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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2024

Configuring and Testing Mesh Radios for Air-To-Ground Communications

The initial mesh network used to demonstrate a simple mesh network for the air-to-ground challenge will consist of 4 mesh radios purchased from DoodleLabs. The multiband radios operate in both the 915MHz and 2450MHz frequencies and can use Wi-Fi to connect to deployed devices. The DoodleLabs radios come preconfigured with unique IP addresses but to make sure of compatibility each radio will be assigned an IP address. For initial testing configurations will be changed using the built-in local web server interface that DoodleLabs radios provide. To access the webserver a computer connects to the radios broadcast Wi-Fi network using the default credentials, then enter the default IP address into a browser. This webserver will allow the user to monitor the radio performance and make changes to the various systems. The simple configuration page will allow an operator to make many of the initial changes to place each radio on the network and secure each connection with a new password. Further testing will then be performed by building out a simulated virtual network of 26 nodes and connecting the 4 DoodleLabs radios into this simulation. This will give insight into the radio’s performance in the larger system they will likely operate in given the project requirements. This testing will focus on multi-hop throughput, latency and the resiliency to packet loss.

Mesh Radio↗
DOE OSTI2017

Safe Active Scanning for Energy Delivery Systems Final Report

The Department of Energy’s Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems Program has funded Safe(r) Active Scanning for Energy Delivery Systems, led by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, to investigate and analyze the impacts of active scanning in the operational environment of energy delivery systems. In collaboration with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Idaho National Laboratory, active scans across three testbeds including 38 devices were performed. This report gives a summary of the initial literature survey performed on the SASEDS project as well as industry partner interview summaries and main findings from Phase 1 of the project. Additionally, the report goes into the details of scanning techniques, methodologies for testing, testbed descriptions, and scanning results, with appendices to elaborate on the specific scans that were performed. As a result of testing, a single device out of 38 exhibited problems when actively scanned, and a reboot was required to fix it. This single failure indicates that active scanning is not likely to have a detrimental effect on the safety and resilience of energy delivery systems. We provide a path forward for future research that could enable wide adoption of active scanning and lead utilities to incorporate active scanning as part of their default network security plans to discover and rectify rogue devices, adversaries, and services that may be on the network. This increased network visibility will allow operational technology cybersecurity practitioners to improve their situational awareness of networks and their vulnerabilities.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator Cohort 1: Authentication and Authorization

In the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy, the Biden-Harris Administration defines the need for a "defensible, resilient digital ecosystem where it is costlier to attack systems than defend them." The strategy cites the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator (CECA) as an exemplary effort to bolster the security and resilience of clean energy generation. These efforts help "secure the clean energy grid of the future and [generate] security best practices that extend to other critical infrastructure sectors" and promise broad and far-reaching impacts to bridge the capabilities of private industry and the needs of energy production. Cohort 1 of CECA launched in the fall of 2022 with a focus on solutions that provide strong authentication and authorization for industrial control systems to mitigate attacks on the energy grid. Authentication and authorization verify that the identity (authentication) and permissions (authorization) of a user or device are aligned with their assigned roles. Weaknesses in either can have serious repercussions. To assess the strength of Cohort 1's solutions, CECA devised threat scenarios grounded in historical precedents: the CECA team reviewed exploits from real-world case studies of state-sponsored actors to match the assessment's attack paths and targets. Cohort 1 results provided the energy industry, product vendors, and related agencies valuable insights into the efficacy and applicability of solutions in common system configurations under realistic threat scenarios. The results of the assessment highlight points for interrogation and improvement in subsequent technology iterations. CECA's evaluations are part of an ongoing conversation and collaboration to bolster U.S. cyber resilience against adversaries today and in the future.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

ASC L2 Milestone Review CTS-2 Production Readiness [Slides]

Open and secure CTS-2 are ready for production capability to include accessibility for users and integration with existing storage and network environment. Hardware testing, early user testing is accomplished, and the systems are generally available for ASC production users.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS2013

