Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “NATURAL RADIOACTIVITY”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 343 records · Page 19
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2015

Hydrothermal Alteration of Glass from Underground Nuclear Tests: Formation and Transport of Pu-clay Colloids at the Nevada National Security Site

The testing of nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS), has led to the deposition of substantial quantities of plutonium into the environment. Approximately 2.8 metric tons (3.1×10 4 TBq) of Pu were deposited in the NNSS subsurface as a result of underground nuclear testing. While 3 H is the most abundant anthropogenic radionuclide deposited in the NNSS subsurface (4.7×10 6 TBq), plutonium is the most abundant from a molar standpoint. The only radioactive elements in greater molar abundance are the naturally occurring K, Th, and U isotopes. 239 Pu and 240 Pu represent the majority of alpha-emitting Pu isotopes. The extreme temperatures associated with underground nuclear tests and the refractory nature of Pu results in most of the Pu (98%) being sequestered in melted rock, referred to as nuclear melt glass (Iaea, 1998). As a result, Pu release to groundwater is controlled, in large part, by the leaching (or dissolution) of nuclear melt glass over time. The factors affecting glass dissolution rates have been studied extensively. The dissolution of Pu-containing borosilicate nuclear waste glasses at 90ºC has been shown to lead to the formation of dioctahedral smectite colloids. Colloid-facilitated transport of Pu at the NNSS has been observed. Recent groundwater samples collected from a number of contaminated wells have yielded a wide range of Pu concentrations from 0.00022 to 2.0 Bq/L. While Pu concentrations tend to fall below the Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL) established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for drinking water (0.56 Bq/L), we do not yet understand what factors limit the Pu concentration or its transport behavior. To quantify the upper limit of Pu concentrations produced as a result of melt glass dissolution and determine the nature of colloids and Pu associations, we performed a 3 year nuclear melt glass dissolution experiment across a range of temperatures (25-200 °C) that represent hydrothermal conditions representative of the underground nuclear test cavities (when groundwater has re-saturated the nuclear melt glass and glass dissolution occurs). Colloid loads and Pu concentrations were monitored along with the mineralogy of both the colloids and the secondary mineral phases. The intent was to establish an upper limit for Pu concentrations at the NNSS, provide context regarding the Pu concentrations observed at the NNSS to date and the Pu concentrations that may be observed in the future. The results provide a conceptual model for the risks posed by Pu migration at the NNSS.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2013

German Support Program for Retrieval and Safe Storage of Disused Radioactive Sealed Sources in Ukraine - 13194

The German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany supports the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) in enhancement of nuclear safety and radiation protection and strengthening of the physical protection. One of the main objectives of the agreement concluded by these parties in 2008 was the retrieval and safe interim storage of disused orphan high radioactive sealed sources in Ukraine. At present, the Ukrainian National Registry does not account all high active radiation sources but only for about 70 - 80 %. GRS in charge of BMU to execute the program since 2008 concluded subcontracts with the waste management and interim storage facilities RADON at different regions in Ukraine as well with the waste management and interim storage facility IZOTOP at Kiev. Below selected examples of removal of high active Co-60 and Cs-137 sources from irradiation facilities at research institutes are described. By end of 2012 removal and safe interim storage of 12.000 disused radioactive sealed sources with a total activity of more than 5,7.10{sup 14} Bq was achieved within the frame of this program. The German support program will be continued up to the end of 2013 with the aim to remove and safely store almost all disused radioactive sealed sources in Ukraine. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2012

