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At least 343 records · Page 19

Uncertainties in Estimates of the Risks of Late Effects from Space Radiation

The health risks faced by astronauts from space radiation include cancer, cataracts, hereditary effects, and non-cancer morbidity and mortality risks related to the diseases of the old age. Methods used to project risks in low-Earth orbit are of questionable merit for exploration missions because of the limited radiobiology data and knowledge of galactic cosmic ray (GCR) heavy ions, which causes estimates of the risk of late effects to be highly uncertain. Risk projections involve a product of many biological and physical factors, each of which has a differential range of uncertainty due to lack of data and knowledge. Within the linear-additivity model, we use Monte-Carlo sampling from subjective uncertainty distributions in each factor to obtain a Maximum Likelihood estimate of the overall uncertainty in risk projections. The resulting methodology is applied to several human space exploration mission scenarios including ISS, lunar station, deep space outpost, and Mar's missions of duration of 360, 660, and 1000 days. The major results are the quantification of the uncertainties in current risk estimates, the identification of factors that dominate risk projection uncertainties, and the development of a method to quantify candidate approaches to reduce uncertainties or mitigate risks. The large uncertainties in GCR risk projections lead to probability distributions of risk that mask any potential risk reduction using the "optimization" of shielding materials or configurations. In contrast, the design of shielding optimization approaches for solar particle events and trapped protons can be made at this time, and promising technologies can be shown to have merit using our approach. The methods used also make it possible to express risk management objectives in terms of quantitative objective's, i.e., the number of days in space without exceeding a given risk level within well defined confidence limits.

Cucinotta, F. A.↗

The Air Quality Monitor “Benzene” Anomaly: Ground Testing and On-going Effects

The International Space Station (ISS) Air Quality Monitors (AQMs) have provided targeted in-flight analysis of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the ISS atmosphere since early 2013. During their initial half decade of use covering multiple sets of units, the AQMs performed well, meeting their validation criteria and showing excellent accuracy compared to archival samples. In addition to routine environmental monitoring, the AQMs have also been used during a number of contingency situations and investigations related to Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS). These include a potential ammonia leak, increases in atmospheric ethanol, and efforts to locate potential sources of polydimethylsiloxanes that lead to the production of dimethylsilanediol (DMSD) in the US Water Processor Assembly (WPA). As the fleet of AQMs has aged, several issues have arisen. These have ranged from pervasive problems on electronics boards to loss of sensitivity due to operating in an elevated CO2 environment. The most notable issue encountered during on-orbit operations was incorrect identification of compounds. This initially occurred in mid-2020, when AQM1 reported the presence of benzene. While the AQM team questioned the validity of these results, the concentration of the “benzene” continued to increase and eventually exceeded the 30- and 180-day Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentration (SMAC). This led to wide-ranging efforts by a number of groups aimed at understanding the situation and identifying the source of the “benzene.” AQM1 failed after being relocated to the Russian Segment as part of the investigation, and the unit was returned for evaluation. When archive samples collected while the AQM was measuring elevated benzene showed no detectable benzene, the focus of the investigation shifted to determining the cause of the false positive readings. Here, we will discuss the results of this investigation by the AQM team, potential causes of the interference, and subsequent reporting of AQM1 results.

W T Wallace↗

The Air Quality Monitor “Benzene” Anomaly: Ground Testing and On-going Effects

The International Space Station (ISS) Air Quality Monitors (AQMs) have provided targeted in-flight analysis of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the ISS atmosphere since early 2013. During their initial half decade of use covering multiple sets of units, the AQMs performed well, meeting their validation criteria and showing excellent accuracy compared to archival samples. In addition to routine environmental monitoring, the AQMs have also been used during a number of contingency situations and investigations related to Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS). These include a potential ammonia leak, increases in atmospheric ethanol, and efforts to locate potential sources of polydimethylsiloxanes that lead to the production of dimethylsilanediol (DMSD) in the US Water Processor Assembly (WPA). As the fleet of AQMs has aged, several issues have arisen. These have ranged from pervasive problems on electronics boards to loss of sensitivity due to operating in an elevated CO2 environment. The most notable issue encountered during on-orbit operations was incorrect identification of compounds. This initially occurred in mid-2020, when AQM1 reported the presence of benzene. While the AQM team questioned the validity of these results, the concentration of the “benzene” continued to increase and eventually exceeded the 30- and 180-day Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentration (SMAC). This led to wide-ranging efforts by a number of groups aimed at understanding the situation and identifying the source of the “benzene.” AQM1 failed after being relocated to the Russian Segment as part of the investigation, and the unit was returned for evaluation. When archive samples collected while the AQM was measuring elevated benzene showed no detectable benzene, the focus of the investigation shifted to determining the cause of the false positive readings. Here, we will discuss the results of this investigation by the AQM team, potential causes of the interference, and subsequent reporting of AQM1 results.