IT Security Support for Spaceport Command and Control System

During the fall 2013 semester, I worked at the Kennedy Space Center as an IT Security Intern in support of the Spaceport Command and Control System under the guidance of the IT Security Lead Engineer. Some of my responsibilities included assisting with security plan documentation collection, system hardware and software inventory, and malicious code and malware scanning. Throughout the semester, I had the opportunity to work on a wide range of security related projects. However, there are three projects in particular that stand out. The first project I completed was updating a large interactive spreadsheet that details the SANS Institutes Top 20 Critical Security Controls. My task was to add in all of the new commercial of the shelf (COTS) software listed on the SANS website that can be used to meet their Top 20 controls. In total, there are 153 unique security tools listed by SANS that meet one or more of their 20 controls. My second project was the creation of a database that will allow my mentor to keep track of the work done by the contractors that report to him in a more efficient manner by recording events as they occur throughout the quarter. Lastly, I expanded upon a security assessment of the Linux machines being used on center that I began last semester. To do this, I used a vulnerability and configuration tool that scans hosts remotely through the network and presents the user with an abundance of information detailing each machines configuration. The experience I gained from working on each of these projects has been invaluable, and I look forward to returning in the spring semester to continue working with the IT Security team.

computer security↗
DOE OSTI2024

Disruption of Commercial Solar Inverter System by TLS Proxy Man-in-the-Middle Attack

Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a cryptographic protocol that encrypts communication data, providing end-to-end communication encryption and authentication. Currently, TLS is widely adopted for securing communication between servers and end devices, including solar inverter systems. Therefore, users/operators can securely access the solar inverters through a web user interface (WebUI) application programmable interface (API) on a PC or server over TLS-enabled Wi-Fi or Ethernet. However, the security of the TLS-based network becomes compromised if it is breached by a TLS proxy man-in-the-middle (MITM) exploit. This report explores potential vulnerabilities in a commercial solar inverter system that leverages a TLS proxy MITM and discusses the impacts through assume-breached penetration testing. Furthermore, the paper explores recommended mitigation methods against the TLS proxy MITM exploit in solar inverters.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

A hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed for cyber-physical energy systems in smart commercial buildings

In recent years, there has been a growing trend toward the development of smart buildings that rely on cyber-physical systems (CPS) to optimize occupant comfort, safety, and energy efficiency. To ensure the reliable and efficient operation of CPS with designed control strategies, it is important to evaluate their performance under various scenarios before deploying them in the real world. This is where a Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed designed for studying sensor and control-related studies in smart buildings can be highly valuable. With the growing threat of cyber-attacks and physical faults targeting smart buildings, it is essential to ensure the security of building operations. A HIL testbed can emulate cyber-attack and physical fault scenarios, allowing researchers to develop and test threat detection and mitigation algorithms. This enables researchers to identify potential issues and optimize the algorithms in a safe and controlled environment before they are deployed in real-world settings, reducing the risk of failures that can negatively impact occupant comfort, safety, and energy efficiency. Therefore, this paper developed a HIL testbed designed for cyber-physical energy systems (e.g. buildings automation system (BAS)) in smart commercial buildings. The HIL testbed is comprised of a real-time building and Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) emulator using Modelica-based dynamic models, a set of BAS controllers, and a BAS computer server. The data generation capability of the HIL testbed is demonstrated by tracking normal and faulty operating data in the BAS, as well as monitoring detailed network traffic in the local BAS network. Here, this study further demonstrates the HIL testbed’s capability by conducting case studies on real-time physical fault and cyber-attack experiments using a Department of Energy (DOE) prototype commercial building. It is anticipated that the fully functional HIL testbed will be utilized for a variety of sensor and control-related studies, including but not limited to testing, developing, validating of different HVAC control strategies, fault detection & diagnosis, energy monitoring and analysis, cyber security study, etc.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2021

Detecting False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids: A Semi-Supervised Deep Learning Approach

The dependence on advanced information and communication technology increases the vulnerability in smart grids under cyber-attacks. Recent research on unobservable false data injection attacks (FDIAs) reveals the high risk of secure system operation, since these attacks can bypass current bad data detection mechanisms. To mitigate this risk, this paper proposes a data-driven learning-based algorithm for detecting unobservable FDIAs in distribution systems. We use autoencoders for efficient dimension reduction and feature extraction of measurement datasets. Further, we integrate the autoencoders into an advanced generative adversarial network (GAN) framework, which successfully detects anomalies under FDIAs by capturing the unconformity between abnormal and secure measurements. Also, considering that the datasets collected from practical power systems are partially labeled due to expensive labeling costs and missing labels, the proposed method only requires a few labeled measurement data in addition to unlabeled data for training. Numerical simulations in three-phase unbalanced IEEE 13-bus and 123-bus distribution systems validate the detection accuracy and efficiency of this method.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Network Slicing for Federated Learning in Operational Technology Environment