Uncertainty evaluation for the matrix 'solidified state' of fissionable elements

In case of the analysis of the radioactive liquid samples, no matter the relative physical analysis method used, two impediments act that belong to the behavior in time of the dispersion state of the liquid samples to be analyzed and of the standard used in the analysis. That is, one of them refers to the state of the sample to be analyzed when being sampled, which 'alter' during the time elapsed from sampling up to the analysis of the sample. The other impediment is the natural change of the dispersion state of the standard radioactive solutions, due to the occurrence and evolution in time of the radiocolloidal and pseudo-radiocolloidal states. These radiocolloidal states are states of aggregation and they lead to the destruction of the homogeneity of the solutions. Taking into consideration the advantages offered by the relative physical methods of analysis as against the chemical or the radiochemical ones, different ways of eliminating these impediments have been tried. We eliminated these impediments processing the liquid reference materials (the solutions calibrated in radionuclides of interest), immediately after the preparation. This processing changes the liquid physical state of the reference materials in a 'solidified state'. Through this procedure the dispersion states of the samples, practically, can no longer be essentially modified in time and also ensure the uniform distribution of the radionuclides of interest in the elemental matrix of the samples 'state solidified'. The homogeneity of the distribution of the atoms of the radionuclides from the samples 'solidified state' was checked up through the track micromapping technique of the alpha particles. Through this technique, in the chemically etched track detectors that were put in direct contact with the sample for a determined period of time, the alpha exposure time of the detectors, micromaps of alpha tracks were obtained. These micromaps are retorts through tracks of the distributions atoms of fissionable elements (Thorium e.g.), of which, heavy charged particles, in this case the alpha radiations naturally emitted, were registered in the CR-39 track detectors. The density of alpha track from the obtained track micromaps was studied through common optic microscopy. Micromaps were studied counting the tracks on equal areas, in different measurement points. For the study of the foils prepared within the paper, the studied area was of 4.9 mm2, formed of 10 fields of 0.49 mm2 area each. The estimation of the uncertainty was carried out for all the sizes that were measured within the paper, no matter if they participate, directly or indirectly, in the estimation of the uncertainty regarding the homogeneity of the Thorium atoms distribution in the 'solidified state' foils of the standard solution calibrated in Thorium, such as: i) the weighted masses, ii) the dropped volumes of solution, iii) the alpha duration of exposure of the detectors, iv) the area studied on the surface of the micromap and v) the densities of alpha tracks. The procedure suggested allowed us to considerate that the homogeneity of alpha tracks distribution, on the surface and in thickness, is within the limits of 3.1%.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2012

Investigation of radiation keeping property of barite coated cloth via image processing method

Preservative clothes which are able to absorb radiation beam are needed not only for saving people working at radioactive environment but also for saving others from natural and man-made radiation sources we are exposed in daily life. Barite is a mineral which can be used for armour plating because of high atomic numbered element barium constituent of barite. In this study, armour plating property of barite was applied to fabrics. Barite coated fabric having characteristic of keeping radiation was obtained by penetrating barite on cloth via coating method. Radiation keeping property of fabrics obtained was determined via image processing. The results of experiments showed that barite coated fabrics have blocked radiation more than normal fabrics have done.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2016

Final Report on Two-Stage Fast Spectrum Fuel Cycle Options

This report presents the performance characteristics of two “two-stage” fast spectrum fuel cycle options proposed to enhance uranium resource utilization and to reduce nuclear waste generation. One is a two-stage fast spectrum fuel cycle option of continuous recycle of plutonium (Pu) in a fast reactor (FR) and subsequent burning of minor actinides (MAs) in an accelerator-driven system (ADS). The first stage is a sodium-cooled FR fuel cycle starting with low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel; at the equilibrium cycle, the FR is operated using the recovered Pu and natural uranium without supporting LEU. Pu and uranium (U) are co-extracted from the discharged fuel and recycled in the first stage, and the recovered MAs are sent to the second stage. The second stage is a sodium-cooled ADS in which MAs are burned in an inert matrix fuel form. The discharged fuel of ADS is reprocessed, and all the recovered heavy metals (HMs) are recycled into the ADS. The other is a two-stage FR/ADS fuel cycle option with MA targets loaded in the FR. The recovered MAs are not directly sent to ADS, but partially incinerated in the FR in order to reduce the amount of MAs to be sent to the ADS. This is a heterogeneous recycling option of transuranic (TRU) elements

