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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 325 records · Page 18
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2017

Development of functional requirements specification for digital instrumentation and control systems upgrades used at nuclear power plants (NPPs) - 396

Recent market conditions have driven the nuclear industry to become more innovative at reducing cost in order to remain competitive. Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems used by many NPPs are based on outdated 1960's and 70's technology. Many of the components used in these digital systems are no longer supported by Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and are rapidly becoming obsolete. Coping with the high cost of replacing I and C equipment due to obsolescence adds to this economic challenge. While other industries have migrated from analog to modern digital I and C technology, implementation of digital I and C controls within the nuclear industry has been very slow. This is primarily due to the high capital cost related to implementation of digital I and C upgrades, which is compounded by regulatory uncertainties that present significant licensing risks. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and the industry's Digital I and C Working Group are working to address many of the regulatory barriers that adversely impacts implementation of digital upgrades at NPPs. The NRC has developed an 'Integrated Action Plan to Modernize Digital Instrumentation and Controls Regulatory Infrastructure' (ML16097A182), Reference 1. Once fully implemented, this plan is expected to help reduce regulatory uncertainties that affects project cost. Excluding regulatory uncertainty, most OEM's will concur that one of the most important factors in reducing project cost is assuring that all requirements are well defined and complete prior to starting the project. A detailed and high quality Functional Requirements Specification (FRS) is critical in documenting these requirements. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

New intrinsically smart severe accident instrumentation saves costs and enhances severe accident management - 302

The Severe Accidents (SA) at Fukushima in 2011, identified the need for enhanced I and C to follow the progress of SA. Since SA environments are significantly Beyond DBA conditions, some new advanced Inherently Smart sensors had to be developed and tested. Nuclear plant designers and operators have helped focus the I and C enhancement based upon lessons learned from the Fukushima accidents. The result has been the addition of I and C for direct measurement of SA conditions hydrogen concentration, oxygen concentration, temperature, and pressure that provide unambiguous information for management of Severe Accident scenarios. The benefits are immediate from three important aspects. First, they deliver on the nuclear promise for enhanced safety at reduced costs. These Inherently Smart sensors have no maintenance and replace equipment that has high maintenance costs. Secondly, these sensors provide multiple benefits, such as condition monitoring information all the time and direct measurement of SA conditions if they are needed. Thirdly, and most importantly, simplify operator actions and training for SA. SA scenarios and SA Management can now rely on direct measurements to know such things as, the extent of fuel damage, integrity of the reactor pressure vessel, when corium is on the floor of containment, and conditions upon which to activate the hardened vent. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Safety software release options to support plant start-up and commissioning activities - 285

The schedule demands on new nuclear power plant site testing and commissioning programs challenge the plant's Instrumentation and Control (I and C) supplier's ability to provide certified safety software releases to meet the needs of these programs. This paper outlines the typical certified safety software development and certification process which follows a Waterfall software life-cycle model. The conflicts that result between supporting the site program and the safety software supplier's internal certification program are identified. An adapted 'functional' safety release process is presented that supports the site program's needs for software changes and in parallel enables the safety software certification process to proceed. Comparisons between the two safety software release processes are examined and the benefits realized through the use of the adapted 'functional' safety software release process are discussed. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Impact of Passive Safety on FHR Instrumentation Systems Design and Classification

