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At least 343 records · Page 19

Surveillance Report on SAVY-4000 and Hagan Nuclear Material Storage Containers for FY 2017

In accordance with the SAVY-4000 Surveillance Plan [1] and DOE M441.1-1 requirements, storage container surveillance continued through fiscal year 2017 at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Surveillance items for the year consisted of 8 SAVY-4000 storage containers, 8 Hagan containers, and 39 SAVY-4000 transfer containers. The SAVY-4000 surveillance items ranged in age from 1 year to 5.6 years and the Hagan containers ranged in age from 6.3 years to 17.6 years. The surveillance containers for this year were selected primarily to better understand the extent of corrosion of the stainless steel components of the containers. Accelerated aging studies indicate that the O-ring and filter components of the SAVY-4000 will last at least 40 years under LANL storage conditions. However, the observation of corrosion on the inside of SAVY-4000 and Hagan surveillance containers has shifted the emphasis to understanding both the nature and the extent of corrosion on the stainless steel body. The restriction on handling soluble residues greater than 500 grams continued this year, delaying the surveillance of some items that was scheduled in earlier surveillance plans.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Gas composition observed by destructive examination of 3013 containers

The Department of Energy’s Integrated Surveillance and Monitoring Program implements requirements to measure gas pressure and gas composition during destructive examination of 3013 containers as required by DOE’s 3013 Standard. Gas pressures and gas compositions measured by the Program during destructive examination of 3013 containers from 2007 to 2017 are reported here. The maximum gas pressure within the population of containers that have undergone destructive examination was 299 kPa (43.4 psia) and this container had 0.52 wt% moisture which is higher than the Standard allows. The majority of containers have essentially no gas pressurization. Hydrogen was quantifiable above the measurement uncertainty in less than half (47 out of 114) of the containers that have undergone destructive examination. The amount of hydrogen that is generated within the sealed 3013 containers is always less than the amount predicted by the 3013 Standard’s pressure equation with the maximum observed hydrogen fraction (observed moles of hydrogen/predicted moles of hydrogen) of 0.18. It is recommended that for the purposes of calculating a maximum hydrogen pressure using the 3013 equation, a correction to the amount of hydrogen produced from decomposition of the water be incorporated. The pressure (or moles) of H 2 should be reduced by multiplying by a hydrogen fraction as described in the text. Helium and nitrogen are the other major constituents. Oxygen which is initially present in nearly all of the containers undergoing destructive examination was consumed to low values in all cases. The highest observed oxygen concentration was 1.7%, and in this case the H 2 concentration was essentially zero. Other minor gases observed in some cases included CO 2 with maximum content of 3.5%, CO with maximum content of 0.8%, N 2 O with maximum content of 1.4%, and CH 4 with maximum content of 0.4%.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Simulations of Pipe Overpack Container Compaction at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is an operating geologic repository in southeastern New Mexico for transuranic (TRU) waste from nuclear defense activities. Past nuclear criticality concerns have generally been low at the WIPP due to the low initial concentration of fissile material and the natural tendency of fissile solute to disperse during fluid transport in porous media (Rechard et al. 2000). On the other hand, the list of acceptable WIPP waste types has expanded over the years to include Criticality Control Overpack (CCO) containers and Pipe Overpack (POP) containers. Containers bound for WIPP are bundled together in hexagon shaped 7-packs (six containers surround one container in the center). Two 7-packs are often combined into a TRUPACT-II package for a total of 14 containers. Most TRUPACT-II packages are restricted to a maximum fissile mass equivalent to plutonium (FMEP) between 0.1 and 0.38 kg, but a CCO TRUPACT-II package and a POP TRUPACT-II package are respectively permitted to have 5.32 kg and 2.80 kg FMEP (see Section 3 of US DOE (2013)). Consequently, CCO container criticality after emplacement at the WIPP was evaluated in Saylor and Scaglione (2018), and Oak Ridge National Laboratories is currently at work on POP container criticality analyses.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

