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A multi-disciplinary team from the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) and The Aerospace Corporation developed a roadmap on how to treat transients in spaceflight pressurized systems. This document presents a focused discussion on the topic of pressure transients for consideration within the aerospace community.
It is well known that the buckling response of thin shell structures can be sensitive to small imperfections in the geometry and loading. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Shell Buckling Knockdown Factor Project (SBKF) has the goal of developing buckling design recommendations for select classes of metallic and composite shells. Part of completed SBKF work is described in this report. In particular, the test and analysis results from the second SBKF composite test article, CTA8.2, are described. This test was the second in a series of tests on sandwich composite cylinders that can be used to experimentally validate analysis methods, which in turn can be used to develop analysis-based shell buckling design guidelines for sandwich composite launch-vehicle cylindrical structures. CTA8.2 was an 8-foot diameter honeycomb-core sandwich cylinder that was fabricated and tested at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). The primary objectives of this test were to interrogate the structural capability of the composite test article, and to verify the test-article design and analysis approach for cylinders subjected to axial compression loads. This report contains the descriptions of the test-article design, fabrication, and test. The pre-test modeling and analysis methods, and corresponding results used in support of the test-article design and test planning, are also described. Additional post-test modeling and analysis efforts and results follow. Selected test results are compared to pre-test predictions and post-test analyses.
In late fiscal year 2020, the Space Nuclear Propulsion (SNP) project began the process of formulating an investment strategy to support development of the technologies required for a high-power (megawatt-class) nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) system capable of performing human-scale missions. This activity was initiated concurrent with several high-level studies and assessments were either under way or had just concluded. Studies of human-scale Mars missions have been performed several times over the past two decades. One of the most recent studies examined opposition-class human Mars missions to occur in the late 2030s timeframe [1,2]. The mission architecture assumed a hybrid NEP/chem-propelled vehicle that used a high specific impulse (Isp) NEP-system and a liquid oxygen (LOx)-liquid methane high thrust chemical stage (two 110 kN (25 klbf) thrust, 365 s Isp engines) for maneuvers performed to enter and exit gravity wells. Trajectory analyses performed in this study showed that such a mission could be performed with 2-4 MWe directed into the electric propulsion system (operating for 20,000+ hours), with the large range representing different opposition-class Mars mission opportunities and permutations on the trajectory design, concept of operations, and technology choices. In 2020, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) performed a study to evaluate the maturity of the different technologies required for nuclear propulsion systems [3]. The executive summary of this report provided the following top-level conclusions: • “The majority of critical technologies for… NEP/Chem… systems are relatively immature” • “TRLs [technology readiness levels] in the literature are often overestimated” • “The majority of critical technologies… for NEP/Chem… systems are at a relatively high level of advancement degree of difficulty (AD2 > 4) for maturation, requiring a dual development approach” • “The proper assessment of baseline TRL and AD2 values and the estimation of requirements and resources required for advancement have been consistent issues for NEP,” • “Non-advocate reviews should occur at the start of a technology program and at all key milestones.” In 2021, the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) issued a separate report [4] identifying the “primary technical and programmatic challenges, merits, and risks for maturing space nuclear propulsion technologies of interest to a future human Mars exploration mission.” That work contained several important findings, including: • “Developing a MWe-class NEP system for the baseline mission would require increasing power by orders of magnitude relative to NEP system flight- or ground-based technology demonstrations completed to date.” • “Subscale in-space flight testing of NEP systems cannot address many of the risks and potential failure modes associated with the baseline mission NEP system. With sufficient M&S [modeling & simulation] and ground testing, including modular subsystem tests at full scale and power, flight qualification requirements can be met by the cargo missions that will precede the first crewed mission to Mars. Fully integrated ground testing may not be required.” • “As a result of low and intermittent investment over the past several decades, it is unclear if even an aggressive program would be able to develop an NEP system capable of executing the baseline mission in 2039.” These efforts motivated the SNP project to investigate the technologies available for a megawatt-class high power nuclear electric propulsion system. That system is illustrated schematically in Figure 1 and is comprised of five separate top-level critical technology elements (CTEs). 