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2012

The behaviour of transuranic mixed oxide fuel in a Candu-900 reactor

The production of transuranic actinide fuels for use in current thermal reactors provides a useful intermediary step in closing the nuclear fuel cycle. Extraction of actinides reduces the longevity, radiation and heat loads of spent material. The burning of transuranic fuels in current reactors for a limited amount of cycles reduces the infrastructure demand for fast reactors and provides an effective synergy that can result in a reduction of as much as 95% of spent fuel waste while reducing the fast reactor infrastructure needed by a factor of almost 13.5 [1]. This paper examines the features of actinide mixed oxide fuel, TRUMOX, in a CANDU{sup R}* nuclear reactor. The actinide concentrations used were based on extraction from 30 year cooled spent fuel and mixed with natural uranium in 3.1 wt% actinide MOX fuel. Full lattice cell modeling was performed using the WIMS-AECL code, super-cell calculations were analyzed in DRAGON and full core analysis was executed in the RFSP 2-group diffusion code. A time-average full core model was produced and analyzed for reactor coefficients, reactivity device worth and online fuelling impacts. The standard CANDU operational limits were maintained throughout operations. The TRUMOX fuel design achieved a burnup of 27.36 MWd/kg HE. A full TRUMOX fuelled CANDU was shown to operate within acceptable limits and provided a viable intermediary step for burning actinides. The recycling, reprocessing and reuse of spent fuels produces a much more sustainable and efficient nuclear fuel cycle. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Assessment of defense-related uranium mines in the United States and other US DOE office of legacy management domestic and international uranium initiatives - 15335

US DOE's Office of Legacy Management (LM) has taken several initiatives to improve domestic uranium mining and milling operations in the United States and to contribute to the management of legacy uranium mining and milling sites around the world. Initiatives include completing the 2014 Report to Congress on Defense-Related Uranium Mines, managing the Title X Uranium and Thorium Program with the Office of Environmental Management, and assisting IAEA with uranium issues in member state countries. The 2014 Report to Congress identified abandoned uranium mines (AUMs) in the United States that provided uranium ore to the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) between 1947 and 1970. The report identified AUM locations, reclamation/remediation status, radiological risks and other hazards, costs for reclamation and remediation, and potential prioritization schemes for mine cleanup. To develop reclamation and remediation cleanup cost estimates and assess risks, AUMs were grouped into six categories by tons of uranium ore produced, ranging from Small (less than 91 metric tons [100 tons]) to Very Large (greater than 453,900 metric tons [500,000 tons]). Radiological risk was calculated using the RESRAD computer code for five exposure scenarios: offsite resident, onsite resident, occasional visitor, recreational visitor, and mine reclamation worker. Results indicate that 69 percent of the AUMs are in Colorado and Utah and 23 percent are in Arizona, Wyoming, and New Mexico; and that the majority of the AUMs (68 percent) were considered Small or Small/Medium production mines, producing less than 908 metric tons (1,000 tons) of uranium ore. Although New Mexico has fewer AUMs (247) than the other states in the Colorado Plateau region, AUMs in that state (primarily those in the Grants Mineral Belt) produced 45 percent of the 79.5 million tons of AEC-purchased uranium ore. About 50 percent of the AUMs are on public land managed by the US Bureau of Land Management; 435 AUMs are on the Navajo Nation. Risk estimates for the onsite resident scenario (plausible on tribal and non-federal land) could result in an incremental cancer risk greater than 10{sup -4}. Radon inhalation was the dominant contributor to radiological risk for the five exposure scenarios evaluated. Different state and federal agencies are conducting cleanup of some AUMs under various remedial and legal authorities. Activities constituting mine 'reclamation' may reduce radiological risks to humans to acceptable levels for many mines on federal public lands if the occasional visitor and recreational visitor exposure scenarios are assumed. Addressing physical hazards (e.g., open shafts) at mines where conditions could cause serious injuries is typically a priority of public land management agencies. At locations where mine-related groundwater contamination occurs, it is a significant contributor to cleanup costs. However, most Small and Small/Medium AUMs were likely developed above the water table, and some wet mines are located in areas where groundwater has high, naturally occurring levels of the same constituents (including radioactive elements) that are typically associated with uranium mines. LM is also administering, with the US DOE Office of Environmental Management, the Title X program, which was developed by Congress to reimburse private companies (i.e., those that held active operating licenses prior to 1978) for a portion of their reclamation costs for mill sites that processed ore sold to AEC. LM recently updated the program guidance document and established internal protocols for annually auditing companies. LM is assisting IAEA on two different initiatives: assisting developing countries with training on the basic steps to take to perform reclamation of uranium mines, and developing technical guidance and case studies related to safety and environmental assessments and post-closure management of uranium legacy sites as part of the IAEA Regulatory Supervision of Legacy Sites initiative. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: October 1, 2013, through December 31, 2014