W T Wallace↗

The Air Quality Monitor “Benzene” Anomaly: Ground Testing and On-going Effects

The International Space Station (ISS) Air Quality Monitors (AQMs) have provided targeted in-flight analysis of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the ISS atmosphere since early 2013. During their initial half decade of use covering multiple sets of units, the AQMs performed well, meeting their validation criteria and showing excellent accuracy compared to archival samples. In addition to routine environmental monitoring, the AQMs have also been used during a number of contingency situations and investigations related to Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS). These include a potential ammonia leak, increases in atmospheric ethanol, and efforts to locate potential sources of polydimethylsiloxanes that lead to the production of dimethylsilanediol (DMSD) in the US Water Processor Assembly (WPA). As the fleet of AQMs has aged, several issues have arisen. These have ranged from pervasive problems on electronics boards to loss of sensitivity due to operating in an elevated CO2 environment. The most notable issue encountered during on-orbit operations was incorrect identification of compounds. This initially occurred in mid-2020, when AQM1 reported the presence of benzene. While the AQM team questioned the validity of these results, the concentration of the “benzene” continued to increase and eventually exceeded the 30- and 180-day Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentration (SMAC). This led to wide-ranging efforts by a number of groups aimed at understanding the situation and identifying the source of the “benzene.” AQM1 failed after being relocated to the Russian Segment as part of the investigation, and the unit was returned for evaluation. When archive samples collected while the AQM was measuring elevated benzene showed no detectable benzene, the focus of the investigation shifted to determining the cause of the false positive readings. Here, we will discuss the results of this investigation by the AQM team, potential causes of the interference, and subsequent reporting of AQM1 results.

William T Wallace↗

Searches for low-energy counterparts of gamma-ray bursters

The results of six studies concerning the identification of low-energy counterparts of gamma-ray bursters (GRBs) are reported. From these results, it is concluded that the near-infrared observations of GRBs from IRAS pose serious difficulties for several GRB models. No precedent or plausible explanation is found for the optical flash detected on February 8, 1984 by Pedersen et al. (1984) other than that the flash originated on a GRB. The star in the middle of the 1944 optical transient error box has an ultraviolet excess which is significant at the 95 percent confidence level, a result which strongly suggests that the object is indeed the quiescent GRB optical counterpart. If true, then GRBs are probably low-mass contact binaries caused by thermonuclear or accretion instabilities at distances of roughly 1 kpc.

Schaefer, B. E.↗

International Space Station Crew Restraint Design

With permanent human presence onboard the International Space Station (ISS), crews will be living and working in microgravity, dealing with the challenges of a weightless environment. In addition, the confined nature of the spacecraft environment results in ergonomic challenges such as limited visibility and access to the activity areas, as well as prolonged periods of unnatural postures. Without optimum restraints, crewmembers may be handicapped for performing some of the on-orbit tasks. Currently, many of the tasks on ISS are performed with the crew restrained merely by hooking their arms or toes around handrails to steady themselves. This is adequate for some tasks, but not all. There have been some reports of discomfort/calluses on the top of the toes. In addition, this type of restraint is simply insufficient for tasks that require a large degree of stability. Glovebox design is a good example of a confined workstation concept requiring stability for successful use. They are widely used in industry, university, and government laboratories, as well as in the space environment, and are known to cause postural limitations and visual restrictions. Although there are numerous guidelines pertaining to ventilation, seals, and glove attachment, most of the data have been gathered in a 1-g environment, or are from studies that were conducted prior to the early 1980 s. Little is known about how best to restrain a crewmember using a glovebox in microgravity. In 2004, The Usability Testing and Analysis Facility (UTAF) at the NASA Johnson Space Center completed development/evaluation of several design concepts for crew restraints to meet the various needs outlined above. Restraints were designed for general purpose use, for teleoperation (Robonaut) and for use with the Life Sciences Glovebox. All design efforts followed a human factors engineering design lifecycle, beginning with identification of requirements followed by an iterative prototype/test cycle. Anthropometric modeling was completed for the 5th percentile Asian female and the 95th percentile American male for all restraints. A series of three evaluations was performed onboard NASA's reduced gravity aircraft (KC-135). For all evaluations, participants performed representative tasks while being videotaped, and then completed a questionnaire following each flight day. The questionnaire included ratings scales and free format questions to assess topics such as comfort, stability provided, flexibility provided, etc. Results from the three flight evaluations are being used to develop the human factors design requirements for crew restraint concepts for 1) general purpose restraints, 2) teleoperation restraints and 3) glovebox restraints. The poster presentation will describe the detailed methodology used, results from each of the three evaluations, and the resulting human factors recommendations for the design of these restraints.