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) environments are essential to modern infrastructure, facing challenges in ensuring low-latency, high-throughput communication while mitigating cyber threats. This paper presents a framework integrating Federated Learning (FL) and network slicing with Quality of Service (QoS) to enable real-time monitoring without disrupting OT operations. Leveraging digital twin technology and Network Function Virtualization (NFV), the architecture supports predictive analytics and Industry 4.0 requirements. FL facilitates decentralized model training, preserving data privacy and scalability, though it introduces potential throughput constraints. Network slicing addresses this by creating dedicated virtualized segments optimized for performance and security. Advanced fault tolerance at the container and instance levels enhances system reliability. The proposed architecture ensures high throughput, low latency, and secure orchestration for real-time anomaly detection in OT networks. Performance evaluations validate its efficiency in throughput, deployment, and learning accuracy, providing a robust foundation for future ICS automation and data-driven decision-making.

Delgado, Brian G. Rodiles [University of Texas at ↗
DOE OSTI2024

Spiking Markov Reward Process v.0.1

SAND2024-11150O The Spiking Markov Reward Process software is a spiking neural network that streams binary arithmetic and computes the state value function of a Markov reward process. The software will be released to the SpiNNcloud group for development of neuromorphic acceleration. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Wang, Felix↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

(ODIN): An Open Source, Low-Latency Data Integration & Visualization Framework for the NASA System Wide Safety Project's Disaster Response Safety Demonstration Series

The Open Data Integration Framework (ODIN) is an open source, low latency data integration and visualization framework (https://github.com/NASARace/race-odin) developed under NASA’s System WideSafety Program to demonstrate new safety capabilities designed to improve US airspace operations. Safety demonstrations are a set of increasingly complex (from public safety perspective) disaster response scenarios under which air systems must operate with increased capacity and include: 1) Wildland fire response, 2) Hurricane relief and recovery, 4) Emergency medical delivery via UAS and 4) Urban disaster relief. To accommodate disaster response, ODIN is field deployable and can scale on one or more multi-core, commodity laptops operating with full to limited or intermittent internet connectivity, conditions likely encountered during operations. ODIN runs as webserver with local, persistent data storage to serve either public or a secured, ad hoc network (e.g., an incident command post). The current released ODIN, ODIN-Fire is tailored for wildland fire management incorporating information on satellite overpasses with links to the near real-time data and imagery from the respective agencies. Included are winds data, an important variable for emergency responders and airspace operations, and high-resolution wind forecasts generated by super-computing resources and ingested into ODIN. As an open-source project, ODIN has attracted interest from multiple entities. We will show how 1) a commercial field instrument and data provider uses ODIN to help users visualize, publish and integrate their in-situ sensor network data and 2) ODIN’s capabilities to ingest, integrate and display near-real time satellite data with air traffic and a USFS winds forecast model used in fire response and post-fire assessment. Within NASA ODIN demonstrated novel, near terminal airspace safety capabilities for a project close-out event and previously it monitored the national airspace in real-time to meet an agency milestone. ODIN is presently under development for the anticipated hurricane relief and response demonstration notionally scheduled for the 2025-27 time frame and is available from NASA's github at the above link.

Aeronautics↗
NASA NTRS2016

Cyber-Threat Assessment for the Air Traffic Management System: A Network Controls Approach

