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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 325 records · Page 18
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Development of spectroscopy apparatus for molten salt reactor safeguards and material characterization

A molten salt reactor (MSR) produces nuclear fission energy using mixture of fissile and non-fissile salts. Salt in the reactor functions as the nuclear material and the coolant allowing for a safer design. International nuclear safeguards is the monitoring of nuclear reactors, nuclear fuel, and irradiated material to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapon grade material in hostile foreign nations. The mixture of salt creates a proliferation risk as it generates a conglomeration of fuel, daughter nuclei, and corrosive material. A method to monitor and measure the materials present in the reactor is essential to the scalable deployment of MSRs. The objective of this project was to design a spectroscopy apparatus for aqueous salt so it can be measured and collected consistently in the aerosol phase.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Material Control and Accounting Regulatory and Technical Considerations for Microreactors

New microreactors must comply with the Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) regulations in 10CFR74. The objective of MC&A is to verify that the nuclear material is not stolen or diverted to unauthorized users. Microreactors have unique features which pose new challenges to addressing these regulations. This work considers general approaches and methods for microreactor MC&A based on the reactor life cycles which have been proposed by microreactor vendors. One key aspect of MC&A is measurement of the nuclear material. Measurement of microreactor fuel could be especially important because the cores may be sealed for up to 20 years, preventing direct visual confirmation. Measurements could also be especially challenging due to the thick shielding designed around microreactors. This work evaluates a range of techniques used in medical, industrial, and nuclear fields. The cost, time, and performance of the techniques were estimated. Finally, for a promising technique of using in-core neutron detectors, the feasibility was analyzed in detail.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Molten Salt Aerosol Spectroscopy Approach to Online Process Monitoring in Molten Salt Reactors

Recent research and development in molten salt reactors (MSRs) has led to many advanced reactor designs, many of which have demonstrations planned in the next decade. However, a significant challenge that must be overcome before liquid fueled MSRs become viable globally is nuclear material accountancy (NMA) and safeguards. Liquid-fueled MSRs are problematic to safeguards because the nuclear material is in the bulk phase, inventories are constantly changing, and there are potentially many outlet pathways that must be monitored, especially in designs with online chemical processing. At the Idaho National Laboratory, we have developed a process monitoring tool to circulate molten salt through a nebulizer and optical cell, where laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) and ultraviolet-visible (UV-VIS) are applied to track the elemental and oxidation states of the constituents in the salt aerosol. This approach has the potential to provide information on the actinides, fission products, and corrosion in the reactor or process. Preliminary testing in aqueous praseodymium chloride (PrCl3) and neodymium chloride (NdCl3) showed good sensitivity detection limits n developed calibration curves. Additional tests and analysis or ongoing in aqueous solutions while equipment is being scaled up for high temperature molten salt testing. Results for continued testing as well as a status of the molten salt design and anticipated commissioning will be presented.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Non-Destructive Plutonium Assay in Pyroprocessing Bulk Materials with a 3D Boron-Coated-Straw Detector Array

Assessment of plutonium content through all the processing steps is needed and is a challenging task. While several destructive assay methods have been developed for nuclear material accountability, a nondestructive assay (NDA) system for the assessment of plutonium in bulk materials is still needed. This system should withstand pyroprocessing harsh environments and have consistent sensitivity and accuracy despite different fuel form factors. We aim to enable the accurate assessment of the plutonium content of nuclear material during pyroprocessing to improve the separation process and enhance its proliferation resistance. We plan to achieve this goal by developing and demonstrating a new 3D boron-coated-straw neutron detector array (3D-BCSDA) with high efficiency and spatial resolution.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Assessing the Impact of Increased Verification Measurements of Category III/IV Material Receipts

Revisions to the US Department of Energy (DOE) regulations for material control and accountability are expected to dramatically increase the number of verification measurements required upon receipt of nuclear material transfers. Material categories and types that were not routinely quantitatively measured upon receipt (Category III and IV) have been added to the more detailed regulations on shipments and receipts of nuclear materials. In anticipation of this change to the regulations, this project was initiated to identify measurement needs in the DOE complex with respect to performing these additional quantitative measurements. The results of surveying multiple DOE facilities to understand the scope of the impact and the potential measurement capability needs are presented.

