Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Failure Rate”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 343 records · Page 19

Motivating the sure bounds

Motivation is provided for a theorem that provides upper and lower bounds for the reliability of reconfigurable digital control systems. The reliability goals for these systems are too high to be established by natural life testing, which means the probability of system failure must be computed from mathematical models that capture the essential elements of fault occurence and system fault recovery. The upper and lower bound theorem shows that system recovery can be adequately described by its first two moments, provided component failure rate is low and system recovery is fast. This result greatly simplifies both the fault injection experiments that study system recovery and the numerical computations that estimate the probability of system failure from a mathematical model.

White, Allan L.↗

Modelling early failures in Space Station Freedom

A major problem encountered in planning for Space Station Freedom is the amount of maintenance that will be required. To predict the failure rates of components and systems aboard Space Station Freedom, the logical approach is to use data obtained from previously flown spacecraft. In order to determine the mechanisms that are driving the failures, models can be proposed, and then checked to see if they adequately fit the observed failure data obtained from a large variety of satellites. For this particular study, failure data and truncation times were available for satellites launched between 1976 and 1984; no data past 1984 was available. The study was limited to electrical subsystems and assemblies, which were studied to determine if they followed a model resulting from a mixture of exponential distributions.

Navard, Sharon E.↗

Enhanced Component Performance Study: Air-Operated Valves 1998–2014

This report presents a performance evaluation of air-operated valves (AOVs) at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study are based on the operating experience failure reports from fiscal year 1998 through 2014 for the component reliability as reported in the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Consolidated Events Database (ICES). The AOV failure modes considered are failure-to-open/close, failure to operate or control, and spurious operation. The component reliability estimates and the reliability data are trended for the most recent 10-year period while yearly estimates for reliability are provided for the entire active period. Three statistically significant trends were observed in the AOV data: 1) The failure rate estimate for fail-to-operate, across all systems, for valves with less than or equal to twenty demands per reactor year, was found to be increasing. 2) The frequency of failure per reactor year for fail-to-operate, across all systems, for valves with less than or equal to twenty demands per reactor year, was found to be increasing. 3) The frequency of demands per reactor year for valves recording the fail-to-open or fail-to-close failure modes, for valves with greater than twenty demands per year, was found to be decreasing.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Federal Emergency Management Agency Mobile Housing Unit Running Gear Testing (Final Report)