Fluoride salt-cooled high-temperature reactors (FHRs) will rely more extensively on passive safety than earlier reactor classes. 10CFR50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, establishes minimum design requirements to provide reasonable assurance of adequate safety. 10CFR50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors, provides guidance on how the safety significance of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) should be reflected in their regulatory treatment. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has provided 10 CFR 50.69 SSC Categorization Guideline (NEI-00-04) that factors in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model insights, as well as deterministic insights, through an integrated decision-making panel. Employing the PRA to inform deterministic requirements enables an appropriately balanced, technically sound categorization to be established. No FHR currently has an adequate PRA or set of design basis accidents to enable establishing the safety classification of its SSCs. While all SSCs used to comply with the general design criteria (GDCs) will be safety related, the intent is to limit the instrumentation risk significance through effective design and reliance on inherent passive safety characteristics. For example, FHRs have no safety-significant temperature threshold phenomena, thus enabling the primary and reserve reactivity control systems required by GDC 26 to be passively, thermally triggered at temperatures well below those for which core or primary coolant boundary damage would occur. Moreover, the passive thermal triggering of the primary and reserve shutdown systems may relegate the control rod drive motors to the control system, substantially decreasing the amount of safety-significant wiring needed. Similarly, FHR decay heat removal systems are intended to be running continuously to minimize the amount of safety-significant instrumentation needed to initiate operation of systems and components important to safety as required in GDC 20. This paper provides an overview of the design process employed to develop a pre-conceptual FHR instrumentation architecture intended to lower plant capital and operational costs by minimizing reliance on expensive, safety related, safety-significant instrumentation through the use of inherent passive features of FHRs.

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DOE OSTI2017

Human Performance Measures for the Evaluation of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Interfaces: A Systematic Review - 265

The purpose of this study was to review the literature related to measuring human performance in the design and evaluation of the human-system interface (HSI) of nuclear power plant (NPP) control rooms and synthesize lessons learned and future directions for research and practice in this field. The design and evaluation of digital or hybrid HSI requires comprehensive measurement of human performance to ensure quality and safety of the nuclear power process control. Human factors evaluation frameworks have been proposed to guide the measurement of human performance constructs. However, there are few guides for selecting appropriate measures for those constructs. A systematic review of empirical research literature was conducted. Studies were identified through academic publication databases and grey literature searches. Eligible studies were coded and information regarding human performance measures was extracted and analyzed. A total of 80 studies met the criteria. Human performance measures extracted from the reviewed studies included measures of: behavioral performance; workload; situation awareness; human-human or human-machine cooperation; other cognitive performance indicators; and system performance. Behavioral performance (speed and accuracy), workload, and situation awareness were the most frequently measured constructs with validated and domain-specific instruments. The results of the literature review provided an overview of the human performance constructs and their corresponding measures for NPP control room HSI evaluation. These results can be used as an initial guide to establish appropriate and comprehensive measurements of human performance for such evaluations. Future directions in measure development are also discussed. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Instrumentation, control, and human system interface contributions to historical severe accidents - 301

In 2015 EPRI completed a study of historical severe accidents. This study was intended to identify the lessons that these events had for instrumentation and control (I and C), and human systems interfaces (HSI) for nuclear power plants. The project studied 19 severe accidents that were identified by a parallel study that was underway for the International Atomic Energy Agency. I and C or HSI issues made significant contributions to 18 of the 19 events studied. This paper will summarize the I and C and HSI deficiencies that contributed to the propagation of the accidents, discuss the likely causes of these deficiencies and describe the role of I and C and HSI in finally terminating the events. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Migration to a fully-integrated control room - 349

