Analysis and Recovery from a Heat Exchanger Tube Leak
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McDuffee, Joel [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000289192314)↗
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Establishing Hazardous Gas Launch Commit Criteria for the Space Shuttle External Tank Intertank Compartment
Until recently, the simultaneous detection and evaluation of multiple Space Transportation System (STS) element compartments for propellant leakage was not possible during the External Tank (ET) pre-pressurization (pre-press) phase of propellant loading; late in the loading sequence (T-3 min to T-0). There exist launch commit criteria (LCCS) designed to protect against leaks resulting in flammable mixtures in the intertank during the functional life of the ET; start of propellant loading through ET-Orbiter separation. However thus far, leak protection had relied on the premise that if a propellant supply system leak were to exist, it would be a leak of fixed area present at the start of propellant loading (dumb leak mode) and such a leak could be detected earlier in the loading sequence than the pre-press phase. No measures had ever been implemented which would protect against leaks potentially developing late in the loading sequence (smart leak mode), The STS community had baselined this situation as an accepted risk their decision supported by exhaustive hardware acceptance criteria and a history of many successful launches. With the recent development of improvements to the hazardous gas detection system (HGDS), an opportunity arose to monitor the intertank compartment for hazardous gas concentrations beyond the T-3 minute mark. In this timeframe the propellant supply system is pressurized for flight and protection was sought against potential leaks generated by this pressurization process. The challenge at hand was to develop LCCs in this timeframe that were not too conservative to unnecessarily prohibit a launch, yet not too liberal to endanger crew safety and mission success. Since essentially no measurement history existed in this timeframe, the LCCs would have to rely on analysis alone. At NASA's direction, Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems (LMMSS) developed requirements that would protect against a smart leak during pre-press. A smart leak protection strategy is noteworthy from an STS main propulsion system (NWS) community perspective. This paper presents the resultant requirements as well as the technical and program issues involved with establishing hazardous gas LCCs for the ET intertank compartment.
Baran, Adam J.↗
The Summer of Hydrogen
Ground crew veterans at Kennedy Space Center still talk about what they call "the summer of hydrogen"-the long, frustrating months in 1990 when the shuttle fleet was grounded by an elusive hydrogen leak that foiled our efforts to fill the orbiter's external fuel tank. Columbia (STS-35) was on Launch Pad A for a scheduled May 30 launch when we discovered the hydrogen leak during - tanking. The external fuel tank is loaded through the orbiter. Liquid hydrogen flows through a 17-inch umbilical between the orbiter and the tank. During fueling, we purge the aft fuselage with gaseous nitrogen to reduce the risk of fire, and we have a leak-detection system in the mobile launch platform, which samples (via tygon tubing) the atmosphere in and around the vehicle, drawing it down to a mass spectrometer that analyzes its composition. When we progressed to the stage of tanking where liquid hydrogen flows through the vehicle, the concentration of hydrogen approached four percent-the limit above which it would be dangerously flammable. We had a leak. We did everything we could think of to find it, and the contractor who supplied the flight hardware was there every day, working alongside us. We did tanking tests, which involved instrumenting the suspected leak sources, and cryo-loaded the external tank to try to isolate precisely where the leak originated. We switched out umbilicals; we replaced the seals between the umbilical and the orbiter. We inspected the seals microscopically and found no flaws. We replaced the recirculation pumps, and we found and replaced a damaged teflon seal in a main propulsion system detent cover, which holds the prevalve-the main valve supplying hydrogen to Space Shuttle Main Engine 3 -in the open position. The seal passed leak tests at ambient temperature but leaked when cryogenic temperatures were applied. We added new leak sensors-up to twenty at a time and tried to be methodical in our placements to narrow down the possible sources of the problem. We even switched orbiters, sending Columbia back to the Vehicle Assembly Building and bringing out Atlantis, scheduled to fly as STS-38. Two shuttles on their mobile launchers passing in the night was a majestic sight, but not one you want to see if you're trying to get an orbiter launched. None of this told us where the leak was, or if we were dealing with more than one leak source.