On April 24, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, now the Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted the Project 57 safety experiment in western Emigrant Valley north east of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site) on lands withdrawn by the Department of Defense (DoD) for the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). The test was undertaken to develop (1) a means of estimating plutonium distribution resulting from a nonnuclear detonation; (2) biomedical evaluation techniques for use in plutonium-laden environments; (3) methods of surface decontamination; and (4) instruments and field procedures for prompt estimation of alpha contamination (Shreve, 1958). Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the land surface. Following the experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DoD. Various radiological surveys have been performed in the area and in 2007, the DOE expanded the demarked contamination area by posting signs 200 to 400 feet (60 to 120 meters) outside of the original fence. Plutonium in soil is thought to attach preferentially to smaller particles. Therefore, redistribution of soil particulates by wind (dust) is the mechanism most likely to transport plutonium beyond the boundary of the Project 57 contamination area. In 2011, DRI installed two instrumentation towers to measure radiological, meteorological, and dust conditions. The monitoring activity was implemented to determine if radionuclide contamination was detectable in samples of airborne dust and characterize meteorological and environmental parameters that influence dust transport. Collected data also permits comparison of radiological conditions at the Project 57 monitoring stations to conditions observed at Community Environmental Monitoring Program (CEMP) stations around the NTTR. Biweekly samples of airborne particulates are submitted for laboratory assessment of gross alpha and gross beta radioactivity and for determination of gamma-emitting radionuclides. Annual average gross alpha values at the Project 57 monitoring stations are in the same range as the highest two values reported for the CEMP stations surrounding the NTTR. Annual average gross beta values at the Project 57 monitoring stations are slightly higher than the lowest value reported for the CEMP stations surrounding the NTTR. Gamma spectroscopy analyses on samples collected from the Project 57 stations identified only naturally occurring radionuclides. No manmade radionuclides were detected. Thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) indicated that the average annual radioactivity dose at the monitoring stations is higher than the dose determined at surrounding CEMP stations but approximately half of the estimated national average dose received by the general public as a result of exposure to natural sources. The TLDs at the Project 57 monitoring stations are exposed to both natural sources (terrestrial and cosmic) and radioactive releases from the Project 57 contamination area. These comparisons show that the gross alpha, gross beta, and gamma spectroscopy levels at the Project 57 monitoring stations are similar to levels observed at the CEMP stations but that the average annual dose rate is higher than at the CEMP stations. Winds in excess of approximately 15 mph begin to generate dust movement by saltation (migration of sand at the ground surface) or direct suspension in the air. Saltated sand, PM10 (inhalable) dust, and PM2.5 (fine particulate dust) exhibit an approximately exponential increase with increasing wind speed. The greatest concentrations of dust occur for winds exceeding 20 mph. During the reporting period, winds in excess of 20 mph occurred approximately 1.6 percent of the time. Preliminary assessment of individual wind events suggests that dust generation is highly variable likely because of the influence of other meteorological and environmental parameters. Although winds sufficient to generate significant amounts of dust occur at the Project 57 site, they are infrequent and of short duration. Additionally, the potential for wind transport of dust is dependent on other parameters whose influence have not yet been assessed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

New Beginnings: Optimising Waste and End-state at UK Nuclear Sites to Enable Environmental Permit surrender (the GRR) - 20193

