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NASA NTRS2015

Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS) Project Overview

The main objective of the Total and Spectral solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS) is to acquire measurements to determine the direct and indirect effects of solar radiation on climate. TSIS total solar irradiance measurements will extend a 37-year long uninterrupted measurement record of incoming solar radiation, the dominant energy source driving the Earths climate and the most precise indicator of changes in the Suns energy output. TSIS solar spectral irradiance measurements will determine the regions of the Earths multi-layered atmosphere that are affected by solar variability, from which the solar forcing mechanisms causing changes in climate can be quantified. TSIS includes two instruments: the Total Irradiance Monitor (TIM) and the Spectral Irradiance Monitor (SIM), integrated into a single payload. The TSIS TIM and SIM instruments are upgraded versions of the two instruments that are flying on the Solar Radiation and Climate Experiment (SORCE) mission launched in January 2003. TSIS was originally planned for the nadir-pointing National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) spacecraft. The TSIS instrument passed a Critical Design Review (CDR) for NPOESS in December 2009. In 2010, TSIS was re-planned for the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) Polar Free Flyer (PFF). The TSIS TIM, SIM, and associated electronics were built, tested, and successfully completed pre-ship review as of December 2013.In early 2014, NOAA and NASA agreed to fly TSIS on the International Space Station (ISS). In the FY16 Presidents Budget, NASA assumes responsibility for the TSIS mission on ISS. The TSIS project includes requirements, interface, design, build and test of the TSIS payload, including an updated pointing system, for accommodation on the ISS. It takes advantage of the prior development of the TSIS sensors and electronics. The International Space Station (ISS) program contributions include launch services and robotic installation of the TSIS payload onto an ISS Express Logistics Carrier, mission operations, and communications. Total and Spectral solar irradiance data products will be produced, calibrated, and made publically available through the Goddard Earth Science Data and Information Services Center (GES DISC).The NASA GSFC TSIS project at GSFC is responsible for project management, system engineering, safety and mission assurance, and engineering oversight for the TSIS payload. The TSIS project has contracted with the University of Colorado Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics (LASP) for the design, development and testing of TSIS, support for ISS integration, science operations of the TSIS instrument, data processing, data evaluation and delivery to the GES DISC. TSIS will be delivered to Kennedy Space Center for integration in 2017, with launch and installation onto ISS planned for late 2017-early 2018. After a 90-day check-out period, NASA plans five years of TSIS operations.

spectral emission↗

NASA NTRS2016

Human Exploration System Test-Bed for Integration and Advancement (HESTIA) Support of Future NASA Deep-Space Missions

The Engineering Directorate at the NASA - Johnson Space Center is outfitting a 20-Foot diameter hypobaric chamber in Building 7 to support future deep-space Environmental Control & Life Support System (ECLSS) research as part of the Human Exploration System Test-bed for Integration and Advancement (HESTIA) Project. This human-rated chamber is the only NASA facility that has the unique experience, chamber geometry, infrastructure, and support systems capable of conducting this research. The chamber was used to support Gemini, Apollo, and SkyLab Missions. More recently, it was used to conduct 30-, 60-, and 90-day human ECLSS closed-loop testing in the 1990s to support the International Space Station and life support technology development. NASA studies show that both planetary surface and deep-space transit crew habitats will be 3-4 story cylindrical structures driven by human occupancy volumetric needs and launch vehicle constraints. The HESTIA facility offers a 3-story, 20-foot diameter habitat consistent with the studies' recommendations. HESTIA operations follow stringent processes by a certified test team that including human testing. Project management, analysis, design, acquisition, fabrication, assembly and certification of facility build-ups are available to support this research. HESTIA offers close proximity to key stakeholders including astronauts, Human Research Program (who direct space human research for the agency), Mission Operations, Safety & Mission Assurance, and Engineering Directorate. The HESTIA chamber can operate at reduced pressure and elevated oxygen environments including those proposed for deep-space exploration. Data acquisition, power, fluids and other facility resources are available to support a wide range of research. Recently completed HESTIA research consisted of unmanned testing of ECLSS technologies. Eventually, the HESTIA research will include humans for extended durations at reduced pressure and elevated oxygen to demonstrate very high reliability of critical ECLSS and other technologies.