The nuclear industry is faced with a pressing need to reduce operating costs in order to remain competitive with other forms of electric generation. While current industry initiatives are focused on incremental gains by streamlining work processes and reducing worker burdens, very few, if any, involve significant reductions in the base workload of a nuclear plant. Migration to a fully-integrated control room affords just such an opportunity. This report describes an NPP digital instrumentation and control (I and C) system design, along with its corresponding human systems interface (HSI) design, which achieves high plant availability, while selectively applying digital equipment redundancy and integrating traditional I and C system partitions, to minimize the digital equipment needed, and thereby minimize initial installation costs and ongoing operations and maintenance (O and M) costs. An additional key component of digital equipment minimization is optimization of the digital interface to conventional plant sensors and controlled plant devices (e.g., pumps, valves), which requires no disturbance to plant cables and results in eliminating thousands of electro-mechanical relay control components. The design is rooted in the highly integrated digital technology applied to the most recent advanced light water reactors under United States (U.S.) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) design certification review and approval. While this design employs technology from new plants, that technology has been adapted to the modernization of current operating NPPs. Hence, the highly integrated digital I and C and HSI design is referred to as the compact control room digital modernization (CDM). Along with minimal digital equipment, the corresponding HSI design employs compact operator workstations with visual display units (VDU) and soft controls for both the main control room (MCR) and remote shutdown room (RSR), to immediately improve human performance and ultimately facilitate operating staff reduction. Some advanced light water reactors have demonstrated this staff reduction through full scope simulator testing of normal and abnormal plant conditions, with U.S. licensed operating crews from currently-operating U.S. plants. Digital equipment minimization, compact operator workstations, and optimized plant component interfaces that require no disturbance to field cables, also facilitate implementation of the CDM over multiple phases, most of which can be conducted during normal refueling shutdown windows. This phased implementation method includes a novel transition of the I and C, MCR and RSR with an operations centered focus. This paper presents the CDM design, along with qualitative cost/benefit comparisons to currently operating plants with conventional analog I and C and HSI technology; this generation of I and C/HSI is referred to as a conventional control room (CCR). A CCR also includes NPPs that have been upgraded with digital systems, but retain the current partitions between plant I and C systems (i.e., no I and C integration) and retain the current plant system to control board configuration of current NPP control rooms. Even though these comparisons are qualitative, a compelling case is presented for the CDM. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

A novel priority selection system for nuclear power plant - 287

The priority selection system is an important component of security level instrument control platform for nuclear power plant, the main function of which is priority processing the manual or automatic command with various security levels and driving engineering safety features and field devices, such as pump and valve. Its stability and safety plays a crucial role in the operation of the power plant. The main objective of the present paper is to describe the new nuclear power plant-oriented priority selection system, which is developed independently by China Nuclear Control System Engineering Company. In this system, the control commands from 1E DCS, ECP and DAS systems are transmitted via hardwire, while those from NC DCS are transmitted by field-bus. The control commands experience priority output to control the field actuators. Meanwhile, in order to control key field devices when failure of the instrument control systems occurs, the issuing interface for native instructions with permissions setting is also offered. The whole system provides collection-feedback functions for field devices, high coverage self-diagnostic functions and periodic test functions for safety systems. Moreover, the feedback information of field devices, the results of self-diagnosis and periodic test will be submitted to DCS of nuclear power plant. In addition, the core part of priority selection system, namely priority selection module, is obtained by pure FPGA technology, which is different from DCS systems and could avoid common cause failure of software effectively. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Computer security approach for Rolls-Royce spinline{sup R} safety platform - 227

The number of digital assets at commercial nuclear power plants is significant and will likely continue to increase with time. As a consequence, these plants have become potential targets for cyber-attacks. Around the world, nuclear safety authorities and national Computer and Information Security Agencies are implementing stricter regulations and inspections for critical systems in nuclear plants. There is a particular focus on instrumentation and control systems as they implement key nuclear safety functions. Rolls-Royce follows a strict computer and information security program based on general and nuclear specific norms, Rolls-Royce group processes, and proven technologies. The Spinline digital safety platform has been designed specifically for nuclear applications and features a secure development and operational environment that provides barriers against unauthorized modifications and implements design requirements promoting integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance. The Rolls-Royce secure development environment provides layers of protection utilizing physical and environmental security, human resource security, and information technology systems access control. The Spinline platform strengthens security functions by providing protection against unauthorized, unintended, and unsafe modifications to the system. The Spinline platform has design features promote integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance in the event of inadvertent operator actions or undesirable behavior of connected equipment. The Spinline technology and these computer security processes are based in a wide spectrum of international standards that were accepted as providing a secure development and operating environment by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2014. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Nuclear power plant instrumentation and control cyber security common vector access leading to relational common cause failures - 340

