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A major phase of the Federal Wind Energy Program, the Mod-2 wind turbine, a second-generation machine developed by the Boeing Engineering and Construction Co. for the U.S. Department of Energy and the Lewis Research Center of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, is described. The Mod-2 is a large (2.5-MW power rating) horizontal-axis wind turbine designed for the generation of electrical power on utility networks. Three machines were built and are located in a cluster at Goodnoe Hills, Washington. All technical aspects of the project are described: design approach, significant innovation features, the mechanical system, the electrical power system, the control system, and the safety system.
The issue of technology advancement and future space transportation vehicles is addressed. The challenge is to develop systems which can be evolved and improved in small incremental steps where each increment reduces present cost, improves, reliability, or does neither but sets the stage for a second incremental upgrade that does. Future requirements are interface standards for commercial off the shelf products to aid in the development of integrated facilities; enhanced automated code generation system slightly coupled to specification and design documentation; modeling tools that support data flow analysis; and shared project data bases consisting of technical characteristics cast information, measurement parameters, and reusable software programs. Topics addressed include: advanced avionics development strategy; risk analysis and management; tool quality management; low cost avionics; cost estimation and benefits; computer aided software engineering; computer systems and software safety; system testability; and advanced avionics laboratories - and rapid prototyping. This presentation is represented by viewgraphs only.
This is the First Quarterly Report for the newly reconstituted Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP). The NASA Administrator rechartered the Panel on November 18,2003, to provide an independent, vigilant, and long-term oversight of NASA's safety policies and programs well beyond Return to Flight of the Space Shuttle. The charter was revised to be consistent with the original intent of Congress in enacting the statute establishing ASAP in 1967 to focus on NASA's safety and quality systems, including industrial and systems safety, risk-management and trend analysis, and the management of these activities.The charter also was revised to provide more timely feedback to NASA by requiring quarterly rather than annual reports, and by requiring ASAP to perform special assessments with immediate feedback to NASA. ASAP was positioned to help institutionalize the safety culture of NASA in the post- Stafford-Covey Return to Flight environment.
Topics covered include: Reversible Chemochromic Hydrogen Detectors; Determining Trajectory of Triboelectrically Charged Particles, Using Discrete Element Modeling; Using Indium Tin Oxide To Mitigate Dust on Viewing Ports; High-Performance Polyimide Powder Coatings; Controlled-Release Microcapsules for Smart Coatings for Corrosion Applications; Aerocoat 7 Replacement Coatings; Photocatalytic Coatings for Exploration and Spaceport Design; New Materials for the Repair of Polyimide Electrical Wire Insulation; Commodity-Free Calibration; Novel Ice Mitigation Methods; Crack Offset Measurement With the Projected Laser Target Device; New Materials for Structural Composites and Protective Coatings; Fire Chemistry Testing of Spray-On Foam Insulation (SOFI); Using Aerogel-Based Insulation Material To Prevent Foam Loss on the Liquid-Hydrogen Intertank; Particle Ejection and Levitation Technology (PELT); Electrostatic Characterization of Lunar Dust; Numerical Analysis of Rocket Exhaust Cratering; RESOLVE Projects: Lunar Water Resource Demonstration and Regolith Volatile Characterization; Tribocharging Lunar Soil for Electrostatic Beneficiation; Numerically Modeling the Erosion of Lunar Soil by Rocket Exhaust Plumes; Trajectory Model of Lunar Dust Particles; Using Lunar Module Shadows To Scale the Effects of Rocket Exhaust Plumes; Predicting the Acoustic Environment Induced by the Launch of the Ares I Vehicle; Measuring Ultrasonic Acoustic Velocity in a Thin Sheet of Graphite Epoxy Composite; Hail Size Distribution Mapping; Launch Pad 39 Hail Monitor Array System; Autonomous Flight Safety System - Phase III; The Photogrammetry Cube; Bird Vision System; Automating Range Surveillance Through Radio Interferometry and Field Strength Mapping Techniques; Next-Generation Telemetry Workstation; GPS Metric Tracking Unit; and Space-Based Range.
