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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 325 records · Page 18

LCROSS - Lunar Impactor: Pioneering Risk-Tolerant Exploration in Search for Water on the Moon

The Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) was launched with the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) on June 18, 2009 to determine the presence of water-ice in a permanently shadowed crater on the south pole of the Moon. However, an equally important purpose was to pioneer low-cost, quick-turnaround NASA missions that could accept a higher-than-normal-level of technical risk. When the LCROSS mission proposal was competitively selected by the NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate to design, build, and launch a spacecraft in 31 months with a $79M cost-capped budget and a fixed mass allocation, NASA Ames Research Center and its industry partner, Northrop-Grumman, needed a game-changing approach to be successful. That approach was a ground-breaking combination of having a risk-tolerant NASA Class D mission status and finding the right balance point between the inflexible elements of cost and schedule and the newly-flexible element of technical capability.

Andrews, Daniel R.↗

Composite chronicles: A study of the lessons learned in the development, production, and service of composite structures

A study of past composite aircraft structures programs was conducted to determine the lessons learned during the programs. The study focused on finding major underlying principles and practices that experience showed have significant effects on the development process and should be recognized and understood by those responsible for using of composites. Published information on programs was reviewed and interviews were conducted with personnel associated with current and past major development programs. In all, interviews were conducted with about 56 people representing 32 organizations. Most of the people interviewed have been involved in the engineering and manufacturing development of composites for the past 20 to 25 years. Although composites technology has made great advances over the past 30 years, the effective application of composites to aircraft is still a complex problem that requires experienced personnel with special knowledge. All disciplines involved in the development process must work together in real time to minimize risk and assure total product quality and performance at acceptable costs. The most successful programs have made effective use of integrated, collocated, concurrent engineering teams, and most often used well-planned, systematic development efforts wherein the design and manufacturing processes are validated in a step-by-step or 'building block' approach. Such approaches reduce program risk and are cost effective.

Vosteen, Louis F.↗

Recent Advances and Future Challenges in Risk-Based Radiation Engineering

We cover a top-level introduction to hardness assurance (HA) from a robotic space system perspective, starting at the piece-part level. We discuss error sources inherent to presently-accepted HA practices and why they cause us to be risk-averse. We conclude by reviewing current proposals that move towards more risk-tolerant system design approaches as well as future challenges that will require these advanced techniques.

radiation effects↗

Low drag attitude control for Skylab orbital lifetime extension

In the fall of 1977 it was determined that Skylab had started to tumble and that the original orbit lifetime predictions were much too optimistic. A decision had to be made whether to accept an early uncontrolled reentry with its inherent risks or try to attempt to control Skylab to a lower drag attitude in the hope that there was enough time to develop a Teleoperator Retrieval System, bring it up on the Space Shuttle and then decide whether to boost Skylab to a higher longer life orbit or to reenter it in a controlled fashion. The end-on-velocity (EOVV) control method is documented, which was successfully applied for about half a year to keep Skylab in a low drag attitude with the aid of the control moment gyros and a minimal expenditure of attitude control gas.

Glaese, J. R.↗

Institutionalizing Lessons Learned

The NASA Integrated Action Team (NIAT) was formed by the NASA Administrator in March 2000. The purpose of this team was to identify the actions that NASA must take to address systemic findings reported in 4 different anomaly investigations. Team membership represented senior managers from all the field centers and NASA Headquarters. NIAT report addressed 165 findings and developed 17 action plans that are described in five themes: people and teams, technology, risk, formulation rigor, and communications. The NIAT actions present a systems solution for strengthening formulation and implementation of programs and improving the environment for their support. NIAT results included: enhancing success by avoiding failures that could have been prevented through good planning and sound practice; ensuring that prudent risks do not compromise safety; and ensuring that mission risks are objectively assessed, appropriately mitigated and consciously accepted by the program team and customers. Definitions of Faster, Better, Cheaper and Success Criteria were also developed and included as part of the NIAT report. As a result of the NIAT report, program and project management process changes were incorporated into NASA's quality system documentation, including NPG 7120.513, "NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements. This paper describes the NIAT results and the resulting updates to NPG 7120.5 that keep this program and project management description a living process.

