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At least 325 records · Page 18

Deriving Safety Cases from Automatically Constructed Proofs

Formal proofs provide detailed justification for the validity of claims and are widely used in formal software development methods. However, they are often complex and difficult to understand, because the formalism in which they are constructed and encoded is usually machine-oriented, and they may also be based on assumptions that are not justified. This causes concerns about the trustworthiness of using formal proofs as arguments in safety-critical applications. Here, we present an approach to develop safety cases that correspond to formal proofs found by automated theorem provers and reveal the underlying argumentation structure and top-level assumptions. We concentrate on natural deduction style proofs, which are closer to human reasoning than resolution proofs, and show how to construct the safety cases by covering the natural deduction proof tree with corresponding safety case fragments. We also abstract away logical book-keeping steps, which reduces the size of the constructed safety cases. We show how the approach can be applied to the proofs found by the Muscadet prover.

Basir, Nurlida↗

A Criteria Standard for Conflict Resolution: A Vision for Guaranteeing the Safety of Self-Separation in NextGen

Distributed approaches for conflict resolution rely on analyzing the behavior of each aircraft to ensure that system-wide safety properties are maintained. This paper presents the criteria method, which increases the quality and efficiency of a safety assurance analysis for distributed air traffic concepts. The criteria standard is shown to provide two key safety properties: safe separation when only one aircraft maneuvers and safe separation when both aircraft maneuver at the same time. This approach is complemented with strong guarantees of correct operation through formal verification. To show that an algorithm is correct, i.e., that it always meets its specified safety property, one must only show that the algorithm satisfies the criteria. Once this is done, then the algorithm inherits the safety properties of the criteria. An important consequence of this approach is that there is no requirement that both aircraft execute the same conflict resolution algorithm. Therefore, the criteria approach allows different avionics manufacturers or even different airlines to use different algorithms, each optimized according to their own proprietary concerns.

Munoz, Cesar↗

Model Transformation for a System of Systems Dependability Safety Case

Software plays an increasingly larger role in all aspects of NASA's science missions. This has been extended to the identification, management and control of faults which affect safety-critical functions and by default, the overall success of the mission. Traditionally, the analysis of fault identification, management and control are hardware based. Due to the increasing complexity of system, there has been a corresponding increase in the complexity in fault management software. The NASA Independent Validation & Verification (IV&V) program is creating processes and procedures to identify, and incorporate safety-critical software requirements along with corresponding software faults so that potential hazards may be mitigated. This Specific to Generic ... A Case for Reuse paper describes the phases of a dependability and safety study which identifies a new, process to create a foundation for reusable assets. These assets support the identification and management of specific software faults and, their transformation from specific to generic software faults. This approach also has applications to other systems outside of the NASA environment. This paper addresses how a mission specific dependability and safety case is being transformed to a generic dependability and safety case which can be reused for any type of space mission with an emphasis on software fault conditions.

Murphy, Judy↗

Formalizing Probabilistic Safety Claims

A safety claim for a system is a statement that the system, which is subject to hazardous conditions, satisfies a given set of properties. Following work by John Rushby and Bev Littlewood, this paper presents a mathematical framework that can be used to state and formally prove probabilistic safety claims. It also enables hazardous conditions, their uncertainties, and their interactions to be integrated into the safety claim. This framework provides a formal description of the probabilistic composition of an arbitrary number of hazardous conditions and their effects on system behavior. An example is given of a probabilistic safety claim for a conflict detection algorithm for aircraft in a 2D airspace. The motivation for developing this mathematical framework is that it can be used in an automated theorem prover to formally verify safety claims.

