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NASA NTRS1991

Safety

Software requirements, design, implementation, verification and validation, and especially management are affected by the need to produce safe software. This paper discusses the changes in the software life cycle that are necessary to ensure that software will execute without resulting in unacceptable risk. Software is being used increasingly to monitor and control safety-critical processes in which a run-time failure or error could result in unacceptable losses such as death, injury, loss of property, or environmental harm. Examples of such processes maybe found in transportation, energy, aerospace, basic industry, medicine, and defense systems.

Leveson, Nancy G.↗

NASA NTRS1998

Experimental Results and Issues on Equalization for Nonlinear Memory Channel: Pre-Cursor Enhanced Ram-DFE Canceler

This thesis investigates the effects of the High Power Amplifier (HPA) and the filters over a satellite or telemetry channel. The Volterra series expression is presented for the nonlinear channel with memory, and the algorithm is based on the finite-state machine model. A RAM-based algorithm operating on the receiver side, Pre-cursor Enhanced RAM-FSE Canceler (PERC) is developed. A high order modulation scheme , 16-QAM is used for simulation, the results show that PERC provides an efficient and reliable method to transmit data on the bandlimited nonlinear channel. The contribution of PERC algorithm is that it includes both pre-cursors and post-cursors as the RAM address lines, and suggests a new way to make decision on the pre-addresses. Compared with the RAM-DFE structure that only includes post- addresses, the BER versus Eb/NO performance of PERC is substantially enhanced. Experiments are performed for PERC algorithms with different parameters on AWGN channels, and the results are compared and analyzed. The investigation of this thesis includes software simulation and hardware verification. Hardware is setup to collect actual TWT data. Simulation on both the software-generated data and the real-world data are performed. Practical limitations are considered for the hardware collected data. Simulation results verified the reliability of the PERC algorithm. This work was conducted at NMSU in the Center for Space Telemetering and Telecommunications Systems in the Klipsch School of Electrical and Computer Engineering Department.

Yuan, Lu↗

NASA NTRS2000

Software IV and V Research Priorities and Applied Program Accomplishments Within NASA

The mission of this research is to be world-class creators and facilitators of innovative, intelligent, high performance, reliable information technologies that enable NASA missions to (1) increase software safety and quality through error avoidance, early detection and resolution of errors, by utilizing and applying empirically based software engineering best practices; (2) ensure customer software risks are identified and/or that requirements are met and/or exceeded; (3) research, develop, apply, verify, and publish software technologies for competitive advantage and the advancement of science; and (4) facilitate the transfer of science and engineering data, methods, and practices to NASA, educational institutions, state agencies, and commercial organizations. The goals are to become a national Center Of Excellence (COE) in software and system independent verification and validation, and to become an international leading force in the field of software engineering for improving the safety, quality, reliability, and cost performance of software systems. This project addresses the following problems: Ensure safety of NASA missions, ensure requirements are met, minimize programmatic and technological risks of software development and operations, improve software quality, reduce costs and time to delivery, and improve the science of software engineering

Blazy, Louis J.↗

NASA NTRS1990

The cleanroom case study in the Software Engineering Laboratory: Project description and early analysis

This case study analyzes the application of the cleanroom software development methodology to the development of production software at the NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center. The cleanroom methodology emphasizes human discipline in program verification to produce reliable software products that are right the first time. Preliminary analysis of the cleanroom case study shows that the method can be applied successfully in the FDD environment and may increase staff productivity and product quality. Compared to typical Software Engineering Laboratory (SEL) activities, there is evidence of lower failure rates, a more complete and consistent set of inline code documentation, a different distribution of phase effort activity, and a different growth profile in terms of lines of code developed. The major goals of the study were to: (1) assess the process used in the SEL cleanroom model with respect to team structure, team activities, and effort distribution; (2) analyze the products of the SEL cleanroom model and determine the impact on measures of interest, including reliability, productivity, overall life-cycle cost, and software quality; and (3) analyze the residual products in the application of the SEL cleanroom model, such as fault distribution, error characteristics, system growth, and computer usage.