McBrayer, Robert O.↗

NEXT Single String Integration Test Results

As a critical part of NASA's Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT) test validation process, a single string integration test was performed on the NEXT ion propulsion system. The objectives of this test were to verify that an integrated system of major NEXT ion propulsion system elements meets project requirements, to demonstrate that the integrated system is functional across the entire power processor and xenon propellant management system input ranges, and to demonstrate to potential users that the NEXT propulsion system is ready for transition to flight. Propulsion system elements included in this system integration test were an engineering model ion thruster, an engineering model propellant management system, an engineering model power processor unit, and a digital control interface unit simulator that acted as a test console. Project requirements that were verified during this system integration test included individual element requirements ; integrated system requirements, and fault handling. This paper will present the results of these tests, which include: integrated ion propulsion system demonstrations of performance, functionality and fault handling; a thruster re-performance acceptance test to establish baseline performance: a risk-reduction PMS-thruster integration test: and propellant management system calibration checks.

Soulas, George C.↗

Effects of Transparency on Pilot Trust and Agreement in the Autonomous Constrained Flight Planner

We performed a human-in-the-loop study to explore the role of transparency in engendering trust and reliance within highly automated systems. Specifically, we examined how transparency impacts trust in and reliance upon the Autonomous Constrained Flight Planner (ACFP), a critical automated system being developed as part of NASA's Reduced Crew Operations (RCO) Concept. The ACFP is designed to provide an enhanced ground operator, termed a super dispatcher, with recommended diversions for aircraft when their primary destinations are unavailable. In the current study, 12 commercial transport rated pilots who played the role of super dispatchers were given six time-pressured all land scenarios where they needed to use the ACFP to determine diversions for multiple aircraft. Two factors were manipulated. The primary factor was level of transparency. In low transparency scenarios the pilots were given a recommended airport and runway, plus basic information about the weather conditions, the aircraft types, and the airport and runway characteristics at that and other airports. In moderate transparency scenarios the pilots were also given a risk evaluation for the recommended airport, and for the other airports if they requested it. In the high transparency scenario additional information including the reasoning for the risk evaluations was made available to the pilots. The secondary factor was level of risk, either high or low. For high-risk aircraft, all potential diversions were rated as highly risky, with the ACFP giving the best option for a bad situation. For low-risk aircraft the ACFP found only low-risk options for the pilot. Both subjective and objective measures were collected, including rated trust, whether the pilots checked the validity of the automation recommendation, and whether the pilots eventually flew to the recommended diversion airport. Key results show that: 1) Pilots trust increased with higher levels of transparency, 2) Pilots were more likely to verify ACFPs recommendations with low levels of transparency and when risk was high, 3) Pilots were more likely to explore other options from the ACFP in low transparency conditions and when risk was high, and 4) Pilots decision to accept or reject ACFPs recommendations increased as a function of the transparency in the explanation. The finding that higher levels of transparency was coupled with higher levels of trust, a lower need to verify other options, and higher levels of agreement with ACFP recommendations, confirms the importance of transparency in aiding reliance on automated recommendations. Additional analyses of qualitative data gathered from subjects through surveys and during debriefing interviews also provided the basis for new design recommendations for the ACFP.

trust↗

Assessing the Fire Risk for a Historic Hangar

NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) is evaluating options of reuse of its historic Hangar 1. As a part of this evaluation, a qualitative fire risk assessment study was performed to evaluate the potential threat of combustion of the historic hangar. The study focused on the fire risk trade-off of either installing or not installing a Special Hazard Fire Suppression System in the Hangar 1 deck areas. The assessment methodology was useful in discussing the important issues among various groups within the Center. Once the methodology was deemed acceptable, the results were assessed. The results showed that the risk remained in the same risk category, whether Hangar 1 does or does not have a Special Hazard Fire Suppression System. Note that the methodology assessed the risk to Hangar 1 and not the risk to an aircraft in the hangar. If one had a high value aircraft, the aircraft risk analysis could potentially show a different result. The assessed risk results were then communicated to management and other stakeholders.