Herencia-Zapana, Heber↗

The Parable of the Boiled System Safety Professional: Drift to Failure

Recall from the Parable of the Boiled Frog, that tossing a frog into boiling water causes the frog to jump out and hop away while placing a frog in suitable temperature water and slowly bringing the water to a boil results in the frog boiling due to not being aware of the slowly increasing danger, theoretically, of course. System safety professionals must guard against allowing dangers to creep unnoticed into their projects and be ever alert to notice signs of impending problems. People have used various phrases related to the idea, most notably, latent conditions, James Reason in Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents (1, pp 10-11), Drift to Failure, Sydney Dekker (2, pp 82-86) in Resilience Engineering: Chronicling the Emergence of Confused Consensus in Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts, Hollnagel, Woods and Leveson, and normalization of deviance, Diane Vaughan in The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA (3). Reason also said, If eternal vigilance is the price of liberty, then chronic unease is the price of safety (1, p 37). Our challenge as system safety professionals is to be aware of the emergence of signals that warn us of slowly eroding safety margins. This paper will discuss how system safety professionals might better perform in that regard.

Shivers, C. Herbert↗

Towards Measurement of Confidence in Safety Cases

Arguments in safety cases are predominantly qualitative. This is partly attributed to the lack of sufficient design and operational data necessary to measure the achievement of high-dependability targets, particularly for safety-critical functions implemented in software. The subjective nature of many forms of evidence, such as expert judgment and process maturity, also contributes to the overwhelming dependence on qualitative arguments. However, where data for quantitative measurements is systematically collected, quantitative arguments provide far more benefits over qualitative arguments, in assessing confidence in the safety case. In this paper, we propose a basis for developing and evaluating integrated qualitative and quantitative safety arguments based on the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) and Bayesian Networks (BN). The approach we propose identifies structures within GSN-based arguments where uncertainties can be quantified. BN are then used to provide a means to reason about confidence in a probabilistic way. We illustrate our approach using a fragment of a safety case for an unmanned aerial system and conclude with some preliminary observations

Denney, Ewen↗

Shaping NASA's Kennedy Space Center Safety for the Future

With the completion of the Space Shuttle Program, the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) safety function will be required to evolve beyond the single launch vehicle launch site focus that has held prominence for almost fifty years. This paper will discuss how that evolution is taking place. Specifically, we will discuss the future of safety as it relates to a site that will have multiple, very disparate, functions. These functions will include new business; KSC facilities not under the control of NASA; traditional payload and launch vehicle processing; and, operations conducted by NASA personnel, NASA contractors or a combination of both. A key element in this process is the adaptation of the current KSC set of safety requirements into a multi-faceted set that can address each of the functions above, while maintaining our world class safety environment. One of the biggest challenges that will be addressed is how to protect our personnel and property without dictating how other Non-NASA organizations protect their own employees and property. The past history of KSC Safety will be described and how the lessons learned from previous programs will be applied to the future. The lessons learned from this process will also be discussed as information for other locations that may undergo such a transformation.

Kirkpatrick, Paul↗

Hard and Soft Safety Verifications

The purpose of this paper is to examine the differences between and the effects of hard and soft safety verifications. Initially, the terminology should be defined and clarified. A hard safety verification is datum which demonstrates how a safety control is enacted. An example of this is relief valve testing. A soft safety verification is something which is usually described as nice to have but it is not necessary to prove safe operation. An example of a soft verification is the loss of the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) casings from Shuttle flight, STS-4. When the main parachutes failed, the casings impacted the water and sank. In the nose cap of the SRBs, video cameras recorded the release of the parachutes to determine safe operation and to provide information for potential anomaly resolution. Generally, examination of the casings and nozzles contributed to understanding of the newly developed boosters and their operation. Safety verification of SRB operation was demonstrated by examination for erosion or wear of the casings and nozzle. Loss of the SRBs and associated data did not delay the launch of the next Shuttle flight.

Wetherholt, Jon↗

Safety and IVHM

When we address safety in a book on the business case for IVHM, the question arises whether safety isn t inherently in conflict with the need of operators to run their systems as efficiently (and as cost effectively) as possible. The answer may be that the system needs to be just as safe as needed, but not significantly more. That begs the next question: How safe is safe enough? Several regulatory bodies provide guidelines for operational safety, but irrespective of that, operators do not want their systems to be known as lacking safety. We illuminate the role of safety within the context of IVHM.