1. Nuclear Reactor – Thermal power source for the system, utilizing high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) as the nuclear fuel. Reactor radiation shielding is also included in this CTE. 2. Power Conversion – Operates as a thermodynamic cycle, accepting nuclear reactor thermal power as an input and converting it to mechanical power. 3. Power Management and Distribution (PMAD) – Accepts as an input mechanical power from the power conversion system, which is used to generate electrical power. The PMAD system also distributes the generated electrical power to all other parts of the spacecraft, including the high-power EP system. The PMAD system may also perform duties such as isolation, fault detection, and power transformation/rectification for different spacecraft systems, including the thrusters. 4. Electric Propulsion (EP) – Accepts as an input electrical power, which is used to accelerate a propellant to high speeds to produce thrust. This system includes the power processing unit (PPU), which converts the power it receives to the correct current and voltage required by the thrusters, and the propellant storage and feed systems, which contain and meter the flow of propellant to the thrusters. 5. Thermal Management (Radiators/Heat Rejection) – The cold side of the thermodynamic power conversion cycle, accepts thermal power from the power conversion system and radiatively rejects that heat to space. In this paper, we describe the SNP project formulation and investment strategy that aims to accomplish the research and development required to advance the technology readiness for each CTE. The strategy relies heavily upon experimental testing supported by modeling and simulation to yield realistic assessments of the technologies, which in turn will be used to inform future NEP system-level design decisions and any potential technology downselects.
The Mars Sample Return Campaign must satisfy a Back Planetary Protection requirement that limits the risk of biological contamination of the Earth by Martian microbes. The Earth Re-turn Orbiter (ERO), being developed by the European Space Agency (ESA), will carry a Capture, Containment and Return System (CCRS), which is being developed by NASA to retrieve orbiting samples (OS) from Mars orbit, surround them with two containment layers to create a Contained OS (COS), and transfer the COS to the Earth Entry System (EES), which will be re-leased by ERO to carry the samples through entry, descent and landing at the Utah Test and Training Range. Micrometeoroid impact damage to the Thermal Protection System (TPS) of the EES, which may occur at any time in the ERO mission, is recognized as a potential risk driver for loss of sample containment that needs to be rigorously assessed. A Micrometeoroid Protection System (MMPS) will be implemented to limit that risk. The MMPS consists of a shield covering the TPS called the Micrometeoroid Garage (MMG) and a system of cameras to inspect the TPS. An extensive study was performed by the CCRS Project in collaboration with the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC)to assess the probability of damage to the MMG and TPS by meteoroids over the entire ERO mission. This included the computation of the meteoroid fluence on the MMG and directly on the TPS after EES separation, and assessment of damage to the MMG and TPS via hypervelocity impact tests, hydrocode simulations, and empirical damage prediction and ballistic limit equations (BLEs). The focus of this paper is the meteoroid fluence on the MMG.
The NESC performed testing to determine if high-speed video techniques can be used to predict the onset of flow-induced vibrations (FIV) in bellows. A comprehensive test matrix was established to determine if Motion Magnification (MM) and Digital Image Correlation (DIC) can be used to determine the onset of FIV in straight and gimbaled bellows. Several of the tests were intended to determine if MM and DIC can establish the resonant frequencies of the bellows with no a priori knowledge. The results of the MM and DIC were compared with data from strain gages and microphones. Although the testing was limited to one single-ply unshielded bellows, this effort provided the proof-of-concept that MM and DIC are feasible methods for determining the onset of FIV in bellows.
The NESC performed an assessment of existing filtration standards and guidance documents for propellant and pressurant systems. The assessment included a vendor survey to better understand concerns about filtration systems, defined a common set of filtration and contamination-related terms, and developed guidelines for system filtration design and implementation.
