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At least 325 records · Page 18

WE-EF-303-03: A New Aperture-Based Imaging System for Prompt-Gamma Range Verification of Proton Beam Therapy

Purpose: To develop and characterize a novel aperture-based imaging system for high-energy gamma-rays. This collimated system will provide 2-dimensional imaging capability for verification of proton beam range and Bragg peak dose via prompt-gamma detection. Methods: A multi-knife-edge slit collimator has been designed, constructed, and characterized via simulations and experimental measurements. The 20×20×7.5 cm{sup 3} tungsten collimator and accompanying LSO scintillation detector were simulated using the TOPAS Geant4 -based Monte Carlo package. Iterative reconstruction methods were combined with point response functions to characterize the imaging performance of the system. The response of the system has begun to be characterized experimentally as well, using 2.6 MeV gamma-rays from Th-228. Results: Both simulation and experimental results indicate that this collimated system provides 2-D imaging capability in the energy range of interest for prompt-gamma dose verification. In the current configuration, with collimator to source distance of 13 cm, image reconstruction of point sources resulted in spatial resolution (FWHM) of approximately 4 mm in both x-and y-directions in the imaging plane. The accuracy of positioning the point sources is less than 1 mm. Conclusion: This work has characterized, via simulation and measurements, a novel multi-knife-edge slit collimator in front of a more conventional position-sensitive LSO scintillator detector. The multi-slit pattern is designed to increase detection efficiency and provide spatial information in 2-dimensions -- an improvement over a single-slit collimator design. The thickness and density of the collimator will allow this detection system to perform well in an environment with high gamma flux, while ultimately providing peak determination accuracy on the order of 1 mm. This material is based upon work supported by the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration under Award Number: DE-NA0000979 through the Nuclear Science and Security Consortium.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Autoradiography Using OSL for Monitoring Warhead Dismantlement

The use of radiation imaging techniques to provide increased confidence in a dismantlement verification regime is still under investigation. Currently, radiation measurements can be used to confirm attributes such as the presence, quality, and mass of containerized nuclear material. However, imaging techniques can be used to confirm the shape, size, and/or symmetry of the object being interrogated. Imaging can be used as a complementary technique to radiation measurements to confirm a declaration or as a chain of custody measure to confirm that an item has not been tampered with. As with other attribute measurements, the image data must be protected behind an information barrier and analyzed to give an unclassified result when compared to an agreed upon threshold. This paper will discuss the use of Optically Stimulated Luminescence to perform autoradiography of sources using coded apertures to differentiate between point sources and various distributed sources. The coded aperture chosen for this application is based on modified uniform redundant arrays (mURAs) which resulted in the design and manufacture of an efficient, high-resolution mURA mask/antimask system. The potential use of the autoradiography technique with the coded aperture as an intrinsic information barrier and the required protection of the mask and unfolding algorithm will also be discussed. This project has been supported by the US Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Dismantlement and Transparency (DOE/NNSA/NA-241).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The attribute measurement technique

Any verification measurement performed on potentially classified nuclear material must satisfy two seemingly contradictory constraints. First and foremost, no classified information can be released. At the same time, the monitoring party must have confidence in the veracity of the measurement. An information barrier (IB) is included in the measurement system to protect the potentially classified information while allowing sufficient information transfer to occur for the monitoring party to gain confidence that the material being measured is consistent with the host's declarations, concerning that material. The attribute measurement technique incorporates an IB and addresses both concerns by measuring several attributes of the nuclear material and displaying unclassified results through green (indicating that the material does possess the specified attribute) and red (indicating that the material does not possess the specified attribute) lights. The attribute measurement technique has been implemented in the AVNG, an attribute measuring system described in other presentations at this conference. In this presentation, we will discuss four techniques used in the AVNG: (1) the 1B, (2) the attribute measurement technique, (3) the use of open and secure modes to increase confidence in the displayed results, and (4) the joint design as a method for addressing both host and monitor needs.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Studying visual search without an eye tracker: an assessment of artificial foveation