The decommissioning of nuclear sites involves the management of large volumes of radioactive waste, other conventional waste, and the clean-up of land and groundwater contamination. In the UK, the disposal of radioactive waste from nuclear sites is regulated by the Environment Agency (England), Natural Resources Wales (Wales) and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (Scotland). All three environment agencies seek to make sure that the generation and disposal of radioactive waste is optimised: ensuring impacts to people are 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA). With a large proportion of UK nuclear sites embarking on decommissioning, the environment agencies have collaboratively developed new guidance: the 'Management of radioactive waste from the decommissioning of nuclear sites: Guidance on the Requirements for Release from radioactive substances regulation' (referred to as the GRR)[1]. The environment agencies worked in liaison with the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), the UK nuclear safety regulator, and the UK government body responsible, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). Prior to finalising the guidance, a 12 month trial was completed at three of the NDA's nuclear sites, enabling the environment agencies to test their draft GRR guidance against 'real world scenarios' and the challenge of incorporating its requirements into decommissioning plans. Experience gained during the trial was incorporated into the current version of the GRR, published in July 2018. The GRR represents the 'new beginning' of this paper's title because for the first time, the UK environmental regulators have expressed in detail their requirements for surrender of environmental permits for nuclear sites. The GRR provides a framework for a UK nuclear site to plan, assess and justify its management of radioactive waste and deliver through decommissioning, an optimal, environmentally safe and sustainable end-state. This paper will describe the requirements and technical standards within the GRR, the establishment of defensible clean-up criteria and the production of a Waste Management Plan (WMP), supported by a Site-Wide Environmental Safety Case (SWESC). It will describe the experience gleaned by operators and regulators during the trial and it will highlight current work by regulators to implement the new approach proportionately. Finally, this paper will look forward and outline planned amendments to legislation in the UK affecting nuclear sites that should enable the full benefits of the GRR to be realised in the future. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Radioisotope identification method for poorly resolved gamma-ray spectrum of nuclear security concern

Gamma-ray signal can be used as a fingerprint for radioisotope identification. In the context of radioactive and nuclear materials security at the border control point, the detection task can present a significant challenge due to various constraints such as the limited measurement time, the shielding conditions, and the noise interference. This study proposes a novel method to identify the signal of one or several radioisotopes from a poorly resolved gamma-ray spectrum. In this method, the noise component in the raw spectrum is reduced by the wavelet decomposition approach, and the removal of the continuum background is performed using the baseline determination algorithm. Finally, the identification of radioisotope is completed using the matrix linear regression method. The proposed method has been verified by experiments using the poorly resolved gamma-ray signals from various scenarios including single source, mixing of natural uranium with five of the most common industrial radioactive sources (57Co, 60Co, 133Ba, 137Cs, and 241Am). The preliminary results show that the proposed algorithm is comparable with the commercial method.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗
DOE OSTI2013

Influence of surface potential on the adhesive force of radioactive gold surfaces

Radioactive particles may acquire surface potential through self-charging, and thus can behave differently from natural aerosols in atmospheric systems with respect to aggregation, deposition, resuspension, and transport to areas surrounding a radioactive source. Here, this work focuses on the adhesive force between radioactive particles and metallic surfaces, which relates to the deposition and resuspension of particles on surrounding surfaces. Scanning surface potential microscopy was employed to measure the surface potential of radioactive gold foil. Atomic force microscopy was used to investigate the adhesive force for gold that acquired surface charge either by irradiation or by application of an equivalent electrical bias. Overall, the adhesive force increases with increasing surface potential or relative humidity. However, a behavior that does not follow the general trend was observed for the irradiated gold at a high decay rate. A comparison between experimental measurements and calculated values revealed that the surface potential promotes adhesion. The contribution of the electrostatic force at high levels of relative humidity was lower than the one found using theoretical calculations due to the effects caused by enhanced adsorption rate of water molecules under a high surface charge density. Lastly, the results of this study can be used to provide a better understanding of the behavior of radioactive particles in atmospheric systems.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2016

Preferred Concepts for Disposal of the UK Inventory of Depleted, Natural and Low Enriched Uranium - 16382