A number of activities within NASA and the space community, as well as growing technology needs and supply chain changes have accelerated the need to expand the use of COTS parts within NASA. While the use of COTS has been formally institutionalized and deemed acceptable for Class D space missions and those with greater tolerance for risk, there is still a lack of understanding of how to most effectively use COTS in such high risk-tolerance missions, and no apparent path towards broad use in missions with much less tolerance for risk. However, the reality is that the fundamental limitations of technology associated with the military specification system combined with the need to fly newer technologies in upcoming flagship robotic missions and human space flight missions will ultimately demand a more expansive use of COTS. The infinite nature of COTS gives rise to numerous challenges in the selection, acceptance, testing, and usage of COTS when reliable operation is essential. This presentation will highlight some of the current artifacts of a NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) study on the use of COTS parts, as well as many of the historical through current facts about parts assurance within Agency to provide a path forward for reliable use of COTS for a range of space applications and risk postures.
In 2019 the International Space Station (ISS) experienced an on on-orbit failure that affected 1 of 28 Battery Charge Discharge Units (BCDUs). Telemetry pointed to a short circuit failure of a Power Rectifier Quad Diode Module. Astronauts removed the failed unit from service which was then returned to Earth for failure analysis. The failure analysis confirmed that the quad diode module had failed short circuit. The investigation identified silver dendrites had grown on the insulated, sloped edge of the mesa semiconductor die of the failed diode and also a 2nd diode in the same quad diode module. Voids between the diode’s protective encapsulating ring and the die provided space within which dendrites were able to form and cause catastrophic failure. The NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) convened a EEE Parts Sub-Team to investigate root cause and to assist with risk assessment for all of the flight diode modules (4 distinct production lots) and the flight spares (from a 5th lot). Analysis of the original diode manufacturer’s read and record screening test data identified some lots which contained diodes with parametric instabilities that could signal conditions suited for silver dendrite formation. Computed Tomography (CT) X-ray screening inspection was performed on flight spare modules to identify diodes that do not exhibit voids between the edge of die and encapsulating ring as a mitigation against dendrite formation.
Following a recommendation of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), in 2022 NEPP has initiated the development of a NASA Agency-level Technical Standard for RHA. An initial progress status is presented on behalf of the SME core team.
NESC’s perspective for crewed spaceflight: Acceptance of flight control gain/phase stability margin reductions from industry standards should be accompanied by an adequately extensive technical treatment, including: •Analyzing the fundamental physics involved, with applicable simulation tool verification (particularly if results are dissimilar among rules of thumb, linear tools, nonlinear analysis, and flight data) •Conducting sensitivity studies in time and frequency domains to analyze effects of possible parameter and system variations •Studying the effects of the consequence of instability associated with offending modes by running stressing cases in time domain •Assessing alternative flight control designs to demonstrate that present design appropriately balances overall vehicle risk (i.e., quantitatively delineate chosen tradeoffs between various stability margins and vehicle performance in the context of risk/consequence) Work presented here represents an example summary of expected engineering work to flight-certify crewed missions with unstable slosh modes and reduced stability margins
Top level overviews of the PILS and VSAT programs to be presented to the NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) Electrical Power Technology Discipline Team Annual Meeting
The Mars Sample Return Campaign must satisfy a Back Planetary Protection requirement that limits the risk of biological contamination of the Earth by Martian microbes. The Earth Re-turn Orbiter (ERO), being developed by the European Space Agency (ESA), will carry a Capture, Containment and Return System (CCRS), which is being developed by NASA to retrieve orbiting samples (OS) from Mars orbit, surround them with two containment layers to create a Contained OS (COS), and transfer the COS to the Earth Entry System (EES), which will be re-leased by ERO to carry the samples through entry, descent and landing at the Utah Test and Training Range. Micrometeoroid impact damage to the Thermal Protection System (TPS) of the EES, which may occur at any time in the ERO mission, is recognized as a potential risk driver for loss of sample containment that needs to be rigorously assessed. A Micrometeoroid Protection System (MMPS) will be implemented to limit that risk. The MMPS consists of a shield covering the TPS called the Micrometeoroid Garage (MMG) and a system of cameras to inspect the TPS. An extensive study was performed by the CCRS Project in collaboration with the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC)to assess the probability of damage to the MMG and TPS by meteoroids over the entire ERO mission. This included the computation of the meteoroid fluence on the MMG and directly on the TPS after EES separation, and assessment of damage to the MMG and TPS via hypervelocity impact tests, hydrocode simulations, and empirical damage prediction and ballistic limit equations (BLEs). The focus of this paper is the meteoroid fluence on the MMG.
