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NASA NTRS2019

NASA's Journey to Safety Culture

One of the organizational causes of the Shuttle Columbia mishap found by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report was a "Broken Safety Culture". Since its release, NASA has strived to improve its Safety Culture In 2009, the Chief of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance asked a member of the Air Force Safety Center and of the CAIB for assistance to develop a NASA Safety Culture Program. This presentation describes the journey that NASA personnel has taken developing a NASA Safety Culture Program to "repair" its Safety Culture.

Dillinger, Tracy↗
NASA NTRS1972

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 6: Space base nuclear system safety plan

A qualitative identification of the steps required to assure the incorporation of radiological system safety principles and objectives into all phases of a manned space base program are presented. Specific areas of emphasis include: (1) radiological program management, (2) nuclear system safety plan implementation, (3) impact on program, and (4) summary of the key operation and design guidelines and requirements. The plan clearly indicates the necessity of considering and implementing radiological system safety recommendations as early as possible in the development cycle to assure maximum safety and minimize the impact on design and mission plans.

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NASA NTRS1996

Space Station Furnace Facility Management Information System (SSFF-MIS) Development

This report summarizes the chronology, results, and lessons learned from the development of the SSFF-MIS. This system has been nearly two years in development and has yielded some valuable insights into specialized MIS development. General: In December of 1994, the Camber Corporation and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) were contracted to design, develop, and implement a MIS for Marshall Space Flight Center's Space Station Furnace Facility Project. The system was to be accessible from both EBM-Compatible PC and Macintosh platforms. The system was required to contain data manually entered into the MIS as well as data imported from other MSFC sources. Electronic interfaces were established for each data source and retrieval was to be performed at prescribed time intervals. The SOW requirement that predominantly drove the development software selection was the dual-platform (IBM-PC and Macintosh) requirement. The requirement that the system would be maintained by Government personnel influenced the selection of Commercial Off-the-shelf software because of its inherent stability and readily available documentation and support. Microsoft FoxPro Professional 2.6 for Windows and Macintosh was selected as the development tool. This is a software development tool that has been in use for many years. It is stable and powerful. Microsoft has since released the replacement for this product, Microsoft Visual FoxPro, but at the time of this development, it was only available on the Windows platform. The initial contract included included the requirement for capabilities relating to the Work- and Organizational Breakdown Structures, cost (plan and actuals), workforce (plan and actuals), critical path scheduling, trend analysis, procurements and contracts, interface to manufacturing, Safety and Mission Assurance, risk analysis, and technical performance indicators. It also required full documentation of the system and training of users. During the course of the contract, the requirements for Safety and Mission Assurance interface, risk analysis, and technical performance indicators were deleted. Additional capabilities were added as reflected in the Contract Chronology below. Modification 4 added the requirement for Support Contractor manpower data, the ability to manually input data not imported from non-nal sources, a general 'health' indicator screen, and remote usage. Mod 6 included the ability to change the level of planning of Civil Service Manpower at any time and the ability to manually enter Op Codes in the manufacturing data where such codes were not provided by the EMPACS database. Modification 9 included a number of changes to report contents and formats. Modification 11 required the preparation of a detailed System Design Document.

Meade, Robert M.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Budget estimates, fiscal year 1995. Volume 2: Mission support and Inspector General

The mission support appropriations provides funding for NASA's civil service work force, space communication services, safety and quality assurance activities, and for maintenance activities for the NASA institution. These objectives are accomplished through the following elements: safety, reliability, and quality assurance; space communication services; research and program management; and construction of facilities.

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NASA NTRS2015

Formal Foundations for Hierarchical Safety Cases

Safety cases are increasingly being required in many safety-critical domains to assure, using structured argumentation and evidence, that a system is acceptably safe. However, comprehensive system-wide safety arguments present appreciable challenges to develop, understand, evaluate, and manage, partly due to the volume of information that they aggregate, such as the results of hazard analysis, requirements analysis, testing, formal verification, and other engineering activities. Previously, we have proposed hierarchical safety cases, hicases, to aid the comprehension of safety case argument structures. In this paper, we build on a formal notion of safety case to formalise the use of hierarchy as a structuring technique, and show that hicases satisfy several desirable properties. Our aim is to provide a formal, theoretical foundation for safety cases. In particular, we believe that tools for high assurance systems should be granted similar assurance to the systems to which they are applied. To this end, we formally specify and prove the correctness of key operations for constructing and managing hicases, which gives the specification for implementing hicases in AdvoCATE, our toolset for safety case automation. We motivate and explain the theory with the help of a simple running example, extracted from a real safety case and developed using AdvoCATE.