Bean, Robert↗
DOE OSTI2024

Semi-automatic image annotation using 3D LiDAR projections and depth camera data

Efficient image annotation is necessary to utilize deep learning object recognition neural networks in nuclear safeguards, such as for the detection and localization of target objects like nuclear material containers (NMCs). This capability can help automate the inventory accounting of different types of NMCs within nuclear storage facilities. The conventional manual annotation process is labor-intensive and time-consuming, hindering the rapid deployment of deep learning models for NMC identifications. This paper introduces a novel semi-automatic method for annotating 2D images of nuclear material containers (NMCs) by combining 3D light detection and ranging (LiDAR) data with color and depth camera images collected from a handheld scan system. The annotation pipeline involves an operator manually marking new target objects on a LiDAR-generated map, and projecting these 3D locations to images, thereby automatically creating annotations from the projections. The semi-automatic approach significantly reduces manual efforts and the expertise in image annotation that is required to perform the task, allowing deep learning models to be trained on-site within a few hours. The paper compares the performance of models trained on datasets annotated through various methods, including semi-automatic, manual, and commercial annotation services. The evaluation demonstrates that the semi-automatic annotation method achieves comparable or superior results, with a mean average precision (mAP) above 0.9, showcasing its efficiency in training object recognition models. Additionally, the paper explores the application of the proposed method to instance segmentation, achieving promising results in detecting multiple types of NMCs in various formations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Support for Advanced Fuel Fabrication MC&A Approaches

This report summarizes the key activities of the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program’s safeguards training work package for FY25. The work focused on two main areas: domestic safeguards training and the development of new technologies for nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC). A key development during this FY was the delivery of NMAC statistics for US Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements refresher course. The course objective was to assist industry in meeting the MC&A program requirements for fuel cycle facilities; this training focused on front-end bulk fuel cycle processes. At the same time, a report was prepared on the research output of an effort that focused on the benefits of commercial fuel debundling for NMAC and waste management. The MPACT team evaluated various technologies and proposed a fuel debundling detector that integrates gamma spectroscopy and neutron detection as the most practical solution. The scope of activities under this work package for FY26 focuses on developing a fundamental nuclear material control plan, also known as MC&A plan, for tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fuel fabrication facilities. This plan will address the various NMAC requirements for facilities that handle Category II.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Threat Sources for Creating Synthetic Urban Search Data

Equivalent point source energy emission distributions were computed for various threat sources for use in simulating the detector responses for urban search scenarios. The sources include standard isotopic sources used in detector testing, medical and industrial sources occasionally encountered in urban searches, and several types of special nuclear materials. Most of the equivalent point source distributions represent small sources inside some amount of shielding, but the special nuclear material sources represent volumetrically distributed sources in spheres of metal. Text-based inputs for emission distributions are available for the Monte Carlo transport codes Monte Carlo N-Particle, SCALE/MAVRIC, and Omnibus/Shift, any of which can easily be converted to other formats. These sources were developed for use in the Radiological Anomaly Detection and Identification (RADAI) project and the follow-on project, the RADAI-Extended project, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2024

Corrosion testing needs and considerations for additively manufactured materials in nuclear reactors

Additive manufacturing (AM) technologies have developed rapidly in recent years, creating new opportunities and challenges for the nuclear industry; however, adoption requires that their corrosion performance be evaluated. Here, we discuss known reactor-specific corrosion issues for multiple reactor types and engineering concerns such as regulations and standards. A review of corrosion studies conducted on select AM alloys informs a discussion on key bulk and surface factors likely to impact corrosion behaviors. Recommendations to assess corrosion performance for AM materials are provided, including management of the unique nature of as-built AM surfaces and the inherent process variability that occurs for AM components.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

4th Big Data for Nuclear Power Plants Workshop 2023

The Ohio State University and Idaho National Laboratory organized the 4 th Big Data for Nuclear Power Plants Workshop in November, 2023 in Columbus, Ohio. Workshop topics were chosen to understand the challenges and gaps that need to be addressed to maximize the impact of data on the nuclear industry, as well as the associated applications and risks. Discussions were focused around six specific application areas: Operation and Maintenance; Machine Learning in Nuclear Materials and Advanced Manufacturing; Cybersecurity; High-Performance Computing and Massive Computation; Big Data and Digital Twins; and Nuclear Non-Proliferation. The opportunities, challenges, and risks identified in the six focus areas explored in this workshop are diverse, but some common themes emerge, such as the importance of data integrity, quality, coverage, privacy, and traceability. Big data and AI/ML tools can be leveraged to reduce costs, optimize human tasking, and reduce human error across various application areas. In order for the nuclear industry to benefit from big data and advanced analytic capabilities, it is essential to address challenges and risks, such as data privacy, model reliability, and computational resource availability. Learning from other industries that have successfully implemented big data and AI/ML technologies, like the aerospace industry, can help the nuclear industry successfully integrate these technologies.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Reducing the Risk of Airborne Contamination through Intelligent Container Surveillance