Nuclear power plants and facilities have been implementing digital system upgrades into their previously analog systems for well over twenty years. New nuclear facilities' control, security, and emergency preparedness systems are almost exclusively built on digital architectures with a high degree of communication between the various systems that are often integrated together into a central control station to aid in operation or security of the facility. As digital systems become more widespread in nuclear facility control system architectures, cyber security related issues have become a significant concern to operators, regulators, governments, and other groups. Among the many concerns related to digital systems and cyber security is the area of common cause and common mode failures. This paper introduces, defines, and discusses some sources of common cause failure from a cyber security perspective: common vector access. This refers to specific access points that an adversary can exploit through a single attack sequence that have the potential to provide relational failures through common cause on multiple components, subsystems, systems, or plants. This paper will further discuss interconnected processes where these access points may exist, the importance of limiting or controlling these pinch points, and some methods of protecting common vector access points. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

An operation verification strategy against network attack of DCS in nuclear power plant - 323

Digital Instrumentation and control (I and C) system serves as the 'senses and nervous system' of a nuclear power plant (NPP). It plays an important role in the safe and economic operation in the NPPs. Digital I and C system has a series of advantages compared with analogue ones, but the introduction of the operation system platform, the application software, and the network communication structure are causing security risk to the power plant. Different kinds of procedures have already been adopted against these risks such as the communication isolation, but the security attacks still occur from time to time in the industrial fields around the world. This paper presents two computer security methods based on the thought of software verification and validation with step-by-step operation identification. First, three scenarios of security attack are proposed according to the structure of a distributed control system (DCS). Then a method with two network bypasses and a security computer are adopted to obtain the operation commands, the actuation signal, and the operation feedback in case of the first two scenarios by identifying the consistency of the obtained data. Furthermore, the method is optimized by combining the operation procedure and the camera shot to identify the anomaly of the information flow, thus to improve the effectiveness against the computer security issues. In the end, the influence and feasibility of this method is discussed. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Severe accident: hardening of standards and qualification requirements for nuclear pressure transmitters - 319

Nuclear power stations are designed according to the nuclear safety principle: the achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents or mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of workers, the public and the environment from undue radiation hazards. This principle is applicable from the design to the dismantling of the power station, including normal and accident (and post-accident) operation. To take into account the world experience (incident or accident as Fukushima), international safety authorities recommends to reinforce safety functions and qualification requirements level. Concerning the instrumentation, devices like sensors are mainly impacted by the following constraint improvements: - Radiation resistance in normal and accident conditions: - Higher total dose; - Dose Rate; - Nature of radiation; - Pressure and Temperature profile in terms of: - Magnitude of pressure and / or temperature (higher); - Duration of higher constraints (longer). All these specifications induce: - The creation of a new qualification level - Severe Accident (SA) or equivalent; - An impact on the sensor technology to improve the resistance to harsh environment. Finally, the paper will present in details the evolution of the requirements and will sum up the advantages and disadvantages of different technologies to meet the severe accident conditions. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Development of an update to ISA S67.04 and RP 67.04: 'Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation for Nuclear Power Plants' - 146

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the update to International Society of Automation (ISA) Standard ISA S67.04 - 2006, 'Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation for Nuclear Power Plants', and ISA RP 67.04-2000, 'Methodologies for Determination of Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation'. Significant advances have occurred on the utility, Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) vendor, and regulatory side, related to improved techniques for analysis and monitoring. These and other changes, including those related to Technical Specifications and surveillance interval extensions, are being included in the latest update to this primary standard for setpoint control in nuclear plants in the U.S. and around the world. In 2016, the ISA S67.04 Committee agreed to proceed with a revision to this Standard and Recommended Practice, with major updates in the following areas: 1. Definitions - Updates for improved definitions based on TSTF-493, Rev 4, RIS-2006-17 and NRC updated Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.105 2. 95/95 - Updates based on improved guidance on the development of component input data and analysis techniques for 95% probability/95% confidence calculations 3. TSTF-493, RIS 2006-17 updates for Technical Specification input and to support changes 4. NRC input from updates in the Regulatory Guide 1.105 and Branch Technical Position BTP-7-12 revision process. 5. Improved guidance from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in References 7, 8 and 9. These standards are being updated with a new version anticipated to be issued as a draft in 2017 and submitted for ISA approval in 2019. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Ensuring operator reliability in digital control rooms - 102