Marmolejo, Jose↗

NASA NTRS2016

Managing a Safe and Successful Multi-User Spaceport

Encouraged by the creation of the Office of Commercial Space Transportation within the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 1984 and the Commercial Space Act of 1998, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) now relies on an extensive network of support from commercial companies and organizations. At NASA's Kennedy Space Center (KSC), this collaboration opens competitive opportunities for launch providers, including repurposing underutilized Shuttle Program resources, constructing new facilities, and utilizing center services and laboratories. The resulting multi-user spaceport fosters diverse activity, though it engenders risk from hazards associated with various spaceflight processing activities. The KSC Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate, in coordination with the center's Spaceport Integration and Center Planning & Development organizations, has developed a novel approach to protect NASA's workforce, critical assets, and the public from hazardous, space-related activity associated with KSC's multi-user spaceport. For NASA KSC S&MA, the transformation to a multi-user spaceport required implementing methods to foster safe and successful commercial activity while resolving challenges involving: Retirement of the Space Shuttle program; Co-location of multiple NASA programs; Relationships between the NASA programs; Complex relationships between NASA programs and commercial partner operations in exclusive-use facilities; Complex relationships between NASA programs and commercial partner operations in shared-use facilities. NASA KSC S&MA challenges were met with long-term planning and solutions involving cooperation with the Spaceport Integration and Services Directorate. This directorate is responsible for managing active commercial partnerships with customer advocacy and services management, providing a dedicated and consistent level of support to a wide array of commercial operations. This paper explores these solutions, their relevance to the current commercial space industry, and the challenges that continue to drive improvement with a focus on areas of safety management and risk assessment that have been crucial in KSC's evolution into a multi-user spaceport. These solutions may be useful to government entities and private companies looking to partner with the commercial space industry.

Range↗

NASA NTRS2016

Flat H Frangible Joint Evolution

Space vehicle staging and separation events require pyrotechnic devices. They are single-use mechanisms that cannot be tested, nor can failure-tolerant performance be demonstrated in actual flight articles prior to flight use. This necessitates the implementation of a robust design and test approach coupled with a fully redundant, failure-tolerant explosive mechanism to ensure that the system functions even in the event of a single failure. Historically, NASA has followed the single failure-tolerant (SFT) design philosophy for all human-rated spacecraft, including the Space Shuttle Program. Following the end of this program, aerospace companies proposed building the next generation human-rated vehicles with off-the-shelf, non-redundant, zero-failure-tolerant (ZFT) separation systems. Currently, spacecraft and launch vehicle providers for both the Orion and Commercial Crew Programs (CCPs) plan to deviate from the heritage safety approach and NASA's SFT human rating requirements. Both programs' partners have base-lined ZFT frangible joints for vehicle staging and fairing separation. These joints are commercially available from pyrotechnic vendors. Non-human-rated missions have flown them numerous times. The joints are relatively easy to integrate structurally within the spacecraft. In addition, the separation event is debris free, and the resultant pyro shock is lower than that of other design solutions. It is, however, a serious deficiency to lack failure tolerance. When used for critical applications on human-rated vehicles, a single failure could potentially lead to loss of crew (LOC) or loss of mission (LOM)). The Engineering and Safety & Mission Assurance directorates within the NASA Johnson Space Center took action to address this safety issue by initiating a project to develop a fully redundant, SFT frangible joint design, known as the Flat H. Critical to the ability to retrofit on launch vehicles being developed, the SFT mechanisms must fit within the same three-dimensional envelope as current designs as well as meet structural loads requirements. There is increased mass associated with the redundant design, and the goal is to minimize the weight impact as much as possible. These requirements presented significant challenges, both technically and financially; these challenges will be explored in this paper. Perhaps greater than the technical issues confronted during this design process, were the financial considerations. These were a significant part of the story of this design and development plan. Insufficient financial and labor resources were formidable barriers to completing this project. Nevertheless, JSC personnel successfully conducted several test series at JSC with very useful results. The many lessons learned drove design improvements, performance efficiency, and increased functional reliability. This paper examines the significant technical and financial challenges that these requirements posed to the project team. It discusses the evolution of the SFT frangible joint design, including optimization, testing, and successful partnering of the Johnson Space Center (JSC) engineering and JSC safety organizations, to enhance the flight safety margin for America's next generation of human-rated space vehicles.