Goebel, Kai↗

Large Scale Experiments on Spacecraft Fire Safety

Full scale fire testing complemented by computer modelling has provided significant know how about the risk, prevention and suppression of fire in terrestrial systems (cars, ships, planes, buildings, mines, and tunnels). In comparison, no such testing has been carried out for manned spacecraft due to the complexity, cost and risk associated with operating a long duration fire safety experiment of a relevant size in microgravity. Therefore, there is currently a gap in knowledge of fire behaviour in spacecraft. The entire body of low-gravity fire research has either been conducted in short duration ground-based microgravity facilities or has been limited to very small fuel samples. Still, the work conducted to date has shown that fire behaviour in low-gravity is very different from that in normal-gravity, with differences observed for flammability limits, ignition delay, flame spread behaviour, flame colour and flame structure. As a result, the prediction of the behaviour of fires in reduced gravity is at present not validated. To address this gap in knowledge, a collaborative international project, Spacecraft Fire Safety, has been established with its cornerstone being the development of an experiment (Fire Safety 1) to be conducted on an ISS resupply vehicle, such as the Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) or Orbital Cygnus after it leaves the ISS and before it enters the atmosphere. A computer modelling effort will complement the experimental effort. Although the experiment will need to meet rigorous safety requirements to ensure the carrier vehicle does not sustain damage, the absence of a crew removes the need for strict containment of combustion products. This will facilitate the possibility of examining fire behaviour on a scale that is relevant to spacecraft fire safety and will provide unique data for fire model validation. This unprecedented opportunity will expand the understanding of the fundamentals of fire behaviour in spacecraft. The experiment is being developed by an international topical team that is collaboratively defining the experiment requirements and performing supporting analysis, experimentation and technology development. This paper presents the objectives, status and concept of this project.

Urban, David L.↗

Large Scale Experiments on Spacecraft Fire Safety

Full scale fire testing complemented by computer modelling has provided significant knowhow about the risk, prevention and suppression of fire in terrestrial systems (cars, ships, planes, buildings, mines, and tunnels). In comparison, no such testing has been carried out for manned spacecraft due to the complexity, cost and risk associated with operating a long duration fire safety experiment of a relevant size in microgravity. Therefore, there is currently a gap in knowledge of fire behaviour in spacecraft. The entire body of low-gravity fire research has either been conducted in short duration ground-based microgravity facilities or has been limited to very small fuel samples. Still, the work conducted to date has shown that fire behaviour in low-gravity is very different from that in normal gravity, with differences observed for flammability limits, ignition delay, flame spread behaviour, flame colour and flame structure. As a result, the prediction of the behaviour of fires in reduced gravity is at present not validated. To address this gap in knowledge, a collaborative international project, Spacecraft Fire Safety, has been established with its cornerstone being the development of an experiment (Fire Safety 1) to be conducted on an ISS resupply vehicle, such as the Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) or Orbital Cygnus after it leaves the ISS and before it enters the atmosphere. A computer modelling effort will complement the experimental effort. Although the experiment will need to meet rigorous safety requirements to ensure the carrier vehicle does not sustain damage, the absence of a crew removes the need for strict containment of combustion products. This will facilitate the possibility of examining fire behaviour on a scale that is relevant to spacecraft fire safety and will provide unique data for fire model validation. This unprecedented opportunity will expand the understanding of the fundamentals of fire behaviour in spacecraft. The experiment is being developed by an international topical team that is collaboratively defining the experiment requirements and performing supporting analysis, experimentation and technology development. This paper presents the objectives, status and concept of this project.

