to understand the risks that may be present in certain buildings and building systems. To achieve this objective, a damage association matrix was developed that categorizes climate hazards, the damage modes that they produce, and the individual component types impacted. This damage matrix formally links state-of-the-art climate model output, which provides projections of the probability of various climate hazards with a damage effects model that quantifies the consequence on component-level condition and service life. This method is applied to an actual portfolio of buildings in a particular geographic location and with a pre-defined component inventory that comprises the building. This approach can be aggregated to the system-, facility-, and site-level thus helping support billions of dollars in recapitalization decisions related to restoration/modernization of facilities.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Melt-Processed Halide Perovskite Thin Films from a Two-Dimensional Ruddlesden–Popper Phase Precursor

While halide perovskite thin films have enormous potential for photovoltaics and other optoelectronics, the use of environmentally hazardous solvents during their deposition and processing poses a barrier to their commercialization. In this work, we demonstrated the deposition of melt-processable precursors and subsequent transformation into halide perovskite thin films without using environmentally hazardous solvents. We melted the wide-bandgap layered perovskites [(C 6 H 5 CH(CH 3 )CH 2 NH 3 ) 2 PbI 4 :β-Me-PEA 2 PbI 4 ] at ~210 °C and blade coated them into films. The β-Me-PEA 2 PbI 4 films were subsequently transformed to perovskite-phase methylammonium or formamidinium lead iodide films using a cation-exchange process in an alcohol-based solvent. Lastly, we demonstrate the potential and limitations of a completely solvent-free approach that uses solid-state transformation of a β-Me-PEA 2 PbI 4 film. As a result, this work represents a substantial step toward eliminating environmentally hazardous solvents and enables inexpensive industrial-scale liquid-phase deposition processes that do not require expensive systems for handling and disposing of environmentally hazardous solvents.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Life Cycle Cost Analysis of Prestressed Concrete Poles Subjected to Wind, Surges, and Waves

Prestressed concrete (PC) poles are becoming popular choices to support coastal power transmission systems. However, the existing literature does not offer a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of PC poles in terms of long-term vulnerabilities and the direct and indirect costs. This is due to (1) lack of fragility models for PC poles and (2) lack of probabilistic wind, storm surge, and wave models in coastal settings. In this study, we address these gaps through a series of Monte Carlo simulations to estimate fragility of PC poles as a function of age and hazard (wind, surges, and waves) intensity, and the development of a probabilistic hazard model based on 10,000 years of synthetic tropical cyclone data. The probabilistic hazard model is used in conjunction with high-resolution hydrodynamic models to generate realizations of coastal wind, storm surges, and waves for the Louisiana and Mississippi coasts. A comprehensive life cycle cost analysis for a service life of 70 years considering direct and indirect losses is conducted to compare the performance of a transmission line located in Pascagoula, Mississippi, when wood poles are replaced by PC poles. Results showed that aging has a minor effect on the reliability of PC poles, highlighting the advantages of replacing wood poles with PC poles, especially in coastal areas. In addition, PC poles are significantly more cost-effective compared with wood poles over their life cycle, leading to an estimated saving of $11.55 million (68.17% reduction). The results of this study provide key insight to inform decision-making processes to keep the coastal power grids resilient and cost-effective against future storm hazards.

natural disasters↗

Information needs, approaches, and case studies in human health risk communication

This article uses ten case studies to illustrate the information needs, various communication approaches, and the communicator's role in explaining environmental health risks from a variety of hazards, to a variety of audiences, over time frames from days to years, using in person consultation, lectures, zooms, and email formats. Events often had a long history before the communication began and may have had a long tail afterward. Audiences may be public officials, companies, workers, communities, or individuals. Each individual may have their own understanding or mental model regarding the hazard, exposure, and risk. The communicator's role or intention may be to reassure an audience that has unrealistic exaggerated concerns or fears or to protect a client if the fears are realistic. Or it may be altruistic to inform a complacent audience to take the risks it faces more seriously. Although risk assessment research has advanced the techniques for communicating abstruse probabilities to audiences with low numeracy, in my experience, audiences are unimpressed by precise–sounding probability numbers, and are more interested in whether exposure is occurring or may occur and how to stop it. Often audiences have reason to be outraged and may be more concerned about punishing wrong doers than about the hazard itself, particularly when the exposure is past and cannot be undone. Thus, there is a difference between discussing the riskiness of a situation (risk communication) and what you are going to do about the situation (risk management). Risk communication is successful when the audience responds as intended, calming down or taking action. These case studies are drawn from a large number of risk communication experiences that I and my Rutgers colleagues have engaged in over the past four decades. Through the 20th century, New Jersey was the most densely industrialized State in United States. New Jersey experienced growth of the chemical and petrochemical industries and the unfortunately profligate disposal of toxic wastes. Having the most Superfund sites of any state is a dubious distinction, but New Jersey also has the most experience in evaluating and responding to these hazards.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Compound Flooding in Halmstad: Common Causes, Interannual Variability and the Effects of Climate Change