Weber, Philip↗
Test Report for the Regulatory Testing of the Welded Isotek-SFC-W-3 Special Form Capsule
Two prototypes the welded ISOTEK-SFC-W-3 special form capsules (SFCs) of the same design were evaluated to determine if the requirements of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 173.469, Tests for Special Form Class 7 (Radioactive) Materials, were met. The results of the special form tests are documented in this test report. This report describes the special form testing activities performed on the two welded ISOTEK-SFC-W-3 capsules. The test units were designated as TU-1 and TU-2. TU-1 was subjected to leak testing, percussion testing, and impact testing. TU-1 was leak tested using the leak rate test specified in 49 CFR 173.469(a)(4)(i). The impact test on TU-1 was conducted according to the requirements in 49 CFR 173.469 (b)(1). The percussion test that was carried out on TU-1 was conducted in accordance with 49 CFR 173.469 (b)(2). TU-2 was subjected to a leak rate test as specified in 173.469(a)(4)(i) and a heat test as specified in 49 CFR 173.469(b)(4). Each test unit was leak tested before and after these respective tests. The leak rate tests performed were helium back-pressure tests and bubble tests, as specified in American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N14.5-2014. The measured leak rates were converted to standard condition leak rates as specified in American Society for Testing and Measurement (ASTM) E 493. The determined standardized leak rates obtained from the test and the calculations for all the test units met the requirements for special form certification. The testing was performed under the direction of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Package Testing Program (PTP).
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Assessing the Potential Impact of Fugitive Methane Emissions on Offshore Platform Safety
One of the biggest risks to safety on offshore platform safety is the ignition of high-pressure natural gas streams. Currently, the size and number of fugitive emissions on offshore platforms is unknown and methods used to detect fugitives have significant shortcomings. To investigate the frequency, size, and potential impact of fugitives, a data collection exercise was conducted using incidents reported, leak survey data, and independent measurements. The size and number of fugitives on offshore facilities were simulated to investigate likely areas of safety concern. Incident reports indicate in 2021 there were 113 reports of gas leaks on 1119 offshore facilities, suggesting 0.02 fugitives per Type 1 facility (older, shallow-water platforms) and 0.31 fugitives per Type 2 facility (larger deeper-water facilities). Leak survey data report 12 fugitives per Type 1 facility (average emission 0.6 kg CH 4 h −1 leak −1 ) and 15 fugitives per Type 2 facility (average emission 1.5 kg CH 4 h −1 leak −1 ). Reconciliation of direct measurements with a bottom-up model suggests that the number of fugitive emissions generated from the leak report data is an underestimate for Type 1 platforms (44 fugitives facility −1 ; average emission 0.6 kg CH 4 h −1 leak −1 ) and in general agreement for the Type 2 platforms (15 fugitives facility −1 ; average emission 1.5 kg CH 4 h −1 leak −1 ). Analysis of the fugitive emission rates on an offshore platform suggests that gas will not collect to explosive concentration if any air movement is present (>0.36 mph); however, large volumes of air (~600 m 3 ) near representative leaks on the working deck could become explosive in hour-long zero-wind conditions. We suggest that wearable technology could be employed to indicate gas build up, safety regulations amended to consider low-wind conditions and real-world experiments are conducted to test assumptions of air mixing on the working deck.