Whitmore, M.↗

Analysis of Bioburden Associated with Nonmetallic Spacecraft Materials

Planetary Protection (PP) requirements help to ensure the integrity of life-detection science conducted on solar system bodies, particularly those with liquid water. Such requirements are often met by a combination of cleaning and verification steps to reduce microbial contamination (i.e. bioburden) to an acceptable limit. There are only two cleaning methods approved by the National and Space Administration (NASA), vapor hydrogen peroxide (VHP) and heat microbial reduction (HMR), the latter of which is the most commonly employed. However, HMR can be harsh and produce its own concerns about material integrity, like aging or increasing hardness. When bioburden reduction methods cannot be employed, the project must rely on assumed NASA specification values of bioburden which can cause compliance issues with strict PP bioburden limitations. This work aimed to more accurately define the risk of contamination of a target body by providing empirical data associated with raw materials commonly used in solid rocket motors for lander missions. In this study, we pulverized nonmetallic materials using a cryogenic grinder, then analyzed the resulting substrate for microbial colony forming units (CFU). We found that many nonmetallic materials do not harbor large bioburden when compared with the NASA specification values, though a range existed depending on the material, treatment, and handling. The results from this work provide quantitative data to help reduce concerns of contamination, while also providing a foundation for follow up studies into additional sterilization methods and molecular identification of contaminating microbes.

Planetary Protection↗

Fatigue Crack and Porosity Measurement in Composite Materials by Thermographic and Ultrasonic Methods

Many nondestructive methods exist for the detection of localized material anomalies in an otherwise good composite structure. The problem arises when the material system as a whole has degraded during service or was improperly manufactured. Porosity and intra-ply microcracking are two such conditions that in unlined composite pressure vessels can be very troublesome to detect and when linked through the thickness can be critical to mission success. These leak paths may lead to loss of pressure/propellant, increased risk of explosion and possible cryo-pumping. Research sought nondestructive methods for quantifying porosity and microcracking in composite tankage. Both thermographic and resonance ultrasound methods have been utilized with artificial neural network and statistical approaches to analyze the data. Resonant ultrasound spectroscopy provides measurements, which are sensitive to fine details in the materials character, such as micro-cracking and porosity. Here, the higher frequency (shorter wavelength) components of the signal train provide more significant interaction with the defects causing the spectral characteristics to shift toward lower amplitudes at the higher frequencies. As the density of the defects increases more interactions occur and more drastic amplitude changes are observed. From a thermal perspective, the higher the defect density the lower the through thickness thermal diffusivity will be. Utilizing a point heat source, and thermographically recording the heat profile with time, diffusivity calculations can be made which in turn can be related to the relative quality of the material. Preliminary experiments to verify the measurable effect on the resonance spectrum of the ultrasonic data to detect microcracking and for porosity detection thermographically are presented. Methods involving supervised and unsupervised artificial neural networks as well as other clustering algorithms are developed for signal identification.