SMR Containment Cable and Electrical Penetration Assembly System

GAIN Project CRADA Number NFE-21-08839, entitled “SMR Containment Cable and EPA System” was initiated by the partnership of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Engineered Solutions Group (ESG) to test an ESG-designed Electrical Penetration Assembly and Containment Cabling System Qualified for not only SMR technologies, but also Advanced Reactors design. An Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA) is a component used to allow electrical power and signal conductors as well as optical fiber through the nuclear reactor’s containment structure while maintaining a pressure barrier. The EPA ensures the containment's integrity both during the normal operation and also accident conditions by providing a sealed passage for power and signals. This project was undertaken to fill the equipment gap of EPA and Cabling Systems that require much more severe environmental requirements than legacy plant applications present due to their smaller containment volumes that result in high energy densities compared to legacy designs. This high energy density results in severe accident environments and also more severe normal operating conditions.This document describes cost effective approaches to qualify a unique EPA for Small Modular Reactor (SMR) technologies as legacy LWR EPA technologies will likely have inherent material performance insufficiencies. The DBA profiles for SMRs (and some Advanced Reactor Technologies) are more severe than the legacy qualification requirements making the design of the qualification testing system challenging as the temperatures and pressures can approach the limits permitted by ASME Pressure Vessel Code, as well as accident temperatures exceeding the capability of polymeric gaskets and dielectrics. Small Modular Reactors are designed to have, as the name suggests, modularity which implies sized for factory fabrication and subsequent assembly at the power plant site. SMR containment is much smaller than a legacy Light Water Reactor containment. The containment walls are likely to be comprised of stainless steel. Qualifying Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPAs) through these steel vessels are of interest in this work. Methods are presented here that discuss critical safety and cost effectiveness for these SMR EPA’s test systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Complex-wide representation of material packaged in 3013 containers

The DOE sites packaging plutonium oxide materials packaged according to Department of Energy 3013 Standard (DOE-STD-3013) are responsible for ensuring that the materials are represented by one or more samples in the Materials Identification and Surveillance (MIS) program. The sites categorized most of the materials into process groups, and the remaining materials were characterized, based on the prompt gamma analysis results. The sites issued documents to identify the relationships between the materials packaged in 3013 containers and representative materials in the MIS program. These “Represented” documents were then reviewed and concurred with by the MIS Working Group. However, these documents were developed uniquely at each site and were issued before completion of sample characterization, small-scale experiments, and prompt gamma analysis, which provided more detailed information about the chemical impurities and the behavior of the material in storage. Therefore, based on the most recent data, relationships between the materials packaged in 3013 containers and representative materials in the MIS program been revised. With the prompt gamma analysis completed for Hanford, Rocky Flats, and Savannah River Site 3013 containers, MIS items have been assigned to the 3013 containers for which representation is based on the prompt gamma analysis results. With the revised relationships and the prompt gamma analysis results, a Master “Represented” table has been compiled to document the linkages between each 3013 container packaged to date and its representative MIS items. This table provides an important link between the Integrated Surveillance Program database, which contains information about each 3013 container to the MIS items database, which contains the characterization, prompt gamma data, and storage behavior data from shelf-life experiments for the representative MIS items.

Narlesky, Joshua E.↗

NEA Multi-Chamber Sample Return Container with Hermetic Sealing

A sample return container is being developed by Honeybee Robotics to receive samples from a derivative of the Champollion/ST4 Sample Acquisition and Transfer Mechanism or other samplers such as the 'Touch and Go' Surface Sampler (TGSS), and then hermetically seal the samples for a sample return mission. The container is enclosed in a phase change material (PCM) chamber to prevent phase change during return and re-entry to earth. This container is designed to operate passively with no motors and actuators. Using the rotation axis of the TGSS sampler for interfacing, transferring and sealing samples, the container consumes no electrical power and therefore minimizes sample temperature change. The circular container houses multiple isolated canisters, which will be sealed individually for samples acquired from different sites or depths. The TGSS based sampler indexes each canister to the sample transfer position, below the index interface for sample transfer. After sample transfer is completed, the sampler indexes a seal carrier, which lines up seals with the openings of the canisters. The sampler moves to the sealing interface and seals the sample canisters one by one. The sealing interface can be designed to work with C-seals, knife edge seals and cup seals. This sample return container is being developed by Honeybee Robotics in collaboration with the JPL Exploration Technology program. A breadboard system of the sample return container has been recently completed and tested. Additional information is contained in the original extended abstract.