explosion↗
Microfabricated Hydrogen Sensor Technology for Aerospace and Commercial Applications
Leaks on the Space Shuttle while on the Launch Pad have generated interest in hydrogen leak monitoring technology. An effective leak monitoring system requires reliable hydrogen sensors, hardware, and software to monitor the sensors. The system should process the sensor outputs and provide real-time leak monitoring information to the operator. This paper discusses the progress in developing such a complete leak monitoring system. Advanced microfabricated hydrogen sensors are being fabricated at Case Western Reserve University (CWRU) and tested at NASA Lewis Research Center (LeRC) and Gencorp Aerojet (Aerojet). Changes in the hydrogen concentrations are detected using a PdAg on silicon Schottky diode structure. Sensor temperature control is achieved with a temperature sensor and heater fabricated onto the sensor chip. Results of the characterization of these sensors are presented. These sensors can detect low concentrations of hydrogen in inert environments with high sensitivity and quick response time. Aerojet is developing the hardware and software for a multipoint leak monitoring system designed to provide leak source and magnitude information in real time. The monitoring system processes data from the hydrogen sensors and presents the operator with a visual indication of the leak location and magnitude. Work has commenced on integrating the NASA LeRC-CWRU hydrogen sensors with the Aerojet designed monitoring system. Although the leak monitoring system was designed for hydrogen propulsion systems, the possible applications of this monitoring system are wide ranged. Possible commercialization of the system will also be discussed.
Hunter, Gary W.↗
Assessment of the hydrogen external tank pressure decay anomaly on Space Transportation System (STS) 51-L
Following the Challenger tragedy, an evaluation of the integrated main propulsion system flight data revealed a premature decay in the hydrogen external tank ullage pressure. A reconstruction of predicted ullage pressure versus time indicated an inconsistency between predicted and measured ullage pressure starting at approximately 65.5 seconds into the flight and reaching a maximum value between 72 and 72.9 seconds. This discrepancy could have been caused by a hydrogen gas leak or by a liquied hydrogen leak that occurred either in the pressurization system or in the external tank. The corresponding leak rates over the time interval from 65.5 to 72.9 seconds were estimated to range from 0.28 kg/s (0.62 lbm/s) + or - 41 percent to between 0.43 and 0.51kg/s (0.94 and 1.12lbs/s) + or - 1 percent for a gas leak and from 72.9 kg/s (160.5 lbs/s) + or - 41 percent to between 111.6 and 133.2 kg/s (245.8 and 293.3 lbs/s) + or - 1 percent for a liquid leak. No speculation is made to ascertain whether the leak is liquid or gas, as this cannot be determined from the analysis performed. Four structural failures in the hydrogen external tank were considered to explain the leak rates. A break in the 5-cm (2 in) pressurization line, in the 13-cm (5 in) vent line, or in the 43-cm (17 in) feedline is not likely. A break in the 10-cm (4 in) recirculation line with a larger structural failure occurring in the 72 to 73-second time period, the time of the visibly identified premature pressure decay, does seem plausible and the most likely of the four modes considered. These modes are not all-inclusive and do not preclude the possibility of a leak elsewhere in the tank.
Buckley, Theresa M.↗
Quantitative Risk Assessment for Fuel Cell Electric Bus Hydrogen Storage and Refueling Facility
It is necessary to understand the safety implications and risk mitigation options for fuel cell electric bus fleet deployment, especially for related facilities responsible for operations such as production, storage, compression, and dispensing of hydrogen for use by the buses. In this report, we present a quantitative risk assessment for a potential fuel cell electric bus fleet that was motivated by efforts to improve resilience at the Portland International Airport but can be applicable to a range of hydrogen case studies and use cases. We estimated risk for a facility that produces, stores, compresses, and dispenses hydrogen for the fleet of buses, with a focus on individual risk to people in terms of annual frequency of fatality. We considered the frequency of hydrogen leaks that could result in harmful physical outcomes like jet fires or explosions, and the consequences of those outcomes for people. We created customized fault trees to calculate the frequencies of different sizes of leaks and event sequence diagrams to calculate ignition probabilities for the various leak sizes. We also leveraged the HyRAM+ toolkit to use these inputs to calculate overall risk for the facility, which we separated into one section responsible for producing, storing, and compressing hydrogen, and one section responsible for dispensing the hydrogen to the buses. We found that the dispensing area seemed to have a higher risk than the production/storage/compression area of the facility, largely because of the inclusion of a component with a high leak frequency (the heat exchanger used to cool the hydrogen before entering the vehicle, to prevent overheating and expansion of hydrogen in the onboard tank). For the example production and refueling facility we evaluated and the data we used for the analysis, the leak frequency had a larger impact on the risk differences between the two sections on the facility, compared to the physical outcome consequence, which was slightly different due to the varying fuel conditions, but not substantially different. Actions can be taken to prevent these hazards (e.g., lowering leak frequencies in system components) or to mitigate the consequences if they do occur (e.g., installing barriers to protect people if ignition events occur). The choice of which actions to take depends not only on safety considerations but also on space, time, staffing, feasibility, and financial constraints. Therefore, the quantitative risk assessment approach can help understand relative risk contributions from different components, leak sizes, consequences, and human actions, to prioritize risk reduction strategies and balance these parameters. The outcomes of this report may be useful for a variety of stakeholders working in the hydrogen, transportation, vehicle, and aviation sector, including those responsible for aspects like facility design, operations, and regulations. There is not a single value of risk that determines whether a hypothetical system is “safe” or not. The insights about risk mitigations may be leveraged, and the quantitative risk assessment approach can be applied to other case studies to understand risk priorities and contributions specific to different FCEB and hydrogen facility uses.
