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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 343 records · Page 19
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2003

Assessment and Control of Spacecraft Charging Risks on the International Space Station

Electrical interactions between the F2 region ionospheric plasma and the 160V photovoltaic (PV) electrical power system on the International Space Station (ISS) can produce floating potentials (FP) on the ISS conducting structure of greater magnitude than are usually observed on spacecraft in low-Earth orbit. Flight through the geomagnetic field also causes magnetic induction charging of ISS conducting structure. Charging processes resulting from interaction of ISS with auroral electrons may also contribute to charging albeit rarely. The magnitude and frequency of occurrence of possibly hazardous charging events depends on the ISS assembly stage (six more 160V PV arrays will be added to ISS), ISS flight configuration, ISS position (latitude and longitude), and the natural variability in the ionospheric flight environment. At present, ISS is equipped with two plasma contactors designed to control ISS FP to within 40 volts of the ambient F2 plasma. The negative-polarity grounding scheme utilized in the ISS 160V power system leads, naturally, to negative values of ISS FP. A negative ISS structural FP leads to application of electrostatic fields across the dielectrics that separate conducting structure from the ambient F2 plasma, thereby enabling dielectric breakdown and arcing. Degradation of some thermal control coatings and noise in electrical systems can result. Continued review and evaluation of the putative charging hazards, as required by the ISS Program Office, revealed that ISS charging could produce a risk of electric shock to the ISS crew during extra vehicular activity. ISS charging risks are being evaluated in ongoing ISS charging measurements and analysis campaigns. The results of ISS charging measurements are combined with a recently developed detailed model of the ISS charging process and an extensive analysis of historical ionospheric variability data, to assess ISS charging risks using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods. The PRA analysis (estimated frequency of occurrence and severity of the charging hazards) are then used to select the hazard control strategy that provides the best overall safety and mission success environment for ISS and the ISS crew. This paper presents: 1) a summary of ISS spacecraft charging analysis, measurements, observations made to date, 2) plans for future ISS spacecraft charging measurement campaigns, and 3) a detailed discussion of the PRA strategy used to assess ISS spacecraft charging risks and select charging hazard control strategies

Koontz, Steve↗
NASA NTRS1973

General aviation air traffic pattern safety analysis

A concept is described for evaluating the general aviation mid-air collision hazard in uncontrolled terminal airspace. Three-dimensional traffic pattern measurements were conducted at uncontrolled and controlled airports. Computer programs for data reduction, storage retrieval and statistical analysis have been developed. Initial general aviation air traffic pattern characteristics are presented. These preliminary results indicate that patterns are highly divergent from the expected standard pattern, and that pattern procedures observed can affect the ability of pilots to see and avoid each other.

Parker, L. C.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Assessment and Control of Spacecraft Charging Risks on the International Space Station

The International Space Station (ISS) operates in the F2 region of Earth's ionosphere, orbiting at altitudes ranging from 350 to 450 km at an inclination of 51.6 degrees. The relatively dense, cool F2 ionospheric plasma suppresses surface charging processes much of the time, and the flux of relativistic electrons is low enough to preclude deep dielectric charging processes. The most important spacecraft charging processes in the ISS orbital environment are: 1) ISS electrical power system interactions with the F2 plasma, 2) magnetic induction processes resulting from flight through the geomagnetic field and, 3) charging processes that result from interaction with auroral electrons at high latitude. Recently, the continuing review and evaluation of putative ISS charging hazards required by the ISS Program Office revealed that ISS charging could produce an electrical shock hazard to the ISS crew during extravehicular activity (EVA). ISS charging risks are being evaluated in an ongoing measurement and analysis campaign. The results of ISS charging measurements are combined with a recently developed model of ISS charging (the Plasma Interaction Model) and an exhaustive analysis of historical ionospheric variability data (ISS Ionospheric Specification) to evaluate ISS charging risks using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods. The PRA combines estimates of the frequency of occurrence and severity of the charging hazards with estimates of the reliability of various hazard controls systems, as required by NASA s safety and risk management programs, to enable design and selection of a hazard control approach that minimizes overall programmatic and personnel risk. The PRA provides a quantitative methodology for incorporating the results of the ISS charging measurement and analysis campaigns into the necessary hazard reports, EVA procedures, and ISS flight rules required for operating ISS in a safe and productive manner.