Diegelman, Thomas E.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Probabilistic Survivability Versus Time Modeling

This presentation documents Kennedy Space Center's Independent Assessment work completed on three assessments for the Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) Program to assist the Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer during key programmatic reviews and provided the GSDO Program with analyses of how egress time affects the likelihood of astronaut and ground worker survival during an emergency. For each assessment, a team developed probability distributions for hazard scenarios to address statistical uncertainty, resulting in survivability plots over time. The first assessment developed a mathematical model of probabilistic survivability versus time to reach a safe location using an ideal Emergency Egress System at Launch Complex 39B (LC-39B); the second used the first model to evaluate and compare various egress systems under consideration at LC-39B. The third used a modified LC-39B model to determine if a specific hazard decreased survivability more rapidly than other events during flight hardware processing in Kennedy's Vehicle Assembly Building.

Operational Hazards↗

NASA NTRS2016

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshal Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗

NASA NTRS2016

S&MA Internship to Support Orion and the European Service Module

As a University Space Research Association (USRA) intern for NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) during the summer 2016 work term, I worked on three main projects for the Space Exploration Division (NC) of the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate. I worked on all three projects concurrently. One of the projects involved facilitating the status and closure of technical actions that were created during European Service Module (ESM) safety reviews by the MPCV Safety & Engineering Review Panel (MSERP). The two main duties included accurately collecting and summarizing qualitative data, and communicating that information to the European Space Agency (ESA) and Airbus (ESA's prime contractor) in a clear, succinct and precise manner. This project also required that I create a report on the challenges and opportunities of international S&MA. With its heavy emphasis on soft skills, this project taught me how to communicate better, by showing me how to present and share information in an easy-to-read and understandable format, and by showing me how to cooperate with and culturally respect international partners on a technical project. The second project involved working with the Orion Thermal Protection System (TPS) Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (PFMEA) Working Group to create the first full version of the Orion TPS PFMEA. The Orion TPS PFMEA Working Group met twice a week to analyze the Avcoat block installation process for failure modes, the failure modes effects, and how such failure modes could be controlled. I was in charge of implementing changes that were discussed in meeting, but were not implemented real time. Another major task included creating a significant portion of the content alongside another team member outside the two weekly meetings. This project caused me to become knowledgeable about TPS, heatshields, space-rated manufacturing, and non-destructive evaluation (NDE). The project also helped me to become better at working with a small team and helped improved my technical communication skills. My main duty for the third project was creating a Safety Verification Tracking Log (SVTL) for the Orbital Maneuvering System Engine (OMS-E), and contacting subject matter experts to close Hazard Report (HR) control verifications. This project also required me to support other OMS-E safety process tasks, like monitoring OMS-E vibration testing for Quality Assurance (QA) purposes. This project helped me become even more proficient in Excel. Throughout the project, I gained knowledge about the OMS-E system and improved my understanding of pressure systems and propellant systems. In terms of education goals, this work term has affirmed my desire to take a few more space-related courses, like orbital mechanics, so that I can have a better understanding of human spaceflight and the industry surrounding it. However, the work term did not persuade me to pursue a master's degree. In terms of career goals, this work term has helped me clarify the direction I would like to head in the future. The perspective of three summer terms working for NASA in S&MA has allowed me to observe that most S&MA employees joined S&MA after working in other NASA directorates, such as Engineering or Flight Operations. It is my belief that it would be advantageous for both NASA and I for me to broaden my knowledge base and technical skill set by completing hands-on technical work on human spaceflight projects, and for me to integrate my safety experience directly into technical work in other directorates. The other significant advantage to this proposed situation is that if I were to eventually return to S&MA, I would be returning with a substantial set of hands-on technical experience and knowledge, which would be a significant resource for S&MA tasks and projects.