Abstract Eye tracking is a useful tool for studying human cognition, both in the laboratory and in real-world applications. However, there are cases in which eye tracking is not possible, such as in high-security environments where recording devices cannot be introduced. After facing this challenge in our own work, we sought to test the effectiveness of using artificial foveation as an alternative to eye tracking for studying visual search performance. Two groups of participants completed the same list comparison task, which was a computer-based task designed to mimic an inventory verification process that is commonly performed by international nuclear safeguards inspectors. We manipulated the way in which the items on the inventory list were ordered and color coded. For the eye tracking group, an eye tracker was used to assess the order in which participants viewed the items and the number of fixations per trial in each list condition. For the artificial foveation group, the items were covered with a blurry mask except when participants moused over them. We tracked the order in which participants viewed the items by moving their mouse and the number of items viewed per trial in each list condition. We observed the same overall pattern of performance for the various list display conditions, regardless of the method. However, participants were much slower to complete the task when using artificial foveation and had more variability in their accuracy. Our results indicate that the artificial foveation method can reveal the same pattern of differences across conditions as eye tracking, but it can also impact participants’ task performance.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

An algorithm for continuum modeling of rocks with multiple embedded nonlinearly-compliant joints [Continuum modeling of elasto-plastic media with multiple embedded nonlinearly-compliant joints]

Here, we present a numerical method for modeling the mechanical effects of nonlinearly-compliant joints in elasto-plastic media. The method uses a series of strain-rate and stress update algorithms to determine joint closure, slip, and solid stress within computational cells containing multiple “embedded” joints. This work facilitates efficient modeling of nonlinear wave propagation in large spatial domains containing a large number of joints that affect bulk mechanical properties. We implement the method within the massively parallel Lagrangian code GEODYN-L and provide verification and examples. We highlight the ability of our algorithms to capture joint interactions and multiple weakness planes within individual computational cells, as well as its computational efficiency. We also discuss the motivation for developing the proposed technique: to simulate large-scale wave propagation during the Source Physics Experiments (SPE), a series of underground explosions conducted at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS).

42 ENGINEERING↗

Final Report for FY15 Spent Fuel Project Task 12: Data Authentication

The data authentication task is concerned with the ability of a user to trust the output from an unattended measurement of spent nuclear fuel intended for disposal. Five high-level requirements that are driven from a data authentication perspective need to be considered for instrument development: The instrument must be secured. All data emerging from the instrument must be signed. Instrument inputs may also need to be signed and authenticated. The instrument environment needs to be controlled. A vulnerability assessment will be necessary for the full system before deployment. Additional requirements may be necessary, especially if operational scenarios include arrangements for joint use. None of the prototype instruments currently under development yet satisfies any of these requirements. From a data authentication perspective, the selection of a preferred instrument from among the candidates under development should consider the relative ability to secure the instrument, its relative needs for ancillary instrumentation, and ability of the instrument to self-interrogate its state of health. Further work is recommended to develop advanced technologies, methods and approaches for tamper indication. Beyond the development of any particular instrument for the nondestructive assay of spent fuel, efforts should be devoted to developing the system for spent fuel verification prior to long term disposal, including likely operational scenarios for routine use of the verification system.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Forensics

Nuclear forensics is a key part of the nuclear security strategy for the United States and the international community. The NACS Division is central to the leadership role that LLNL has had in nuclear forensics over the past 25 years. Our current nuclear forensic program includes conducting R&D on provenance and attribution signatures, collaborating with international partners, training the next generation of nuclear forensic experts, developing test materials for verification and validation exercises, and providing expert advice to national and international policy makers. Key to our success in these areas has been the strong and continuing involvement in nuclear forensic casework obtained through law enforcement and intelligence channels as well as our outstanding analytical capabilities. NACS must continue to conduct forward-thinking R&D in nuclear forensics that supports operational programs and addresses intelligence gaps. To maintain leadership in nuclear forensics, we must attract, develop, and retain the best talent. The NNSA has a central leadership role in developing educational initiatives for nuclear forensics. In concert with the Glenn T. Seaborg Institute, the NACS Division will continue to participate in all nuclear forensic educational initiatives (undergraduate, graduate, postdoctoral) and incorporate LLNL’s D&I vision into its student and postdoc recruitment efforts. We will continue to build formal relationships with key academic partners and institutions with active and emerging nuclear forensic research interests. We will also strengthen relationships with NNSA DNN and SSAA funded university consortia (e.g. NSSC, ACE, CNEC, CVT, ETI, MTV), helping them conduct research of interest and relevance to nuclear forensics, while at the same time evaluating and recruiting promising talent from these programs.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Evaluating Probability of Containment Effectiveness at a GCS Sites using integrated assessment modeling approach with Bayesian decision Networks