08 HYDROGEN↗
Investigative techniques used to locate the liquid hydrogen leakage on the Space Shuttle Main Propulsion System
Standard leak detection methods at ambient temperature have been developed in order to prevent excessive leakage from the Space Shuttle liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen Main Propulsion System. Unacceptable hydrogen leakage was encountered on the Columbia and Atlantis flight vehicles in the summer of 1990 after the standard leak check requirements had been satisfied. The leakage was only detectable when the fuel system was exposed to subcooled liquid hydrogen during External Tank loading operations. Special instrumentation and analytical tools were utilized during a series of propellant tanking tests in order to identify the sources of the hydrogen leakage. After the leaks were located and corrected, the physical characteristics of the leak sources were analyzed in an effort to understand how the discrepancies were introduced and why the leakage had evaded the standard leak detection methods. As a result of the post-leak analysis, corrective actions and leak detection improvements have been implemented in order to preclude a similar incident.
Hammock, William R., Jr.↗
Command and Control Software Development Memory Management
This internship was initially meant to cover the implementation of unit test automation for a NASA ground control project. As is often the case with large development projects, the scope and breadth of the internship changed. Instead, the internship focused on finding and correcting memory leaks and errors as reported by a COTS software product meant to track such issues. Memory leaks come in many different flavors and some of them are more benign than others. On the extreme end a program might be dynamically allocating memory and not correctly deallocating it when it is no longer in use. This is called a direct memory leak and in the worst case can use all the available memory and crash the program. If the leaks are small they may simply slow the program down which, in a safety critical system (a system for which a failure or design error can cause a risk to human life), is still unacceptable. The ground control system is managed in smaller sub-teams, referred to as CSCIs. The CSCI that this internship focused on is responsible for monitoring the health and status of the system. This team's software had several methods/modules that were leaking significant amounts of memory. Since most of the code in this system is safety-critical, correcting memory leaks is a necessity.
Programmin↗
Fitness For Service Assessment of a Corroded Heat Exchanger
Within the Fermi National Accelerator complex, there exist various water systems that support accelerator operations. One of these systems is extremely vital to the operation of the machine; that is the cooling system. The cooling system consists of nine relatively large heat exchangers that take untreated pond water and use it to cool the process fluid that further cools machine components. Over the 30 years these heat exchangers have been in operation, they have undergone significant material loss on the channels. This material loss, due to various forms of corrosion such as galvanic and microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC) and possibly others, has deteriorated more than 80% of the nominal wall thickness of some of the exchangers and placed them in a questionable state. ASME FFS-1 (API 579) has been applied to address the condition of the heat exchangers due to their noncompliance with the governing code, BPVC Sec. VIII Div. 1. The assessments encompassed ASME FFS-1 parts 4: General Metal Loss and 9: Crack Like Flaw using level 1, 2, and 3 analysis techniques based on inspection data obtained by API 510 inspections. Level 1 and 2 assessments were deemed unfit for the corroded regions due to their location relative to a major structural discontinuity (channel to tube-sheet joint), so a level 3 analysis was conducted according to ASME Sec. VIII Div. 2 (design by analysis) rules for pressure vessels. Supplemental information included pond water tests to determine an accurate future corrosion allowance due to lacking inspection history. A leak before break (LBB) route was chosen to evaluate the possibility of leaking prior to the onset of failure. The analysis of one heat exchanger shows that the possibility the channel will develop a pinhole leak over 2.5 more years of operation should not be overlooked, but burst was unlikely from operation. The use of fracture mechanics show, that if a through-wall crack were to develop, it would not propagate further than the channel geometry and cause a leak not greater than 35 GPM. Using ASME Section XI Code Case N-705-1, allowing us to operate with a leak until the next outage given certain operating conditions and developing a leak mitigation procedure, this heat exchanger is deemed fit-for-service.