Hutcheson, Connor↗

NASA NTRS2016

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (Orion)

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. In order to determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana↗

NASA NTRS2017

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (Orion)

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. To determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators, and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules, and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana L.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Modeling in the State Flow Environment to Support Launch Vehicle Verification Testing for Mission and Fault Management Algorithms in the NASA Space Launch System

Analysis methods and testing processes are essential activities in the engineering development and verification of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) new Space Launch System (SLS). Central to mission success is reliable verification of the Mission and Fault Management (M&FM) algorithms for the SLS launch vehicle (LV) flight software. This is particularly difficult because M&FM algorithms integrate and operate LV subsystems, which consist of diverse forms of hardware and software themselves, with equally diverse integration from the engineering disciplines of LV subsystems. M&FM operation of SLS requires a changing mix of LV automation. During pre-launch the LV is primarily operated by the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) organization with some LV automation of time-critical functions, and much more autonomous LV operations during ascent that have crucial interactions with the Orion crew capsule, its astronauts, and with mission controllers at the Johnson Space Center. M&FM algorithms must perform all nominal mission commanding via the flight computer to control LV states from pre-launch through disposal and also address failure conditions by initiating autonomous or commanded aborts (crew capsule escape from the failing LV), redundancy management of failing subsystems and components, and safing actions to reduce or prevent threats to ground systems and crew. To address the criticality of the verification testing of these algorithms, the NASA M&FM team has utilized the State Flow environment6 (SFE) with its existing Vehicle Management End-to-End Testbed (VMET) platform which also hosts vendor-supplied physics-based LV subsystem models. The human-derived M&FM algorithms are designed and vetted in Integrated Development Teams composed of design and development disciplines such as Systems Engineering, Flight Software (FSW), Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) and major subsystems and vehicle elements such as Main Propulsion Systems (MPS), boosters, avionics, Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C), Thrust Vector Control (TVC), liquid engines, and the astronaut crew office. Since the algorithms are realized using model-based engineering (MBE) methods from a hybrid of the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and Systems Modeling Language (SysML), SFE methods are a natural fit to provide an in depth analysis of the interactive behavior of these algorithms with the SLS LV subsystem models. For this, the M&FM algorithms and the SLS LV subsystem models are modeled using constructs provided by Matlab which also enables modeling of the accompanying interfaces providing greater flexibility for integrated testing and analysis, which helps forecast expected behavior in forward VMET integrated testing activities. In VMET, the M&FM algorithms are prototyped and implemented using the same C++ programming language and similar state machine architectural concepts used by the FSW group. Due to the interactive complexity of the algorithms, VMET testing thus far has verified all the individual M&FM subsystem algorithms with select subsystem vendor models but is steadily progressing to assessing the interactive behavior of these algorithms with LV subsystems, as represented by subsystem models. The novel SFE applications has proven to be useful for quick look analysis into early integrated system behavior and assessment of the M&FM algorithms with the modeled LV subsystems. This early MBE analysis generates vital insight into the integrated system behaviors, algorithm sensitivities, design issues, and has aided in the debugging of the M&FM algorithms well before full testing can begin in more expensive, higher fidelity but more arduous environments such as VMET, FSW testing, and the Systems Integration Lab7 (SIL). SFE has exhibited both expected and unexpected behaviors in nominal and off nominal test cases prior to full VMET testing. In many findings, these behavioral characteristics were used to correct the M&FM algorithms, enable better test coverage, and develop more effective test cases for each of the LV subsystems. This has improved the fidelity of testing and planning for the next generation of M&FM algorithms as the SLS program evolves from non-crewed to crewed flight, impacting subsystem configurations and the M&FM algorithms that control them. SFE analysis has improved robustness and reliability of the M&FM algorithms by revealing implementation errors and documentation inconsistencies. It is also improving planning efficiency for future VMET testing of the M&FM algorithms hosted in the LV flight computers, further reducing risk for the SLS launch infrastructure, the SLS LV, and most importantly the crew.

