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331 records · Page 19

Exploring Applied Cryptosystems to Formally Verify Security in Cyber-Physical Systems

This project aims to evaluate RSA as a method for public-key encryption for cyber-physical systems (CPS). As technology advances, cyber attacks are increasing, and with them, the need for cybersecurity advances; the average cost for cybercrime in the world was estimated at $6 trillion in 2021. A public-key cryptosystem that has been around since 1977, RSA has recently garnered some critiques for its fragility, computational cost, and lazy implementation. In this project I will review the mathematical derivation of RSA, analyze the practical implications of such mathematical framework for the security of RSA, and propose a formal methods based approach to verify encryption schemes for CPS.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Authentication Protocol for ICS without Encryption

Industrial control systems (ICS) describes the different types of control systems and associated instrumentation, which includes the devices, systems, networks, and controls used to operate and/or automate industrial processes. Depending on the industry, each ICS functions differently and are built to electronically manage tasks efficiently. Historically, industrial plants have included networking, and changes have been made over time without consideration for security. Many ICS devices currently have inadequate security features. Adding encryption in ICS is undesirable because many of the new detection method involves deep packet inspection. Therefore, we propose to develop a method of providing authentication between devices without encrypting the data. This testbed design will allow rapid development and experimentation with Cyber Physical Systems. Modbus connects to a supervisory computer with a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Our project seeks to enhance security in the ICS environment by adding device authentication to the lower levels of the plant floor. This approach was selected as it allows verification of the sender of data from level 1/level 0 devices up to supervisory systems. This addition is desirable as it adds enhanced verification to the integrity of system data without obscuring (via encryption) the data being transmitted across the network. This is important because many ICS systems are real time critical (decryption adds to latency) and many other good security options require deep packet inspection (which encryption completely defeats). To accomplish this, a proof of concept of adding an authentication scheme was designed and will be tested with a common ICS protocol. The setup includes a single serial cable connecting the serial ports on two devices, a Master and a Minion. Authentication will occur in the following methods: - Data layer involving Transport Layer Security/Secure Socket Layer (TLS/SSL); - TCP/IP route implementation; - Key exchange algorithm; - Raspberry Pi programming for authentication. A portion of the setup includes adding Raspberry Pi into the system as the device is handling the authentication for the network traffic. Modbus is the chosen ICS protocol. It is used to transmit signals from instrumentation and control devices back to a main controller or data gathering system. Typically, the device identity is assumed but not verified. For verifying device identity, we constructed a digital signature architecture with TLS. A novel adaptation of this is to use only the digital signature that is provided and not the encryption capability. This allows ICS traffic to flow unobscured while still providing verification for the integrity of the data. Verification of this process will involve adding additional I/O level network devices with spoofed IP addresses and detecting the authenticated versus unauthenticated traffic. Our TLS implementation will have encryption disabled but should still allow for digital signing of data. This will enable our system to distinguish between real end devices and spoofed end devices. This experiment is presently building the test setup. It is focusing on a small setting to identify authenticated and unauthenticated devices on the network. This should allow for scaling to a larger network size after the initial proof of concept. One concern with this scheme is a certificate deployment has a large scale key management. Network size will thus increase the key management task for security. In addition, we believe that further research should be done on exploring the use of this method to defeat man-in-the-middle attacks.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Employing a Hardware-in-the-Loop Approach to Realize a Fully Homomorphic Controller for a Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor

This paper addresses the cybersecurity challenges of advanced nuclear reactors by integrating fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) into their control systems, enabling encrypted processing of control signals without compromising functionality. Advanced nuclear reactors, including Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and microreactors, aim to achieve autonomous and remote operations, reducing costs and enhancing competitiveness. However, these advancements expand the attack surface for cyberattacks, particularly in autonomous and remote operation scenarios. Cyberattacks can exploit vulnerabilities to manipulate physical processes, causing shutdowns, asset damage, or public harm. Such attacks begin with passive reconnaissance, where adversaries intercept communications or observe behaviors to gather information, which is then leveraged to execute cyber-physical attacks by injecting malicious commands. Nuclear power must adopt cybersecurity protection measures to secure the integrity and availability of their digital control systems. This paper demonstrates the application of FHE to secure operations by enabling encrypted processing of sensitive signals and parameters -- ensuring privacy without exposing data. FHE supports secure mathematical operations on encrypted data without requiring decryption. Using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) approach, this paper implements an FHE-integrated controller on a BeagleBone Black (BBB) controlling a simulation of the Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR). By doing so, the encrypted controller protects the integrity of critical set points and control signals during transmission and processing. Thus, FHE-integrated controllers enhance secure operations of advanced nuclear reactors while maintaining functionality.

control systems↗

Restricted Authentication and Encryption for Cyber-physical Systems

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are characterized by the close linkage of computational resources and physical devices. These systems can be deployed in a number of critical infrastructure settings. As a result, the security requirements of CPS are different than traditional computing architectures. For example, critical functions must be identified and isolated from interference by other functions. Similarly, lightweight schemes may be required, as CPS can include devices with limited computing power. One approach that offers promise for CPS security is the use of lightweight, hardware-based authentication. Specifically, we consider the use of Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to bind an access request to specific hardware with device-specific keys. PUFs are implemented in hardware, such as SRAM, and can be used to uniquely identify the device. This technology could be used in CPS to ensure location-based access control and encryption, both of which would be desirable for CPS implementations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