Humenik, Alex [Fermilab]↗
Total hydrocarbon analysis by ion mobility spectrometry
Astronauts must be alerted quickly to chemical leaks that compromise their health and the success of their missions. An ideal leak detector would be equally sensitive to all compounds that might constitute a hazard and insensitive to nontoxic compounds. No ideal sensor exists; thus, selection of a methodology is a series of compromises. The commonly used methods are either insensitive at the low exposure levels set by OSHA, NASA, and other organizations or are selectively insensitive to important classes of chemicals such as Freons. After extensive study and experience, the Toxicology Group at JSC has selected ion mobility spectrometry (IMS) for development into a broad range, sensitive detector. In addition to the sensing method, signal processing is important leak detection because a background signal can be expected at all times. The leak-detecting instrument must be programmed to discriminate between authentic leaks and background fluctuations caused by routine operations. The results of an evaluation of the prototype THA is presented in terms related to spacecraft operations. The evaluation included determination of instrumental parameters such as stability and response times. We also included responses to some common components of spacecraft atmospheres in pure form and in binary and ternary mixtures. The output of the four algorithms to the mixtures was found to be noticeably different. These responses are compared on the basis of their utility for signaling a chemical leak. As a means of evaluating its resistance to a falsely positive response, the THA was challenged with carbon dioxide and methane, compounds whose concentrations normally increase in spacecraft air during human habitation. The instrument showed virtually no response to these interferences. Although the prototype THA is designed for space flight, this detector is expected to be useful for field screening at chemical waste dumps and other environmentally sensitive locations.
Cross, John H.↗
Hydrogen Sensors Boost Hybrids; Today's Models Losing Gas?
Advanced chemical sensors are used in aeronautic and space applications to provide safety monitoring, emission monitoring, and fire detection. In order to fully do their jobs, these sensors must be able to operate in a range of environments. NASA has developed sensor technologies addressing these needs with the intent of improving safety, optimizing combustion efficiencies, and controlling emissions. On the ground, the chemical sensors were developed by NASA engineers to detect potential hydrogen leaks during Space Shuttle launch operations. The Space Shuttle uses a combination of hydrogen and oxygen as fuel for its main engines. Liquid hydrogen is pumped to the external tank from a storage tank located several hundred feet away. Any hydrogen leak could potentially result in a hydrogen fire, which is invisible to the naked eye. It is important to detect the presence of a hydrogen fire in order to prevent a major accident. In the air, the same hydrogen-leak dangers are present. Stress and temperature changes can cause tiny cracks or holes to form in the tubes that line the Space Shuttle s main engine nozzle. Such defects could allow the hydrogen that is pumped through the nozzle during firing to escape. Responding to the challenges associated with pinpointing hydrogen leaks, NASA endeavored to improve propellant leak-detection capabilities during assembly, pre-launch operations, and flight. The objective was to reduce the operational cost of assembling and maintaining hydrogen delivery systems with automated detection systems. In particular, efforts have been focused on developing an automated hydrogen leak-detection system using multiple, networked hydrogen sensors that are operable in harsh conditions.