NASA has established a technical challenge, under the Aviation Safety Program, Vehicle Systems Safety Technologies project, to improve crew decision-making and response in complex situations. The specific objective of this challenge is to develop data and technologies which may increase a pilot's (crew's) ability to avoid, detect, and recover from adverse events that could otherwise result in accidents/incidents. Within this technical challenge, a cooperative industry-government research program has been established to develop innovative flight deck-based counter-measures that can improve the crew's ability to avoid, detect, mitigate, and recover from unsafe loss-of-aircraft state awareness - specifically, the loss of attitude awareness (i.e., Spatial Disorientation, SD) or the loss-of-energy state awareness (LESA). A critical component of this research is to develop specific and quantifiable metrics which identify decision-making and the decision-making influences during simulation and flight testing. This paper reviews existing metrics and methods for SD testing and criteria for establishing visual dominance. The development of Crew State Monitoring technologies - eye tracking and other psychophysiological - are also discussed as well as emerging new metrics for identifying channelized attention and excessive pilot workload, both of which have been shown to contribute to SD/LESA accidents or incidents.
A system is safety-critical if its failure can endanger human life or cause significant damage to property or the environment. State-of-the-art computer systems on commercial aircraft are highly complex, software-intensive, functionally integrated, and network-centric systems of systems. Ensuring that such systems are safe and comply with existing safety regulations is costly and time-consuming as the level of rigor in the development process, especially the validation and verification activities, is determined by considerations of system complexity and safety criticality. A significant degree of care and deep insight into the operational principles of these systems is required to ensure adequate coverage of all design implications relevant to system safety. Model-based development methodologies, methods, tools, and techniques facilitate collaboration and enable the use of common design artifacts among groups dealing with different aspects of the development of a system. This paper examines the application of model-based development to complex and safety-critical aircraft computer systems. Benefits and detriments are identified and an overall assessment of the approach is given.
The AP1000 power plant has implemented multiple layers of passive safety systems to enhance reactor safety and ensure system integrity during postulated scenarios, such as loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and main steam line break (MSLB). Among these, the passive containment cooling system (PCCS) is a safety-related system designed to prevent the containment from exceeding the design limits of both pressure and temperature following a postulated design basis accident, by transferring heat from the steel containment vessel to the atmosphere. During LOCA, natural air convection plays a vital role in removing heat from the steel containment vessel to the atmosphere. This is integrated with the condensate film from the Passive Containment Cooling Water Storage Tank (PCCWST). Air natural convection is also the only heat removal mechanism after the dry-out of the PCCWST and during the loss of shutdown decay heat removal (LOSDHR) event. Therefore, it is essential to investigate the thermal hydraulics behavior of the containment under transient conditions to ensure its safety and integrity. This paper presents a simplified CFD/ANSYS FLUENT model developed to analyze the impact of different parameters, such as air relative humidity, air temperature, and steel containment temperature, on the natural convection capability to remove the decay heat following LOCA. The model aims to examine the thermal behavior of the containment and provides a comprehensive understanding of the system's natural convection capability during postulated accidents. The results obtained from the model can be used to improve the safety and integrity of the containment system and provide valuable insights for future research in the field.
NASA Vehicle System Safety Technology (VSST) project management uses systems analysis to identify key issues and maintain a portfolio of research leading to potential solutions to its three identified technical challenges. Statistical data and published safety priority lists from academic, industry and other government agencies were reviewed and analyzed by NASA Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) systems analysis personnel to identify issues and future research needs related to one of VSST's technical challenges, Crew Decision Making (CDM). The data examined in the study were obtained from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Aviation Accident and Incident Data System, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Accident/Incident Data System and the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). In addition, this report contains the results of a review of safety priority lists, information databases and other documented references pertaining to aviation crew systems issues and future research needs. The specific sources examined were: Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) Safety Enhancements Reserved for Future Implementation (SERFIs), Flight Deck Automation Issues (FDAI) and NTSB Most Wanted List and Open Recommendations. Various automation issues taxonomies and priority lists pertaining to human factors, automation and flight design were combined to create a list of automation issues related to CDM.
