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At least 325 records · Page 18

An Earthling to an Astronaut: Medical Challenges

Humans can travel safely into space in low Earth orbit (LEO) or to near-Earth objects if several medical, physiological, environmental, and human factors issues risks are mitigated. Research must be performed in order to set standards in these four areas, and current NASA standards are contained in the Space Flight Human System Standards volumes 1 and 2, and crew medical certification standards. These three sets of standards drive all of the clinical, biomedical research and environmental technology development for the NASA human space flight program. These standards also drive the identification of specific risks to crew health and safety, and we currently manage 65 human system risks within the human space flight program. Each risk has a specific program of research, technology development, and development of operational procedures to mitigate the risks. Some of the more important risks tat will be discussed in this talk include exposure to radiation, behavioral health due to confinement in a closed cabin, physiological changes such as loss of bone, muscle and exercise capability, reduction in immune system capability, environmental threats of maintaining an adequate atmosphere and water for drinking, avoidance of toxic or infectious material, protection of hearing, and human factors issues of equipment and task design. A nutritious and varied food supply must also be provided. All of these risks will be discussed and current strategies for mitigating these risks for long-duration human space flight. In mitigating these 65 human system risks, novel approaches to problem solving must be employed to find the most appropriate research and technology based applications. Some risk mitigations are developed internally to NASA while others are found through research grants, technology procurements, and more recently open innovation techniques to seek solutions from the global technical community. Examples and results will be presented from all of these approaches including the more recent use of prizes to stimulate innovation.

Davis, Jeffrey R.↗

Design Concepts to Meet EASA SC-VTOL-01 Single Failure Criteria

The objective of the current work is to discuss European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) SC-VTOL-01 single failure criteria, VTOL.2250(c). Prior studies have developed concept distributed propulsion and flight control (DPFC) system architectures and found they comply with EASA SC-VTOL-01 probabilistic failure criteria, VTOL.2510(a). Prior work developed two all-electric DPFC systems utilized in a quadrotor concept aircraft developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); one uses interconnecting shafts and gearboxes to interconnect redundant motors with each rotor system and the other uses gearboxes to connect redundant motors locally, near each rotor. Common between the two electric DPFC systems were rotor shafts, epicyclic systems, and motors. The current work explores Category I failures in drive systems, relevant research to support fail-safe design practices for gear systems, research and adjacent industry trends in motor fail-safety and reliability, and proposed design concepts to comply with VTOL.2250(c). Continued research in fail-safe design concepts and design guidance will benefit eVTOL and conventional rotorcraft, alike. Continued research in these areas will benefit eVTOL certification against SC-VTOL-01, and could optimistically translate to more widespread adoption of similar fail-safe design concepts into new rotorcraft designs certified against CS-29.

Rotorcraft↗

Design and Certification of the Extravehicular Activity Mobility Unit (EMU) Water Processing Jumper

The Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMUs) onboard the International Space Station (ISS) experienced a failure due to cooling water contamination from biomass and corrosion byproducts forming solids around the EMU pump rotor. The coolant had no biocide and a low pH which induced biofilm growth and corrosion precipitates, respectively. NASA JSC was tasked with building hardware to clean the ionic, organic, and particulate load from the EMU coolant loop before and after Extravehicular Activity (EVAs). Based on a return sample of the EMU coolant loop, the chemical load was well understood, but there was not sufficient volume of the returned sample to analyze particulates. Through work with EMU specialists, chemists, (EVA) Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) representation, safety and mission assurance, astronaut crew, and team engineers, requirements were developed for the EMU Water Processing hardware (sometimes referred to as the Airlock Coolant Loop Recovery [A/L CLR] system). Those requirements ranged from the operable level of ionic, organic, and particulate load, interfaces to the EMU, maximum cycle time, operating pressure drop, flow rate, and temperature, leakage rates, and biocide levels for storage. Design work began in February 2005 and certification was completed in April 2005 to support a return to flight launch date of May 12, 2005. This paper will discuss the details of the design and certification of the EMU Water Processing hardware and its components