Air transportation networks are being disrupted with increasing frequency by failures in their cyber- (computing, communication, control) systems. Whether these cyber- failures arise due to deliberate attacks or incidental errors, they can have far-reaching impact on the performance of the air traffic control and management systems. For instance, a computer failure in the Washington DC Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC) on August 15, 2015, caused nearly complete closure of the Centers airspace for several hours. This closure had a propagative impact across the United States National Airspace System, causing changed congestion patterns and requiring placement of a suite of traffic management initiatives to address the capacity reduction and congestion. A snapshot of traffic on that day clearly shows the closure of the ZDC airspace and the resulting congestion at its boundary, which required augmented traffic management at multiple locations. Cyber- events also have important ramifications for private stakeholders, particularly the airlines. During the last few months, computer-system issues have caused several airlines fleets to be grounded for significant periods of time: these include United Airlines (twice), LOT Polish Airlines, and American Airlines. Delays and regional stoppages due to cyber- events are even more common, and may have myriad causes (e.g., failure of the Department of Homeland Security systems needed for security check of passengers, see [3]). The growing frequency of cyber- disruptions in the air transportation system reflects a much broader trend in the modern society: cyber- failures and threats are becoming increasingly pervasive, varied, and impactful. In consequence, an intense effort is underway to develop secure and resilient cyber- systems that can protect against, detect, and remove threats, see e.g. and its many citations. The outcomes of this wide effort on cyber- security are applicable to the air transportation infrastructure, and indeed security solutions are being implemented in the current system. While these security solutions are important, they only provide a piecemeal solution. Particular computers or communication channels are protected from particular attacks, without a holistic view of the air transportation infrastructure. On the other hand, the above-listed incidents highlight that a holistic approach is needed, for several reasons. First, the air transportation infrastructure is a large scale cyber-physical system with multiple stakeholders and diverse legacy assets. It is impractical to protect every cyber- asset from known and unknown disruptions, and instead a strategic view of security is needed. Second, disruptions to the cyber- system can incur complex propagative impacts across the air transportation network, including its physical and human assets. Also, these implications of cyber- events are exacerbated or modulated by other disruptions and operational specifics, e.g. severe weather, operator fatigue or error, etc. These characteristics motivate a holistic and strategic perspective on protecting the air transportation infrastructure from cyber- events. The analysis of cyber- threats to the air traffic system is also inextricably tied to the integration of new autonomy into the airspace. The replacement of human operators with cyber functions leaves the network open to new cyber threats, which must be modeled and managed. Paradoxically, the mitigation of cyber events in the airspace will also likely require additional autonomy, given the fast time scale and myriad pathways of cyber-attacks which must be managed. The assessment of new vulnerabilities upon integration of new autonomy is also a key motivation for a holistic perspective on cyber threats.

Complex Networks↗
DOE OSTI2019

Cybersecurity Assessments on Emulated DER Communication Networks

An increasing number of public utility commissions are adopting Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interconnection standards which require photovoltaic (PV) inverters, energy storage systems, and other DER to include interoperable grid-support functionality. The recently updated national standard, IEEE 1547-2018, requires all DER to include a Sun Spec Modbus, IEEE 2030.5, or IEEE 1815 communication interface in order to provide local and bulk power system services. Those communication protocols and associated information models will ensure system interoperability for PV and storage systems, but these new utility-to-DER communication networks must be deployed with sufficient cybersecurity to protect the U.S. power system and other critical infrastructure reliant on dependable power. Unlike bulk generators, DER are commonly connected to grid operators via public internet channels. These DER networks are exposed to a large attack surface that may leverage sophisticated techniques and infrastructure developed on IT systems, including remote exploits and distributed attacks. Although DER make up a growing portion of the national generation mix, they have limited processing capabilities and do not typically support modern security features such as encryption or authentication. In this work, Sandia National Laboratories constructed simulated DER communication net- works with a range of security features in order to study the security posture of different communication approaches. The experimental test environment was created in a Sandia-developed co-simulation platform, called SCEPTRE, which emulated Sun Spec-compliant DER equipment, the utility DER management system, communication network, and distribution power system. Adversary-based assessments were conducted and a quantitative scoring criteria was applied to evaluate the resilience of various architectures against cyber attacks and to measure the systemic impact during such attacks. The team found that network segmentation, encryption, and moving target defense improved the security of these networks and would be recommended for utility, aggregator, and local DER networks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS1989

UNIX security in a supercomputing environment

The author critiques some security mechanisms in most versions of the Unix operating system and suggests more effective tools that either have working prototypes or have been implemented, for example in secure Unix systems. Although no computer (not even a secure one) is impenetrable, breaking into systems with these alternate mechanisms will cost more, require more skill, and be more easily detected than penetrations of systems without these mechanisms. The mechanisms described fall into four classes (with considerable overlap). User authentication at the local host affirms the identity of the person using the computer. The principle of least privilege dictates that properly authenticated users should have rights precisely sufficient to perform their tasks, and system administration functions should be compartmentalized; to this end, access control lists or capabilities should either replace or augment the default Unix protection system, and mandatory access controls implementing multilevel security models and integrity mechanisms should be available. Since most users access supercomputing environments using networks, the third class of mechanisms augments authentication (where feasible). As no security is perfect, the fourth class of mechanism logs events that may indicate possible security violations; this will allow the reconstruction of a successful penetration (if discovered), or possibly the detection of an attempted penetration.