Concept provides definition of relationship between safety and reliability, personnel safety measurement, and equipment safety evaluation. Safety systems cope with single or combined risks. Cost and effectiveness of alternate hypothetical safety systems are estimated and used as basis for final system design.
The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation
This paper describes the initial measured performance results of the previously documented NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) Cockpit Motion Facility (CMF) motion base hardware safety devices. These safety systems are required to prevent excessive accelerations that could injure personnel and damage simulator cockpits or the motion base structure. Excessive accelerations may be caused by erroneous commands or hardware failures driving an actuator to the end of its travel at high velocity, stepping a servo valve, or instantly reversing servo direction. Such commands may result from single order failures of electrical or hydraulic components within the control system itself, or from aggressive or improper cueing commands from the host simulation computer. The safety systems must mitigate these high acceleration events while minimizing the negative performance impacts. The system accomplishes this by controlling the rate of change of valve signals to limit excessive commanded accelerations. It also aids hydraulic cushion performance by limiting valve command authority as the actuator approaches its end of travel. The design takes advantage of inherent motion base hydraulic characteristics to implement all safety features using hardware only solutions.
SLS Driving Objectives: I. Safe: a) Human-rated to provide safe and reliable systems for human missions. b) Protecting the public, NASA workforce, high-value equipment and property, and the environment from potential harm. II. Affordable: a) Maximum use of common elements and existing assets, infrastructure, and workforce. b) Constrained budget environment. c) Competitive opportunities for affordability on-ramps. III. Sustainable: a) Initial capability: 70 metric tons (t), 2017-2021. 1) Serves as primary transportation for Orion and exploration missions. 2) Provides back-up capability for crew/cargo to ISS. b) Evolved capability: 105 t and 130 t, post-2021. 1) Offers large volume for science missions and payloads. 2) Modular and flexible, right-sized for mission requirements.
The goal of this project is to evaluate the metrics and processes used by NASA's Aviation Safety Program in assessing technologies that contribute to NASA's aviation safety goals. There were three objectives for reaching this goal. First, NASA's main objectives for aviation safety were documented and their consistency was checked against the main objectives of the Aviation Safety Program. Next, the metrics used for technology investment by the Program Assessment function of AvSP were evaluated. Finally, other metrics that could be used by the Program Assessment Team (PAT) were identified and evaluated. This investigation revealed that the objectives are in fact consistent across organizational levels at NASA and with the FAA. Some of the major issues discussed in this study which should be further investigated, are the removal of the Cost and Return-on-Investment metrics, the lack of the metrics to measure the balance of investment and technology, the interdependencies between some of the metric risk driver categories, and the conflict between 'fatal accident rate' and 'accident rate' in the language of the Aviation Safety goal as stated in different sources.
The aspects of software as well as hardware in application of system safety to nuclear safety, consumer product safety, rail transit safety, auto safety, petroleum safety, and advanced surface transport safety are emphasized. The possibility of product liability as a forcing function to stimulate adoption of system safety analysis is projected.
During the 2005 Conference for the Advancement for Space Safety, after a typical presentation of safety tools, a Russian in the audience simply asked, "How does that affect the hardware?" Having participated in several International System Safety Conferences, I recalled that most attention is dedicated to safety tools and little, if any, to hardware. The intent of this paper on the hazard of fracture and failure modes associated with fracture is my attempt to draw attention to the grass roots of system safety - improving hardware robustness and resilience.
- Deliver validated methods and recommended practices to reduce certification costs for ground and onboard vehicle guidance and control systems through expanded acceptability of analysis as evidence for certification FY 2022. - Communicate results to maximize public awareness of the research and transfer capabilities via a set of on-demand training seminars and supporting materials including reports, publications and open source software codes where applicable.