Peterson, Laurie J.↗

Develop advanced nonlinear signal analysis topographical mapping system

The SSME has been undergoing extensive flight certification and developmental testing, which involves some 250 health monitoring measurements. Under the severe temperature pressure, and dynamic environments sustained during operation, numerous major component failures have occurred, resulting in extensive engine hardware damage and scheduling losses. To enhance SSME safety and reliability, detailed analysis and evaluation of the measurements signal are mandatory to assess its dynamic characteristics and operational condition. Efficient and reliable signal detection techniques will reduce catastrophic system failure risks and expedite the evaluation of both flight and ground test data, and thereby reduce launch turn-around time. The basic objective of this contract are threefold: (1) Develop and validate a hierarchy of innovative signal analysis techniques for nonlinear and nonstationary time-frequency analysis. Performance evaluation will be carried out through detailed analysis of extensive SSME static firing and flight data. These techniques will be incorporated into a fully automated system. (2) Develop an advanced nonlinear signal analysis topographical mapping system (ATMS) to generate a Compressed SSME TOPO Data Base (CSTDB). This ATMS system will convert tremendous amounts of complex vibration signals from the entire SSME test history into a bank of succinct image-like patterns while retaining all respective phase information. A high compression ratio can be achieved to allow the minimal storage requirement, while providing fast signature retrieval, pattern comparison, and identification capabilities. (3) Integrate the nonlinear correlation techniques into the CSTDB data base with compatible TOPO input data format. Such integrated ATMS system will provide the large test archives necessary for a quick signature comparison. This study will provide timely assessment of SSME component operational status, identify probable causes of malfunction, and indicate feasible engineering solutions. The final result of this program will yield an ATMS system of nonlinear and nonstationary spectral analysis software package integrated with the Compressed SSME TOPO Data Base (CSTDB) on the same platform. This system will allow NASA engineers to retrieve any unique defect signatures and trends associated with different failure modes and anomalous phenomena over the entire SSME test history across turbo pump families.

Jong, Jen-Yi↗

Develop advanced nonlinear signal analysis topographical mapping system

The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) has been undergoing extensive flight certification and developmental testing, which involves some 250 health monitoring measurements. Under the severe temperature, pressure, and dynamic environments sustained during operation, numerous major component failures have occurred, resulting in extensive engine hardware damage and scheduling losses. To enhance SSME safety and reliability, detailed analysis and evaluation of the measurements signal are mandatory to assess its dynamic characteristics and operational condition. Efficient and reliable signal detection techniques will reduce catastrophic system failure risks and expedite the evaluation of both flight and ground test data, and thereby reduce launch turn-around time. The basic objective of this contract are threefold: (1) develop and validate a hierarchy of innovative signal analysis techniques for nonlinear and nonstationary time-frequency analysis. Performance evaluation will be carried out through detailed analysis of extensive SSME static firing and flight data. These techniques will be incorporated into a fully automated system; (2) develop an advanced nonlinear signal analysis topographical mapping system (ATMS) to generate a Compressed SSME TOPO Data Base (CSTDB). This ATMS system will convert tremendous amount of complex vibration signals from the entire SSME test history into a bank of succinct image-like patterns while retaining all respective phase information. High compression ratio can be achieved to allow minimal storage requirement, while providing fast signature retrieval, pattern comparison, and identification capabilities; and (3) integrate the nonlinear correlation techniques into the CSTDB data base with compatible TOPO input data format. Such integrated ATMS system will provide the large test archives necessary for quick signature comparison. This study will provide timely assessment of SSME component operational status, identify probable causes of malfunction, and indicate feasible engineering solutions. The final result of this program will yield an ATMS system of nonlinear and nonstationary spectral analysis software package integrated with the Compressed SSME TOPO Data Base (CSTDB) on the same platform. This system will allow NASA engineers to retrieve any unique defect signatures and trends associated with different failure modes and anomalous phenomena over the entire SSME test history across turbo pump families.