DOE Manual 441.1-1 provides a set of performance criteria that nuclear material storage containers must achieve to provide protection to the worker, public, and environment. At Los Alamos National Laboratory, the SAVY-4000 is the container of choice for nuclear material storage, meeting all Manual requirements. At the outset, polymer components of the SAVY 4000 were considered to be life-limiting components due to their performance degradation resulting from radiation exposure. However, recent annual surveillance results revealed another life-limiting phenomenon for the container: a deterioration of the package integrity through corrosion of the stainless steel components, primarily the body. Container surveillance remains the choice method of observing, measuring, and tracking container health in service.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Review of Nuclear Forensics: 2016-2020

The study of nuclear forensics harkens back to the Manhattan Project-era, when scientists first started to analyze the debris from the 1945 Trinity test. Political turmoil stemming from the Cold War and the rehabilitation of Germany following WWII has led to new challenges in international security involving nuclear proliferation. Nuclear materials have, on occasion, been lost, misplaced, or stolen from former Soviet countries, and illicit materials have been interdicted all over the world. The National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) was established in 2006, and has been at the forefront of drive to advance nuclear forensic capabilities in the United States. The ultimate goal of nuclear forensics is to examine nuclear and other radioactive materials using analytical techniques to determine origin and history of the material, particularly in the context of law enforcement investigations. Nuclear forensics can be divided into two parts: predetonation and post-detonation. Pre-detonation forensics, as the name implies, is the investigation of a nuclear material or weapon that has not been detonated or involved in an explosion, whereas postdetonation forensics is the study of activation or fission products in debris or the environment following the use of a nuclear or radiological dispersal device (RDD). Both parts require a number of analytical chemical and radiochemical techniques to determine identification of the material. Many advancements in analytical techniques, including rapidity, sample size, and forensic signatures have been made in recent years. The analytical methods that can be used in a nuclear forensic investigation, such as mass spectrometry and gamma spectroscopy, have been described in detail in previous reviews, including Straub et.al, and will not be explained here. This review will discuss recent publications (from 2016 to present) describing advancements of techniques such as radiochronometry, morphology, development of novel reference materials, and inter-laboratory collaborations for both pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2025

Applications of quantum materials in nuclear physics experiments (Final Report)

The goals of this project are to search for hypothesized spin-hall effects of neutrons and variants of neutron-electron hybrid spin hall effects in quantum materials with strong spin-orbit-coupling (SOC) – such as: • Deflection of neutrons dependent on spin (polarization) states (a); • Electrical current induced electron spin polarization or (dynamically polarized) nuclear spin polarization (as suggested in PI’s prior work) may affect polarization states of transmitted or reflected neutron beam • Spin polarized neutrons transfer some spin angular momenta to electrons, which get converted to electronic charge voltage via electronic inverse spin Hall effect (b), which if realized, offers an electrical method to detect neutron spins.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Signature Analysis Utilizing a Dynamic Molten Salt Reactor Model for MC&A