Urban, David↗

Speech Recognition Interfaces Improve Flight Safety

"Alpha, Golf, November, Echo, Zulu." "Sierra, Alpha, Golf, Echo, Sierra." "Lima, Hotel, Yankee." It looks like some strange word game, but the combinations of words above actually communicate the first three points of a flight plan from Albany, New York to Florence, South Carolina. Spoken by air traffic controllers and pilots, the aviation industry s standard International Civil Aviation Organization phonetic alphabet uses words to represent letters. The first letter of each word in the series is combined to spell waypoints, or reference points, used in flight navigation. The first waypoint above is AGNEZ (alpha for A, golf for G, etc.). The second is SAGES, and the third is LHY. For pilots of general aviation aircraft, the traditional method of entering the letters of each waypoint into a GPS device is a time-consuming process. For each of the 16 waypoints required for the complete flight plan from Albany to Florence, the pilot uses a knob to scroll through each letter of the alphabet. It takes approximately 5 minutes of the pilot s focused attention to complete this particular plan. Entering such a long flight plan into a GPS can pose a safety hazard because it can take the pilot s attention from other critical tasks like scanning gauges or avoiding other aircraft. For more than five decades, NASA has supported research and development in aviation safety, including through its Vehicle Systems Safety Technology (VSST) program, which works to advance safer and more capable flight decks (cockpits) in aircraft. Randy Bailey, a lead aerospace engineer in the VSST program at Langley Research Center, says the technology in cockpits is directly related to flight safety. For example, "GPS navigation systems are wonderful as far as improving a pilot s ability to navigate, but if you can find ways to reduce the draw of the pilot s attention into the cockpit while using the GPS, it could potentially improve safety," he says.

Source record↗

Space-Based Telemetry And Range Safety Flight Demonstration #1

The basic ability of STARS to maintain a satellite communications link with TDRSS satellites during dynamic aircraft flights was successfully demonstrated during FD 1. The Range Safety and Range User systems' link margins were measured. The ability to acquire/reacquire and maintain lock between a high-dynamic vehicle and a satellite-based system was demonstrated. The Range Safety system simultaneously received and processed command links from space and ground transmitters and provided near real-time Range Safety telemetry to DFRC, which then sent it in near real time to KSC, GSFC, and WFF for monitoring. The GPS receiver maintained track except during extremely dynamic maneuvers. The Range User system sent data at three different data rates. There were excellent cooperation and support from the different Centers, contractors, and Ranges. A large amount of data was recorded and extensive post-flight analysis was performed. The Range User TDRSS link margin met or exceeded the predicted performance at three different data rates. The Range Safety launch-head link margins generally agreed with the predicted performance. The UPS positions and velocities agreed with those from tracking radar to within about 20 m and a few rn/s. The link margins for the Range Safety TDRSS telemetry link were less than expected. The link margin for one TDRSS command link LPT channel was occasionally much less than the other. Additional post-flight testing has yet to identify the root causes of these results. There were many lessons learned from this first set of test flights. The most important one is that more time and testing are needed for each step to deal with the inevitable problems. It is vital that these lessons be among the primary areas of study that will carry over from FD#1 to FD#2, which is currently scheduled for early FY05 at DFRC and will use a specially designed Ku-band phased array antenna for the Range User system. The next series of flight demonstrations scheduled for late 2004 at DFRC will incorporate many lessons learned from FD#1. A specially designed Ku-band phased array antenna will be used with the Range User system. A test flight on a hypersonic vehicle is planned by the end of 2006.

Demspm. Erol↗

Enhancing the NASA Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Review Process Through Program Activities

The safety review process for NASA spacecraft flown on Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs) has been guided by NASA-STD 8719.8, Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Review Process Standard. The standard focused primarily on the safety approval required to begin pre-launch processing at the launch site. Subsequent changes in the contractual, technical, and operational aspects of payload processing, combined with lessons-learned supported a need for the reassessment of the standard. This has resulted in the formation of a NASA ELV Payload Safety Program. This program has been working to address the programmatic issues that will enhance and supplement the existing process, while continuing to ensure the safety of ELV payload activities.