Source record↗

Optimal Category-A Helicopter Flight Trajectories for Operation From a Clear Heliport

Engine failure represents a major safety hazard to helicopter operation. As a result, FA certifies helicopters according to their abilities to survive engine failures. Federal Aviation Regulation Part 29 specifies that transport helicopters must be certified as either category A or B. Category-B certification applies to either single or multi-engine helicopters with gross weight less than 20,000 lbs. A Category-B helicopter must be able to land safely in the case of one or all engine failures. There is no requirement for continued flight capability. In contrast, Category-A certification applies to multi-engine helicopters with independent engine systems. It requires that helicopter can continue flight with one engine inoperative (OEI). Therefore, Category-A helicopters are capable of operating from rooftops and oil rigs and flying to areas where no emergency landing sites are available. While there is no maximum weight limit, a Category-A helicopter must be able to satisfy OEI operation requirements within the available runway field. Additional information is contained in the original extended abstract.

Sharma, Vivek↗

X-57 Static Structural Requirements and Airworthiness Approach

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Armstrong Flight Research Center (AFRC) (Edwards, California, U.S.A.) has been flying various types of aircraft, including experimental ones requiring structural modifications. Many of these aircraft aren’t typically certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or the Department of Defense (DoD), but NASA can provide its own airworthiness certification utilizing a riskbased approach. The AFRC has established review processes and procedures to identify hazards, manage risks associated with flight programs, ensure safe flight operations, and satisfy programmatic requirements. The Aerostructures Branch at AFRC developed guidelines for the structural safety of flight, covering experimental aircraft, new components, payloads, and modifications. These guidelines detail structural design, analysis, instrumentation, ground testing, and flight-test operational aspects. The guidelines are followed for defining the airworthiness plan throughout the life cycle of a project. The guidelines can be tailored to the risk posture of each individual project. This paper documents the details of the structural airworthiness plan for the X-57 aircraft, including existing, modified, and newly developed structures. Additionally, it covers the design requirements and load cases specific to the X-57 aircraft.

Wesley W. Li↗

Recommendations on Evidence and Process for Certification of Learning-enabled Components in Aerospace Systems

This report primarily identifies a collection of relevant and necessary evidence for assurance of machine learnt components (MLCs)—also known as learning-enabled components—integrated into aircraft systems, and gives preliminary suggestions on the elements of a certification process that invoke the identified evidence. The main focus is on feedforward neural networks that are static and trained offline through supervised learning. A brief background on the generic elements of the lifecycle of an MLC is given to contextualize the assurance considerations and, consequently, the evidence that is relevant and necessary to support certification. At the level of an MLC, those considerations relate to: (i) the consistency and correctness of MLC contributions to system functions in the context of a validated functional intent; and (ii) the absence of MLC contributions to aircraft-level failure conditions. At an ML model level, confidence in model and data properties contribute to assurance of the containing MLC, in particular: (a) generalizability and robustness of models, in the presence of inputs not previously seen during training, disturbances to inputs, and unexpected inputs; and (b) valid data, i.e., data that are at least representative, relevant, complete, and accurate. Evidence for the above span the elements of the ML lifecycle, and includes, at a minimum, lifecycle artifacts that pertain to: (1) properties of requirements capturing functional intent, safety constraints, and aspects of the intended use and operating environment; (2) model performance, model complexity and design, and algorithm choice; (3) achievement of required performance at the levels of a trained model during model development, a trained model after model development is complete, and a trained model that is transformed into an executable equivalent; (4) model implementation aspects necessary for transforming a trained model into the executable equivalent; (5) integration of the executable trained model into the containing MLC, and eventually the larger system; and, (6) lastly, the verification and validation (V&V) of each of the above. Such V&V lifecycle artifacts themselves include: aspects of coverage, e.g., of various levels of requirements by the input space of the model and the data; traceability (where applicable); application of formal methods for property specification, analysis, and checking. Examples of evidence generation methods and tools further ground the discussion on what constitutes evidence, and the contribution to assurance during certification. The identified assurance considerations and supporting evidence is not a comprehensive set. Additionally, neither what should be considered as sufficient evidence relative to the assigned criticality of an MLC, nor how criticality ought to be determined and adjusted, have been considered in this report. However, suggestions are made for potential activities of the ML lifecycle that are aimed at providing confidence that an MLC can be relied upon when integrated into its containing (aircraft) system. Those activities are proposed as candidate elements of a certification process for MLCs. The main purpose of this report to inform regulatory guidance and consensus standards that may be used to meet the safety intent of the applicable regulations.

