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Theoretical assumptions used by researchers in the area of attention, with emphasis upon errors and inconsistent assumptions used by some researchers were studied. Two GAT experiments, two laboratory studies and one field experiment were conducted.
Using a technique that requires a subject to consult an imagined or remembered spatial array while performing a visual task, a reliable reduction in the number of directed eye movements that are available for the acquisition of visual information is shown.
An investigation of visuomotor adaptation to optical rotation and optical inversion was conducted. Experiment 1 examined the visuomotor adaptability of subjects to an optically rotating visual world with a univariate repeated measures design. Experiment 1A tested one major prediction of a model of adaptation put forth by Welch who predicted that the aversive drive state that triggers adaptation would be habituated to fairly rapidly. Experiment 2 was conducted to investigate the role of motor activity in adaptation to optical rotation. Specifically, this experiment contrasted the reafference hypothesis and the proprioceptive change hypothesis. Experiment 3 examined the role of cognition, error-corrective feedback, and proprioceptive and/or reafferent feedback in visuomotor adaptation to optical inversion. Implications for research and implications for practice were suggested for all experiments.
Load estimates based upon subjective and performance indices were compared for subjects performing size matching and letter typing tasks under 6 levels of priorities, in single and dual task conditions. Each half of the group used a different task as reference in their subjective judgement. The results are interpreted to indicate that subjective measures are especially sensitive to voluntary allocation of attention and to the load on working memory. Association with performance is expected whenever these two factors are main determinants of performance efficiency, otherwise the two are likely to dissociate.
The features of the Space Station which permit crew members to utilize work time for payload operations are discussed. The user orientation, modular design, nonstressful flight regime, in space construction, on board control, automation and robotics, and maintenance and servicing of the Space Station are examined. The proposed crew size, skills, and functions as station operator and mission specialists are described. Mission objectives and crew functions, which include performing material processing, life science and astronomy experiments, satellite and payload equipment servicing, systems monitoring and control, maintenance and repair, Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle and Mobile Remote Manipulator System operations, on board planning, housekeeping, and health maintenance and recreation, are studied.
In one study, schizophrenics, bipolar manics, and mentally normal individuals were administered a digit recall task. The total performance of schizophrenics looked much like that of a normal processor under a higher load level. The manics' performance was intermediate. Primary performance was particularly poor among the mentally ill subjects. In a second study, three groups in the same populations as in the first study were asked to shadow and recall verbatim eight descriptive text passages. Distraction effects were found for schizophrenics only in the areas of percentage of words correctly shadowed and recall variables; the two areas were not correlated, however. It appears that, for schizophrenics, distraction disrupts the ability to effectively shadow information to a greater extent than it disrupts the ability to encode information for recall. The two studies imply that capacity-carrying abnormalities that affect the quantity but not the quality of information processing can be useful in pointing to information processing of normal humans under high load conditions.
This experiment continues earlier research of Kantowitz et al. (1983) conducted in a GAT-1 motion-base trainer to evaluate choice-reaction secondary tasks as measures of pilot work load. The earlier work used an asynchronous secondary task presented every 22 sec regardless of flying performance. The present experiment uses a synchronous task presented only when a critical event occurred on the flying task. Both two- and four-choice visual secondary tasks were investigated. Analysis of primary flying-task results showed no decrement in error for altitude, indicating that the key assumption necessary for using a choice secondary task was satisfied. Reaction times showed significant differences between 'easy' and 'hard' flight scenarios as well as the ability to discriminate among flight tasks.
Among the new technologies that are expected to aid helicopter designers are speech controls. Proponents suggest that speech controls could reduce the potential for manual control overloads and improve time-sharing performance in environments that have heavy demands for manual control. This was tested in a simulation of an advanced single-pilot, scout/attack helicopter. Objective performance indicated that the speech controls were effective in decreasing the interference of discrete responses during moments of heavy flight control activity. However, subjective ratings indicated that the use of speech controls required extra effort to speak precisely and to attend to feedback. Although the operational reliability of speech controls must be improved, the present results indicate that reliable speech controls could enhance the time-sharing efficiency of helicopter pilots. Furthermore, the results demonstrated the importance of using multiple assessment techniques to completely assess a task. Neither the objective nor the subjective measures alone provided complete information. It was the contrast between the measures that was most informative.
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The extent to which flight simulation models of increasing complexity are successful in predicting pilot performance was investigated using four models of increasing sophistication addressed by the TASKILLAN (for task skill analysis) computer-generated helicopter simulation. At the simplest level of complexity was the total task model (Model T), followed by the demand model (Model D), the undifferentiated capacity model (Model U), and, ultimately, by the multiple resources model (Model M), which is at the highest level of sophistication addressed by the TASKILLAN project. It was found that the correlations between variables were higher with the two more sophisticated models (U and M), which impose a penalty for increased difficulty in time-sharing. The performance prediction was best with the Model U, while the best predictors of subjective measures were models D and M.
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The complexity of space-based systems makes monitoring them and diagnosing their faults taxing for human beings. Mission control operators are well-trained experts but they can not afford to have their attention diverted by extraneous information. During normal operating conditions monitoring the status of the components of a complex system alone is a big task. When a problem arises, immediate attention and quick resolution is mandatory. To aid humans in these endeavors we have developed an automated advisory system. Our advisory expert system, Trouble, incorporates the knowledge of the power system designers for Space Station Freedom. Trouble is designed to be a ground-based advisor for the mission controllers in the Control Center Complex at Johnson Space Center (JSC). It has been developed at NASA Lewis Research Center (LeRC) and tested in conjunction with prototype flight hardware contained in the Power Management and Distribution testbed and the Engineering Support Center, ESC, at LeRC. Our work will culminate with the adoption of these techniques by the mission controllers at JSC. This paper elucidates how we have captured power system failure knowledge, how we have built and tested our expert system, and what we believe are its potential uses.
The complexity of space-based systems makes monitoring them and diagnosing their faults taxing for human beings. When a problem arises, immediate attention and quick resolution is mandatory. To aid humans in these endeavors we have developed an automated advisory system. Our advisory expert system, Trouble, incorporates the knowledge of the power system designers for Space Station Freedom. Trouble is designed to be a ground-based advisor for the mission controllers in the Control Center Complex at Johnson Space Center (JSC). It has been developed at NASA Lewis Research Center (LeRC) and tested in conjunction with prototype flight hardware contained in the Power Management and Distribution testbed and the Engineering Support Center, ESC, at LeRC. Our work will culminate with the adoption of these techniques by the mission controllers at JSC. This paper elucidates how we have captured power system failure knowledge, how we have built and tested our expert system, and what we believe its potential uses are.
NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) incident reports are reviewed in two related areas: pilots' failures to appropriately manage tasks, and breakdowns in geographic orientation. Examination of 51 relevant reports on task management breakdowns revealed that altitude busts and inappropriate runway usee were the most frequently reported consequences. Task management breakdowns appeared to occur at all levels of expertise, and prominent causal factors were related to breakdowns in crew communications, over-involvement with the flight management system and, for small (general aviation) aircraft, preoccupation with weather. Analysis of the 83 cases of geographic disorientation suggested that these too occurred at all levels of pilot experience. With regard to causal factors, a majority was related to poor cockpit resource management, in which inattention led to a loss of geographic awareness. Other leading causes were related to poor weather and poor decision making. The potential of the ASRS database for contributing to research and design issues is addressed.