Depleted, natural and low enriched uranium (DNLEU) forms a significant quantity of the UK inventory of higher activity radioactive materials. The great majority comprises uranic materials produced from uranium enrichment operations and from reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels. The most recent estimate of the total quantity (stocks plus arisings) of UK-owned DNLEU from civil nuclear operations is 170,000 tU. Current UK Government strategy is for DNLEU to be stored indefinitely in existing or new facilities, as required. However, Government strategy for long-term management of uranic materials is under review and a change could potentially cause this material to be reclassified as a waste. An Integrated Project Team (IPT) was formed in 2012 with the objective of identifying and addressing the issues associated with the potential need to dispose of DNLEU, in order to inform wider decision-making on the long-term management of UK DNLEU. Key technical issues considered by the IPT relate to the following: 1. The need for an improved understanding of the UK DNLEU inventory. 2. The identification of preferred chemical and physical form(s), and preferred packaging and disposal concepts for DNLEU - the main subject of this paper. 3. The approach to safety assessment of DNLEU disposal. This paper summarises the disposal concepts under consideration by the IPT, and the rationale for identification of preferred concepts for disposal of DNLEU inventory components. The conclusions will be of interest to other programmes and countries with a requirement to manage large quantities of similar materials. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Oil and Natural Gas Development near and beneath Uranium Tailings Cells and Other Remediated Sites - 20358

DOE LM is responsible for maintaining remedies at more than 50 remediated sites that require active long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS and M). Institutional controls (ICs) were established to limit human and environmental exposures to residual contamination by controlling land use, restricting access to potential hazards, and making the public aware of potential dangers from the residual contamination. ICs for each site were developed based on current and foreseeable conditions; however, these controls should evolve to mitigate potential human health and other environmental risks from unanticipated changes in activities or site conditions. Activities conducted beyond the DOE long-term care boundaries by non-DOE parties may impact the effectiveness of ICs or even the long-term stability of disposal cells and groundwater remedies. Several sites that LM manages or that will transfer to LM for LTS and M are in active oil and gas production basins. The sites are associated with uranium ore milling or nuclear test sites and have been remediated or are in the process of remediation and have no ongoing DOE mission. Particularly since 2005, hydraulic fracturing ('fracking') combined with directional drilling has dramatically increased oil and natural gas (oil/gas) production in the United States, now making it the number one hydrocarbon-producing country. Fracking has allowed production from shale and other rocks of low natural permeability that were historically not considered viable oil/gas resources. Also, because wellbores can now be drilled as many as 5 kilometers or more horizontally, hydrocarbons can be recovered from zones without having access to the surface above them. Drilling activity near Rulison, Colorado, the location of an underground nuclear detonation managed by LM, has raised public concerns that remnant radioactivity in the detonation zone could migrate to producing wells and enter the natural gas distribution system. At sites like the Falls City, Texas, Disposal site, transitioned to LM with a split estate, increased production in the region has resulted in wellbores beneath the long-term care boundary of the site. While the DOE license for Falls City was approved by the NRC in 1997 without the acquisition of the subsurface rights, NRC has raised concerns on whether this activity impacts the integrity of the cell and/or groundwater remedies. In Wyoming, LM is anticipating receiving the license for the Bear Creek site and manages the Spook site, both locations of uranium mill tailings disposal cells. These Wyoming sites are in an active region of major oil and gas development. This change in surrounding land use will require LM to work collaboratively with NRC to address these concerns. At several DOE sites radioactive waste, and often intermixed nonradioactive constituents, is permanently isolated in engineered disposal cells. At other sites, residual contamination can be present in groundwater, blast cavities, and infinite amounts within soil. Areas targeted for oil and gas development at the Texas and Wyoming sites range from depths of 2440 to 3350 meters (8000-11000 feet) below ground surface. When most site remedies were designed, oil and gas development was not considered to be an issue within the site boundary. With the more recent uses of directional drilling, fracking, and associated wastewater injections, the evaluative criteria for incoming sites and ICs for managing long-term protectiveness and regulatory compliance are changing. Although DOE surface ownership was previously thought to be a robust IC to prevent surface and subsurface development, particularly at disposal sites, that may no longer be the case. Whereas the subsurface development at Texas and Wyoming sites is currently occurring at thousands of meters beneath the surface, shallower and direct onsite development would be more of a concern for LM. The energy introduced when a well is hydraulically fractured causes microseismic events (magnitude -2 to 1.0) as the fractures propagate but does not directly cause seismic events (earthquakes) of sufficient magnitude to damage surface structures. Additionally, the extent of the hydraulic fractures is limited to the targeted depths, which are far below the surface. However, earthquakes of sufficient magnitude to damage surface structures have been attributed to the injection of wastewater into disposal wells. States that have experienced these effects have enacted regulations that limit the rate and pressures that wastewater can be injected into disposal wells. Items LM may consider are the need for monitoring the volume of water injected into nearby disposal wells and possibly installing seismic stations at sites most susceptible to damage. While the need to demonstrate that no impact from oil and gas extraction activities on a site groundwater remedy or disposal cells will vary from site to site, LM is assessing risk criteria for this activity. Though LM has not experienced an issue yet at a uranium tailings disposal site, it cannot assume that there will be none, and must address NRC concerns. LM is building on past experiences at other sites and beginning to form new processes with the hope that these concepts can be applied for other future sites. (authors)