Aviation safety↗

Structural Analysis for the American Airlines Flight 587 Accident Investigation: Global Analysis

NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) supported the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in the American Airlines Flight 587 accident investigation due to LaRC's expertise in high-fidelity structural analysis and testing of composite structures and materials. A Global Analysis Team from LaRC reviewed the manufacturer s design and certification procedures, developed finite element models and conducted structural analyses, and participated jointly with the NTSB and Airbus in subcomponent tests conducted at Airbus in Hamburg, Germany. The Global Analysis Team identified no significant or obvious deficiencies in the Airbus certification and design methods. Analysis results from the LaRC team indicated that the most-likely failure scenario was failure initiation at the right rear main attachment fitting (lug), followed by an unstable progression of failure of all fin-to-fuselage attachments and separation of the VTP from the aircraft. Additionally, analysis results indicated that failure initiates at the final observed maximum fin loading condition in the accident, when the VTP was subjected to loads that were at minimum 1.92 times the design limit load condition for certification. For certification, the VTP is only required to support loads of 1.5 times design limit load without catastrophic failure. The maximum loading during the accident was shown to significantly exceed the certification requirement. Thus, the structure appeared to perform in a manner consistent with its design and certification, and failure is attributed to VTP loads greater than expected.

Young, Richard D.↗

John F. Kennedy Space Center, Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance, Survey and Audit Program

This document is the product of the KSC Survey and Audit Working Group composed of civil service and contractor Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) personnel. The program described herein provides standardized terminology, uniformity of survey and audit operations, and emphasizes process assessments rather than a program based solely on compliance. The program establishes minimum training requirements, adopts an auditor certification methodology, and includes survey and audit metrics for the audited organizations as well as the auditing organization.

Source record↗

Liquid Nitrogen Removal of Critical Aerospace Materials

Identification of innovative solutions to unique materials problems is an every-day quest for members of the aerospace community. Finding a technique that will minimize costs, maximize throughput, and generate quality results is always the target. United Space Alliance Materials Engineers recently conducted such a search in their drive to return the Space Shuttle fleet to operational status. The removal of high performance thermal coatings from solid rocket motors represents a formidable task during post flight disassembly on reusable expended hardware. The removal of these coatings from unfired motors increases the complexity and safety requirements while reducing the available facilities and approved processes. A temporary solution to this problem was identified, tested and approved during the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) return to flight activities. Utilization of ultra high-pressure liquid nitrogen (LN2) to strip the protective coating from assembled space shuttle hardware marked the first such use of the technology in the aerospace industry. This process provides a configurable stream of liquid nitrogen (LN2) at pressures of up to 55,000 psig. The performance of a one-time certification for the removal of thermal ablatives from SRB hardware involved extensive testing to ensure adequate material removal without causing undesirable damage to the residual materials or aluminum substrates. Testing to establish appropriate process parameters such as flow, temperature and pressures of the liquid nitrogen stream provided an initial benchmark for process testing. Equipped with these initial parameters engineers were then able to establish more detailed test criteria that set the process limits. Quantifying the potential for aluminum hardware damage represented the greatest hurdle for satisfying engineers as to the safety of this process. Extensive testing for aluminum erosion, surface profiling, and substrate weight loss was performed. This successful project clearly demonstrated that the liquid nitrogen jet possesses unique strengths that align remarkably well with the unusual challenges that space hardware and missile manufacturers face on a regular basis. Performance of this task within the confines of a critical manufacturing facility marks a milestone in advanced processing.