Hierarchy↗
NASA NTRS2018

FUELEAP Model-Based System Safety Analysis

NASA researchers, in a partnership with Boeing, are investigating a fuel-cell powered variant of the X-57 “Maxwell” Mod-II electric propulsion aircraft, which is itself derived from a stock Tecnam P2006T. The “Fostering Ultra-Efficient Low-Emitting Aviation Power” (FUELEAP) project will replace the X-57 power subsystem with a hybrid Solid-Oxide Fuel Cell (SOFC) system to increase the potential range of the electric-propulsion aircraft while dramatically improving efficiency and emissions over stock internal-combustion engines. Our FUELEAP safety analysis faces two primary challenges. First, the Part 23 certificated Tecnam P2006T is undergoing significant modifications to host the hybrid electric-propulsion system, and the challenge is to assure that the safety inherent in the stock aircraft (and subsequently in X-57 Mod-II) is not compromised by changes in avionics, aircraft structural loading, weight and balance, or other considerations. Secondly, because the SOFC power system has little (if any) relevant in-service precedent, our challenge is to assure that we identify and mitigate all reasonably plausible hazards introduced by unique FUELEAP equipage. We are investigating and utilizing Model-Based Safety Analysis (MBSA) methods to help us address these FUELEAP safety challenges. We captured aircraft-level system hazard conditions using instances of a SysML hazard block via aircraft-level Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA). Then, using SysML models of the FUELEAP architecture, we related the hazard conditions to initiating system events and possible mitigations, such as design architecture modifications or operational constraints. We are continuing to define our approach to MBSA by developing a component-by-component inventory of local failure modes and tracing their possible contribution to hazard conditions. Finally, we are applying an argument-based approach to FUELEAP assurance. Through a FUELEAP “safety case,” we are providing an explicit argument for FUELEAP safety by associating assurance evidence with overarching safety claims through a structured argument.

Woodham, Kurt P.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Defining Baconian Probability for Use in Assurance Argumentation

The use of assurance cases (e.g., safety cases) in certification raises questions about confidence in assurance argument claims. Some researchers propose to assess confidence in assurance cases using Baconian induction. That is, a writer or analyst (1) identifies defeaters that might rebut or undermine each proposition in the assurance argument and (2) determines whether each defeater can be dismissed or ignored and why. Some researchers also propose denoting confidence using the counts of defeaters identified and eliminated-which they call Baconian probability-and performing arithmetic on these measures. But Baconian probabilities were first defined as ordinal rankings which cannot be manipulated arithmetically. In this paper, we recount noteworthy definitions of Baconian induction, review proposals to assess confidence in assurance claims using Baconian probability, analyze how these comport with or diverge from the original definition, and make recommendations for future practice.

Graydon, Patrick J.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Taking the Risk Out of Risk Assessment

The ability to understand risks and have the right strategies in place when risky events occur is essential in the workplace. More and more organizations are being confronted with concerns over how to measure their risks or what kind of risks they can take when certain events transpire that could have a negative impact. NASA is one organization that faces these challenges on a daily basis, as effective risk management is critical to the success of its missions especially the Space Shuttle missions. On July 29, 1996, former NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin charged NASA s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance with developing a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) tool to support decisions on the funding of Space Shuttle upgrades. When issuing the directive, Goldin said, "Since I came to NASA [in 1992], we've spent billions of dollars on Shuttle upgrades without knowing how much they improve safety. I want a tool to help base upgrade decisions on risk." Work on the PRA tool began immediately. The resulting prototype, the Quantitative Risk Assessment System (QRAS) Version 1.0, was jointly developed by NASA s Marshall Space Flight Center, its Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, and researchers at the University of Maryland. QRAS software automatically expands the reliability logic models of systems to evaluate the probability of highly detrimental outcomes occurring in complex systems that are subject to potential accident scenarios. Even in its earliest forms, QRAS was used to begin PRA modeling of the Space Shuttle. In parallel, the development of QRAS continued, with the goal of making it a world-class tool, one that was especially suited to NASA s unique needs. From the beginning, an important conceptual goal in the development of QRAS was for it to help bridge the gap between the professional risk analyst and the design engineer. In the past, only the professional risk analyst could perform, modify, use, and perhaps even adequately understand PRA. NASA wanted to change this by developing a PRA tool that would be friendlier, more understandable, and more useful to the broader engineering community. This concept ultimately led to the look, feel, and functionality that QRAS has today.