Green, Scott↗

NASA NTRS2003

Simulation-Based Verification of Livingstone Applications

AI software is viewed as a means to give greater autonomy to automated systems, capable of coping with harsh and unpredictable environments in deep space missions. Autonomous systems pose a serious challenge to traditional test-based verification approaches, because of the enormous space of possible situations that they aim to address. Before these systems are put in control of critical applications, appropriate new verification approaches need to be developed. This article describes Livingstone PathFinder (LPF), a verification tool for autonomous diagnosis applications based on NASA's Livingstone model-based diagnosis system. LPF applies state space exploration algorithms to an instrumented testbed, consisting of the Livingstone diagnosis system embedded in a simulated operating environment. The article describes different facets of LPF and reports some experimental results from applying LPF to a Livingstone model of the main propulsion feed subsystem of the X-34 space vehicle. This paper describes Livingstone PathFinder (LPF), a verification tool for autonomous diagnosis applications based on NASA's Livingstone model-based diagnosis system. LPF applies state space exploration algorithms to an instrumented testbed, consisting of the Livingstone diagnosis system embedded in a simulated operating environment. Section 2 provides an overview of Livingstone; Section 3 describes the LPF architecture; Section 4 discusses its applicability; Section 5 reviews some experimental results; Section 6 compares LPF to related verification approaches; Section 7 draws conclusions and discusses some perspectives.

Lindsey, Anthony E.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Assuring NASA's Safety and Mission Critical Software

What is IV&V? Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) is an objective examination of safety and mission critical software processes and products. Independence: 3 Key parameters: Technical Independence; Managerial Independence; Financial Independence. NASA IV&V perspectives: Will the system's software: Do what it is supposed to do?; Not do what it is not supposed to do?; Respond as expected under adverse conditions?. Systems Engineering: Determines if the right system has been built and that it has been built correctly. IV&V Technical Approaches: Aligned with IEEE 1012; Captured in a Catalog of Methods; Spans the full project lifecycle. IV&V Assurance Strategy: The IV&V Project's strategy for providing mission assurance; Assurance Strategy is driven by the specific needs of an individual project; Implemented via an Assurance Design; Communicated via Assurance Statements.

Validation↗

NASA NTRS1975

Automatic documentation system extension to multi-manufacturers' computers and to measure, improve, and predict software reliability

The DOMONIC system has been modified to run on the Univac 1108 and the CDC 6600 as well as the IBM 370 computer system. The DOMONIC monitor system has been implemented to gather data which can be used to optimize the DOMONIC system and to predict the reliability of software developed using DOMONIC. The areas of quality metrics, error characterization, program complexity, program testing, validation and verification are analyzed. A software reliability model for estimating program completion levels and one on which to base system acceptance have been developed. The DAVE system which performs flow analysis and error detection has been converted from the University of Colorado CDC 6400/6600 computer to the IBM 360/370 computer system for use with the DOMONIC system.

Simmons, D. B.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Applying Formal Methods to Safety-Critical Systems

How do you know a proof is correct? Traditionally, mathematical proofs are socially verified – at least one human, following a set of implicit rules of natural language and logic, determines if the proof is believable. If the proof becomes overly tedious and/or is essential to some safety- or mission-critical application, it becomes necessary to determine the soundness to a higher standard. 'Formal methods' refer to mathematically rigorous techniques and tools that enable specification, design, and verification of hardware and software systems. The specification used in formal methods are statements in a mathematical logic while the formal verifications are deductions in that logic. Formal methods can be difficult or time/resource intensive, but offer a higher level of assurance than standard verification through testing or handwritten proofs. This talk will introduce formal methods, motivated by applications of interest to NASA, including uncrewed aircraft operations in the national airspace, urban air environments, and wildfire areas. The audience will be given a crash course in mechanically verified proofs in the Prototype Verification System (PVS), an interactive theorem prover.