Trevino, Luis↗

NASA NTRS2017

Additive Manufacturing (AM) Activities and Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) at GSFC

NASA personnel will be meeting with a delegation from the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) at Langley Research Center on 2217 through 3217. The purpose of the meeting is a technical interchange between NASA and JAXA to discuss Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) of Additive Manufacturing (AM) parts and the HALT process (relates to accelerated life testing). The visitors will be a small group of Japanese citizens. Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) has been asked to participate in the meeting, either in person or via teleconference. This presentation covers NDE efforts at GSFC and provides a cursory overview of AM and lab capabilities.

additive manufacturing↗

NASA NTRS2017

An Alternative Approach to Human Servicing of Crewed Earth Orbiting Spacecraft

As crewed spacecraft have grown larger and more complex, they have come to rely on spacewalks, or Extravehicular Activities (EVA), for assembly and to assure mission success. Typically, these spacecraft maintain all of the hardware and trained personnel needed to perform an EVA on-board at all times. Maintaining this capability requires up-mass, volume for storage of EVA hardware, crew time for ground and on-orbit training, and on-orbit maintenance of EVA hardware. This paper proposes an alternative methodology, utilizing either launch-on-need hardware and crew or regularly scheduled missions to provide EVA capability for space stations in low Earth orbit after assembly complete. Much the same way that one would call a repairman to fix something at their home these EVAs are dedicated to maintenance and upgrades of the orbiting station. For crew safety contingencies it is assumed the station would be designed such the crew could either solve those issues from inside the spacecraft or use the docked Earth to Orbit vehicles as a return lifeboat, in the same manner as the International Space Station (ISS) which does not rely on EVA for crew safety related contingencies. This approach would reduce ground training requirements for long duration crews, save Intravehicular Activity (IVA) crew time in the form of EVA hardware maintenance and on-orbit training, and lead to more efficient EVAs because they would be performed by specialists with detailed knowledge and training stemming from their direct involvement in the development of the EVA. The on-orbit crew would then be available to focus on the immediate response to any failures such as IVA systems reconfiguration or jumper installation as well as the day-to-day operations of the spacecraft and payloads. This paper will look at how current unplanned EVAs are conducted on ISS, including the time required for preparation, and offer an alternative for future spacecraft. As this methodology relies on the on-time and on-need launch of spacecraft, any space station that utilized this approach would need a robust transportation system, possibly including more than one launch vehicle capable of carrying crew. In addition, the fault tolerance of the future space station would be an important consideration in how much time was available for EVA preparation after the failure. Ideally the fault tolerance of the station would allow for the maintenance tasks to be grouped such that they could be handled by regularly scheduled maintenance visits and not contingency launches. Each future program would have to weigh the risk of on-time launch against the increase in available crew time for the main objective of the spacecraft. This is only one of several ideas that could be used to reduce or eliminate a station's reliance on rapid turnaround EVAs using on-board crew. Others could include having shirt-sleeve access to critical systems or utilizing low pressure temporarily pressurized equipment bays.

Mularski, John R.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) Risk Analysis Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) directorate at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) has applied its knowledge and experience with Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to projects in industries ranging from spacecraft to nuclear power plants. PRA is a comprehensive and structured process for analyzing risk in complex engineered systems and/or processes. The PRA process enables the user to identify potential risk contributors such as, hardware and software failure, human error, and external events. Recent developments in the oil and gas industry have presented opportunities for NASA to lend their PRA expertise to both ongoing and developmental projects within the industry. This paper provides an overview of the PRA process and demonstrates how this process was applied in estimating the probability that a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) operating in the Gulf of Mexico and equipped with a generically configured Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) loses location and needs to initiate an emergency disconnect. The PRA described in this paper is intended to be generic such that the vessel meets the general requirements of an International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)/Circ. 645 Class 3 dynamically positioned vessel. The results of this analysis are not intended to be applied to any specific drilling vessel, although provisions were made to allow the analysis to be configured to a specific vessel if required.