04 OIL SHALES AND TAR SANDS↗
DOE OSTI2013

An Information Building on Radioactivity and Nuclear Energy for the French CEA Cadarache Research Center - 13492

The CEA Cadarache research center is one of the 10 research centers of the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA). Distributed throughout various research platforms, it focuses on nuclear fission, nuclear fusion, new energy technologies (hydrogen, solar, biomass) and fundamental research in the field of vegetal biology. It is the most important technological research and development centers for energy in Europe. Considering the sensitive nature of nuclear activities, the questions surrounding the issue of radioactive waste, the nuclear energy and the social, economic and environmental concerns for present and future generations, the French Government asked nuclear actors to open communication and to give all the information asked by the Local Information Commission (CLI) and the public [1]. In this context, the CEA Cadarache has decided to better show and explain its expertise and experience in the area of nuclear energy and nuclear power plant design, and to make it available to stakeholders and to the public. CEA Cadarache receives each year more than 9000 visitors. To complete technical visits of the research facilities and laboratories, a scientific cultural center has been built in 2011 to inform the public on CEA Cadarache research activities and to facilitate the acceptance of nuclear energy in a way suited to the level of knowledge of the visitors. A modern interactive exhibition of 150 m{sup 2} allows visitors to find out more about energy, CEA Cadarache research programs, radioactive waste management and radiological impact on the research center activities. It also offers an auditorium for group discussions and for school groups to discover science through enjoyment. This communication center has received several thousand visitors since its opening on October 2011; the initial results of this experience are now available. It's possible to explain the design of this exhibition, to give some statistics on the number of the visitors, their characteristics and their perception after their center visits. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

New developments and prospects on COSI, the simulation software for fuel cycle analysis

COSI, software developed by the Nuclear Energy Direction of the CEA, is a code simulating a pool of nuclear power plants with its associated fuel cycle facilities. This code has been designed to study various short, medium and long term options for the introduction of various types of nuclear reactors and for the use of associated nuclear materials. In the frame of the French Act for waste management, scenario studies are carried out with COSI, to compare different options of evolution of the French reactor fleet and options of partitioning and transmutation of plutonium and minor actinides. Those studies aim in particular at evaluating the sustainability of Sodium cooled Fast Reactors (SFR) deployment and the possibility to transmute minor actinides. The COSI6 version is a completely renewed software released in 2006. COSI6 is now coupled with the last version of CESAR (CESAR5.3 based on JEFF3.1.1 nuclear data) allowing the calculations on irradiated fuel with 200 fission products and 100 heavy nuclides. A new release is planned in 2013, including in particular the coupling with a recommended database of reactors. An exercise of validation of COSI6, carried out on the French PWR historic nuclear fleet, has been performed. During this exercise quantities like cumulative natural uranium consumption, or cumulative depleted uranium, or UOX/MOX spent fuel storage, or stocks of reprocessed uranium, or plutonium content in fresh MOX fuel, or the annual production of high level waste, have been computed by COSI6 and compared to industrial data. The results have allowed us to validate the essential phases of the fuel cycle computation, and reinforces the credibility of the results provided by the code.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2014