Datta, Koushik↗

Phasing COTS Part Into Low-Risk-Tolerant Missions

A number of activities within NASA and the space community, as well as growing technology needs and supply chain changes have accelerated the need to expand the use of COTS parts within NASA. While the use of COTS has been formally institutionalized and deemed acceptable for Class D space missions and those with greater tolerance for risk, there is still a lack of understanding of how to most effectively use COTS in such high risk-tolerance missions, and no apparent path towards broad use in missions with much less tolerance for risk. However, the reality is that the fundamental limitations of technology associated with the military specification system combined with the need to fly newer technologies in upcoming flagship robotic missions and human space flight missions will ultimately demand a more expansive use of COTS. The infinite nature of COTS gives rise to numerous challenges in the selection, acceptance, testing, and usage of COTS when reliable operation is essential. This presentation will highlight some of the results of a NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) study on the use of COTS parts, as well as many of the historical through current facts about parts assurance within Agency to provide a path forward for reliable use of COTS for a range of space applications and risk postures. In addition this presentation will dispel the myth that expanded use of COTS parts causes a new set of radiation threats to missions.

COTS↗

Phasing COTS Part Into Low-Risk-Tolerant Missions

A number of activities within NASA and the space community, as well as growing technology needs and supply chain changes have accelerated the need to expand the use of COTS parts within NASA. While the use of COTS has been formally institutionalized and deemed acceptable for Class D space missions and those with greater tolerance for risk, there is still a lack of understanding of how to most effectively use COTS in such high risk-tolerance missions, and no apparent path towards broad use in missions with much less tolerance for risk. However, the reality is that the fundamental limitations of technology associated with the military specification system combined with the need to fly newer technologies in upcoming flagship robotic missions and human space flight missions will ultimately demand a more expansive use of COTS. The infinite nature of COTS gives rise to numerous challenges in the selection, acceptance, testing, and usage of COTS when reliable operation is essential. This presentation will highlight some of the results of a NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) study on the use of COTS parts, as well as many of the historical through current facts about parts assurance within Agency to provide a path forward for reliable use of COTS for a range of space applications and risk postures. In addition this presentation will dispel the myth that expanded use of COTS parts causes a new set of radiation threats to missions.

COTS↗

Advanced Air Mobility and Safety Management Systems

Our current air transportation system has underserved markets, including local, regional, intraregional, and urban transportation of both people and cargo. Recent advances in aviation technology such as small highly-automated vehicles, electric aircraft, and automated air traffic are enabling business opportunities in these markets. Advanced Air Mobility, or AAM, refers to a community effort to overcome the gaps in operational rules, safety analysis, and overall acceptance, so that these new operations will be possible. For full details, please see: https://www.nasa.gov/aam As we think about how we can safely introduce these new operations, fundamental questions about how the structure of Safety Management Systems can be applied to AAM, and how that structure can be used to help us overcome the necessary technical and societal obstacles arise. Two of these questions are: • How do we tailor the requirements and desired level of monitoring and assessment to achieve safety given the breadth of possible operations and the associated risk of those operations? • How do we aid innovation by rapidly evaluating the safety of novel operations without losing associated rigor? We assume that a Safety Management System that enables these future systems will incorporate knowledge of the acceptable level of risk, and will utilize data science to automate the core monitor, assess and mitigate functions that will allow us to respond to risks and hazards in time to prevent safety incidents. In 2018, the National Academies proposed an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) that would advance these goals. (https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24962/in-time-aviation-safety-management-challenges-and-research-for-an) The National Academies made a clear distinction between in-time systems, in which hazards could be identified and risks mitigated in time to prevent incidents, and real-time systems, since many hazards and risks do not need real-time data and analysis to detect and mitigate.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗

Model-Driven Development of Safety Architectures

We describe the use of model-driven development for safety assurance of a pioneering NASA flight operation involving a fleet of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) flying beyond visual line of sight. The central idea is to develop a safety architecture that provides the basis for risk assessment and visualization within a safety case, the formal justification of acceptable safety required by the aviation regulatory authority. A safety architecture is composed from a collection of bow tie diagrams (BTDs), a practical approach to manage safety risk by linking the identified hazards to the appropriate mitigation measures. The safety justification for a given unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operation can have many related BTDs. In practice, however, each BTD is independently developed, which poses challenges with respect to incremental development, maintaining consistency across different safety artifacts when changes occur, and in extracting and presenting stakeholder specific information relevant for decision making. We show how a safety architecture reconciles the various BTDs of a system, and, collectively, provide an overarching picture of system safety, by considering them as views of a unified model. We also show how it enables model-driven development of BTDs, replete with validations, transformations, and a range of views. Our approach, which we have implemented in our toolset, AdvoCATE, is illustrated with a running example drawn from a real UAS safety case. The models and some of the innovations described here were instrumental in successfully obtaining regulatory flight approval.