Palo, Thomas E.↗

Aviation Trends Related to Atmospheric Environment Safety Technologies Project Technical Challenges

Current and future aviation safety trends related to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Atmospheric Environment Safety Technologies Project's three technical challenges (engine icing characterization and simulation capability; airframe icing simulation and engineering tool capability; and atmospheric hazard sensing and mitigation technology capability) were assessed by examining the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident database (1989 to 2008), incidents from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) accident/incident database (1989 to 2006), and literature from various industry and government sources. The accident and incident data were examined for events involving fixed-wing airplanes operating under Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Parts 121, 135, and 91 for atmospheric conditions related to airframe icing, ice-crystal engine icing, turbulence, clear air turbulence, wake vortex, lightning, and low visibility (fog, low ceiling, clouds, precipitation, and low lighting). Five future aviation safety risk areas associated with the three AEST technical challenges were identified after an exhaustive survey of a variety of sources and include: approach and landing accident reduction, icing/ice detection, loss of control in flight, super density operations, and runway safety.

Reveley, Mary S.↗

Is Model-Based Development a Favorable Approach for Complex and Safety-Critical Computer Systems on Commercial Aircraft?

A system is safety-critical if its failure can endanger human life or cause significant damage to property or the environment. State-of-the-art computer systems on commercial aircraft are highly complex, software-intensive, functionally integrated, and network-centric systems of systems. Ensuring that such systems are safe and comply with existing safety regulations is costly and time-consuming as the level of rigor in the development process, especially the validation and verification activities, is determined by considerations of system complexity and safety criticality. A significant degree of care and deep insight into the operational principles of these systems is required to ensure adequate coverage of all design implications relevant to system safety. Model-based development methodologies, methods, tools, and techniques facilitate collaboration and enable the use of common design artifacts among groups dealing with different aspects of the development of a system. This paper examines the application of model-based development to complex and safety-critical aircraft computer systems. Benefits and detriments are identified and an overall assessment of the approach is given.

Torres-Pomales, Wilfredo↗

Aviation Safety Risk Modeling: Lessons Learned From Multiple Knowledge Elicitation Sessions

Aviation safety risk modeling has elements of both art and science. In a complex domain, such as the National Airspace System (NAS), it is essential that knowledge elicitation (KE) sessions with domain experts be performed to facilitate the making of plausible inferences about the possible impacts of future technologies and procedures. This study discusses lessons learned throughout the multiple KE sessions held with domain experts to construct probabilistic safety risk models for a Loss of Control Accident Framework (LOCAF), FLightdeck Automation Problems (FLAP), and Runway Incursion (RI) mishap scenarios. The intent of these safety risk models is to support a portfolio analysis of NASA's Aviation Safety Program (AvSP). These models use the flexible, probabilistic approach of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) and influence diagrams to model the complex interactions of aviation system risk factors. Each KE session had a different set of experts with diverse expertise, such as pilot, air traffic controller, certification, and/or human factors knowledge that was elicited to construct a composite, systems-level risk model. There were numerous "lessons learned" from these KE sessions that deal with behavioral aggregation, conditional probability modeling, object-oriented construction, interpretation of the safety risk results, and model verification/validation that are presented in this paper.

Luxhoj, J. T.↗

Planning the Unplanned Experiment: Assessing the Efficacy of Standards for Safety Critical Software

We need well-founded means of determining whether software is t for use in safety-critical applications. While software in industries such as aviation has an excellent safety record, the fact that software aws have contributed to deaths illustrates the need for justi ably high con dence in software. It is often argued that software is t for safety-critical use because it conforms to a standard for software in safety-critical systems. But little is known about whether such standards `work.' Reliance upon a standard without knowing whether it works is an experiment; without collecting data to assess the standard, this experiment is unplanned. This paper reports on a workshop intended to explore how standards could practicably be assessed. Planning the Unplanned Experiment: Assessing the Ecacy of Standards for Safety Critical Software (AESSCS) was held on 13 May 2014 in conjunction with the European Dependable Computing Conference (EDCC). We summarize and elaborate on the workshop's discussion of the topic, including both the presented positions and the dialogue that ensued.

Graydon, Patrick J.↗