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) stages manufactured housing units (MHUs) at key locations to be used during disasters when other housing accommodations cannot be arranged for individuals or families. Due to the unpredictability of natural disasters and the limitations of the manufactured housing industry to produce large numbers of MHUs in very short periods of time, it is necessary for FEMA to store a large number of units for many months or years. With these long storage periods come degradation issues with frames, tires, bearing, and braking systems. These types of issues are also of interest to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) because regulated carriers normally transport these units and 49 CFR 393.75 Tires specifies tire loading restrictions for manufactured homes. To compare the running gear (tires, brakes, drums, bearings, axles, springs, and spring mounting hardware) currently specified in the 2014 Rugged Based Performance Requirements (RBPR) and the newly recommended running gear specified in the upcoming revision to the RBPR, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) outlined a Longevity Test Plan, which focused on the assessment of component longevity (failure rates by component type). The Test Plan also studied the forces imparted to the MHU from the running gear from interaction with the roadway for both the running gear in the 2014 RBPR and the running gear specified in the upcoming RBPR revision. Since the assessment of component longevity and failures are also issues of concern for FMCSA, both agencies collaborated to support the research presented in this report. The tests and data collection were conducted at the Navistar Proving Grounds (NPG) in New Carlisle (near South Bend), Indiana, during the May-November 2018 period. Four alternatives for the suspension system of a typical three-bedroom MHU were considered in this test. Alternative 0 was the MHU that was selected from the FEMA staging area in Selma, Alabama. Empirical data had shown that, on average, this alternative experiences one tire failure every 150 miles (or 0.0067 tire failures per mile traveled). Before testing, Alternative 0 was equipped with similar running gear hardware, although in new condition and installed following the manufacturer’s specifications. This became the Baseline Unit, or Alternative 1. Another unit, also selected from the FEMA staging area in Selma, Alabama, was equipped with better axles (i.e., axles that were rated for 7,000lbs as opposed to 6,000lbs for the Baseline Unit) and better tires. This became the Upgrade Unit, or Alternative 2. At the end of the Longevity Test, the Upgrade Unit was mounted with radial tires. This became Alternative 3.Alternative 1 (Baseline Unit) had, on average, one tire failure every 251 miles (or 0.0040 tire failures per mile traveled). So, by simply following the correct manufacturer’s specifications for the assembly of the transportation system, a reduction of 41% in the per mile tire failure was achieved. In the same test, Alternative 2 (Upgrade Unit) showed, on average, one tire failure every 728 miles traveled (or 0.0014 tire failure s per mile traveled). When the Upgrade Unit was mounted with radial tires in the last part of the test, no tire failures were observed for the 2,400 miles tested. That is, in the case of the radial tires (Alternative 3) the tire failure was less than one per 2,400 miles traveled (or less than 0.0004 tire failures per mile traveled). The data collected for the Longevity Test showed that the maximum accelerations were registered in all cases at the center of the MHU in the vertical direction. The overall maximum was registered by the Baseline Unit, Alternative 1. If that value is normalized to 100%, then the Upgrade Unit (Alternative 2) showed, on average, 81% at the same location, and Alternative 3 (radial-tire test) 59%. That is, the upgraded transportation system showed a reduction of 19% and 41% in the vertical accelerations transmitted to MHU at its center when regular and radial tires, respectively, were used. As part of the Test Protocol, NPG conducted a visual inspection of the MHUs and transportation system at the end of each test day. ORNL reviewed all the inspection reports in an attempt to determine if there was any difference in the damage that the Baseline and Upgrade MHUs showed during the test. The Upgrade Unit always showed lower accelerations transmitted to the MHU than the Baseline Unit. In most cases, these differences were statistically significant. The FEMA inspection report, conducted by a FEMA certified inspector at the end of the tests, included a shorter list of damaged items for the Baseline Unit than for the Upgrade Unit, although similar type of damages was described for both units. This may be an indication that, although lower than those of the Baseline Unit, the accelerations transmitted by the Upgrade Unit were above the threshold at which MHU elements start to fail.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Assembly and comparison of available solar hot water system reliability databases and information.

Solar hot water (SHW) systems have been installed commercially for over 30 years, yet few quantitative details are known about their reliability. This report describes a comprehensive analysis of all of the known major previous research and data regarding the reliability of SHW systems and components. Some important conclusions emerged. First, based on a detailed inspection of ten-year-old systems in Florida, about half of active systems can be expected to fail within a ten-year period. Second, valves were identified as the probable cause of a majority of active SHW failures. Third, passive integral and thermosiphon SHW systems have much lower failure rates than active ones, probably due to their simple design that employs few mechanical parts. Fourth, it is probable that the existing data about reliability do not reveal the full extent of fielded system failures because most of the data were based on trouble calls. Often an SHW system owner is not aware of a failure because the backup system silently continues to produce hot water. Thus, a repair event may not be generated in a timely manner, if at all. This final report for the project provides all of the pertinent details about this study, including the source of the data, the techniques to assure their quality before analysis, the organization of the data into perhaps the most comprehensive reliability database in existence, a detailed statistical analysis, and a list of recommendations for additional critical work. Important recommendations include the inclusion of an alarm on SHW systems to identify a failed system, the need for a scientifically designed study to collect high-quality reliability data that will lead to design improvements and lower costs, and accelerated testing of components that are identified as highly problematic.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

The Threat of Uncertainty: Why Using Traditional Approaches for Evaluating Spacecraft Reliability are Insufficient for Future Human Mars Missions