Bishop, Matt↗
DOE OSTI2021

Baylor University Campus-Wide Deep Dive

In January 2020, staff members from the Engagement and Performance Operations Center (EPOC) and the Lonestar Education And Research Network (LEARN) met with researchers and staff at Baylor University for the purpose of a Campus-Wide Deep Dive into research drivers. The goal of this meeting was to help characterize the requirements for five campus research use cases and to enable cyberinfrastructure support staff to better understand the needs of the researchers they support. Profiled scientific use cases included: - Experimental High Energy Physics (HEP) - Proton Computed Tomography (pCT) - Nutrition and Relation to Digestive Microbiome - Baylor University Core Research Facilities - Molecular Quantum-dot Cellular Automata (QCA), and Material Science of Quantum Computing - Modeling and Simulation of Low-Dimensional and Nano-Structured Materials - Computational Fluid Dynamics Material for this event included the written documentation from each of the research areas at Baylor University, documentation about the current state of technology support, and a write-up of the discussion that took place in person. The Case Studies highlighted the ongoing challenges that Baylor University has in supporting a cross-section of established and emerging research use cases. Each Case Study mentioned unique challenges which were summarized into common needs. These included: - Tradeoffs for network/software security, and usability of the resulting infrastructure. Better communication to set expectations and understand realities is required. - Computation use on campus is widespread and healthy. While no major problems were uncovered, upgrades to maintain current usage patterns and encourage growth will be required. - Storage is a critical need for enterprise use cases and research. In particular, a campus wide ‘storage architecture’ to support research use cases (e.g. instruments, data sharing) is required in the 2-5 year time window. - Instrumentation on campus is healthy and expanding. Technology must scale with this in the form of computation and storage. - Working with LEARN to upgrade network capacity (in multiples of 10G, or upgrades to 100G) will be required in the 1-3 year time frame. - Network monitoring and visibility will help to establish external science use cases. - Data sharing via portal systems is not currently a critical need, but growing in scope. EPOC can assist Baylor with options.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS1998

Modeling, Simulation and Analysis of Public Key Infrastructure

Security is an essential part of network communication. The advances in cryptography have provided solutions to many of the network security requirements. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the foundation of the cryptography applications. The main objective of this research is to design a model to simulate a reliable, scalable, manageable, and high-performance public key infrastructure. We build a model to simulate the NASA public key infrastructure by using SimProcess and MatLab Software. The simulation is from top level all the way down to the computation needed for encryption, decryption, digital signature, and secure web server. The application of secure web server could be utilized in wireless communications. The results of the simulation are analyzed and confirmed by using queueing theory.

Liu, Yuan-Kwei↗
DOE OSTI2026

Accelerating Next-Generation Cybersecurity R&D Using AI Workflows: BADGER Project Development

The Broadband Automation for Distributed Grid Efficiency and Resilience (BADGER) project aligns with national strategic priorities for integrating emerging wireless technologies and advancing AI-driven security. As critical infrastructure modernizes toward increasingly software-defined and interconnected systems, the ability to leverage 5G/NextG networks and AI-enabled control becomes essential. This report outlines work at the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) to develop a NextG-native security architecture powered by AI-RAN concepts and evaluate workflows that enable efficient and reliable architectures. Together, these efforts position the laboratory to accelerate innovation while directly supporting national security and resilience objectives.

5G/6G↗
DOE OSTI2020

Data-driven Cyberattack Detection for Photovoltaic (PV) Systems through Analyzing Micro-PMU Data

With increasing exposure to software-based sensing and control, Photovoltaic (PV) systems are facing higher risks of cyber attacks. Here, to ensure the system stability and minimize potential economic losses, it is imperative to monitor operating states and detect attacks at the early stage. To meet this demand, Micro-Phasor Measurement Units (μPMU) are increasingly popular in monitoring distribution networks. However, due to the relatively low sampling rate, μPMU has not yet been used to detect and classify cyber-attacks in power electronics enabled smart grid. To our knowledge, this is one of the first attempts to use μPMU to detect cyber attacks that degrade the performance of power electronics systems. We propose to apply data-driven methods on micro-PMU data to implement attack detection. We have evaluated data-driven methods, including decision tree (DT), K-nearest neighbor (KNN), support vector machine (SVM), artificial neural network (ANN), long short-term memory (LSTM) and convolutional neural network (CNN). The proposed CNN model achieves the required performances with the highest 99.23% accuracy and 0.9963 F 1 score.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