Compound flooding was investigated in Halmstad on the Swedish west coast. The highest sea level ever recorded in Sweden was recorded by the Halmstad tide gauge. Moreover, through the city runs Nissan, one of the largest hydropower-producing rivers in southern Sweden. Together these features make the city an interesting location to study compound flooding. Co-variability between different hazards are studied using a unique set of downscaled climate scenario projections produced using state-of-the-art regional atmosphere, ocean and hydrological models. River discharge and sea level annual maxima are found to be correlated with peak strength on interannual time scales. This co-variability is found to derive from a mutual dependence that these hazards have on the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO). Precipitation also shares this dependence in winter months and acts as a driver, building up the fluvial river hazard, while potentially adding additional pluvial hazard. Trends are also assessed, and it was found that future changes in compound flooding will most likely be driven primarily by mean sea level rise and secondarily by increases in mean river discharge.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Comparison of Light-Weight Radioisotope Heater Unit (LWRHU) Historical Testing to Special Form Testing Requirements

This paper compares the Light-Weight Radioisotope Heater Unit (LWRHU) historical testing to Department of Transportation (DOT) Special Form criteria per 49 CFR Part 173, Shippers-General Requirements for Shipments and Packages, Section 469, Tests for special form Class 7 (radioactive) materials as specified in DOE-STD-1027, Hazard Categorization of DOE Nuclear Facilities. Compliance with the aforementioned criteria allows for the exclusion of radioactive sources from the facility’s nuclear material inventory. As part of a new program at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), LWRHUs are planned to be moved into TA-55, PF-5 Power Source Assembly Area (PSAA) for assembly and testing activities. The PSAA Facility is categorized as a low hazard, non-nuclear facility per DOE STD-1027 and is described in TA55-PF-5-FHC-11-001, Facility Hazard Categorization of the PSAA at PF-5, TA-55. The Facility Hazard Categorization document states, there must be documentation that radioactive sources are engineered to pass the special form testing specified by DOT in 49 CFR 173.469, Tests for special form Class 7 (radioactive) materials or ANSI N43.6, Sealed Radioactive Sources - Classification. This paper documents the extensive historical environmental safety testing of the LWRHU and demonstrates its ability to survive potential launch safety accident scenarios. The testing results are used herein to demonstrate through a comparative analysis that the robust design of the LWRHU meets or exceeds the special form testing specifications in 49 CFR 173.469, enabling the LWRHU to be transported and handled in PF-5 in support of testing and assembly program.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Extent-of-Condition Review of Electrical Events Fiscal Year 2019

Sandia National Laboratories has experienced a number of electrical events in recent years. A careful examination of data shows that for the third year in a row, two of the three most frequently categorized Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS)-reportable event types were unexpected or unintended personal contact with a hazardous energy source and a failure to follow a prescribed hazardous energy control process, as defined in the occurrence reporting criteria of DOE Order 232.2A, Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information, 2D(1) and 2D(2). Sandia policy CA001.2, Identify and Manage Issues, requires an extent-of-condition review for any high-level reportable occurrence, and the analysts were tasked to perform this EOC in light of high-level reportable occurrence NA-SS-SNL-1000-2019- 0007, Contact with Electrical Energy During Marx Capacitor Troubleshooting. This extent of condition not only evaluated the 10 reportable electrical occurrences for Fiscal Year 2019, but also looked at 11 other related events: those involving control of hazardous energy and electrical events associated with less than hazardous energy.1 This Extent-of-Condition report makes several observations, conclusions, and recommendations for improvement.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Alternate Fuel Vehicles in Tunnels

Many types of vehicles using fuels that differ from typical hydrocarbons such as gasoline and diesel are in use throughout the world. These include vehicles running on the combustion of natural gas and propane as well as electrical drive vehicles utilizing batteries or hydrogen as energy storage. These alternative fuels pose hazards that are different from traditional fuels and the safety of these vehicles are being questioned in areas such as tunnels and other enclosed spaces. Much scientific research and analysis has been conducted on tunnel and garage hazard scenarios; however, the data and conclusions might not seem to be immediately applicable to highway tunnel owners and authorities having jurisdiction over tunnels. This report provides a comprehensive, concise summary of the literature available characterizing the various hazards presented by all alternative fuel vehicles, including light-duty, medium- and heavy-duty, as well as buses. Research characterizing both worst-case and more plausible scenarios and risk-based analysis is also summarized Gaps in the research are identified in order to guide future research efforts to provide a complete analysis of the hazards and recommendations for the use of alternative fuel vehicles in tunnels.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Framework for Quantitative Evaluation of Resilience Solutions: An Approach to Determine the Value of Resilience for a Particular Site