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NASA NTRS2016

The NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) Mission Assurance Process

In 2010, NASA established the Commercial Crew Program in order to provide human access to the International Space Station and low earth orbit via the commercial (non-governmental) sector. A particular challenge to NASA has been how to determine the commercial providers transportation system complies with Programmatic safety requirements. The process used in this determination is the Safety Technical Review Board which reviews and approves provider submitted Hazard Reports. One significant product of the review is a set of hazard control verifications. In past NASA programs, 100 percent of these safety critical verifications were typically confirmed by NASA. The traditional Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) model does not support the nature of the Commercial Crew Program. To that end, NASA SMA is implementing a Risk Based Assurance (RBA) process to determine which hazard control verifications require NASA authentication. Additionally, a Shared Assurance Model is also being developed to efficiently use the available resources to execute the verifications. This paper will describe the evolution of the CCP Mission Assurance process from the beginning of the Program to its current incarnation. Topics to be covered include a short history of the CCP; the development of the Programmatic mission assurance requirements; the current safety review process; a description of the RBA process and its products and ending with a description of the Shared Assurance Model.

Commercial Crew Program↗
NASA NTRS2005

The Importance of Multilateral Safety Requirements for Human Spaceflight

The International Space Station (ISS) Program initially implemented safety requirements in a series of bilateral agreements between NASA and each International Partner. As the program matured and multilateral processes began to be developed, the differences between these bilaterally agreed requirement sets became more significant. Efforts to develop multilateral safety requirements were hampered for many reasons including assessment of national standards used in the bilateral agreements, requirements baselines for existing contracts, and resource limitations to address requirements changes late in the development and operations phases. To avoid similar requirements issues in the future, international safety requirements need to be developed for human spaceflight. This paper will provide the background of the ISS bilateral Safety and Mission Assurance requirements and processes, describe the activities to develop multilateral safety requirements and processes, and give examples of issues that were encountered. Further, the paper will make recommendations regarding the development of international safety requirements for human spaceflight and the safety topics to be addressed.

Pido, Kelle↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA Software Assurance's Roles in Research and Technology

This slide presentation reviews the interactions between the scientist and engineers doing research and technology and the software developers and others who are doing software assurance. There is a discussion of the role of the Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) in developing software to be used for research and technology, and the importance of this role as the technology moves to the higher levels of the technology readiness levels (TRLs). There is also a call to change the way the development of software is developed.

Wetherholt, Martha↗
NASA NTRS2016

Mass and Reliability System (MaRS)

The Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate is responsible for mitigating risk, providing system safety, and lowering risk for space programs from ground to space. The S&MA is divided into 4 divisions: The Space Exploration Division (NC), the International Space Station Division (NE), the Safety & Test Operations Division (NS), and the Quality and Flight Equipment Division (NT). The interns, myself and Arun Aruljothi, will be working with the Risk & Reliability Analysis Branch under the NC Division's. The mission of this division is to identify, characterize, diminish, and communicate risk by implementing an efficient and effective assurance model. The team utilizes Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to ensure decisions concerning risks are informed, vehicles are safe and reliable, and program/project requirements are realistic and realized. This project pertains to the Orion mission, so it is geared toward a long duration Human Space Flight Program(s). For space missions, payload is a critical concept; balancing what hardware can be replaced by components verse by Orbital Replacement Units (ORU) or subassemblies is key. For this effort a database was created that combines mass and reliability data, called Mass and Reliability System or MaRS. The U.S. International Space Station (ISS) components are used as reference parts in the MaRS database. Using ISS components as a platform is beneficial because of the historical context and the environment similarities to a space flight mission. MaRS uses a combination of systems: International Space Station PART for failure data, Vehicle Master Database (VMDB) for ORU & components, Maintenance & Analysis Data Set (MADS) for operation hours and other pertinent data, & Hardware History Retrieval System (HHRS) for unit weights. MaRS is populated using a Visual Basic Application. Once populated, the excel spreadsheet is comprised of information on ISS components including: operation hours, random/nonrandom failures, software/hardware failures, quantity, orbital replaceable units (ORU), date of placement, unit weight, frequency of part, etc. The motivation for creating such a database will be the development of a mass/reliability parametric model to estimate mass required for replacement parts. Once complete, engineers working on future space flight missions will have access a mean time to failures and on parts along with their mass, this will be used to make proper decisions for long duration space flight missions