The U.S. fleet of nuclear power plants is aging, and efforts are being made to modernize instrumentation and control systems including integration of digital human-machine interfaces (HMIs) into the control room. Automation and control technologies have advanced since original systems were installed in the plants. This presents unique opportunities and challenges in ensuring the replacements are a benefit to the operators and the overall safe and reliable operation of the plant. We discuss trends we have observed from assisting utilities in their modernization efforts. Automation and evolving control rooms come with their own host of problems that existing human factors and engineering methods fail to capture. Traditional approaches are analytical approaches to ensuring reliability. Here we discuss some of the shortfalls of these traditional approaches as plants become increasingly more complex. We suggest that ensuring reliability for modernized and next generation control room will require expanding the scope of what was traditionally considered human factors as well as exploring novel approaches and methodologies for dealing with complexity and rapidly advancing technology. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Recent results from a testbed for the reliability of the digital instrumentation and control systems and cybersecurity in nuclear power plants - 392

Transition from analog to digital instrumentation and control systems requires a systematic study of the modifications, and assessment of their reliability. Such studies are often carried out on a test bed. The test bed developed earlier includes a commercially available triple modular redundant (TMR) programmable logic controller (PLC) for testing not only the reliability of the digital I and C but also the cyber-security of the system during plant operation. This paper reports results of our preliminary analyses carried out using the test bed following the injection of faults mimicking faulty sensors. The fault injection tool generates faulty signals in single or multiple sensors located in the primary loop. These scenarios studied under steady-state operation conditions simulate a bad sensor, a cut wire, noise, etc. The faults injected can lead to information being displayed in the main control room (MCR) to not match the conditions in the plant. In addition to a fault injection module, a result analyzer module is also a part of this testbed. Operator actions can be based on information displayed in the MCR, or they can be informed by the result analyzer. Potential operator actions following these single- or multiple faulty signals are assessed. It is concluded that the result analyzer in some cases can be helpful in guiding operators to make the right decisions. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Identification of Significant NPP Cyber-Attack Scenarios based on Risk Information

For the last decades, analog instrumentation and control (I and C) systems have been replaced with digital systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs). While there are various advantages of the digital technology for the plant safety, new threats have been introduced such as cyber security. In fact, there have been cyber-attacks on nuclear facilities adopting digital systems. The cyber-attack on the Iran nuclear facility is a typical example which shows the possibility of a cyber-attack on safety critical infrastructures with intra-network. Cyber security has been introduced as one of the significant issues for NPP safety and recently its importance has been more highlighted, but the research in this field is not mature yet. Moreover, there is not much information about cyber security of NPPs. In this work, as a fundamental research for risk evaluation of cyber-attacks, a method to identify significant cyber-attack scenarios on NPPs was proposed based on the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) method which is widely used for evaluating the safety of NPPs. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Bayesian and HRA-Aided Method for the Novel Reliability Analysis of Software

Technological advancements and nuclear power plant modernization has inspired considerable research in the areas of safety and reliability, yet there remains a lack of consensus for the reliability assessment of digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems. Motivated by the lack of consensus for reliability analysis methods, this work employs a novel framework that incorporates Bayesian, human reliability, and common-cause failure (CCF) modeling techniques. The novel framework allows the use of state-of-the-art or classical modeling techniques when accounting for human and CCF effects on system reliability. The Bayesian and HRA-Aided Method for the Reliability Analysis of Software (BAHAMAS) is demonstrated by a case study for the quantification of software hazards found in a previous analysis of a digital reactor trip system. The results demonstrate the ability of BAHAMAS to account for human activities during the software development life cycle and their influence on software reliability. BAHAMAS is a flexible tool for extending the coverage of conventional probabilistic risk assessments to include modernized digital I&C systems.

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