Thigpen, Eric B.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Review of Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human Spaceflight from a Human Factors Perspective

This project aims to identify poor human factors design decisions that led to error-prone systems, or did not facilitate the flight crew making the right choices; and to verify that NASA is effectively preventing similar incidents from occurring again. This analysis was performed by reviewing significant incidents and close calls in human spaceflight identified by the NASA Johnson Space Center Safety and Mission Assurance Flight Safety Office. The review of incidents shows whether the identified human errors were due to the operational phase (flight crew and ground control) or if they initiated at the design phase (includes manufacturing and test). This classification was performed with the aid of the NASA Human Systems Integration domains. This in-depth analysis resulted in a tool that helps with the human factors classification of significant incidents and close calls in human spaceflight, which can be used to identify human errors at the operational level, and how they were or should be minimized. Current governing documents on human systems integration for both government and commercial crew were reviewed to see if current requirements, processes, training, and standard operating procedures protect the crew and ground control against these issues occurring in the future. Based on the findings, recommendations to target those areas are provided.

Silva-Martinez, Jackelynne↗

NASA NTRS2017

Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) Risk Analysis Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)

Thigpen, Eric B.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Strategic Employee Development (SED) Program

As with many other U.S. agencies, succession planning is becoming a critical need for NASA. The primary drivers include (a) NASAs higher-than-average aged workforce with approximately 50 of employees eligible for retirement within 5 years; and (b) employees who need better developmental conversations to increase morale and retention. This problem is particularly concerning for Safety Mission Assurance (SMA) organizations since they traditionally rely on more experienced engineers and specialists to perform their organizations functions.In response to this challenge, the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) SMA organization created the Strategic Employee Development (SED) program. The SED programs goal is to provide a proactive method to counter the primary drivers by creating a deeper bench strength and providing a more comprehensive developmental feedback experience for the employee. The SED is a new succession planning framework that enables customization to any organization, and in this case, specifically for an SMA organization. This is accomplished via the identification of key positions, the corresponding critical competencies, and a process to help managers have relevant and meaningful development conversations with the workforce. As a result of the SED, several tools and products were created that allows management to make better strategic workforce decisions. Although there are opportunities for improvement for the SED program, the most important impact has been on the quality of developmental discussions for employees.

Nguyen, Johnny↗

NASA NTRS2017

Strategic Employee Development in The Government Sector

As with many other U.S. agencies, succession planning is becoming a critical need for NASA. The primary drivers include (a) NASA's higher-than-average aged workforce with approximately 50% of employees eligible for retirement within 5 years; and (b) employees who need better developmental conversations to increase morale and retention. This problem is particularly concerning for Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) organizations since they traditionally rely on more experienced engineers and specialists to perform their organizations' functions. In response to this challenge, the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) S&MA organization created the Strategic Employee Development (SED) program. The SED program's goal is to provide a proactive method to counter the primary drivers by creating a deeper "bench strength" and providing a more comprehensive developmental feedback experience for the employee. The SED is a new succession planning framework that enables customization to any organization, and in this case, specifically for an S&MA organization. This is accomplished via the identification of key positions, the corresponding critical competencies, and a process to help managers have relevant and meaningful development conversations with the workforce. As a result of the SED, several tools and products were created that allows management to make better strategic workforce decisions. Although there are opportunities for improvement for the SED program, the most important impact has been on the quality of developmental discussions for employees.

Nguyen, Johnny↗

NASA NTRS2017

Open-Source RTOS Space Qualification: An RTEMS Case Study

NASA space-qualification of reusable off-the-shelf real-time operating systems (RTOSs) remains elusive due to several factors notably (1) The diverse nature of RTOSs utilized across NASA, (2) No single NASA space-qualification criteria, lack of verification and validation (V&V) analysis, or test beds, and (3) different RTOS heritages, specifically open-source RTOSs and closed vendor-provided RTOSs. As a leader in simulation test beds, the NASA IV&V Program is poised to help jump-start and lead the space-qualification effort of the open source Real-Time Executive for Multiprocessor Systems (RTEMS) RTOS. RTEMS, as a case-study, can be utilized as an example of how to qualify all RTOSs, particularly the reusable non-commercial (open-source) ones that are gaining usage and popularity across NASA. Qualification will improve the overall safety and mission assurance of RTOSs for NASA-agency wide usage. NASA's involvement in space-qualification of an open-source RTOS such as RTEMS will drive the RTOS industry toward a more qualified and mature open-source RTOS product.

Real-time operating system↗