Supporting Failure Analysis with Discoverable Annotated Log Datasets.
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Systems and methods are provided for generating faults and analyzing fault propagation and its effects. Starting from the ontologies of components, functions, flows, and faults, systems and methods are provided that describe, generate and track faults in a computer system across multiple domains throughout design and/or development. In order to construct the system and fault models, a series of concepts is introduced in the form of ontologies and their dependencies. An investigation is performed into the faults, including their type, cause, life-cycle aspects, and effect. Principles and rules are created to generate various faults based on system configurations. After the modeling process, a simulation engine is described to execute actions and simulate the process of fault generation and propagation. As a result, fault paths that impact components and functions can be obtained.
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Launch vehicle ascent is a time of high risk for an onboard crew. There is a large fraction of possible failures for which time is of the essence and a successful abort is possible if the detection and action happens quickly enough. This paper focuses on abort determination based on data already available from the Guidance, Navigation, and Control system. This work is the result of failure analysis efforts performed during the Ares I launch vehicle development program. The two primary areas of focus are the derivation of abort triggers to ensure that abort occurs as quickly as possible when needed, but that false aborts are avoided, and evaluation of success in aborting off the failing launch vehicle.
Failure occurs when one or more of the intended functions of a product are no longer fulfilled to the customer's satisfaction. The most critical product failures are those that escape design reviews and in-house quality inspection and are found by the customer. The product may work for a while until its performance degrades to an unacceptable level or it may have not worked even before customer took possession of the product. The end results of failures which may lead to unsafe conditions or major losses of the main function are rated high in severity. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a tool widely used in the automotive, aerospace, and electronics industries to identify, prioritize, and eliminate known potential failures, problems, and errors from systems under design, before the product is released (Stamatis, 1997). Several industrial FMEA standards such as those published by the Society of Automotive Engineers, US Department of Defense, and the Automotive Industry Action Group employ the Risk Priority Number (RPN) to measure risk and severity of failures. The Risk Priority Number (RPN) is a product of 3 indices: Occurrence (O), Severity (S), and Detection (D). In a traditional FMEA process design engineers typically analyze the 'root cause' and 'end-effects' of potential failures in a sub-system or component and assign penalty points through the O, S, D values to each failure. The analysis is organized around categories called failure modes, which link the causes and effects of failures. A few actions are taken upon completing the FMEA worksheet. The RPN column generally will identify the high-risk areas. The idea of performing FMEA is to eliminate or reduce known and potential failures before they reach the customers. Thus, a plan of action must be in place for the next task. Not all failures can be resolved during the product development cycle, thus prioritization of actions must be made within the design group. One definition of detection difficulty (D) is how well the organization controls the development process. Another definition relates to the detectability of a particular failure in the product when it is in the hands of the customer. The former asks 'What is the chance of catching the problem before we give it to the customer'? The latter asks 'What is the chance of the customer catching the problem before the problem results in a catastrophic failure?' (Palady, 1995) These differing definitions confuse the FMEA users when one tries to determine detection difficulty. Are we trying to measure how easy it is to detect where a failure has occurred or when it has occurred? Or are we trying to measure how easy or difficult it is to prevent failures? Ordinal scale variables are used to rank-order industries such as, hotels, restaurants, and movies (Note that a 4 star hotel is not necessarily twice as good as a 2 star hotel). Ordinal values preserve rank in a group of items, but the distance between the values cannot be measured since a distance function does not exist. Thus, the product or sum of ordinal variables loses its rank since each parameter has different scales. The RPN is a product of 3 independent ordinal variables, it can indicate that some failure types are 'worse' than others, but give no quantitative indication of their relative effects. To resolve the ambiguity of measuring detection difficulty and the irrational logic of multiplying 3 ordinal indices, a new methodology was created to overcome these shortcomings, Life Cost-Based FMEA. Life Cost-Based FMEA measures failure/risk in terms of monetary cost. Cost is a universal parameter that can be easily related to severity by engineers and others. Thus, failure cost can be estimated using the following simplest form: Expected Failure Cost = {sup n}{Sigma}{sub i=1}p{sub i}c{sub i}, p: Probability of a particular failure occurring; c: Monetary cost associated with that particular failure; and n: Total number of failure scenarios. FMEA is most effective when there are inputs into it from all concerned disciplines of the product development team. However, FMEA is a long process and can become tedious and won't be effective if too many people participate. An ideal team should have 3 to 4 people from: design, manufacturing, and service departments if possible. Depending on how complex the system is, the entire process can take anywhere from one to four weeks working full time. Thus, it is important to agree to the time commitment before starting the analysis else, anxious managers might stop the procedure before it is completed.