Barnes, Sarah↗
NASA NTRS1981

Reliability and quality assurance on the MOD 2 wind system

The Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance (R&QA) approach developed for the largest wind turbine generator, the Mod 2, is described. The R&QA approach assures that the machine is not hazardous to the public or to the operating personnel, is operated unattended on a utility grid, demonstrates reliable operation, and helps establish the quality assurance and maintainability requirements for future wind turbine projects. The significant guideline consisted of a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) during the design phase, hardware inspections during parts fabrication, and three simple documents to control activities during machine construction and operation.

Mason, W. E. B.↗
NASA NTRS2024

Evolution of NASA’s Nuclear Flight Safety Program to Infuse Risk Leadership and Assurance Framework Concepts

In recent years, the United States (U.S.) Government has issued several new National policies that fundamentally change the approach to nuclear flight safety for aerospace applications, including the complete revision of the Federal policy for handling launch of spacecraft containing space nuclear systems. In response, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is updating its nuclear flight safety program while still maintaining consistency with other Federal policies, international conventions, and NASA’s own policies. To achieve this evolution, NASA is factoring in an objectives-driven and assurance case mindset to develop a risk-informed and performance-based program. NASA and others have successfully applied this mindset in other disciplines and contexts and it is being pursued here via broad cooperation within NASA and with external stakeholders. This paper will briefly describe how the NASA nuclear flight safety program is evolving to meet these changing needs.

Matthew J. Forsbacka↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model-Based Engineering

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies [5]. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses [1], GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System

NASA↗
NASA NTRS2018

Computer Programming Resources 2018

The document is a compilation of Computer Programming resources. It is geared toward front-end and back-end web development. It specializes on an ongoing project to create a website for the Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate. The Quality Assurance System (QAS) is intended to improve the overall quality and efficiency of communication among NASA Quality Assurance Engineers and Contractors. The use of QAS software will be limited to NASA Kennedy Space Center and Contractors. It is accessible through the KSC network.

Confluence↗
NASA NTRS2016

An Investigation of Proposed Techniques for Quantifying Confidence in Assurance Arguments

The use of safety cases in certification raises the question of assurance argument sufficiency and the issue of confidence (or uncertainty) in the argument's claims. Some researchers propose to model confidence quantitatively and to calculate confidence in argument conclusions. We know of little evidence to suggest that any proposed technique would deliver trustworthy results when implemented by system safety practitioners. Proponents do not usually assess the efficacy of their techniques through controlled experiment or historical study. Instead, they present an illustrative example where the calculation delivers a plausible result. In this paper, we review current proposals, claims made about them, and evidence advanced in favor of them. We then show that proposed techniques can deliver implausible results in some cases. We conclude that quantitative confidence techniques require further validation before they should be recommended as part of the basis for deciding whether an assurance argument justifies fielding a critical system.

Graydon, Patrick J.↗
NASA NTRS2006

A Taxonomy of Fallacies in System Safety Arguments

Safety cases are gaining acceptance as assurance vehicles for safety-related systems. A safety case documents the evidence and argument that a system is safe to operate; however, logical fallacies in the underlying argument may undermine a system s safety claims. Removing these fallacies is essential to reduce the risk of safety-related system failure. We present a taxonomy of common fallacies in safety arguments that is intended to assist safety professionals in avoiding and detecting fallacious reasoning in the arguments they develop and review. The taxonomy derives from a survey of general argument fallacies and a separate survey of fallacies in real-world safety arguments. Our taxonomy is specific to safety argumentation, and it is targeted at professionals who work with safety arguments but may lack formal training in logic or argumentation. We discuss the rationale for the selection and categorization of fallacies in the taxonomy. In addition to its applications to the development and review of safety cases, our taxonomy could also support the analysis of system failures and promote the development of more robust safety case patterns.

Greenwell, William S.↗