Koontz, Steve↗
NASA NTRS2012

Dust Hazard Management in the Outer Solar System

Most robotic missions to the outer solar system must grapple with the hazards posed by the dusty rings of the gas giants. Early assessments of these hazards led simply to ring avoidance due to insufficient data and high uncertainties on the dust population present in such rings. Recent approaches, principal among them the Cassini dust hazard management strategy, provide useful results from detailed modeling of spacecraft vulnerabilities and dust hazard regions, which along with the range of mission trajectories are used to to assess the risks posed by each passage through a zone of potential hazard. This paper shows the general approach used to implement the analysis for Cassini, with recommendations for future outer planet missions.

mission hazards↗
NASA NTRS1988

Debris prevention analysis for DFI/OFI/OEI (STS-26 configuration only)

The first 3 shuttle flights to use the Redesigned Solid Rocket Motors (RSRMs) will utilize Development Flight Instrumentation (DFI), as well as Operational Flight Instrumentation (OFI), and Operational Environment Instrumentation (OEI). The OFI consists of high pressure transducers used on both RSRMs to monitor the igniter and motor chamber pressure. DFI consists of assorted strain gages, temperature sensors, accelerometers, girth gages, and low level pressure transducers. The latter are installed on the left hand booster to measure post-separation aerodynamic loading. OEI consistes of temperature sensors. After Flight 3, all DFI gages are to be deleted, and only OFI and OEI will be used for subsequent flights. This report deals specifically with debris prevention and hazards concernig the STS-26 flight DFI configuration only. Continued analysis is being done that will adequately address the debris hazards associated with the STS-27 and subsequent flight DFI configurations.

Richi, Glen A.↗
NASA NTRS2016

The Orion Exploration Flight Test Post Flight Solid Particle Flight Environment Inspection and Analysis

Orbital debris in the millimeter size range can pose a hazard to current and planned spacecraft due to the high relative impact speeds in Earth orbit. Fortunately, orbital debris has a relatively short life at lower altitudes due to atmospheric effects; however, at higher altitudes orbital debris can survive much longer and has resulted in a band of high flux around 700 to 1,500 km above the surface of the Earth. While large orbital debris objects are tracked via ground based observation, little information can be gathered about small particles except by returned surfaces, which until the Orion Exploration Flight Test number one (EFT-1), has only been possible for lower altitudes (400 to 500 km). The EFT-1 crew module backshell, which used a porous, ceramic tile system with surface coatings, has been inspected post-flight for potential micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) damage. This paper describes the pre- and post-flight activities of inspection, identification and analysis of six candidate MMOD impact craters from the EFT-1 mission.

Miller, Joshua E.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Textual and Network Analysis of Title 14 CFR Part107 Waivers

Context: The management of hazards in small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) operations is not as well defined as today's commercial operations despite sUAS widespread use. FAA Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 107 waived operations' provisions, which manage hazards for higher risk operations that require approval, can offer insight to organizations establishing UAS Programs in managing their own operation hazards. Aim: We seek to understand how the Title 14 CFR Part 107 waived operations manage hazards. Method: We used the constant comparative method to identify hazard mitigation textual categories from provisions and use networks to assess the dispersion of provisions and the identified categories across issued waivers. Results: Eight mitigation categories and twenty-four sub-categories were identified. Most provisions present in waivers are mostly reused in one waiver. Conclusion: While there is a broad range of provisions to control for hazard mitigations in the Title 14 CFR Part 107 issued waivers analyzed regulations, they require case-by-case modifications.