Improved scientific and engineering understanding of the behavior of geologic CO2 storage together with established regulatory framework and incentive structures raise the prospects for accelerated, large-scale deployment of this greenhouse gas emissions reduction approach. Incentive structures call for the establishment of appropriate verification and accounting approaches to support claims of the integrity of a geologic storage complex and to justify taking credit for long-term storage. In this study, we present a framework for assessing the probability of containment effectiveness over the lifetime of a geologic carbon storage site (e.g., after 70 years of injection and post-injection site performance) using forward stochastic model realizations based on site characterization data and using a monitoring-informed Bayesian network based on hypothetical detectability from surface seismic surveys over the site injection and post-injection phases. The National Risk Assessment Partnership’s open-source Integrated Assessment Model (NRAP-Open-IAM) was utilized to develop an ensemble of 10,000 a priori stochastic forecasts of CO2 containment. Those simulations were used to train the Bayesian network model to estimate the prior probabilities of the CO2 leakage mass into overlying, monitorable aquifers considering the uncertainties in the reservoir properties, permeability of potentially leaky wells and the overlying aquifers. The conditional probabilities in the Bayesian network were either learned from the NRAP-Open-IAM simulations or derived from the predefined detection thresholds for the monitoring method. Observations obtained from monitoring, over time during the site operation phases were then used to generate updated posterior probabilities of containment (and any loss from containment) in the Bayesian network by propagating the prior probabilities through the conditional probabilities. We demonstrate how to construct and use the Bayesian network for verifying the long-term storage complex effectiveness informed by monitoring based on the NRAP-Open-IAM simulations previously developed for the FutureGen 2.0 site. This approach may have relevance for stake holders to demonstrate secure geologic storage, provide a defensible, probabilistic approach to claim credit for geologic storage, and to estimate the likelihood that any fraction of the claimed credit may need to be refunded to the creditor based on available monitoring information.

Bayesian network, Risk assessment, Monitoring, car↗

A real-time in vivo dosimetric verification method for high-dose rate intracavitary brachytherapy of nasopharyngeal carcinoma

Purpose: A real-time in vivo dosimetric verification method using metal-oxide-semiconductor field effect transistor (MOSFET) dosimeters has been developed for patient dosimetry in high-dose rate (HDR) intracavitary brachytherapy of nasopharyngeal carcinoma (NPC). Methods: The necessary calibration and correction factors for MOSFET measurements in {sup 192}Iridium source were determined in a water phantom. With the detector placed inside a custom-made nasopharyngeal applicator, the actual dose delivered to the tumor was measured in vivo and compared to the calculated values using a commercial brachytherapy planning system. Results: Five MOSFETs were independently calibrated with the HDR source, yielding calibration factors of 0.48 {+-} 0.007 cGy/mV. The maximum sensitivity variation was no more than 7% in the clinically relevant distance range of 1-5 cm from the source. A total of 70 in vivo measurements in 11 NPC patients demonstrated good agreement with the treatment planning. The mean differences between the planned and the actually delivered dose within a single treatment fraction were -0.1%{+-} 3.8% and -0.1%{+-} 3.7%, respectively, for right and left side assessments. The maximum dose deviation was less than 8.5%. Conclusions: In vivo measurement using the real-time MOSFET dosimetry system is possible to evaluate the actual dose to the tumor received by the patient during a treatment fraction and thus can offer another line of security to detect and prevent large errors.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Puck and Puck/SAW Loop Seals (Final Report)

Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), also known as seals, play a crucial role in various sectors including international nuclear safeguards, arms control, domestic security, and commercial products, by ensuring that monitored or high-value items are not accessed undetected. These devices do not block access but alert to unauthorized tampering. With adversaries' capabilities evolving, there's a pressing need for seals to advance in terms of effectiveness (e.g., better tamper indication and unique identification), and new technology can improve the efficiency of installation and verification. Passive loop seals, widely used in international nuclear safeguards to ensure that continuity of knowledge is maintained on declared items, face stringent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements that surpass those met by commercial products. The metal cup seal (Figure 1, left), a staple IAEA seal, is robust but requires significant resources for post-use verification – specifically, the seal’s unique identity can only be verified at IAEA headquarters after removal from facilities. Further, the seal has been in use for decades and seal types should periodically be replaced to counter adversarial efforts for defeating seals. In 2020, the IAEA outlined about 40 requirements for a new passive loop seal, aiming for in-situ verification, minimal external tool use, unique identification (UID), and clear tamper indication. In response, research and development efforts focused on creating a new passive loop seal that meets these criteria and in 2022 the IAEA announced the completion of the Field Verifiable Passive Loop Seal (FVPS) (Figure 1, right). Concurrently to the IAEA’s efforts, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) designed, developed, and tested two seal versions – Puck and Puck/SAW, with Puck based on the IAEA’s requirements and including a novel visually-obvious tamper response, and Puck/SAW adding additional beneficial capabilities like the ability to receive a unique identifier from a standoff distance and monitoring the wire integrity. Puck/SAW was specifically designed and developed to address sealing applications in dry spent fuel storage facilities, where the number of sealed spent fuel containers results in heavy verification burden and inspector safety issues related to radiation exposure. These efforts are described in this Executive Summary.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NASA Tech Briefs, June 2012