The paper provides the approach to providing a benefit cost analysis of energy and water alternatives to provide resilience to extreme events. The approach estimates the costs and returns of providing greater resilience of water and energy infrastructure. Extreme events are defined as high impact, low-frequency events such as, but not limited to, hurricanes, floods, storm surges and earthquakes. The provides justification for hardening water and energy infrastructure. Resilience is defined as “the ability to prepare for and to withstand an extreme event with little or no damage, or to recover more quickly from an extreme event.” The approach can be summarized as follows. The approach requires the development of a baseline with which to compare alternatives. The baseline is used to evaluate the baseline’s resilience to hazards through the probability of the hazard(s), the likelihood of damage from that the hazard through a vulnerability analysis, and the consequence to calculate a cost of the damage. The approach then evaluates proposed mitigation alternatives that would improve the resilience of the system. Each alternative is evaluated based on probability of the hazard, probability of vulnerability and consequence to determine the reduced damage that each alternative presents. The approach includes any monetary and non-monetary benefits that can quantified for each of the alternatives. Non-quantifiable benefits are evaluated based on the relative importance of each alternative to the criteria used to determine how well the alternative meets the goals and objectives of the site/facility. Then, a life cycle cost analysis should be conducted for the baseline and alternatives. Finally, the results of the life cycle analysis should be presented in a decision matrix with cost, net present value, benefit/cost ratios, and any non-monetary criteria ranked to show how well the alternatives met the criteria, weighted with the decision maker’s weights and the results presented.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Standardizing an Intermediate-Scale High Explosive Safety Test Suite

Small-scale safety testing, while successful in screening out extremely dangerous explosive compositions, does not fully characterize the explosive hazards associated with handling larger, consolidated or bare charges. It is proposed that intermediate-scale tests using consolidated charges in the range 25 mg – 1 kg are warranted to satisfactorily address the hazards. A standard for this intermediate-scale testing should be developed, proofed, peer-reviewed and adopted to assist in the development of safe new high explosive compositions across the complex. This whitepaper explains why current small-scale safety testing is insufficient to characterize the handling hazard, identifies the guiding aspects of explosive response that drive the handling hazards associated with larger consolidated charges, and proposes a suite of tests/experiments that can serve as a starting point for an intermediate-scale safety standard.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Case Study: Applying the INL Resilience Framework to Iowa Lakes Electric Cooperative Distributed Wind Systems

Traditional metrics and evaluation methods for resiliency are not sufficient to evaluate the effect that distributed wind systems will have, particularly in light of the challenges described above. While the concept of resiliency is not new, its application to the electric grid is neither standardized nor well-defined, and there is little to no guidance on how to evaluate resilience specifically for distributed wind systems. To fill this gap, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), as part of the multi-laboratory Microgrids, Infrastructure Resilience, and Advanced Controls Launchpad (MIRACL) project, has developed a resilience framework for electric energy delivery systems (EEDS). The framework provides detailed steps for evaluating resiliency in the planning, operational, and future stages, and encompasses five core functions of resilience. It allows users to evaluate the resilience of distributed wind, taking into consideration the resilience of the wind systems themselves, as well as the effect they have on the resiliency of any systems they are connected to. In this study, we evaluate the resilience of the distributed wind systems at Iowa Lakes Electric Cooperative to cybersecurity hazards. We show that the wind resource can benefit the overall system resilience during some hazards. We show that the practices in place make the wind subsystems resilient against some cybersecurity hazards but that there are still significant risks associated with other cybersecurity hazards

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Facility Safety Plan – Building 225

B225 is operated by the Weapons and Complex Integration (WCI) Directorate and is classified as a Low Hazard facility for radiological hazards and Light Science Industry (LSI) for chemical, radiation generating devices (RGDs) and industrial hazards. Explosives and biological hazards are not authorized for B225. B225 is located in the southwest quadrant of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) less than 600 meters from the nearest site boundary. B225 is a single-story concrete tilt-up building with a steel deck roof. The primary mission of this facility is to apply nondestructive evaluation (NDE) methods to materials, components, and assemblies. B225 also contains the polymer additive manufacturing laboratories. The floor plans for B225 are provided in Appendix A.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Tier 2 Safety Basis Document: Weapons and Complex Integration - Building 225

This Safety Basis Document (SBD) covers operations in the Weapons and Complex Integration (WCI) Building 225 (B225) facility. B225 is located in the southwestern quadrant of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and is operated and owned by WCI. This SBD satisfies the requirements of LLNL ES&H Manual Document 3.1, Nonnuclear Safety Basis Program (Ref. 2). B225 is classified as a Low Hazard Facility based on the inventory of radiological materials. Other hazards in B225: chemicals, radiation generating devices, and industrial hazards are managed at the Light Science and Industry (LSI) level. Biological and explosive hazards are not authorized in B225. There are four general Administrative Controls (ACs) identified as the B225 Operational Safety Requirements (OSRs). These administrative controls are deemed sufficient to ensure safe operations with respect to co-located workers and the public. Other safety features and administrative requirements are required by the LLNL ES&H Manual, including those to protect the facility workers and the environment, but these have not been selected as credited controls to protect the co-located workers or the public, which are the target populations of concern for the SBD.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