Formal Methods↗

NASA NTRS2017

Critical Software for Human Spaceflight

The NASA Orion vehicle that will fly to the moon in the next years is propelled along its mission by the European Service Module (ESM), developed by ESA and its prime contractor Airbus Defense and Space. This paper describes the development of the Propulsion Drive Electronics (PDE) Software that provides the interface between the propulsion hardware of the European Service Module with the Orion flight computers, and highlights the challenges that have been faced during the development. Particularly, the specific aspects relevant to Human Spaceflight in an international cooperation are presented, as the compliance to both European and US standards and the software criticality classification to the highest category A. An innovative aspect of the PDE SW is its Time- Triggered Ethernet interface with the Orion Flight Computers, which has never been flown so far on any European spacecraft. Finally the verification aspects are presented, applying the most exigent quality requirements defined in the European Cooperation for Space Standardization (ECSS) standards such as the structural coverage analysis of the object code and the recourse to an independent software verification and validation activity carried on in parallel by a different team.

Preden, Antonio↗

NASA NTRS2010

Proceedings of the Second NASA Formal Methods Symposium

This publication contains the proceedings of the Second NASA Formal Methods Symposium sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and held in Washington D.C. April 13-15, 2010. Topics covered include: Decision Engines for Software Analysis using Satisfiability Modulo Theories Solvers; Verification and Validation of Flight-Critical Systems; Formal Methods at Intel -- An Overview; Automatic Review of Abstract State Machines by Meta Property Verification; Hardware-independent Proofs of Numerical Programs; Slice-based Formal Specification Measures -- Mapping Coupling and Cohesion Measures to Formal Z; How Formal Methods Impels Discovery: A Short History of an Air Traffic Management Project; A Machine-Checked Proof of A State-Space Construction Algorithm; Automated Assume-Guarantee Reasoning for Omega-Regular Systems and Specifications; Modeling Regular Replacement for String Constraint Solving; Using Integer Clocks to Verify the Timing-Sync Sensor Network Protocol; Can Regulatory Bodies Expect Efficient Help from Formal Methods?; Synthesis of Greedy Algorithms Using Dominance Relations; A New Method for Incremental Testing of Finite State Machines; Verification of Faulty Message Passing Systems with Continuous State Space in PVS; Phase Two Feasibility Study for Software Safety Requirements Analysis Using Model Checking; A Prototype Embedding of Bluespec System Verilog in the PVS Theorem Prover; SimCheck: An Expressive Type System for Simulink; Coverage Metrics for Requirements-Based Testing: Evaluation of Effectiveness; Software Model Checking of ARINC-653 Flight Code with MCP; Evaluation of a Guideline by Formal Modelling of Cruise Control System in Event-B; Formal Verification of Large Software Systems; Symbolic Computation of Strongly Connected Components Using Saturation; Towards the Formal Verification of a Distributed Real-Time Automotive System; Slicing AADL Specifications for Model Checking; Model Checking with Edge-valued Decision Diagrams; and Data-flow based Model Analysis.

Munoz, Cesar↗

NASA NTRS2016

Assurance of Fault Management: Risk-Significant Adverse Condition Awareness

Fault Management (FM) systems are ranked high in risk-based assessment of criticality within flight software, emphasizing the importance of establishing highly competent domain expertise to provide assurance for NASA projects, especially as spaceflight systems continue to increase in complexity. Insight into specific characteristics of FM architectures seen embedded within safety- and mission-critical software systems analyzed by the NASA Independent Verification Validation (IVV) Program has been enhanced with an FM Technical Reference (TR) suite. Benefits are aimed beyond the IVV community to those that seek ways to efficiently and effectively provide software assurance to reduce the FM risk posture of NASA and other space missions. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated IVV techniques provides a TR suite that enables greater assurance that critical software systems will adequately protect against faults and respond to adverse conditions. The role FM has with regard to overall asset protection of flight software systems is being addressed with the development of an adverse condition (AC) database encompassing flight software vulnerabilities.Identification of potential off-nominal conditions and analysis to determine how a system responds to these conditions are important aspects of hazard analysis and fault management. Understanding what ACs the mission may face, and ensuring they are prevented or addressed is the responsibility of the assurance team, which necessarily should have insight into ACs beyond those defined by the project itself. Research efforts sponsored by NASAs Office of Safety and Mission Assurance defined terminology, categorized data fields, and designed a baseline repository that centralizes and compiles a comprehensive listing of ACs and correlated data relevant across many NASA missions. This prototype tool helps projects improve analysis by tracking ACs, and allowing queries based on project, mission type, domain component, causal fault, and other key characteristics. The repository has a firm structure, initial collection of data, and an interface established for informational queries, with plans for integration within the Enterprise Architecture at NASA IVV, enabling support and accessibility across the Agency. The development of an improved workflow process for adaptive, risk-informed FM assurance is currently underway.