Through the Evolvable Mars Campaign (EMC) study, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) continues to evaluate potential approaches for sending humans beyond low Earth orbit (LEO). A key aspect of these missions is the strategy that is employed to maintain and repair the spacecraft systems, ensuring that they continue to function and support the crew. Long duration missions beyond LEO present unique and severe maintainability challenges due to a variety of factors, including: limited to no opportunities for resupply, the distance from Earth, mass and volume constraints of spacecraft, high sensitivity of transportation element designs to variation in mass, the lack of abort opportunities to Earth, limited hardware heritage information, and the operation of human-rated systems in a radiation environment with little to no experience. The current approach to maintainability, as implemented on ISS, which includes a large number of spares pre-positioned on ISS, a larger supply sitting on Earth waiting to be flown to ISS, and an on demand delivery of logistics from Earth, is not feasible for future deep space human missions. For missions beyond LEO, significant modifications to the maintainability approach will be required.Through the EMC evaluations, several key findings related to the reliability and safety of the Mars spacecraft have been made. The nature of random and induced failures presents significant issues for deep space missions. Because spare parts cannot be flown as needed for Mars missions, all required spares must be flown with the mission or pre-positioned. These spares must cover all anticipated failure modes and provide a level of overall reliability and safety that is satisfactory for human missions. This will require a large amount of mass and volume be dedicated to storage and transport of spares for the mission. Further, there is, and will continue to be, a significant amount of uncertainty regarding failure rates for spacecraft components. This uncertainty makes it much more difficult to anticipate failures and will potentially require an even larger amount of spares to provide an acceptable level of safety. Ultimately, the approach to maintenance and repair applied to ISS, focusing on the supply of spare parts, may not be tenable for deep space missions. Other approaches, such as commonality of components, simplification of systems, and in-situ manufacturing will be required.

Stromgren, Chel↗

Analyzing a Five-Year Failure Record of a Leadership-Class Supercomputer

Extreme-scale computing systems are required to solve some of the grand challenges in science and technology. From astrophysics to molecular biology, supercomputers are an essential tool to accelerate scientific discovery. However, large computing systems are prone to failures due to their complexity. It is crucial to develop an understanding of how these systems fail to design reliable supercomputing platforms for the future. This paper examines a five-year failure and workload record of a leadership-class supercomputer. To the best of our knowledge, five years represents the vast majority of the lifespan of a supercomputer. This is the first time such analysis is performed on a top 10 modern supercomputer. We performed a failure categorization and found out that: i) most errors are GPU-related, with roughly 37% of them being double-bit errors on the cards; ii) failures are not evenly spread across the physical machine, with room temperature presumably playing a major role; and iii) software errors of the system bring down several nodes concurrently. Our failure rate analysis unveils that: i) the system consistently degrades, being at least twice as reliable at the beginning, compared to the end of the period; ii) Weibull distribution closely fits the mean-time-between-failure data; and iii) hardware and software errors show a markedly different pattern. Finally, we correlated failure and workload records to reveal that: i) failure and workload records are weakly correlated, except for certain types of failures when segmented by the hours of the day; ii) several categories of failures make jobs crash within the first minutes of execution; and iii) a significant fraction of failed jobs exhaust the requested time with a disregard of when the failure occurred during execution.

Rojas, Elvis↗

Investigation of mercury thruster isolators

Mercury ion thruster isolator lifetime tests were performed using different isolator materials and geometries. Tests were performed with and without the flow of mercury through the isolators in an oil diffusion pumped vacuum facility and cryogenically pumped bell jar. The onset of leakage current in isolators occurred in time intervals ranging from a few hours to many hundreds of hours. In all cases, surface contamination was responsible for the onset of leakage current and subsequent isolator failure. Rate of increase of leakage current and the leakage current level increased approximately exponentially with isolator temperature. Careful attention to shielding techniques and the elimination of sources of metal oxides appear to have eliminated isolator failures as a thruster life limiting mechanism.

Mantenieks, M. A.↗

Investigation of mercury thruster isolators

Mercury ion thruster isolator lifetime tests were performed using different isolator materials and geometries. Tests were performed with and without the flow of mercury through the isolators in an oil diffusion pumped vacuum facility and cryogenically pumped bell jar. The onset of leakage current in isolators tested occurred in time intervals ranging from a few hours to many hundreds of hours. In all cases, surface contamination was responsible for the onset of leakage current and subsequent isolator failure. Rate of increase of leakage current and the leakage current level increased approximately exponentially with isolator temperature. Careful attention to shielding techniques and the elimination of sources of metal oxides appear to have eliminated isolator failures as a thruster life limiting mechanism.