Rafeek, Shaheed↗

Separation and Sealing of a Sample Container Using Brazing

A special double-wall container and a process for utilizing the container are being developed to enable (1) acquisition of a sample of material in a dirty environment that may include a biological and/or chemical hazard; (2) sealing a lid onto the inner part of the container to hermetically enclose the sample; (3) separating the resulting hermetic container from the dirty environment; and (4) bringing that hermetic container, without any biological or chemical contamination of its outer surface, into a clean environment. The process is denoted S(exp 3)B (separation, seaming, and sealing using brazing) because sealing of the sample into the hermetic container, separating the container from the dirty environment, and bringing the container with a clean outer surface into the clean environment are all accomplished simultaneously with a brazing operation.

Bar-Cohen, Yoseph↗

The Containment Assurance Risk Framework of the Mars Sample Return Program

The Mars Sample Return campaign aims at bringing rock and atmospheric samples from Mars to Earth through a series of robotic missions. These missions would collect the samples being cached and deposited on Martian soil by the Perseverance rover, place them in a container, and launch them into Martian orbit for subsequent capture by an orbiter that would bring them back. Given there exists a non-zero probability that the samples contain biological material, precautions are being taken to design systems that would break the chain of contact between Mars and Earth. These include techniques such as sterilization of Martian particles, redundant containment vessels, and a robust reentry capsule capable of accurate landings without a parachute. Requirements exist that the probability of containment not assured of Martian-contaminated material into Earth’s biosphere be less than one in a million. To demonstrate compliance with this strict requirement, a statistical framework was developed to assess the likelihood of containment loss during each sample return phase and make a statement about the total combined mission probability of containment not assured. The work presented here describes this framework, which considers failure modes or fault conditions that can initiate failure sequences ultimately leading to containment not assured. Reliability estimates are generated from databases, design heritage, component specifications, or expert opinion in the form of probability density functions or point estimates and provided as inputs to the mathematical models that simulate the different failure sequences. The probabilistic outputs are then combined following the logic of several fault trees to compute the ultimate probability of containment not assured. Given the multidisciplinary nature of the problem and the different types of mathematical models used, the statistical tools needed for analysis are required to be computationally efficient. While standard Monte Carlo approaches are used for fast models, a multi-fidelity approach to rare event probabilities is proposed for expensive models. In this paradigm, inexpensive low-fidelity models are developed for computational acceleration purposes while the expensive high-fidelity model is kept in the loop to retain accuracy in the results. This work presents an example of end-to-end application of this framework highlighting the computational benefits of a multi-fidelity approach.

Giuseppe Cataldo↗

Development of an Additively Manufactured Subscale Secondary Sealed Container for the NASA FROSTE Project

This presentation details the development of an additively manufactured (AM) subscale test article for the secondary sealed container (SSC) as part of the NASA FROSTE project. FROSTE is focused on the collection of regolith samples from shadowed regions of the Moon and the preservation of those samples at cryogenic temperatures for return to Earth. Our team was integrated into the FROSTE program to leverage innovative design approaches and additive manufacturing capabilities in support of a scalable development strategy, where the subscale configuration serves as the development path toward a full-scale SSC. Scalmalloy was selected as the primary material for all AM components due to its favorable strength-to-weight ratio, thermal conductivity, and demonstrated performance in aerospace applications. Its aluminum-based composition supports robust mechanical behavior at cryogenic temperatures while enabling efficient heat transfer and control of thermal gradients within the containment system. The SSC architecture consists of an outer container assembly that houses a phase change material (PCM) tank, which in turn contains primary containers holding the regolith. Thermal management relies on controlled conductive and radiative heat transfer, including a thermal connection assembly that interfaces the PCM tank to an external cryocooler via a thermal strap, and IMLI surrounding the PCM tank to inhibit radiative heat transfer. The outer container assembly incorporates sealing interfaces, thermal connection ports, and I/O feedthroughs, with PTFE spring seals used at critical interfaces to maintain containment integrity. The PCM tank is manufactured as a single monolithic Scalmalloy component and incorporates an integral lattice structure to minimize thermal gradients, internal channels for thermocouple routing, and interface features for thermal connection assembly integration. The tank is centrally suspended within the outer container using support rings, with G10 insulating components employed to inhibit thermal leaks. This work describes the design methodology, AM approach, and key considerations used to inform the design.