Walker, James L.↗

Method and Apparatus for Measuring Fluid Flow

The invention is a method and apparatus for monitoring the presence, concentration, and the movement of fluids. It is based on utilizing electromagnetic measurements of the complex permittivity of the fluids for detecting and monitoring the fluid. More particularly the apparatus uses one or more microwave probes which are placed at the locations where the measurements are to be made. A radio frequency signal is transmitted to the probe and the reflected signal is phase and amplitude detected at a rapid rate for the purpose of identifying the fluids, based on their dielectric constant at the probe. The apparatus can be used for multiple purposes including measures of flow rates, turbulence, dispersion, fluid identification, and changes in flow conditions of multiple fluids or multiple states of a single fluid in a flowline or a holding container. The apparatus includes a probe consisting of two electrical conductors separated by an insulator. A radio frequency signal is communicated to the probe and is reflected back from the portion of the probe exposed to the fluid. The radio frequency signal also provides a reference signal. An oscillator generates a second signal which combined with each of the reference signal and the reflected signal to produce signals of lower frequencies to facilitate filtering and amplifying those signals. The two signals are then mixed in a detector to produce an output signal that is representative of the phase and amplitude change caused by the reflection of the signal at the probe exposed to the fluid. The detector may be a dual phase detector that provides two such output signals that are in phase quadrature. A phase shifter may be provided for selectively changing the phase of the reference signal to improve the sensitivity of at least one of the output signals for more accurate readings and/or for calibration purposes. The two outputs that are in quadrature with respect to each other may be simultaneously monitored to account for drift errors. The output signals are digitized and provided to a computer at a sample rate which may be very high. The computer is operable to identify the fluid based on its complex permittivity as may be useful for identifying the flow rates, determining the fluid mixture ratio, detecting impurities in the fluid, and so forth. Novelty is believed to reside in the use of the real part of complex permittivity to measure small difference in permittivity of the fluid.

Arndt, G. Dickey↗

Development and Analysis of a Thick Cloud Layers Database for Lightning Launch Commit Criteria Improvement

Lightning can pose a potential threat to space launch vehicles. In response to this, rules were created called the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC) that help weather personnel evaluate the potential for natural and rocket-triggered lightning. One of the ten LLCC with the least research is called the Thick Cloud Layers rule. To further understand electrification of thick cloud layers and potentially improve the Thick Cloud Layers rule, a database of thick cloud layers that occurred over the Eastern Range was created. This database is then used to create an algorithm for identifying and differentiating thick cloud layers from other cloud types based on radar characteristics, temperature levels in reference to cloud height, and the surface electric field. By analyzing and identifying thick cloud events, this project could help narrow down when thick clouds are occurring and potentially minimize unnecessary launch delays. Events that caused LLCC violations involving the Thick Cloud Layers rule were analyzed by hand using Level-2 NEXRAD radar data from the National Weather Service WSR-88D radar in Melbourne with the program GR2Analyst. Cases that were found to be isolated and not involved with convection were recorded (date, start/end time, location) in a database. Radar data associated with these cases was collected and gridded using Python radar packages. Once gridded, I calculated and recorded for each radar scan the following radar reflectivity driven parameters within an 11x11 km bin centered on each 1 square km grid point: the mean reflectivity colder than 0 degrees Celsius, Maximum Radar Reflectivity (MRR) colder than 0 degrees Celsius, Volume Averaged Height Integrated Radar Reflectivity (VAHIRR), Hydrometeor Identification (HID), the difference between the maximum and mean reflectivity, the cloud depth colder than 0 degrees Celsius, the overall cloud depth, the cloud top, and the cloud bottom. Soundings for each event were used to determine cloud temperature levels, and where the cloud is in relation to the freezing level. Electric field mill data collected over the Eastern Range was used to determine surface electric fields below each cloud. All parameters were analyzed in depth for several thick cloud cases to gain an understanding of typical thick cloud characteristics. Cases of thick clouds and other isolated cloud types were also recorded for training purposes to see if enough differences exist between cloud types to differentiate them with an algorithm. Each case along with its corresponding characteristics was recorded in a database, and this database was used to compare differing cloud types, as well as train the algorithm to detect thick clouds.