Software Verification & Validation↗

NASA NTRS1986

Software engineering environment tool set integration

Space Transportation System Division (STSD) Engineering has a program to promote excellence within the engineering function. This program resulted in a capital funded facility based on a VAX cluster called the Rockwell Operational Engineering System (ROSES). The second phase of a three phase plan to establish an integrated software engineering environment for ROSES is examined. It discusses briefly phase one which establishes the basic capability for a modern software development environment to include a tool set, training and standards. Phase two is a tool set integration. The tool set is primarily off-the-shelf tools acquired through vendors or government agencies (public domain). These tools were placed into categories of software development. These categories are: requirements, design, and construction support; verification and validation support; and software management support. The integration of the tool set is being performed through concept prototyping and development of tools specifically designed to support the life cycle and provide transition from one phase to the next.

Selfridge, William P.↗

NASA NTRS1990

Software safety - A user's practical perspective

Software safety assurance philosophy and practices at the NASA Ames are discussed. It is shown that, to be safe, software must be error-free. Software developments on two digital flight control systems and two ground facility systems are examined, including the overall system and software organization and function, the software-safety issues, and their resolution. The effectiveness of safety assurance methods is discussed, including conventional life-cycle practices, verification and validation testing, software safety analysis, and formal design methods. It is concluded (1) that a practical software safety technology does not yet exist, (2) that it is unlikely that a set of general-purpose analytical techniques can be developed for proving that software is safe, and (3) that successful software safety-assurance practices will have to take into account the detailed design processes employed and show that the software will execute correctly under all possible conditions.

Dunn, William R.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Exploring Requirements for Software that Learns: A Research Preview

Context & motivation: The development of software that learns has revolutionized how many systems perform. For the most part, these systems are neither safety- nor mission-critical. However, as technology and aspirations advance, there is an increased desire and need for Machine Learning (ML) software in safety- and mission-critical systems, e.g., driverless cars or autonomous space robotics. Problem: In these domains, reliability is crucial and systems have to undergo much scrutiny in terms of both the developed artefacts and the adopted development process. Central to the development of such systems is the elicitation and definition of software requirements that are used to guide the design and verification process. The addition of software components that learn, and the associated capability for unforeseen behavior, makes defining detailed software requirements especially difficult. Principal ideas/results: In this paper, we identify unique characteristics of software requirements that are specific to ML components. To this end, we collect and examine requirements from both academic and industrial sources. Contribution: To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that presents real-life, industrial patterns of requirements for ML components. Furthermore, this paper identifies key characteristics and provides a foundation for developing a taxonomy of requirements for software that learns.

Probabilistic requirements↗

NASA NTRS2008

Challenges and Demands on Automated Software Revision

In the past three decades, automated program verification has undoubtedly been one of the most successful contributions of formal methods to software development. However, when verification of a program against a logical specification discovers bugs in the program, manual manipulation of the program is needed in order to repair it. Thus, in the face of existence of numerous unverified and un- certified legacy software in virtually any organization, tools that enable engineers to automatically verify and subsequently fix existing programs are highly desirable. In addition, since requirements of software systems often evolve during the software life cycle, the issue of incomplete specification has become a customary fact in many design and development teams. Thus, automated techniques that revise existing programs according to new specifications are of great assistance to designers, developers, and maintenance engineers. As a result, incorporating program synthesis techniques where an algorithm generates a program, that is correct-by-construction, seems to be a necessity. The notion of manual program repair described above turns out to be even more complex when programs are integrated with large collections of sensors and actuators in hostile physical environments in the so-called cyber-physical systems. When such systems are safety/mission- critical (e.g., in avionics systems), it is essential that the system reacts to physical events such as faults, delays, signals, attacks, etc, so that the system specification is not violated. In fact, since it is impossible to anticipate all possible such physical events at design time, it is highly desirable to have automated techniques that revise programs with respect to newly identified physical events according to the system specification.

