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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 325 records · Page 18

Orion Exploration Flight Test-1 Contingency Drogue Deploy Velocity Trigger

As a backup to the GPS-aided Kalman filter and the Barometric altimeter, an "adjusted" velocity trigger is used during entry to trigger the chain of events that leads to drogue chute deploy for the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Exploration Flight Test-1 (EFT-1). Even though this scenario is multiple failures deep, the Orion Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) software makes use of a clever technique that was taken from the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) program, which recently successfully landing the Curiosity rover on Mars. MSL used this technique to jettison the heat shield at the proper time during descent. Originally, Orion use the un-adjusted navigated velocity, but the removal of the Star Tracker to save costs for EFT-1, increased attitude errors which increased inertial propagation errors to the point where the un-adjusted velocity caused altitude dispersions at drogue deploy to be too large. Thus, to reduce dispersions, the velocity vector is projected onto a "reference" vector that represents the nominal "truth" vector at the desired point in the trajectory. Because the navigation errors are largely perpendicular to the truth vector, this projection significantly reduces dispersions in the velocity magnitude. This paper will detail the evolution of this trigger method for the Orion project and cover the various methods tested to determine the reference "truth" vector; and at what point in the trajectory it should be computed.

Gay, Robert S.↗

Toxicological Assessment of ISS Air Quality: Contingency Sampling - February 2013

Two grab sample containers (GSCs) were collected by crew members onboard ISS in response to a vinegar-like odor in the US Lab. On February 5, the first sample was collected approximately 1 hour after the odor was noted by the crew in the forward portion of the Lab. The second sample was collected on February 22 when a similar odor was noted and localized to the end ports of the microgravity science glovebox (MSG). The crewmember removed a glove from the MSG and collected the GSC inside the glovebox volume. Both samples were returned on SpaceX-2 for ground analysis.

Meyers, Valerie↗

The Contingency of Success: Operations for Deep Impact's Planet Hunt

The Deep Impact Flyby spacecraft completed its prime mission in August 2005. It was reactivated for a mission of opportunity add-on called EPOXI on September 25, 2007. The first portion of EPOXI, called EPOCh (Extra-solar Planetary Observation & CHaracterization), occurred from January 21, 2008 through August 31, 2008. Its purpose was to characterize transiting hot-Jupiters by measuring the effects the planet has on the luminosity of its parent star. These observations entailed using the spacecraft in ways it was never intended. A new green-light, success-oriented operational strategy was devised that entailed high amounts of automation and minimal intervention from the ground. The specifics, techniques, and key challenges to obtaining the 172,209 usable science images from EPOCh are discussed in detail.

observation↗

Onboard Decision-Making for Nominal and Contingency sUAS Flight

This study presents an onboard decision-making architecture for small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS). The decision-maker is part of NASA's SAFE50 project that is working under the UAS Traffic Management (UTM) Technical Capability Level (TCL) 4 to provide autonomous point-to-point UAV flight in BVLOS, high-density urban environments. The decision-maker monitors various metrics to determine the safety and feasibility of the mission and categorizes flight states as Nominal, Off-Nominal, Alternate Land, and Land Now in a finite state machine. Changes in the monitored metrics serve as transitions in the state machine and trigger replanning. Navigation degradation and communication failure are simulated to show the feasibility of the decision-maker framework in appropriately switching the flight state.

Baculi, Joshua↗

Verification and Validation of Safety-Critical Aircraft Systems Operating under Off-Nominal, Contingency, and Emergency Conditions

Verification and validation (V&V) of safety-critical technologies developed for loss of control (LOC) prevention and recovery and other aviation safety concerns pose significant challenges. Aircraft LOC can result from a wide spectrum of hazards, often occurring in combination, which cannot be fully replicated during evaluation. Technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery must therefore be effective under a wide variety of hazardous and uncertain conditions, and the verification and validation of these technologies must provide some measure of assurance that the new vehicle safety technologies do no harm (i.e., that they themselves do not introduce new safety risks). V&V technologies must also enable the identification of system limitations and constraints, as well as enable the identification of safe and unsafe operating conditions (and their boundaries). Additionally, the V&V of complex, increasingly autonomous systems is a fundamental concern. Scalable, reproducible and cost-effective techniques for the assurance of safety critical systems during their design and operation is a key barrier to fielding new systems or updating current systems. Moreover, these techniques need to provide artifacts that enable a comprehensive evidence-based approach to certification. This briefing summarizes research performed under NASA’s Aviation Safety Program and follow-on research for the V&V of safety-critical aircraft system technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery and increasingly autonomous systems, and for a broad assurance capability in both current and emerging aviation applications. Note that, in this briefing, the term “validation” refers to a confirmation that the system implementation (e.g., algorithms etc.) is performing the intended function(s), as well as an affirmation of effectiveness in these functions. “Verification” refers to a confirmation that the system implementation in the software and hardware meets its (hopefully validated) specifications (e.g., correctly executes algorithms as designed).

Validation↗

Creating Formal Characterizations of Routine Contingency Management in Commercial Aviation

The identification, modelling, and analysis of root causes of accidents and incidents dominate conventional safety management approaches. However, the effect of humans’ safety-producing behavior on the overall resilience of the system is often neglected. Additionally, emerging aviation markets are giving rise to concepts of operation, such as urban air mobility and optionally piloted air cargo operations, that are leading to a shift in locus of control between humans and automation. Without an understanding of the human contribution to safety, it is difficult to assess the effects of these novel role allocations on overall system safety. In this work, safety-producing behaviors are identified and abstracted into resilient performance strategies. Production rules that encapsulate these strategies are then generated and classified in the Soar cognitive architecture. The strategies are then applied to a remotely-operated air cargo example to demonstrate how safe learning is facilitated. The learned rules and strategies are then formally verified.

Safety Critical Systems↗