Lightning↗

Identification of Noise Sources During Rocket Engine Test Firings and a Rocket Launch Using a Microphone Phased-Array

A 70 microphone, 10-foot by 10-foot, microphone phased array was built for use in the harsh environment of rocket launches. The array was setup at NASA Wallops launch pad 0A during a static test firing of Orbital Sciences' Antares engines, and again during the first launch of the Antares vehicle. It was placed 400 feet away from the pad, and was hoisted on a scissor lift 40 feet above ground. The data sets provided unprecedented insight into rocket noise sources. The duct exit was found to be the primary source during the static test firing; the large amount of water injected beneath the nozzle exit and inside the plume duct quenched all other sources. The maps of the noise sources during launch were found to be time-dependent. As the engines came to full power and became louder, the primary source switched from the duct inlet to the duct exit. Further elevation of the vehicle caused spilling of the hot plume, resulting in a distributed noise map covering most of the pad. As the entire plume emerged from the duct, and the ondeck water system came to full power, the plume itself became the loudest noise source. These maps of the noise sources provide vital insight for optimization of sound suppression systems for future Antares launches.

acoustics↗

STS-51 pad abort. OV103-engine 2033 (ME-2) fuel flowmeter sensor open circuit

The STS-51 initial launch attempt of Discovery (OV-103) was terminated on KSC launch pad 39B on 12 Aug. 1993 at 9:12 AM E.S.T. due to a sensor redundancy failure in the liquid hydrogen system of ME-2 (Engine 2033). The event description and time line are summarized. Propellant loading was initiated on 12 Aug. 1993 at 12:00 AM EST. All space shuttle main engine (SSME) chill parameters and Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) were nominal. At engine start plus 1.34 seconds a Failure Identification (FID) was posted against Engine 2033 for exceeding the 1800 spin intra-channel (A1-A2) Fuel Flowrate sensor channel qualification limit. The engine was shut down at 1.50 seconds followed by Engines 2032 and 2030. All shut down sequences were nominal and the mission was safely aborted. SSME Avionics hardware and software performed nominally during the incident. A review of vehicle data table (VDT) data and controller software logic revealed no failure indications other than the single FID 111-101, Fuel Flowrate Intra-Channel Test Channel A disqualification. Software logic was executed according to requirements and there was no anomalous controller software operation. Immediately following the abort, a Rocketdyne/NASA failure investigation team was assembled. The team successfully isolated the failure cause to an open circuit in a Fuel Flowrate Sensor. This type of failure has occurred eight previous times in ground testing. The sensor had performed acceptably on three previous flights of the engine and SSME flight history shows 684 combined fuel flow rate sensor channel flights without failure. The disqualification of an Engine 2 (SSME No. 2033) Fuel Flowrate sensor channel was a result of an instrumentation failure and not engine performance. All other engine operations were nominal. This disqualification resulted in an engine shutdown and safe sequential shutdown of all three engines prior to ignition of the solid boosters.

Source record↗

Alternating Twist Along an Erupting Prominence

Triangulation measurements using observations from the two Solar Terrestrial Relations Observatory (STEREO) spacecraft, combined with observations from the Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO), are used to characterize the behavior of a prominence involved in two successive coronal mass ejections 6-7 December 2010. The STEREO separation at the time was 171.6 degrees, which was functionally equivalent to a separation of 8.4 degrees, and thus very favorable for feature co-identification above the limb. The first eruption at approximately 14:16 UT (Universal Time) on 6 December of the middle branch of the prominence starts off a series of magnetic reconfigurations in the right branch, which itself erupts at approximately 2:06 UT the next day, about 12 hours after the first eruption. The cool prominence material seen at 304 angstroms drains back down to the surface, but a flux-rope-like magnetic structure is seen to erupt in both 195 angstroms by the STEREO/Extreme Ultraviolet Imager (EUVI), and in white light by the STEREO/COR1 (Coronagraph 1) inner coronagraph. In between the two eruptions, two different signs of helicity are seen in the measured twist of the right branch. This is interpreted to be caused by the overall prominence channel being composed of different segments with alternating helicity signs. The erupting parts on 6 and 7 December both show positive twist, but negative twist is seen in between these positive sections. Negative twist is consistent with the dextral chirality signs seen in the He II line at 304 angstroms prior to both eruptions. However, during the period between the eruptions, a region of positive twist grows and replaces the region of negative twist, and finally erupts. We interpret these observations in the light of models that predict that helicity cancellation can be an important factor in the triggering of flares and coronal mass ejections.