Bonakdarpour, Borzoo↗

NASA NTRS2018

NOS3: NASA Operational Simulator for Small Satellites

The NASA Operational Simulator for Small Satellites (NOS3) is a suite of open-source software tools to aid in areas such as software development, integration & test (I&T), mission operations/training, verification and validation (V&V), and software systems check-out. NOS3 provides a software development environment, a multi-target build system, operational interface/ground software, dynamics and environment simulations, and software-based hardware models. NOS3 has just recently been open-sourced by NASA and is available for immediate use. It enables the development of flight software (FSW) early in the project life cycle when hardware availability is limited. Small satellite development suffers from extensive lead times on many of the commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components as well as limited funding for engineering test units (ETUs). To alleviate the need to provide a hardware test-bed for each developer/tester, NOS3 hardware models are based upon characteristic data or manufacturer's data sheets for each individual component. The NOS3 hardware models' fidelity is such that FSW executes unaware that physical hardware is not present. This allows FSW binaries to be compiled for both the simulation environment and the flight computer without changing the FSW source code. For hardware models that provide data which is dependent upon the environment and spacecraft dynamics, such as a GPS receiver or magnetometer, an open-source tool from NASA GSFC (42 Spacecraft Simulator) is used to provide the necessary data. The underlying infrastructure used to transfer messages between FSW and the hardware models can also be used to monitor, intercept, and inject messages, which has proven to be beneficial for V&V of larger missions such as James Webb Space Telescope (JWST). As hardware is selected and becomes available, drivers can be added to the NOS3 environment to enable hardware-in-the-loop (HWIL) testing. When strict time synchronization is not vital, any number of combinations of hardware components and software-based models can be tested. NOS3 was actively used for FSW development and component testing of the Simulation-to-Flight 1 (STF-1) CubeSat and the Lunar IceCube CubeSat. As NOS3 matures, hardware models have been added for common small satellite components such as GPS receivers, electrical power systems and batteries, and antenna systems.

Suder, Mark↗

NASA NTRS1993

Development of a software safety process and a case study of its use

The goal of this research is to continue the development of a comprehensive approach to software safety and to evaluate the approach with a case study. The case study is a major part of the project, and it involves the analysis of a specific safety-critical system from the medical equipment domain. The particular application being used was selected because of the availability of a suitable candidate system. We consider the results to be generally applicable and in no way particularly limited by the domain. The research is concentrating on issues raised by the specification and verification phases of the software lifecycle since they are central to our previously-developed rigorous definitions of software safety. The theoretical research is based on our framework of definitions for software safety. In the area of specification, the main topics being investigated are the development of techniques for building system fault trees that correctly incorporate software issues and the development of rigorous techniques for the preparation of software safety specifications. The research results are documented. Another area of theoretical investigation is the development of verification methods tailored to the characteristics of safety requirements. Verification of the correct implementation of the safety specification is central to the goal of establishing safe software. The empirical component of this research is focusing on a case study in order to provide detailed characterizations of the issues as they appear in practice, and to provide a testbed for the evaluation of various existing and new theoretical results, tools, and techniques. The Magnetic Stereotaxis System is summarized.

Knight, John C.↗

NASA NTRS2004

From Bridges and Rockets, Lessons for Software Systems

Although differences exist between building software systems and building physical structures such as bridges and rockets, enough similarities exist that software engineers can learn lessons from failures in traditional engineering disciplines. This paper draws lessons from two well-known failures the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge in 1940 and the destruction of the space shuttle Challenger in 1986 and applies these lessons to software system development. The following specific applications are made: (1) the verification and validation of a software system should not be based on a single method, or a single style of methods; (2) the tendency to embrace the latest fad should be overcome; and (3) the introduction of software control into safety-critical systems should be done cautiously.

Holloway, C. Michael↗