regolith↗

Apparatus for inspecting a group of containers and method of using same

An apparatus and method for inspecting a plurality of containers are provided. Each container has an outer surface for housing at least one material therein. The techniques provided involve at least one inspection vehicle and at least one detector. Each inspection vehicle has a plurality of wheels for movably positioning about the plurality of containers. The wheels may have at least one magnet for selectively adhering to the outer surface of at least one of the containers whereby the inspection vehicle traverses the container(s). The detector is positionable proximate at least one of the containers. The detector may be deployable from the inspection vehicle to a position adjacent the container(s). The detector has at least one sensor for measuring at least one characteristic of the plurality of containers. At least one base station may be provided for communicating with the inspection vehicle(s) and/or detector(s).

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Smart container UWB sensor system for situational awareness of intrusion alarms

An in-container monitoring sensor system is based on an UWB radar intrusion detector positioned in a container and having a range gate set to the farthest wall of the container from the detector. Multipath reflections within the container make every point on or in the container appear to be at the range gate, allowing intrusion detection anywhere in the container. The system also includes other sensors to provide false alarm discrimination, and may include other sensors to monitor other parameters, e.g. radiation. The sensor system also includes a control subsystem for controlling system operation. Communications and information extraction capability may also be included. A method of detecting intrusion into a container uses UWB radar, and may also include false alarm discrimination. A secure container has an UWB based monitoring system

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Method to produce water-soluble sugars from biomass using solvents containing lactones

A process to produce an aqueous solution of carbohydrates that contains C6-sugar-containing oligomers, C6 sugar monomers, C5-sugar-containing oligomers, C5 sugar monomers, or any combination thereof is presented. The process includes the steps of reacting biomass or a biomass-derived reactant with a solvent system including a lactone and water, and an acid catalyst. The reaction yields a product mixture containing water-soluble C6-sugar-containing oligomers, C6-sugar monomers, C5-sugar-containing oligomers, C5-sugar monomers, or any combination thereof. A solute is added to the product mixture to cause partitioning of the product mixture into an aqueous layer containing the carbohydrates and a substantially immiscible organic layer containing the lactone.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Method to produce water-soluble sugars from biomass using solvents containing lactones

A process to produce an aqueous solution of carbohydrates that contains C6-sugar-containing oligomers, C6 sugar monomers, C5-sugar-containing oligomers, C5 sugar monomers, or any combination thereof is presented. The process includes the steps of reacting biomass or a biomass-derived reactant with a solvent system including a lactone and water, and an acid catalyst. The reaction yields a product mixture containing water-soluble C6-sugar-containing oligomers, C6-sugar monomers, C5-sugar-containing oligomers, C5-sugar monomers, or any combination thereof. A solute is added to the product mixture to cause partitioning of the product mixture into an aqueous layer containing the carbohydrates and a substantially immiscible organic layer containing the lactone.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Conformal core cooling and containment structure

A nuclear reactor includes a pressure vessel and a nuclear reactor core comprising fissile material disposed inside the pressure vessel at the bottom of the pressure vessel. A secondary core containment structure includes a containment basket comprising insulation with a maximum stable temperature of at least 2200K cladded by steel. The bottom of the pressure vessel and the nuclear reactor core are disposed inside the containment basket with the containment basket spaced apart from the bottom of the pressure vessel by a clearance gap. The containment basket may comprise zirconia insulation cladded by steel. In some embodiments the clearance gap between the containment basket and the bottom of the pressure vessel is no larger than one meter. The secondary core containment structure may further comprise conduits arranged to inject water into the clearance gap between the containment basket and the bottom of the pressure vessel.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Conformal core cooling and containment structure