Safety case↗

Interrelationships Between Receiver/Relative Operating Characteristics Display, Binomial, Logit, and Bayes' Rule Probability of Detection Methodologies

Unknown risks are introduced into failure critical systems when probability of detection (POD) capabilities are accepted without a complete understanding of the statistical method applied and the interpretation of the statistical results. The presence of this risk in the nondestructive evaluation (NDE) community is revealed in common statements about POD. These statements are often interpreted in a variety of ways and therefore, the very existence of the statements identifies the need for a more comprehensive understanding of POD methodologies. Statistical methodologies have data requirements to be met, procedures to be followed, and requirements for validation or demonstration of adequacy of the POD estimates. Risks are further enhanced due to the wide range of statistical methodologies used for determining the POD capability. Receiver/Relative Operating Characteristics (ROC) Display, simple binomial, logistic regression, and Bayes' rule POD methodologies are widely used in determining POD capability. This work focuses on Hit-Miss data to reveal the framework of the interrelationships between Receiver/Relative Operating Characteristics Display, simple binomial, logistic regression, and Bayes' Rule methodologies as they are applied to POD. Knowledge of these interrelationships leads to an intuitive and global understanding of the statistical data, procedural and validation requirements for establishing credible POD estimates.

Generazio, Edward R.↗

Pre-flight risk assessment in Emergency Medical Service (EMS) helicopters

The Emergency Medical Service (EMS) industry has been the subject of several television and newspaper articles (Harvey and Jensen, 1987) which emphasized the negative aspects, (e.g., fatalities and high accident rates), rather than the life saving services performed. Until recently, the accident rate of the EMS industry has been five times as high as that of other civil helicopters. This high accident rate has been coupled with the dramatic rise in the number of programs. The industry has built from a single service at its inception in 1972, to over 180 in 1987 (Spray, 1987), to the point that 93 percent of the contiguous U.S. is now covered by some type of EMS service. These factors prompted the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to study the accidents that occurred between May 11, 1978 and December 3, 1986 (NTSB, 1988). The NTSB report concluded that 'Sound pilot judgment is central to safe flight operations.' They further stated that '... factors unique to EMS helicopter operations--such as the influence of the mission itself, program competition, and EMS program management perspectives--can drastically influence pilot judgment during the EMS mission.' One of the most difficult decisions that a pilot must make is whether to accept or decline a mission. A pre-flight risk assessment system (SAFE) was developed at NASA-Ames Research Center for civil EMS operations to aid pilots in making this decision objectively. The ability of the SAFE system to predict mission risk profiles was tested at an EMS facility. The results of this field study demonstrated that the usefulness of SAFE was highly dependent on the type of mission flown. SAFE is now being modified so that it can 'learn' with each mission flown. For example, after flying a mission to a particular site, an EMS pilot would input information about this mission into the system, such as new buildings, wires, or approach procedures. Then, the next time a pilot flew a similar mission or one to the same area, this additional information would be taken into account in computing a risk assessment.

Shively, R. J.↗

On the Moral Hazard of Autonomy

This paper describes the concept of moral hazard as applied to technologies that incorporate automation and autonomy. Moral hazard is said to exist when a party to a transaction feels more comfortable taking undue risks because another party will bear the costs if things go badly. As opposed to regular physical hazards, a moral hazard comes from within a person. In this paper, we reveal two categories of moral hazards related to autonomy. The first category of moral hazard occurs when the owner of the autonomy introduces an autonomous system without accepting the full responsibility for improper operation thereby shifting the risks from one party to another party. This category of moral hazard is similar to moral hazards experienced in other industries and can often be addressed through appropriate policy and establishing liability for irresponsible behavior. The issue becomes more complicated in cases where the operator of the autonomy may not have a full understanding of the system behavior. In the second category of moral hazard, risks are shifted from people to autonomy. In this category, the humans in proximity to the autonomous system begin to trust its behavior. Their behavior may change in that they may believe they are more insulated from harm and subsequently exhibit more risky behavior towards increasingly autonomous technologies. Mitigating this type of moral hazard may require the autonomy to possess certain design features to discourage this type of harmful human behavior so that humans do not suffer needlessly in their interactions with autonomous systems by placing inappropriate trust where that trust is neither warranted nor deserved.