Noah, Donald E.↗

Design certification review assessment report. Electron/proton spectrometer

The characteristics of the electron-photon spectrometer developed for the Skylab program are presented. The spectrometer is externally mounted on the Skylab module complex and provides omnidirectional measurement of electrons and protons which result from solar flares or enhancement of the radiation belts. The data are applied to the determination of relative biological effectiveness factors as a safety factor for manned space flight.

Source record↗

Data Based Shock Test Specification

It is vital that avionic packages used for testing and certifying the reliability and safety of U.S. nuclear weapons with platform aircraft survive exposure to shock environments during transportation and delivery. The objective of this research was to characterize the response to these transportation shock environments delivering accurate shock test specifications in order to set laboratory programming material and device certification rigor. Responses to shock events were analyzed in the frequency domain via the Shock Response Spectrum (SRS). Shocks were then grouped based on respective behavior of maximum response accelerations which were pseudorandomly resampled and compared to test data to form test specifications based on the MinerPalmgren hypothesis. In addition to discovering significant over testing in current shock specifications, a new systematic, data-driven approach to designing shock specifications was formulated.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Advanced Durability and Damage Tolerance Design and Analysis Methods for Composite Structures: Lessons Learned from NASA Technology Development Programs

Aerospace vehicles are designed to be durable and damage tolerant. Durability is largely an economic life-cycle design consideration whereas damage tolerance directly addresses the structural airworthiness (safety) of the vehicle. However, both durability and damage tolerance design methodologies must address the deleterious effects of changes in material properties and the initiation and growth of microstructural damage that may occur during the service lifetime of the vehicle. Durability and damage tolerance design and certification requirements are addressed for commercial transport aircraft and NASA manned spacecraft systems. The state-of-the-art in advanced design and analysis methods is illustrated by discussing the results of several recently completed NASA technology development programs. These programs include the NASA Advanced Subsonic Technology Program demonstrating technologies for large transport aircraft and the X-33 hypersonic test vehicle demonstrating technologies for a single-stage-to-orbit space launch vehicle.

Harris, Charles E.↗

A Vehicle Management End-to-End Testing and Analysis Platform for Validation of Mission and Fault Management Algorithms to Reduce Risk for NASAs Space Launch System