Urban Air Mobility↗
NASA NTRS2006

Passive imaging based multi-cue hazard detection spacecraft safe landing

Accurate assessment of potentially damaging ground hazards during the spacecraft EDL (Entry, Descent and Landing) phase is crucial to insure a high probability of safe landing. A lander that encounters a large rock, falls off a cliff, or tips over on a steep slope can sustain mission ending damage. Guided entry is expected to shrink landing ellipses from 100-300 km to -10 km radius for the second generation landers as early as 2009. Regardless of size and location, however, landing ellipses will almost always contain hazards such as craters, discontinuities, steep slopes, and large rocks. It is estimated that an MSL (Mars Science Laboratory)-sized lander should detect and avoid 16- 150m diameter craters, vertical drops similar to the edges of 16m or 3.75m diameter crater, for high and low altitude HAD (Hazard Detection and Avoidance) respectively. It should also be able to detect slopes 20' or steeper, and rocks 0.75m or taller. In this paper we will present a passive imaging based, multi-cue hazard detection and avoidance (HDA) system suitable for Martian and other lander missions. This is the first passively imaged HDA system that seamlessly integrates multiple algorithm-crater detection, slope estimation, rock detection and texture analysis, and multicues- crater morphology, rock distribution, to detect these hazards in real time.

hazard detection↗
NASA NTRS1982

An assessment of the crash fire hazard of liquid hydrogen fueled aircraft

The crash fire hazards of liquid hydrogen fueled aircraft relative to those of mission equivalent aircraft fueled either with conventional fuel or with liquefied methane were evaluated. The aircraft evaluated were based on Lockheed Corporation design for 400 passenger, Mach 0.85, 5500 n. mile aircraft. Four crash scenarios were considered ranging from a minor incident causing some loss of fuel system integrity to a catastrophic crash. Major tasks included a review of hazardous properties of the alternate fuels and of historic crash fire data; a comparative hazard evluation for each of the three fuels under four crash scenarios a comprehensive review and analysis and an identification of areas further development work. The conclusion was that the crash fire hazards are not significantly different when compared in general for the three fuels, although some fuels showed minor advantages in one respect or another.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1985

Safety Evaluation Methodology for Mining Systems

Methodolgy evaluates design of proposed mining systems. Analysis tests proposed mining systems against specifications and hazards of existing similar systems, examines soundness of new design in terms of reducing or eliminating major health and safety hazards, and identifies major design weaknesses.

Zimmerman, W. F.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Developing a safe on-orbit cryogenic depot

New U.S. space initiatives will require technology to realize planned programs such as piloted lunar and Mars missions. Key to the optimal execution of such missions are high performance orbit transfer vehicles and propellant storage facilities. Large amounts of liquid hydrogen and oxygen demand a uniquely designed on-orbit cryogenic propellant depot. Because of the inherent dangers in propellant storage and handling, a comprehensive system safety program must be established. This paper shows how the myriad and complex hazards demonstrate the need for an integrated safety effort to be applied from program conception through operational use. Even though the cryogenic depot is still in the conceptual stage, many of the hazards have been identified, including fatigue due to heavy thermal loading from environmental and operating temperature extremes, micrometeoroid and/or depot ancillary equipment impact (this is an important problem due to the large surface area needed to house the large quantities of propellant), docking and maintenance hazards, and hazards associated with extended extravehicular activity. Various safety analysis techniques were presented for each program phase. Specific system safety implementation steps were also listed. Enhanced risk assessment was demonstrated through the incorporation of these methods.