Topics covered include: iGlobe Interactive Visualization and Analysis of Spatial Data; Broad-Bandwidth FPGA-Based Digital Polyphase Spectrometer; Small Aircraft Data Distribution System; Earth Science Datacasting v2.0; Algorithm for Compressing Time-Series Data; Onboard Science and Applications Algorithm for Hyperspectral Data Reduction; Sampling Technique for Robust Odorant Detection Based on MIT RealNose Data; Security Data Warehouse Application; Integrated Laser Characterization, Data Acquisition, and Command and Control Test System; Radiation-Hard SpaceWire/Gigabit Ethernet-Compatible Transponder; Hardware Implementation of Lossless Adaptive Compression of Data From a Hyperspectral Imager; High-Voltage, Low-Power BNC Feedthrough Terminator; SpaceCube Mini; Dichroic Filter for Separating W-Band and Ka-Band; Active Mirror Predictive and Requirement Verification Software (AMP-ReVS); Navigation/Prop Software Suite; Personal Computer Transport Analysis Program; Pressure Ratio to Thermal Environments; Probabilistic Fatigue Damage Program (FATIG); ASCENT Program; JPL Genesis and Rapid Intensification Processes (GRIP) Portal; Data::Downloader; Fault Tolerance Middleware for a Multi-Core System; DspaceOgreTerrain 3D Terrain Visualization Tool; Trick Simulation Environment 07; Geometric Reasoning for Automated Planning; Water Detection Based on Color Variation; Single-Layer, All-Metal Patch Antenna Element with Wide Bandwidth; Scanning Laser Infrared Molecular Spectrometer (SLIMS); Next-Generation Microshutter Arrays for Large-Format Imaging and Spectroscopy; Detection of Carbon Monoxide Using Polymer-Composite Films with a Porphyrin-Functionalized Polypyrrole; Enhanced-Adhesion Multiwalled Carbon Nanotubes on Titanium Substrates for Stray Light Control; Three-Dimensional Porous Particles Composed of Curved, Two-Dimensional, Nano-Sized Layers for Li-Ion Batteries 23 Ultra-Lightweight; and Ultra-Lightweight Nanocomposite Foams and Sandwich Structures for Space Structure Applications.

Source record↗

Feasibility of critical infrastructure protection using network functions for programmable and decoupled ICS policy enforcement over WAN

Industrial control systems (ICS) represent a major component of our critical infrastructure. With the increasing need for more control and monitoring of such systems, ICS have seen an increase in connectivity to wide area networks (WAN) exposing aging equipment to rapidly evolving cybersecurity threats. Furthermore, the ICS data requires a reliability measure from the networks for critical functions for infrastructure monitoring and control. Especially when remote plant sites are involved such as pipelines, energy distribution networks, and transportation, WAN transport impairments most often provide a best effort delivery with no strict reliability guarantees. Network functions can provide a vendor agnostic, programmable critical infrastructure protection with a single maintenance, policy determination, and reliability assurance surface. A network function (NF) can be utilized for policy enforcement over the communication between remote entities and the main control office. This paper presents the research on transparent integration with existing ICS without disrupting communications, resulting in minimal downtime while decoupling the fast paced evolution of defensive security measures from the upgrade cycle of expensive long term hardware. We report our measurements on the resource requirements and overhead in the network for successful NF insertion under a wide variety of network impairments (network packet delay, reordering, and loss). Our paired NF implementation provides a policy enforcement platform extensible to cover myriad cybersecurity-related communication goals, including packet signing for verification, encryption for data privacy, packet filtering and data diode operation (i.e. protecting against eavesdropping, packet injection, and denial-of-service). Furthermore, bundling communication specifications into packet flows allows for tunability in applying policies as coarse- or fine-grained as the needs of the operator. We report on network function resource requirements in the form of required queue depth and network utilization overhead to inform the decision making against hardware cost constraints.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DAKOTA (Design Analysis Kit for Optimization and Terascale) v.6.14