Following the successful implementation of full-field photogrammetry, more specifically three-dimensional Digital Image Correlation (3D-DIC), on the Mars 2020 Heat Shield Structural Failure Review assessment, 3D-DIC was selected as one of the primary measurement techniques for the Mars 2020 Rover wheel assembly qualification test at the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). To validate the Rover wheel landing loads simulations, it was extremely important to have high confidence in the wheel models. Due to the large deformations and strains that the wheel would be subject to during landing, traditional instrumentation such as linear variable displacement transducers (LVDTs), electrical-resistance strain gages and string potentiometers, would not be sufficient on their own to provide all the necessary validation data. Therefore, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) provided the 3D-DIC expertise and support to measure the high deformation and strain in the wheel flexures and qualify the overall structural response of the Mars 2020 rover wheel assembly. There were two key objectives for the photogrammetry technique: (1) monitor the wheel response in real-time, guarding against anomalous behavior and failure, and (2) provide test data for test-analysis correlation to validate and/or improve the high-fidelity computational model. The contents of this paper will focus on the challenges of applying 3D-DIC to the Mars 2020 Rover wheel assembly and how these challenges were overcome. Examples of test-analysis correlation during the stiffness characterization and structural qualification will be presented and discussed in detail. Experimental results were compared with the analysis and showed excellent agreement between the predicted behavior and helped validate the high-fidelity models.
The Artemis space suit glove environmental protection garment (EPG) will be the first line of protection used to protect the crewmember’s hands from the environments encountered during extravehicular activity (EVA). As the Artemis missions will include more extreme environments, it is necessary to define tests to evaluate if gloves can meet new, challenging requirements. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC)has funded an effort with the goal to help vendors to produce a space suit glove that is sufficiently durable to meet the needs of the Artemis missions. Three problems were identified in meeting that goal. First, there are no standardized tests defined to evaluate the durability of space suit gloves for the extreme lunar environments. Second, there is insufficient data on glove performance in a lunar environment from which to compare new designs. And third, current ISS glove TMG fabrics are unlikely to be sufficient to meet Lunar requirements. Four tasks were established to answer different aspects of these three problems. Task 1 focused on the characterization of potential glove fabrics using ASTM standardized test methods when possible. When one did not exist, new standardized test procedures were devised. Task 2 focused on developing a procedure for characterizing the thermal performance of a glove assembly. Task 3 focused on devising a standard procedure for characterizing the dust/abrasion resistance of a space suit glove. Task 4 focused on devising a standard procedure for characterizing the cut resistance of a space suit glove while at cryogenic temperatures. The new procedures created in Tasks 2, 3 and 4 were then validated by testing the Phase VI glove to collect baseline data. This paper will summarize the approach used to establish standardized test methods for each task and will expound on the ASTM process to publish the new standards.