Moving from traditional fixed fuel nuclear reactor systems to a mobile, dynamic fuel system that has dissolved special nuclear material in a molten salt is a paradigm shift in several respects. One major consideration is how to develop effective nuclear material controls and accounting for these novel reactor systems. The Molten Salt Reactor Experiment is one example of a critical molten salt system and provided a significant reference library based on the documented effort. But it was low thermal power that was not intended to reflect a commercial scale electricity production design. Therefore, to facilitate and assist vendors with domestic licensing considerations, research is underway to identify methods that could be used for domestic safeguards approaches for these novel reactor systems. This research presents the results of a signature analysis of data generated from three simulated scenarios using the molten salt demonstration reactor model defined in the Transient Simulation Framework of Reconfigurable Modules. Each scenario provides 1 hour isotope inventories over a 180 day period. The scenarios investigated provide test cases to examine if direct gamma-ray spectroscopy of the fuel can be used to identify changes comparing a base case (no reactivity control and fixed fission contribution) to an insertion of reactivity (10 pcm no change in fission composition) and a change in fission composition. The analysis demonstrates that monitoring the total count rate in a highly collimated high-resolution photon energy spectrum is sensitive to perturbations imposed into the reactor model. The total photon count rate changes ≈2% for the fission composition change and ≈4.5% for the reactivity insertion compared to the base case. However, both scenarios show an increase in the total photon count rate. The total photon count rate can be used to identify changes due to power (number of fissions) but not due to a change in the material undergoing fission. To distinguish between the two cases of increased power, the photon spectrum would require an intensive analysis technique. A photon peak count rate ratio analysis could be used to identify changes in the fissile material fission generation in the core through identification of a static peak that shows little variation to the source of fission and a highly varying peak. The photon peak strength will ultimately be determined by the isotope’s fission yield. A preliminary analysis investigating the coupling of the isotope’s fission yield and its concentration in the fuel salt derived from the modeling has been performed. A ratio analysis of the photon peak count rates of 140 La to 99 Mo demonstrated that the reactivity insertion creates a distinct difference in the ratio compared to the fission composition change scenario.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Workshop on Improving Holdup Monitoring in the US

The characterization and quantification of nuclear deposits, or residual nuclear material retained in process equipment, generally referred to as holdup, continues to challenge nuclear processing facilities in DOE program areas such as nuclear criticality safety, material control and accountability, environmental management. The efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear operations in these facilities depends heavily on the results from nondestructive techniques designed to measure nuclear materials in situ. The traditional methods used to measure holdup were established more than 30 years ago and assume unrealistic conditions for most measurement cases. These blind, in situ measurements present unique challenges due to the following attributes: unique, non-ideal geometries; unknown deposit thicknesses; lack of representative calibration standards; large number of holdup deposit locations; and poor accessibility for many measurement locations. These difficulties and the poor assumptions made to handle them have resulted in measurement uncertainties that are often too large for many programs to effectively utilize. In an effort to address and identify solutions to the current holdup challenges facing the US nuclear industry, Oak Ridge National Laboratory hosted the Technical Workshop on Improving Holdup Monitoring in the US. The two-day workshop held August 21–22, 2019, was attended by 35 holdup measurement practitioners, program managers, stakeholders from US Department of Energy sites, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and representatives from commercial industry. The primary objectives were to identify critical elements of a successful and defensible holdup measurement program; identify technical challenges, needs, and potential improvements associated with measurement of holdup; and share best practices and lessons learned from recent accumulation events. Fourteen presentations were delivered on holdup topics including necessary elements for effective program management, measurement needs, emerging technologies and other measurement solutions, and lessons learned from recent events. These presentations highlighted best practices related to accumulation monitoring, considerations and proactive steps to facilitate holdup in new facility designs, imaging solutions to improve holdup assumptions, and new software developed in support of holdup measurements. Breakout sessions were also employed to determine additional needs and identify potential solutions to common holdup challenges. The primary discussions focused on causes and prevention of material accumulations, needs for uranium and plutonium measurements, and reduction of measurement uncertainty, all of which were explicitly identified as critical needs during the 2018 Workshop on Technical and Programmatic Needs for a Sustainable NDA Program for the US DOE.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Knowledge Transfer and Training in Safeguards for Decommissioned Nuclear Facilities (Project Final Report for FY2022)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) applies safeguards to nuclear facilities that are not operating, including those undergoing decommissioning, and the IAEA’s effort in this area is both considerable and increasing. Specifically, the IAEA Department of Safeguards’ Division of Concepts and Planning (SGCP-003: Safeguards Approaches) identified an R&D need to “Develop safeguards implementation guidelines for facilities under decommissioning and safeguards concepts for post-accident facilities under decommissioning”. Nuclear facilities undergoing decommissioning are not exempt from safeguards agreements between the IAEA and Host State, and, accordingly, the requirement for verification of no diversion of nuclear material and detection of undeclared activities at decommissioned facilities remain even after facility shutdown. However, the effort required to meet safeguards objectives diminishes as nuclear material and essential equipment are removed during the decommissioning process which shifts the emphasis from verification of ever-diminishing fissile or source material inventories to verification of changes in facility design and equipment operability.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