To facilitate construction analysis, failure analysis, and research in lithium ion battery technology, a high quality methodology for battery disassembly is needed. This paper presents a methodology for battery disassembly that considers key factors based on the nature and purpose of post-disassembly analysis. The methodology involves upfront consideration of analysis paths that will be conducted on the exposed internal components to preserve the state (operational or failed) of the battery. The disassembly processes and exposures must not alter the battery materials once they are removed from their hermetically sealed containers. Because the process of battery disassembly can involve exposure to potentially hazardous compounds or lead to thermal run-away, a brief review concerning the safety hazards of disassembly is also given.
A requirements analysis for the Space Station's polar platform data system has been performed. Based upon this analysis, a cluster, layered cluster, and layered-modular implementation of one specific module within the Eos Data and Information System (EosDIS), an active data base for satellite remote sensing research has been developed. It is found that a distributed system based on a layered-modular architecture and employing current generation work station technologies has the requisite attributes ascribed by the remote sensing research community. Although, based on benchmark testing, probabilistic analysis, failure analysis and user-survey technique analysis, it is found that this architecture presents some operational shortcomings that will not be alleviated with new hardware or software developments. Consequently, the potential of a fully-modular layered architectural design for meeting the needs of Eos researchers has also been evaluated, concluding that it would be well suited to the evolving requirements of this multidisciplinary research community.
The primary objective of this research effort is to identify failure modes and hazards associated with the concept vehicles and to perform functional hazard analyses (FHA) and failure modes and effects criticality analyses (FMECA) for each. Boeing also created a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for each of the concept vehicles, as the FTA contains the connectivity between systems and is an accepted, top-down method to analyze the safety of an air-vehicle. Conceptual design of notional powertrain configuration for each of four (4) NASA RVLT (Revolutionary Vertical Lift Technology) Concept Vehicles were developed in as much detail as was necessary to support the reliability and safety analysis for this project. Functional block diagrams from each of the conceptual powertrain configurations were created and used to order the FHA, FMECA, and FTA. Hazards were identified and the severity of each were categorized in the FHA for use in a follow-up FMECA. The FTA took inputs from the FMECA and the functional block diagrams to develop the connectivity and develop a quantitative architecture that could be used to perform sensitivity studies, as related to vehicle safety.Guidelines for reliability targets for both the air vehicle and the operation in the UAM (Urban Air Mobility) mission are discussed. An industry literature search was performed in order to assess gaps in existing government regulations and industry specifications. The industry literature search led to air-vehicle and operational reliability discussions, as related to Distributed Electric/Hybrid-Electric Propulsion (DE/HEP) system operating in the UAM role. A discussion of results and recommendations for future work is also provided.
Failure Environment Analysis Tool (FEAT) computer program enables people to see and better understand effects of failures in system. Uses digraph models to determine what will happen to system if set of failure events occurs and to identify possible causes of selected set of failures. Digraphs or engineering schematics used. Also used in operations to help identify causes of failures after they occur. Written in C language.
Traditional risk-based design processes seek to mitigate operational hazards by manually identifying possible faults and corresponding mitigation strategies—a tedious process which critically relies on the designer’s limited knowledge. Resilience-based design, on the other hand, seeks to embody generic hazard-mitigating properties in the system to mitigate unknown hazards, often by modelling the system's response to potential hazardous events. This work adapts this approach to the traditional risk-based design process to synthetically generate hazardous modes, by representing them as a unique combination of internal component health-states which can then be injected and simulated in a model of the system failure dynamics. The design process may then reduce the risk of unknown internal hazards by iteratively mitigating the effects of these modes. The performance of this approach is evaluated in a model of an autonomous rover, where cluster analysis shows that elaborating the space of synthetic faults in the drive system using this approach uncovers a wider range of possible hazardous trajectories and failure consequences within each trajectory. However, this increase in hazard information comes at a high computational expense, highlighting the need for advanced, efficient methods to search and sample the hazard space.
Traditional risk-based design processes seek to mitigate operational hazards by manually identifying possible faults and corresponding mitigation strategies—a tedious process which critically relies on the designer’s limited knowledge. Resilience-based design, on the other hand, seeks to embody generic hazard-mitigating properties in the system to mitigate unknown hazards, often by modelling the system's response to potential hazardous events. This work adapts this approach to the traditional risk-based design process to synthetically generate hazardous modes, by representing them as a unique combination of internal component health-states which can then be injected and simulated in a model of the system failure dynamics. The design process may then reduce the risk of unknown internal hazards by iteratively mitigating the effects of these modes. The performance of this approach is evaluated in a model of an autonomous rover, where cluster analysis shows that elaborating the space of synthetic faults in the drive system using this approach uncovers a wider range of possible hazardous trajectories and failure consequences within each trajectory. However, this increase in hazard information comes at a high computational expense, highlighting the need for advanced, efficient methods to search and sample the hazard space.