Sandia's Dakota software supports science and engineering transformation through advanced exploration of simulations. Specifically, Dakota manages and analyzes ensembles of simulations to provide broader and deeper perspective for analysts and decision makers. This enables them to: (1) enhance understanding of risk, (2) improve products, and (3) assess simulation credibility. In its simplest mode, Dakota can automate typical parameter variation studies through a generic interface to a computational model. Dakota also delivers advanced parametric analysis techniques enabling design exploration, optimization, model calibration, risk analysis, and quantification of margins and uncertainty with such models. It directly supports verification and validation activities. The algorithms implemented in Dakota aim to address challenges in performing these analyses with complex science and engineering models from desktop to high performance computers. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525 SAND2021-10468 O

Adams, BrianM.↗

DAKOTA (Design Analysis Kit for Optimization and Terascale) v.6.16

Sandia's Dakota software supports science and engineering transformation through advanced exploration of simulations. Specifically, Dakota manages and analyzes ensembles of simulations to provide broader and deeper perspective for analysts and decision makers. This enables them to: (1) enhance understanding of risk, (2) improve products, and (3) assess simulation credibility. In its simplest mode, Dakota can automate typical parameter variation studies through a generic interface to a computational model. Dakota also delivers advanced parametric analysis techniques enabling design exploration, optimization, model calibration, risk analysis, and quantification of margins and uncertainty with such models. It directly supports verification and validation activities. The algorithms implemented in Dakota aim to address challenges in performing these analyses with complex science and engineering models from desktop to high performance computers. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525 SAND2021-10468 O

Adams, BrianM.↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 367: Area 10 Sedan, Ess and Uncle Unit Craters Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1

Corrective Action Unit 367 comprises four corrective action sites (CASs): • 10-09-03, Mud Pit • 10-45-01, U-10h Crater (Sedan) • 10-45-02, Ess Crater Site • 10-45-03, Uncle Crater Site The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation of the corrective actions and site closure activities implemented at CAU 367. A corrective action of closure in place with use restrictions was completed at each of the three crater CASs (10-45-01, 10-45-02, and 10-45-03); corrective actions were not required at CAS 10-09-03. In addition, a limited soil removal corrective action was conducted at the location of a potential source material release. Based on completion of these correction actions, no additional corrective action is required at CAU 367, and site closure is considered complete. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from February 2010 through March 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 367: Area 10 Sedan, Ess and Uncle Unit Craters, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides, and investigation of non-test or other releases (e.g., migration in washes and potential source material). Based on the proximity of the Uncle, Ess, and Sedan craters, the impact of the Sedan test on the fallout deposited from the two earlier tests, and aerial radiological surveys, the CAU 367 investigation was designed to study the releases from the three crater CASs as one combined release (primary release). Corrective Action Site 10-09-03, Mud Pit, consists of two mud pits identified at CAU 367. The mud pits are considered non-test releases or other releases and were investigated independent of the three crater CASs. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 367 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. For the primary release, radiological doses exceeding the FAL of 25 millirem per year were not found to be present in the surface or shallow subsurface soil outside the default contamination boundary. However, it was assumed that radionuclides are present in subsurface media within each of the three craters (Sedan, Ess, and Uncle) due to prompt injection of radionuclides from the tests. Based on the assumption of radiological dose exceeding the FAL, corrective actions were undertaken that consisted of implementing a use restriction and posting warning signs at each crater CAS. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. With regard to other releases, no contaminants of concern were identified at the mud pits or any of the other release locations, with one exception. Potential source material in the form of lead was found at one location. A corrective action of clean closure was implemented at this location, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 367. • Corrective Action Unit 367 should be promoted from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Supporting Technology for Chain of Custody of Nuclear Weapons and Materials throughout the Dismantlement and Disposition Processes