Bahr, Nicholas J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Application of Objectives-Driven Assurance Cases to System Development in an Evolving Acquisition Model

System properties such as “safety” and “dependability” cannot, in practice, be proven, and must be argued in an “assurance case” aimed at supporting risk-acceptance decisions that have to be made by system acquirers and/or regulatory authorities. The paper is concerned with applications of the “assurance case” idea early in design and development of new systems, when (apart from dedicated testing) the only available operating experience information derives from previous (non-identical) systems. Much of the discussion is based on an evolving acquisition model at the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration; previously, most major systems were developed in-house, but some major systems will now be developed by and acquired from commercial providers. Key points discussed include the following. (1) By promoting a particular kind of focused discussion between acquirers and providers, the use of assurance cases should be particularly valuable under the new acquisition model. (2) In principle, objectives-driven (sometimes called “performance-based”) approaches to assurance of performance have significant advantages in cases where they are applicable. (3) For truly novel systems, completeness of the safety analysis is a significant issue; it is important for the assurance case to include a commitment by the provider (or applicant) to seriously pursue analysis of operating experience, so that previously unrecognized hazards can be identified and addressed. (4) Inquiries into major accidents often point to deficiencies in management oversight in all parts of the life cycle; management processes need to be addressed in the formulation and the implementation of an assurance case. Under the new acquisition model, these considerations imply a serious reconsideration of the way in which the development process is managed by both providers and acquirers.

Objectives-driven↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Survey of Autonomous Navigation Techniques Applicable to Lunar Surface Exploration

As humanity returns to the Moon, and more and more attention is being paid to lunar surface operations, there is a greater need than ever for methods of surface navigation. These could be methods of computer-assisted orienteering for astronauts exploring on foot during an Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA), or methods of solving the Lost-on-the-Moon problem to initialize a crewed or autonomous rover’s state estimate. It may also be necessary to process navigation data associated with surface samples or other surface operations a posteriori to better understand where that analysis occurred. Autonomous rover operation will also require Hazard Detection and Avoidance (HDA) and terrain-aware pathfinding. While navigation on the surface of the Moon will likely rely on Earth-based assets such as the Deep Space Network (DSN) or communication with other spacecraft (e.g., LunaNet, LCRNS, pre-deployed moon beacons, a nearby lander) it may be necessary to navigate in a loss-of-communication scenario. This paper analyzes the methods of surface navigation used on other celestial bodies, such as those used during the Apollo missions and autonomous exploration of Mars, as well as novel methods which have been studied but not yet implemented which may prove useful. It is shown that the navigator has myriad options when processing data from an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), a star tracker, (rover) wheel encoders, optical cameras, and LIght Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) sensors. The intention of this paper is to provide a broad overview of what has been done and what could be done, to aid those designing vehicles and/or missions to the lunar surface.

Paul D Mckee↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Survey of Autonomous Navigation Techniques Applicable to Lunar Surface Exploration

As humanity returns to the Moon, and more and more attention is being paid to lunar surface operations, there is a greater need than ever for methods of surface navigation. These could be methods of computer-assisted orienteering for astronauts exploring on foot during an Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA), or methods of solving the Lost-on-the-Moon problem to initialize a crewed or autonomous rover’s state estimate. It may also be necessary to process navigation data associated with surface samples or other surface operations a posteriori to better understand where that analysis occurred. Autonomous rover operation will also require Hazard Detection and Avoidance (HDA) and terrain-aware pathfinding. While navigation on the surface of the Moon will likely rely on Earth-based assets such as the Deep Space Network (DSN) or communication with other spacecraft (e.g., LunaNet, LCRNS, pre-deployed moon beacons, a nearby lander) it may be necessary to navigate in a loss-of-communication scenario. This paper analyzes the methods of surface navigation used on other celestial bodies, such as those used during the Apollo missions and autonomous exploration of Mars, as well as novel methods which have been studied but not yet implemented which may prove useful. It is shown that the navigator has myriad options when processing data from an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), a star tracker, (rover) wheel encoders, optical cameras, and LIght Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) sensors. The intention of this paper is to provide a broad overview of what has been done and what could be done, to aid those designing vehicles and/or missions to the lunar surface.

Paul McKee↗