A nuclear reactor includes a pressure vessel and a nuclear reactor core comprising fissile material disposed inside the pressure vessel at the bottom of the pressure vessel. A secondary core containment structure includes a containment basket comprising insulation with a maximum stable temperature of at least 2200K cladded by steel. The bottom of the pressure vessel and the nuclear reactor core are disposed inside the containment basket with the containment basket spaced apart from the bottom of the pressure vessel by a clearance gap. The containment basket may comprise zirconia insulation cladded by steel. In some embodiments the clearance gap between the containment basket and the bottom of the pressure vessel is no larger than one meter. The secondary core containment structure may further comprise conduits arranged to inject water into the clearance gap between the containment basket and the bottom of the pressure vessel.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

The SAVY 4000 Container Storage Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory - 17313

Incidents involving release of nuclear materials stored in containers of convenience such as food pack cans, slip lid taped cans, paint cans, etc. has resulted in the U.S. Defense Nuclear Safety Board concerns over the lack of prescriptive performance requirements for interim storage of nuclear materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has shared in these incidents and in response proactively moved into developing a performance based storage container design, the SAVY-4000{sup R}. The SAVY-4000{sup R} is the first vented general use nuclear material container demonstrated to meet the requirements of DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. The SAVY-4000{sup R} is an innovative and creative design demonstrated by the fact that it can be opened and closed in a few seconds without torque wrenches or other tools; has a built-in, fire-rated filter that prevents the build-up of hydrogen gas, yet retains 99.97% of plutonium particulates, and prevents release of material even in a 12 foot drop. Finally, it has been fire then drop tested and will reduce the risk to the public in the event of an earthquake/fire scenario. This will allow major nuclear facilities to credit the container towards source term Material at Risk (MAR) reduction. The container was approved for nuclear material storage in the TA-55 Plutonium Facility on March 15, 2011, and there are currently over 2000 SAVY-4000{sup R} containers available for use within the facility. A Safety Analysis Report was developed to demonstrate Manual 441.1-1 compliance and was approved April, 2014. The first four SAVY-4000{sup R} containers were packaged with plutonium on August 2, 2011. Key aspects of the SAVY-4000{sup R} vented storage container design will be discussed which include design description, qualification and testing, surveillance strategy, and the design life extension program as enhanced by surveillance activities with the intent to extend well beyond the current five year design life. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of the B-25 Low Level Radioactive Waste Container in Taiwan - 1900x

Chinshan Nuclear Power Plant will be permanently stopped its operation in the middle of 2019 and will be the first nuclear power plant stepping into the decommissioning phase in Taiwan. According to Nuclear Reactor Facilities Regulation Act, a nuclear facility must be dismantled in 25 years after being permanently ceased operation. In its decommissioning plan, the B -25 low level radioactive waste container was one of the proposed containers used for this decommissioning task. However, the B-25 waste container was not used or developed in Taiwan before. To meet this need, Institute of Nuclear Energy Research developed a new type of B-25 waste container and will apply to the authority for its usage license. This article provided the information of the low level radioactive waste containers have been approved in Taiwan and described the design specifications of the developed B-25 waste container. Besides, the numerical evaluation and test results were also included in this article. Based on the evaluation and test results, the developed B-25 waste container satisfied the requirements of the storage container and industrial package type 2. It is believed that the usage license would be granted soon after applying it to the authority. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

CLOSURE WELD DEVELOPMENT FOR 3013 OUTER CONTAINERS

Excess plutonium materials in the DOE complex are packaged and stored in accordance with DOE-STD-3013. This standard specifies requirements for the stabilization of such materials and subsequent packaging in dual nested seal-welded containers. Austenitic stainless steels have been selected for container fabrication. The inner 3013 container provides contamination control while the outer 3013 container is the primary containment vessel and is the focus of this paper. Each packaging site chose a process for seal welding the outer 3013 containers in accordance with its needs and expertise. The two processes chosen for weld closure were laser beam welding (LBW) and gas tungsten arc welding (GTAW). Following development efforts, each system was qualified in accordance with DOE-STD-3013 prior to production use. The 3013 outer container closure weld joint was designed to accommodate the characteristics of a laser weld. This aspect of the joint design necessitated some innovative process and equipment considerations in the application of the GTAW process. Details of the weld requirements and the development processes are presented and several potential enhancements for the GTAW system are described.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