Mantenieks, M. A.↗

AN INITIAL LOOK AT THE HEAT PIPE RESILIENCY TO REACTOR OPERATION

Several special purpose reactor designs are aiming to utilize heat pipes due to its inherently passive features allowing safe heat removal to the power conversion systems. There is insufficient data on heat pipe survivability in reactor environments, although heat-pipe failures are predicted to have low failure rates. In this paper, we perform a coupled neutronics and thermo-mechanics analyses for a 45 kWth HALEU fueled, hydride moderated homogenous design to evaluate the transient effects during both startup and a heatpipe-failure scenario. The heatpipe-failure study includes both a single failure case and a failure-propagation (cascading) case. While the model only evaluates a homogenous core, the approach could be applied to more complex models for any heat pipe cooled small reactor.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

COMPONENT DEGRADATION SUSCEPTIBILITIES AS THE BASES FOR MODELING REACTOR AGING RISK

The extension of nuclear power plant operating licenses beyond 60 years in the United States will be necessary if we are to meet national energy needs while addressing the issues of carbon and climate. Characterizing the operating risks associated with aging reactors is problematic because the principal tool for risk-informed decision-making, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), is not ideally-suited to addressing aging systems. The components most likely to drive risk in an aging reactor - the passives - receive limited treatment in PRA, and furthermore, standard PRA methods are based on the assumption of stationary failure rates: a condition unlikely to be met in an aging system. A critical barrier to modeling passives aging on the wide scale required for a PRA is that there is seldom sufficient field data to populate parametric failure models, and nor is there the availability of practical physics models to predict out-year component reliability. The methodology described here circumvents some of these data and modeling needs by using materials degradation metrics, integrated with conventional PRA models, to produce risk importance measures for specific aging mechanisms and component types. We suggest that these measures have multiple applications, from the risk-screening of components to the prioritization of materials research.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

EReinit: Scalable and efficient fault-tolerance for bulk-synchronous MPI applications

Scientists from many different fields have been developing Bulk-Synchronous MPI applications to simulate and study a wide variety of scientific phenomena. Since failure rates are expected to increase in larger-scale future HPC systems, providing efficient fault-tolerance mechanisms for this class of applications is paramount. The global-restart model has been proposed to decrease the time of failure recovery in Bulk-Synchronous applications by allowing a fast reinitialization of MPI. However, the current implementations of this model have several drawbacks: they lack efficiency; their scalability have not been shown; and they require the use of the MPI profiling interface, which precludes the use of tools. Here, we present EReinit, an implementation of the global-restart model that addresses these problems. Our key idea and optimization is the co-design of basic fault-tolerance mechanisms such as failure detection, notification, and recovery between MPI and the resource manager in contrast to current approaches on which these mechanisms are implemented in MPI only. We demonstrate EReinit in three HPC programs and show that it is up to four times more efficient than existing solutions at 4,096 processes.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Designing to Mitigate Food Growing Failures in Space

Future space life support systems may use crop plants to grow most of the crew s food. A harvest failure can reduce the food available for future consumption. If the previously stored food is insufficient to reach the next harvest, the crew may go hungry. This paper considers how the overall food supply system should be modified to cope with food production failures. The food supply concept for a mission will use grown food, or stored food, cIr both. The optimum food supply mix depends on the costs and failure probabilities of stored and grown food. A simple food system model assumes that either we obtain the nominal harvest or a failure occurs and no food is harvested. Given the probability that any particular harvest fails, it is easy to compute the expected number of failures and the total food shortfall over a mission. If some food is grown and the probability of harvest failure is high, a non-redundant system has an unacceptable likelihood that the crew will have no food for a full harvest period. Food supply reliability must be increased either by supplying more food initially or by increasing food production capacity. We can obtain a very reliable food supply even when the harvest failure rate is high. If the cost of growing food is much less than the cost of providing stored food, it is better to provide redundant food growing capacity than to increase initial storage. A more realistic biomass production failure model allows the harvest amount or time to vary around the nominal values, using stochastic modeling with repeated Monte Carlo simulation, but such failures have minor impact compared to a complete harvest failure.