The engineering development of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) new Space Launch System (SLS) requires cross discipline teams with extensive knowledge of launch vehicle subsystems, information theory, and autonomous algorithms dealing with all operations from pre-launch through on orbit operations. The nominal and off-nominal characteristics of SLS's elements and subsystems must be understood and matched with the autonomous algorithm monitoring and mitigation capabilities for accurate control and response to abnormal conditions throughout all vehicle mission flight phases, including precipitating safing actions and crew aborts. This presents a large and complex systems engineering challenge, which is being addressed in part by focusing on the specific subsystems involved in the handling of off-nominal mission and fault tolerance with response management. Using traditional model-based system and software engineering design principles from the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and Systems Modeling Language (SysML), the Mission and Fault Management (M&FM) algorithms for the vehicle are crafted and vetted in Integrated Development Teams (IDTs) composed of multiple development disciplines such as Systems Engineering (SE), Flight Software (FSW), Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) and the major subsystems and vehicle elements such as Main Propulsion Systems (MPS), boosters, avionics, Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC), Thrust Vector Control (TVC), and liquid engines. These model-based algorithms and their development lifecycle from inception through FSW certification are an important focus of SLS's development effort to further ensure reliable detection and response to off-nominal vehicle states during all phases of vehicle operation from pre-launch through end of flight. To test and validate these M&FM algorithms a dedicated test-bed was developed for full Vehicle Management End-to-End Testing (VMET). For addressing fault management (FM) early in the development lifecycle for the SLS program, NASA formed the M&FM team as part of the Integrated Systems Health Management and Automation Branch under the Spacecraft Vehicle Systems Department at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). To support the development of the FM algorithms, the VMET developed by the M&FM team provides the ability to integrate the algorithms, perform test cases, and integrate vendor-supplied physics-based launch vehicle (LV) subsystem models. Additionally, the team has developed processes for implementing and validating the M&FM algorithms for concept validation and risk reduction. The flexibility of the VMET capabilities enables thorough testing of the M&FM algorithms by providing configurable suites of both nominal and off-nominal test cases to validate the developed algorithms utilizing actual subsystem models such as MPS, GNC, and others. One of the principal functions of VMET is to validate the M&FM algorithms and substantiate them with performance baselines for each of the target vehicle subsystems in an independent platform exterior to the flight software test and validation processes. In any software development process there is inherent risk in the interpretation and implementation of concepts from requirements and test cases into flight software compounded with potential human errors throughout the development and regression testing lifecycle. Risk reduction is addressed by the M&FM group but in particular by the Analysis Team working with other organizations such as S&MA, Structures and Environments, GNC, Orion, Crew Office, Flight Operations, and Ground Operations by assessing performance of the M&FM algorithms in terms of their ability to reduce Loss of Mission (LOM) and Loss of Crew (LOC) probabilities. In addition, through state machine and diagnostic modeling, analysis efforts investigate a broader suite of failure effects and associated detection and responses to be tested in VMET to ensure reliable failure detection, and confirm responses do not create additional risks or cause undesired states through interactive dynamic effects with other algorithms and systems. VMET further contributes to risk reduction by prototyping and exercising the M&FM algorithms early in their implementation and without any inherent hindrances such as meeting FSW processor scheduling constraints due to their target platform - the ARINC 6535-partitioned Operating System, resource limitations, and other factors related to integration with other subsystems not directly involved with M&FM such as telemetry packing and processing. The baseline plan for use of VMET encompasses testing the original M&FM algorithms coded in the same C++ language and state machine architectural concepts as that used by FSW. This enables the development of performance standards and test cases to characterize the M&FM algorithms and sets a benchmark from which to measure their effectiveness and performance in the exterior FSW development and test processes. This paper is outlined in a systematic fashion analogous to a lifecycle process flow for engineering development of algorithms into software and testing. Section I describes the NASA SLS M&FM context, presenting the current infrastructure, leading principles, methods, and participants. Section II defines the testing philosophy of the M&FM algorithms as related to VMET followed by section III, which presents the modeling methods of the algorithms to be tested and validated in VMET. Its details are then further presented in section IV followed by Section V presenting integration, test status, and state analysis. Finally, section VI addresses the summary and forward directions followed by the appendices presenting relevant information on terminology and documentation.

Trevino, Luis↗

A Vehicle Management End-to-End Testing and Analysis Platform for Validation of Mission and Fault Management Algorithms to Reduce Risk for NASA's Space Launch System