Prominences↗

A Holistic Approach for Risk Management During Design

In this paper, an approach for the identification, assessment, mitigation and continuous management of risks during the process of designing a space mission is presented. This approach has been developed by observing the risk patterns that occur at the Project Design Center of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (TeamX) which develops conceptual, concurrent design of Space Missions. TeamX develops an end-to-end conceptual design of a Space Mission in a matter of one or two weeks. As the risk chair in TeamX, the author has had the opportunity to observe the risk patterns that occur during design over the course of many design sessions. This paper introduces an abstraction and generalization of those patterns. Risk is defined as anything that can go wrong, along with its approximate likelihood and consequence. The indicators, and causes, and effects of these risks are cross cutting across the multiple levels of people and processes involved in the design, and the actual design product itself.

reliability analysis↗

Identification of Gravity-Related Effects on Crystal Growth From Melts With an Immiscibility Gap

This work involves an experimental-numerical approach to study the effects of natural and Marangoni convections on solidification of single crystals from a silicate melt with a liquid-liquid immiscibility gap. Industrial use of crystals grown from silicate melts is becoming increasingly important in electronic, optical, and high temperature structural applications. Even the simplest silicate systems like Al203-SiO2 have had, and will continue to have, a significant role in the development of traditional and advanced ceramics. A unique feature of crystals grown from the silicate systems is their outstanding linear electro-optic properties. They also exhibit exceptionally high optical rotativity. As a result, these crystals are attractive materials for dielectric, optical, and microwave applications. Experimental work in our laboratory has indicated that directional solidification of a single crystal mullite appears to be preceded by liquid-liquid phase separation in the melt. Disruption of the immiscible state results in crystallization of a two phase structure. There is also evidence that mixing in the melt caused by density-driven convection can significantly affect the stability of the immiscible liquid layers and result in poly-crystalline growth. On earth, the immiscible state has only been observed for small diameter crystals grown in float zone systems where natural convection is almost negligible. Therefore, it is anticipated that growth of large single crystals from silicate melts would benefit from microgravity conditions because of the reduction of the natural convective mixing. The main objective of this research is to determine the effects of transport processes on the phase separation in the melt during growth of a single crystal while addressing the following issues: (1) When do the immiscible layers form and are they real?; (2) What are the main physical characteristics of the immiscible liquids?; and (3) How mixing by natural or Marangoni convection affects the stability of the phase separated melt.

Kassemi, M.↗

STS-55 pad abort: Engine 2011 oxidizer preburner augmented spark igniter check valve leak

The STS-55 initial launch attempt of Columbia (OV102) was terminated on KSC launch pad A March 22, 1993 at 9:51 AM E.S.T. due to violation of an ME-3 (Engine 2011) Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) limit exceedance. The event description and timeline are summarized. Propellant loading was initiated on 22 March, 1993 at 1:15 AM EST. All SSME chill parameters and launch commit criteria (LCC) were nominal. At engine start plus 1.44 seconds, a Failure Identification (FID) was posted against Engine 2011 for exceeding the 50 psia Oxidizer Preburner (OPB) purge pressure redline. The engine was shut down at 1.50 seconds followed by Engines 2034 and 2030. All shut down sequences were nominal and the mission was safely aborted. The OPB purge pressure redline violation and the abort profile/overlay for all three engines are depicted. SSME Avionics hardware and software performed nominally during the incident. A review of vehicle data table (VDT) data and controller software logic revealed no failure indications other than the single FID 013-414, OPB purge pressure redline exceeded. Software logic was executed according to requirements and there was no anomalous controller software operation. Immediately following the abort, a Rocketdyne/NASA failure investigation team was assembled. The team successfully isolated the failure cause to the oxidizer preburner augmented spark igniter purge check valve not being fully closed due to contamination. The source of the contaminant was traced to a cut segment from a rubber O-ring which was used in a fine clean tool during valve production prior to 1992. The valve was apparently contaminated during its fabrication in 1985. The valve had performed acceptably on four previous flights of the engine, and SSME flight history shows 780 combined check valve flights without failure. The failure of an Engine 3 (SSME No. 2011) check valve to close was sensed by onboard engine instruments even though all other engine operations were normal. This resulted in an engine shutdown and safe sequential shutdown of all three engines prior to ignition of the solid boosters.