Source record↗
Apparatus for Testing Flat Specimens of Thermal Insulation
An apparatus has been developed to implement an improved method of testing flat-plate specimens of thermal-insulation materials for cryogenic application. The method includes testing under realistic use conditions that could include vacuum and mechanical loading at a pressure up to 70 psi (=0.48 MPa). The apparatus can accommodate a rigid or flexible specimen having thickness up to 1.25 in. (=3.2 cm) and diameters between 6 and 10 in. (about 15.2 and 25.4 cm, respectively). Typical test conditions include boundary temperatures between 77 K and 373 K and vacuum/interstitial gas filling at a pressure between 10(exp -6) torr (=1.3 x 10(exp -4) Pa) and 760 torr (atmospheric pressure =0.1 MPa). The interstitial gas could be N2, He, CO2, or any other suitable gas to which the insulation is expected to be exposed in use. Relative to prior apparatuses and testing methods, this apparatus and the testing method that it implements offer advantages of relative simplicity and ease of use. The basic principle of operation of the apparatus is that of boil-off calorimetry, using liquid nitrogen or any other suitable liquid that boils at a desired temperature below ambient temperature. Comparative rates of flow of heat through the thicknesses of the specimens (heat-leak rates) and apparent-thermal-conductivity values are obtained from tests of specimens. Absolute values of heat-leak rates and apparent thermal conductivities are computed from a combination of (1) the aforementioned comparative values and (2) calibration factors obtained by testing reference specimens of materials that have known thermal-insulation properties. The apparatus includes a full complement of temperature sensors, a vacuum pump and chamber, a monitoring and control system, and tools and fixtures that enable rapid and reliable installation and removal of specimens. A specimen is installed at the bottom of the vacuum chamber, and a cold-mass assembly that includes a tank is lowered into position above and around the specimen (see figure). A spring-based compensating fixture helps to ensure adequate thermal contact with possibly irregular specimen surfaces. For a high-compression test, the springs can be replaced with spacers. A flat circular load cell at the bottom of the chamber measures the compressive load on the specimen. Once the desired compressive-load, temperature, and vacuum/gas-filling conditions are established, testing begins. During a test, all measurements are recorded by use of a portable data-acquisition system and a computer. The total heat-leak rate is measured and calculated as the boil-off flow rate multiplied by the latent heat of vaporization. The parasitic heat leak (to the side of the specimen and to the top and side of the cold-mass tank) is reduced to a small fraction of the total heat leak by use of a combination of multilayer-insulation (MLI) shield rings, reflective film, a fiberglass/epoxy centering ring, and a bulk fill of aerogel beads. This combination eliminates the need for a cryogenic guard chamber used in a typical prior apparatus to reduce the parasitic heat leak.
Fesmire, James E.↗
Elastomeric Seal Performance after Terrestrial Ultraviolet Radiation Exposure
Ultraviolet radiation was evaluated to determine its negative effects on the performance of elastomeric gas pressure seals. The leak rates of the silicone elastomer S0383-70 O-ring test articles were used to quantify the degradation of the seals after exposure to vacuum-ultraviolet and/or middle-to-near-ultraviolet wavelength radiation. Three groups of seals were exposed in terrestrial facilities to 115-165 nm wavelength radiation, 230-500 nm wavelength radiation, or both spectrums, for an orbital spaceflight equivalent of 125 hours. The leak rates of the silicone elastomer S0383-70 seals were quantified and compared to samples that received no radiation. Each lot contained six samples and statistical t-tests were used to determine the separate and combined influences of exposure to the two wavelength ranges. A comparison of the mean leak rates of samples exposed to 115-165 nm wavelength radiation to the control specimens showed no difference, suggesting that spectrum was not damaging. The 230-500 nm wavelength appeared to be damaging, as the mean leak rates of the specimens exposed to that range of wavelengths, and those exposed to the combined 115-165 nm and 230-500 nm spectrums, were significantly different from the leak rates of the control specimens. Most importantly, the test articles exposed to both wavelength spectrums exhibited mean leak rates two orders of magnitude larger than any other exposed specimens, which suggested that both wavelength spectrums are important when simulating the orbital environment.