Cybernetics↗

Pre-flight risk assessment in emergency medical service (EMS) helicopters

A preflight risk assessment system (SAFE) was developed at NASA-Ames Research Center for civil EMS operations to assist pilots in making a decision objectively to accept or decline a mission. The ability of the SAFE system to predict risk profiles was examined at an EMS operator. Results of this field study showed that the usefulness of SAFE was largely dependent on the type of mission flown.

Shively, Robert J.↗

Directed Acyclic Graphs: A Tool for Understanding the NASA Human Spaceflight System Risks - Human System Risk Board

For over a decade, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tracked and configuration-managed approximately 30 risks to astronaut health and performance that occur before, during and after spaceflight. The Human System Risk Board (HSRB), a Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) Board at NASA Johnson Space Center, is the entity responsible for identifying, assessing, analyzing, and monitoring the official understanding of the risk or risk posture for each of the Human System Risks and determining – based on evaluation of the available evidence – when that risk posture changes. The ultimate purpose of tracking and researching these risks is to find ways to reduce the risk that astronaut crews face during spaceflight. Historically, research, development and operations relevant to one risk have been conducted in isolation from other risks; these individual risk ‘silos’ enabled initial characterization of each specific risk. In spaceflight however, the impact of exposure to risk for astronaut crews is cumulative, and not independent of exposures or other risks, as all the adverse effects of the spaceflight environment begin at launch, continue throughout the duration of the mission and in some cases across the lifetime of the crews. In January of 2020, the HSRB at NASA embarked on a pilot project designed to assess the potential value of causal diagramming as a tool to facilitate understanding of these cumulative and interdependent effects as applied within Human System Risk management. This process uses directed acyclic graphs as a means of formalizing a shared mental model of the causal flow of risk among Risk Board stakeholders. Initially this model was to improve communication among those stakeholders, but the potential value exceeds communication alone. The causal diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to function as a type of knowledge graph for reference for the board and its stakeholders. This document is a sister document to NASA/TM 20220006812 Directed Acyclic Graph Guidance Documentation (1). In that document, the basic guidance for creating and standardizing directed acyclic graphs as tools for cross-risk analysis is provided. This document contains the initial configuration managed DAGs that were created as a result of applying those principles. These initial versions were accepted by the HSRB in January of 2022. Each of the Human System Risks are represented by a DAG that has been reviewed by the larger Human Health and Performance community at NASA including life scientists, physical scientists, physicians, nurses, pharmacists, exercise specialists and more. These results show the starting point for Human System Risk DAGs as shared mental models and communication aids across the boundaries of the various expertise needed to understand and mitigate the human risks in spaceflight. Because they are a starting point, each of these DAGs can be expected to change over time as new or refined evidence becomes available. The process for updating these DAGs can be found in the JSC-66705 Human System Risk Management Plan (2) that is publicly available on the NASA Technical Reports Server.

Erik L. Antonsen↗

Quantified, Localized Health Benefits of Accelerated Carbon Dioxide Emissions Reductions

Societal risks increase as Earth warms, and increase further for emissions trajectories accepting relatively high levels of near-term emissions while assuming future negative emissions will compensate, even if they lead to identical warming as trajectories with reduced near-term emissions. Accelerating carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions reductions, including as a substitute for negative emissions, hence reduces long-term risks but requires dramatic near-term societal transformations. A major barrier to emissions reductions is the difficulty of reconciling immediate, localized costs with global, long-term benefits. However, 2 C trajectories not relying on negative emissions or 1.5 C trajectories require elimination of most fossil-fuel-related emissions. This generally reduces co-emissions that cause ambient air pollution, resulting in near-term, localized health benefits. We therefore examine the human health benefits of increasing 21st-century CO2 reductions by 180 GtC, an amount that would shift a 'standard' 2 C scenario to 1.5 C or could achieve 2 C without negative emissions. The decreased air pollution leads to 153 +/- 43 million fewer premature deaths worldwide, with approx.40% occurring during the next 40 years, and minimal climate disbenefits. More than a million premature deaths would be prevented in many metropolitan areas in Asia and Africa, and greater than 200,000 in individual urban areas on every inhabited continent except Australia.

Atmospheric science↗