The ratification and ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty have been widely regarded as noteworthy global security achievements for both the Obama Administration and the Putin (formerly Medvedev) regime. But deeper cuts that move beyond the United States and Russia to engage the P-5 and other nuclear weapons possessor states are envisioned under future arms control regimes, and are indeed required for the P-5 in accordance with their Article VI disarmament obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Future verification needs will include monitoring the cessation of production of new fissile material for weapons, monitoring storage of warhead components and fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondary stages, and other materials. A fundamental challenge to implementing a nuclear disarmament regime is the ability to thwart unauthorized material diversion throughout the dismantlement and disposition process through strong chain of custody implementation. Verifying the declared presence, or absence, of nuclear materials and weapons components throughout the dismantlement and disposition lifecycle is a critical aspect of the disarmament process. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under these future arms control regimes will require new solutions. Since any acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes to prevent the release of classified or other proliferation-sensitive information, non-nuclear non-sensitive modalities may provide significant new verification tools which do not require the use of additional information barriers. Alternative verification technologies based upon electromagnetic and acoustics could potentially play an important role in fulfilling the challenging requirements of future verification regimes. For example, researchers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to rapidly confirm the presence of specific components on a yes/no basis without revealing classified information. PNNL researchers have also used ultrasonic measurements to obtain images of material microstructures which may be used as templates or unique identifiers of treaty-limited items. Such alternative technologies are suitable for application in various stages of weapons dismantlement and often include the advantage of an inherent information barrier due to the inability to extract classified weapon design information from the collected data. As a result, these types of technologies complement radiation-based verification methods for arms control. This article presents an overview of several alternative verification technologies that are suitable for supporting a future, broader and more intrusive arms control regime that spans the nuclear weapons disarmament lifecycle. The general capabilities and limitations of each verification modality are discussed and example technologies are presented. Potential applications are defined in the context of the nuclear material and weapons lifecycle. Example applications range from authentication (e.g., tracking and signatures within the chain of custody from downloading through weapons storage, unclassified templates and unique identification) to verification of absence and final material disposition.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Optimising National WM Strategies through early consideration of Nuclear Safeguards - 18607

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards stand alongside safety and security as one of the three pillars for prudent management of all nuclear material, including nuclear waste. Although safety considerations, including public and environmental radiation protection, are the traditional drivers of waste management strategies, there is a requirement for nuclear safeguards in shaping and quantifying long-term solutions for special classes of radioactive waste. This is especially important when considering the disposal of nuclear material in a repository that could be released from regulatory oversight for radiation protection after a period of institutional control, as some safeguards oversight would still be required. Failure to consider nuclear safeguards at the early stages of planning may alternatively lead to excessive volumes for disposal or the need to recondition already treated wastes. At the very least, safeguards measures should be considered before countries seek to dispose of legacy nuclear materials, decommissioning wastes and other materials containing uranium, thorium or plutonium in an operating repository. Nuclear safeguards are the set of tools and techniques used by the IAEA to verify that countries comply with their international obligations not to divert nuclear materials to nuclear explosive devices. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear safeguards apply to all uranium, thorium and plutonium held in non-weapons NPT states, with limited exceptions. In nuclear-weapon states, much of their material is likewise subject to IAEA safeguards through conditions in agreements with respective suppliers of the uranium. Under IAEA safeguards, such nuclear material must remain accounted for and accessible for periodic verification-analogous to the safety concepts of reversibility and retrievability. Nevertheless, safeguards requirements can be terminated - provided that the State and the [IAEA] agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable - through dilution or immobilisation in solid form (such as cement, glass or ceramic). This means candidate material can be disposed of as non- nuclear material, with no further safeguards requirements, provided this criterion is met. Unlike radiological wastes where repository design strongly influences pathways for radionuclide migration and overall safety performance, repository design is not a factor in considering the termination of safeguards on nuclear material. This paper looks at similarities and differences in the safety, security and safeguards regulatory requirements for the management of radioactive waste and nuclear material in Australia. In particular, it outlines recent experience gained from participation in Australia's waste acceptance criteria working group for a national low-level waste repository and intermediate-level waste store, as well as from Australia's overall waste management strategy. These items of work have coincided with the IAEA update of its internal policy on termination of safeguards on nuclear material. Australia's experience shows how inclusion of safeguards criteria in the planning process is leading to optimisations in choice of facility concepts, project sequencing and equitable distribution of economic risk. By considering the three pillars-safety, security and safeguards-early on in the planning process, Australia's waste management strategy will provide a benchmark for other states in establishing and updating their own waste acceptance criteria for the disposal of nuclear material. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Countering the future chemical weapons threat

After decades of difficult negotiations, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was adopted in 1993 and entered into force on 29 April 1997, banning the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons (CW). As the CWC celebrates the 25th anniversary of its entry into force, it can document considerable success, much of it attributed to the CWC implementing body—the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, facing a volatile international security environment and an everchanging chemical industry, the OPCW must transform to meet its mission and remain an exemplar for multilateralism. As the next CWC review conference approaches in 2023, a next-generation OPCW 2.0 can be effective and credible only if it reinforces international norms against CW, anticipates future challenges posed by advancements in science and technology (S&T), incorporates more qualitative elements into the verification and compliance system, and keeps pace with technological change.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