Jones, Harry↗

AGR-5/6/7 Post-Irradiation Examination Plan

This plan describes the PIE activities to be carried out on AGR-5/6/7 fuel and the non-fuel components of the AGR-5/6/7 irradiation test train. PIE of AGR-5/6/7 fuel and test train components will provide data on fuel performance over a range of irradiation conditions (e.g., burnup, neutron fluence, and temperature), test fuel under postulated accident conditions, and support development of fuel performance and fission product transport models. Examination of the non-fuel test train components will give information on TRISO fuel and compact performance and information on releases of radioactive fission products from the fuel compacts. PIE of the fuel compacts is used for many purposes including, but not limited to: updating the irradiation thermal calculations, measuring burnup, determining retention/release of fission products from the compacts and the TRISO particles, determining TRISO layer failure rates, determining fuel performance at elevated accident temperatures, determining fuel performance under oxidizing atmospheres, determining the distribution of fission products within the compact and fuel particles, and observing compact and particle morphology to explain mechanisms of TRISO layer failure and/or fission product release/retention.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Outcome After Conformal Salvage Radiotherapy in Patients With Rising Prostate-Specific Antigen Levels After Radical Prostatectomy

Purpose: This study attempts to improve our understanding of the role of salvage radiotherapy (SRT) in patients with prostate-specific antigen (PSA) relapse after radical prostatectomy with regard to biochemical control, rate of distant metastasis, and survival. Methods and Materials: We performed a retrospective analysis of 96 men treated with conformal prostate bed SRT (median, 64.8 Gy) at a single institution (median follow-up, 70 months). The majority had intermediate- or high-risk prostate cancer. Fifty-four percent underwent a resection with positive margins (R1 resection). The median time interval between surgery and SRT was 22 months. Results: After SRT, 66% of patients reached a PSA nadir of less than 0.2 ng/mL. However, the 5-year biochemical no evidence of disease rate was 35%. Seminal vesicle involvement was predictive for a significantly lower biochemical no evidence of disease rate. All patients with a preoperative PSA level greater than 50 ng/mL relapsed biochemically within 2 years. The 5-year distant metastasis rate was 18%, the 5-year prostate cancer-specific survival rate was 90%, and the 5-year overall survival rate was 88%. Significantly more distant metastases developed in patients with a PSA nadir greater than 0.05 ng/mL after SRT, and they had significantly inferior prostate cancer-specific and overall survival rates. Resection status (R1 vs. R0) was not predictive for any of the endpoints. Conclusions: Men with postoperative PSA relapse can undergo salvage treatment by prostate bed radiotherapy, but durable PSA control is maintained only in about one-third of the patients. Despite a high biochemical failure rate after SRT, prostate cancer-specific survival does not decrease rapidly.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Instrumentation and Data Analysis Supporting the Transient Rod Pneumatic System Design Study at the Annular Core Research Reactor

The Sandia National Laboratories Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) has been experiencing intermittent failures of its pneumatically operated transient rod system. The most frequent failures have been to the dashpot rod where it connects to the upper aluminum connecting rod. Within the three systems, Transient Rod (TR) A has the most frequent failures. In order to conduct the pulse operations, the Transient Rods are pneumatically driven to quickly remove "poison" from the reactor core. During these pulse operations increased forces and vibrations are placed on the TR system. In an effort to fix these problems, Sandia's TA-V Nuclear Reactor and Systems Engineering Department (Engineering Department) has started an extensive Transient Rod Pneumatic System Design Study. The goal of this study is to determine the causes of the elevated failure rates in TR A. This necessitates an increased understanding of the dynamics in the TR systems. This report will cover the approach taken and reasoning behind the choices of instrumentation, calibration, data collection and data analysis used to diagnose these failures. In order to determine the types and specifications for the sensors that will be installed, estimates of the TR system performance needed to be determined. Using known and assumed parameters, mechanical and thermodynamic models were developed, and calculations performed to estimate ranges of displacement, speed, and acceleration experienced by the transient rod system. After some preliminary data collection, the thermodynamic models were refined for better accuracy. After installation of the full suite of sensors, data can be collected and analyzed in order to determine the cause of the increased failures.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Reliability measurement during software development

During the development of data base software for a multi-sensor tracking system, reliability was measured. The failure ratio and failure rate were found to be consistent measures. Trend lines were established from these measurements that provided good visualization of the progress on the job as a whole as well as on individual modules. Over one-half of the observed failures were due to factors associated with the individual run submission rather than with the code proper. Possible application of these findings for line management, project managers, functional management, and regulatory agencies is discussed. Steps for simplifying the measurement process and for use of these data in predicting operational software reliability are outlined.

Hecht, H.↗