The engineering development of the new Space Launch System (SLS) launch vehicle requires cross discipline teams with extensive knowledge of launch vehicle subsystems, information theory, and autonomous algorithms dealing with all operations from pre-launch through on orbit operations. The characteristics of these spacecraft systems must be matched with the autonomous algorithm monitoring and mitigation capabilities for accurate control and response to abnormal conditions throughout all vehicle mission flight phases, including precipitating safing actions and crew aborts. This presents a large and complex system engineering challenge, which is being addressed in part by focusing on the specific subsystems involved in the handling of off-nominal mission and fault tolerance with response management. Using traditional model based system and software engineering design principles from the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and Systems Modeling Language (SysML), the Mission and Fault Management (M&FM) algorithms for the vehicle are crafted and vetted in specialized Integrated Development Teams (IDTs) composed of multiple development disciplines such as Systems Engineering (SE), Flight Software (FSW), Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) and the major subsystems and vehicle elements such as Main Propulsion Systems (MPS), boosters, avionics, Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC), Thrust Vector Control (TVC), and liquid engines. These model based algorithms and their development lifecycle from inception through Flight Software certification are an important focus of this development effort to further insure reliable detection and response to off-nominal vehicle states during all phases of vehicle operation from pre-launch through end of flight. NASA formed a dedicated M&FM team for addressing fault management early in the development lifecycle for the SLS initiative. As part of the development of the M&FM capabilities, this team has developed a dedicated testbed that integrates specific M&FM algorithms, specialized nominal and off-nominal test cases, and vendor-supplied physics-based launch vehicle subsystem models. Additionally, the team has developed processes for implementing and validating these algorithms for concept validation and risk reduction for the SLS program. The flexibility of the Vehicle Management End-to-end Testbed (VMET) enables thorough testing of the M&FM algorithms by providing configurable suites of both nominal and off-nominal test cases to validate the developed algorithms utilizing actual subsystem models such as MPS. The intent of VMET is to validate the M&FM algorithms and substantiate them with performance baselines for each of the target vehicle subsystems in an independent platform exterior to the flight software development infrastructure and its related testing entities. In any software development process there is inherent risk in the interpretation and implementation of concepts into software through requirements and test cases into flight software compounded with potential human errors throughout the development lifecycle. Risk reduction is addressed by the M&FM analysis group working with other organizations such as S&MA, Structures and Environments, GNC, Orion, the Crew Office, Flight Operations, and Ground Operations by assessing performance of the M&FM algorithms in terms of their ability to reduce Loss of Mission and Loss of Crew probabilities. In addition, through state machine and diagnostic modeling, analysis efforts investigate a broader suite of failure effects and associated detection and responses that can be tested in VMET to ensure that failures can be detected, and confirm that responses do not create additional risks or cause undesired states through interactive dynamic effects with other algorithms and systems. VMET further contributes to risk reduction by prototyping and exercising the M&FM algorithms early in their implementation and without any inherent hindrances such as meeting FSW processor scheduling constraints due to their target platform - ARINC 653 partitioned OS, resource limitations, and other factors related to integration with other subsystems not directly involved with M&FM such as telemetry packing and processing. The baseline plan for use of VMET encompasses testing the original M&FM algorithms coded in the same C++ language and state machine architectural concepts as that used by Flight Software. This enables the development of performance standards and test cases to characterize the M&FM algorithms and sets a benchmark from which to measure the effectiveness of M&FM algorithms performance in the FSW development and test processes.

Trevino, Luis↗

NASA Commercial Crew Program Crew Transportation System Certificate of Flight Readiness Plan

NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) Crew Transportation System (CTS) Certification of Flight Readiness (CoFR) is the authorization granted by the Agency that certifies the flight readiness of a Commercial Provider’s CTS to conduct a flight test or mission to transport NASA Crew to and from the ISS. The Commercial Provider is responsible for developing and executing its plan for certifying the flight readiness of its CTS. The CCP with the International Space Station (ISS) Program must substantiate the Commercial Provider’s CoFR assertion to ensure compliance with NASA requirements and NASA Crew safety. NASA CCP CTS CoFR is the approval of the Commercial Provider’s evidence that: • The physical as-built CTS was produced, assembled, integrated, and tested within the approved production and operational constraints. • The mission specific requirements are enveloped within the certified CTS capabilities. • The CTS personnel are trained and certified to support the mission. • All aspects of the CTS are ready for the mission.

Certification of Flight Readiness↗

White Paper on Case Study of Safe Installation of Second-Life Energy Storage System

This technical report provides for a case study for the safe installation of a second-life, or repurposed, battery, that has been reconfigured for use as a stationary energy storage systems (ESS). Driven by legislative requirements such as California Senate Bill 615 and projections that retired EV batteries could meet a substantial portion of U.S. grid ESS needs beginning in 2035, the repurposing of EV batteries is anticipated to grow significantly. However, safety concerns arise from the effects of aging, unknown prior usage history, and changes in thermal runaway behavior, which may increase failure risks compared to new batteries. NFPA 855, the predominant U.S. standard for ESS installation, mandates that second-life batteries meet all requirements for new batteries, with repurposers complying with UL 1974 in addition to obtaining UL 9540 and UL 1973 listings. These are certifications that few repurposers have achieved and represent a regulatory barrier to entry for the market as a whole.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