leakage↗
Dust Tolerance Characterization of Lunar Docking and Hatch Seals
Low-leakage seals are an enabling technology for future lunar surface systems, and they must be kept clean to ensure that crews have sufficient breathable air for extended lunar surface missions. Previous testing has shown that contamination and debris on seals can cause them to exhibit higher leak rates. However, seal performance in the presence of lunar dust has not been thoroughly characterized, and the size and concentration of dust particles that cause seal leak rates to become unacceptable have not been defined or well understood. To address this knowledge gap, researchers at the NASA Glenn Research Center have been executing a multiphase study to better understand and mitigate seal dust-exposure risks. The focus of this paper is on the first phase of that study, in which tests were conducted to develop a performance database for two representative state-of-the-art seal designs. Leak rates are presented for seals with varying levels of dust contamination, and breakthrough points are identified at which seal leak rates exceeded equivalent leak rate requirements. This phase of the study also investigated the effects of temperature on the seals’ ability to hold pressure when contaminated with dust.
Dust Mitigation↗
Quantitative Risk Assessment for Hydrogen-Powered Locomotive Refueling
Hydrogen powered locomotives are being explored to reduce emissions in rail applications. The risks of operations like refueling should be understood to ensure safe environments for workers and members of the public. Sensitivity analyses were conducted using HyRAM+ to identify major drivers of risk and compare effects of system parameters on individual risk. The consequences of jet fires from full-bore leaks dominated the risk, compared to explosions or smaller leaks. Pipe size, leak detection capability, and leak frequencies of system components greatly affected risk while overpressure modeling parameters and ambient conditions had little effect. The effects of personal protective equipment (PPE) materials on individual risk were quantified by reducing the individual’s exposure time or absorbed thermal dose. PPE only showed a risk reduction in low-risk cases. This study highlighted target areas for risk mitigation, including leak detection equipment and component maintenance, and indicated that the minimal effects of other parameters on risk may not justify prescriptive requirements for refueling operators.
08 HYDROGEN↗
Radiolytic Gas Generation and Pressure Buildup in a Closed System Containing Mo-99 Solution
This study measured radiolytic gas generation and pressure buildup in a sealed stainless-steel system containing alkaline Mo-99 solution with added sodium nitrate as a hydrogen suppressant. In each of two experiments, approximately 200 Ci of Mo-99 solution was transferred into a closed experimental vessel inside a hot cell, isolated, and monitored for pressure rise caused by gas generation during radioactive decay. After pressure buildup, headspace gas samples were collected and analyzed by mass spectrometry to determine hydrogen and oxygen concentrations. The purpose was to quantify the magnitude of pressure buildup in a closed system and to characterize the gas composition produced by radiolysis of the Mo-99 target solution under representative handling and storage conditions. The two experiments used similar total Mo-99 activity but differed in solution volume, headspace volume, and leak integrity. In the first experiment, 197.5 Ci of Mo-99 in 16.92 mL of solution was loaded into a vessel with a 31.1-mL headspace; a small leak was later identified, and the measured peak pressure of 46 psig was extrapolated to about 70 psig in the absence of leakage. The headspace gas from this experiment contained about 21.4% H2 and 63.4% O2, but the composition was influenced by preferential hydrogen loss through the leak. In the second experiment, 193 Ci of Mo-99 in 5.41 mL of solution with 0.46 g NaNO3 was loaded into a vessel with a larger 42.61 mL headspace, and no detectable leak was observed. This experiment reached a peak pressure of 38 psig, and the measured gas composition was approximately 28.2% H2 and 51.5% O2. Because the second experiment was leak-free, it is considered the more reliable indicator of the true pressure buildup and intrinsic radiolytic gas composition of the Mo-99 solution.
Chemerisov, Sergey D.↗