Source record↗

Big Bend Ecological Forecasting: Integrating Earth Observations Into Invasive Species Management Decisions in Big Bend National Park in Texas

Located in Brewster County Texas, U.S., along the Texas-Mexico border, Big Bend National Park is 3,243 square kilometers of desert, mountains, and rivers. NASA’s MSFC Spring 2024 DEVELOP Team partnered with the National Park Service (NPS), to address the environmental concern of perineal invasive grasses in Big Bend National Park. Buffelgrass (Cenchrus ciliaris), introduced to the park in the 1940’s, poses an ongoing threat, and causes habitat destruction for many of the park’s native ecosystems. Buffelgrass amplifies fire risk in the park, aids in the destruction of historic structures, and alters stream channels. To address the rising concern of Buffelgrass presence, unique advanced spatial technique applications were necessary to construct a habitat suitability model and perform a comprehensive fire risk assessment. A habitat suitability model was developed considering climate, vegetation, and phenological variables, in addition to physical and topographical variables. Subsequently, a fire risk model was developed, taking into account fire history data, accessibility factors, climate trends and predictions, along with developed areas. Multi-Source Land Surface Phenology (LSP) Sentinel-2 and Landsat 8 Operational Land Imager (OLI) imagery were used to predict Buffelgrass hotspot locations throughout the park. These analyses allowed the identification of optimal Buffelgrass habitat and hotspot locations, as well as park zones that reflect the greatest risk for future Buffelgrass invasion and fire risk. The collective results of the habitat suitability model, fire risk assessment, and Buffelgrass hot spot identification will allow the NPS to facilitate efficient mitigation measures and management strategies, and improved resource allocation where it’s most needed.

remote sensing↗

Ares I-X Ground Diagnostic Prototype

Automating prelaunch diagnostics for launch vehicles offers three potential benefits. First, it potentially improves safety by detecting faults that might otherwise have been missed so that they can be corrected before launch. Second, it potentially reduces launch delays by more quickly diagnosing the cause of anomalies that occur during prelaunch processing. Reducing launch delays will be critical to the success of NASA's planned future missions that require in-orbit rendezvous. Third, it potentially reduces costs by reducing both launch delays and the number of people needed to monitor the prelaunch process. NASA is currently developing the Ares I launch vehicle to bring the Orion capsule and its crew of four astronauts to low-earth orbit on their way to the moon. Ares I-X will be the first unmanned test flight of Ares I. It is scheduled to launch on October 27, 2009. The Ares I-X Ground Diagnostic Prototype is a prototype ground diagnostic system that will provide anomaly detection, fault detection, fault isolation, and diagnostics for the Ares I-X first-stage thrust vector control (TVC) and for the associated ground hydraulics while it is in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) at John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and on the launch pad. It will serve as a prototype for a future operational ground diagnostic system for Ares I. The prototype combines three existing diagnostic tools. The first tool, TEAMS (Testability Engineering and Maintenance System), is a model-based tool that is commercially produced by Qualtech Systems, Inc. It uses a qualitative model of failure propagation to perform fault isolation and diagnostics. We adapted an existing TEAMS model of the TVC to use for diagnostics and developed a TEAMS model of the ground hydraulics. The second tool, Spacecraft Health Inference Engine (SHINE), is a rule-based expert system developed at the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory. We developed SHINE rules for fault detection and mode identification. The prototype uses the outputs of SHINE as inputs to TEAMS. The third tool, the Inductive Monitoring System (IMS), is an anomaly detection tool developed at NASA Ames Research Center and is currently used to monitor the International Space Station Control Moment Gyroscopes. IMS automatically "learns" a model of historical nominal data in the form of a set of clusters and signals an alarm when new data fails to match this model. IMS offers the potential to detect faults that have not been modeled. The three tools have been integrated and deployed to Hangar AE at KSC where they interface with live data from the Ares I-X vehicle and from the ground hydraulics. The outputs of the tools are displayed on a console in Hangar AE, one of the locations from which the Ares I-X launch will be monitored. The full paper will describe how the prototype performed before the launch. It will include an analysis of the prototype's accuracy, including false-positive rates, false-negative rates, and receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves. It will also include a description of the prototype's computational requirements, including CPU usage, main memory usage, and disk usage. If the prototype detects any faults during the prelaunch period then the paper will include a description of those faults. Similarly, if the prototype has any false alarms then the paper will describe them and will attempt to explain their causes.

Schwabacher, Mark↗