Radioactively powered emission from black hole-neutron star mergers

Detection of the electromagnetic counterparts of gravitational wave (GW) sources is important to unveil the nature of compact binary coalescences. We perform three-dimensional, time-dependent, multi-frequency radiative transfer simulations for radioactively powered emission from the ejecta of black hole (BH)-neutron star (NS) mergers. Depending on the BH to NS mass ratio, spin of the BH, and equations of state of dense matter, BH-NS mergers can eject more material than NS-NS mergers. In such cases, radioactively powered emission from the BH-NS merger ejecta can be more luminous than that from NS-NS mergers. We show that, in spite of the expected larger distances to BH-NS merger events, the observed brightness of BH-NS mergers can be comparable to or even higher than that of NS-NS mergers. We find that, when the tidally disrupted BH-NS merger ejecta are confined to a small solid angle, the emission from BH-NS merger ejecta tends to be bluer than that from NS-NS merger ejecta for a given total luminosity. Thanks to this property, we might be able to distinguish BH-NS merger events from NS-NS merger events by multi-band observations of the radioactively powered emission. In addition to the GW observations, such electromagnetic observations can potentially provide independent information on the progenitors of GW sources and the nature of compact binary coalescences.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Formerly Used Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) W. R. Grace Building 23 Remedial Action-Challenges and Successes - 12247

Monazite sand processing was conducted at the W. R. Grace Curtis Bay Facility (Baltimore, Maryland) from mid-May 1956 through the spring of 1957 under license to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), for the extraction of source material in the form of thorium, as well as rare earth elements. The processing was conducted in the southwest quadrant of a ca. 100 year old, five-story, building (Building 23) in the active manufacturing portion of the facility. Building components and equipment in the southwest quadrant of Building 23 exhibited residual radiological activity remaining from the monazite sand processing. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) conducted a remedial investigation (RI) and feasibility study (FS) and prepared a Record of Decision (ROD) to address residual radioactivity on building components and equipment in the southwest quadrant of Building 23. The remedy selected for the southwest quadrant of Building 23, which was documented in the ROD (dated May 2005), was identified as 'Alternative 2: Decontamination With Removal to Industrial Use Levels'. The selected remedy provided for either decontaminating or removing areas of radioactivity to meet the RGs. Demonstration of compliance with the selected ARAR was performed using the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) and other appropriate guidance, as well as appropriate dose modeling codes where necessary. USACE-Baltimore District along with its private industry partner worked together under the terms of a 2008 Settlement Agreement to implement the remedial action (RA) for the southwest quadrant of Building 23. The RA was conducted in two phases: Phase 1 was completed to improve the building condition for support of subsequent remedial action and decrease scope uncertainty of the remedial action, and Phase 2 included decontamination and removal activities to meet the RGs and demonstration of compliance with the selected ARAR. Challenges encountered during the RA include: coordination with stakeholders, coordination between multiple RA contractors, addressing unique structural challenges for Building 23, nonradiological hazards associated with the RA, weather issues, and complex final status survey (FSS) coordination. The challenges during the Phase 1 RA were handled successfully. The challenges for the Phase 2 RA, which is anticipated to be complete by late-summer of 2012, have been handled successfully so far. By fall of 2012, USACE is expecting to finalize a robust RA Closure Report, including the Final Status Survey Report, which summarizes the RA activities and documents compliance with the ROD. During the ongoing RA at Building 23, there have been and still are many challenges both technically and from a project management perspective, due in part to the nature and extent of impact at the site (residual radioactivity within an active processing building), dual oversight by the property owner and USACE, and site-specific challenges associated with a complex RA and multiple contractors. Currently, USACE and its industry partner are overseeing the completion of RA field activities. RA closure documentation for the remediation of Building 23 to address residual contamination in building materials will be reviewed/approved by USACE and its industry partner upon completion of the field activities. USACE and its industry partner are working well together, through the Settlement Agreement, to conduct a cost-efficient and effective remedial action to address the legacy issues at Building 23. This cooperative effort has set a firm foundation for achieving a successful RA at the RWDA using a 'forward think' approach, and it is a case study for other sites where an industry partner is involved. The collaborative effort led to implementation of an RA which is acceptable to the site owner, the regulators, and the public, thus allowing USACE to move this project forward successfully in the FUSRAP program. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