This paper discusses the current focus of NASA’s Advanced Space Suit Pressure Garment Technology Development team’s efforts, the status of that work, and a summary of longer term technology development priorities and activities. The Exploration Extra-vehicular Activity Mobility Unit (xEMU) has been the team’s primary effort over the past several years. ICES papers in 2022 detailed the design of the xEMU pressure garment components. This paper outlines the design updates to the xPGS since that time. More notably, this paper documents the various tests executed with the xPGS to evaluate its performance, durability, and acceptability for microgravity and Lunar missions. An overview of ongoing and planned xEMU testing and training is provided. The PGS team’s transition from xEMU development and testing, to supporting the Exploration Extravehicular Activity Services (xEVAS) vendors will also be discussed. In addition, technology development efforts in coordination with the EVA and Human Surface Mobility Program (EHP), the NASA Engineering Safety Council (NESC) and the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program will be discussed in the context of supporting sustaining EVA operations on the Lunar surface over the coming decade. Finally, a brief review of longer-term pressure garment challenges and technology gaps will be presented to provide an understanding of the advanced pressure garment team’s technology investment priorities and needs.
Venus-GRAM Overview - Engineering-oriented atmospheric model that estimates mean values and statistical variations of Venus atmospheric properties - Outputs include atmospheric density, temperature, pressure, chemical composition, and wind components along a user-defined path - Widely used by the engineering community because of its ability to create realistic atmospheric dispersions - Can be integrated into high fidelity flight dynamic simulations of launch, entry, descent and landing (EDL), aerobraking and aerocapture - Has been used in multiple studies and proposals including NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Autonomous Aerobraking Study and various Discovery proposals - Optional trajectory input file consisting of time, height, latitude, and longitude can be used to provide the Venus-GRAM trajectory path - Optional auxiliary profile consisting of height, latitude, longitude, temperature, pressure, density, eastward wind, and northward wind may be used to replace model data in Venus-GRAM - Not a forecast model - GRAMs are also available for Earth, Mars, Titan, Neptune, Uranus, and Jupiter - Available through the NASA Software Catalog https://software.nasa.gov/software/MFS-33888-1
Since the beginning of the space age, the Moon has been proposed as a platform for astronomy. The Moon provides unique capabilities for astrophysics observations. NASA’s Artemis plan to return humans to the Moon in the mid-2020s in a sustainable manner provides an opportunity to advance synergistic approaches between human and robotic exploration. This NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) workshop assesses the feasibility and value proposition of using the Moon as a location for performing unique science observations, leveraging Artemis-era infrastructure while evaluating risks and key engineering challenges.
Since mid-1980s NASA has launched several first-generation interplanetary observatory missions. A salient feature of these missions has been the mounting of the optical payload on top of a large flexible space structure. This imposes challenging control-structure interaction problems (CSI) that have been studied over several decades. The Dec. 2021 launch of the James Webb Telescope marks the latest example of such a mission. One way to encourage development of novel control methods is to provide a benchmark problem for researchers. By the mid-2000s, there were a few well-known benchmark problems developed by the control community with a focus on CSI applications. However, in the past 15 years, the control challenges in optical observation missions have shifted from CSI to line-of-sight (LOS) precision pointing. This is because popular designs of the second-generation (Gen II) space earth missions have eliminated the large structure interface by mounting the optical payload directly on top of a rigid bus platform. The focus now is to achieve accurate pointing with maximum rejection of the surrounding disturbances. The NASA Safety and Engineering Center (NESC) has tasked T he Aerospace Corporation to develop a Benchmark Problem to study the challenging control issues that Gen II observatory missions encounter. This software tool is to be released as a public domain platform aimed at government, academic, and industry researchers. The focus of this benchmark problem is for researchers to design a set of innovative payload control laws with the maximum Optical Disturbance Rejection (ODR) capability to meet a set of pre-defined μrad-level of LOS jitter requirements. This paper describes the development of the benchmark problem. Aerospace/NASA will provide an integrated LOS plant model and disturbance/command profiles for users to run their design and simulation with as well as a user’s guide describing the required interfaces. The Aerospace Corp is also working to develop a hardware fast steering mirror testbed for users to demonstrate their innovative design in real hardware, if so desired.